



5 MAR 1952

R. Communism

L. G. Lubstein

all laws
by authority

DISPOSED OF
BY AUTHORITY

VS

BR



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2022 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation

STALIN'S SATELLITES IN EUROPE



STALIN'S SATELLITES
IN EUROPE

by

YGAEL GLUCKSTEIN

London

GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD
RUSKIN HOUSE MUSEUM STREET

FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1952

*This book is copyright under the Berne Convention
Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of
private study, research, criticism or review, as per-
mitted under the Copyright Act 1911, no portion
may be reproduced by any process without written
permission. Enquiry should be made to the
publishers*

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY WILLMER BROTHERS AND CO. LTD.
BIRKENHEAD

PREFACE

IN THE COURSE of the Second World War the Soviet Armies entered a number of countries in Europe and stayed in them some months or years. These are Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria. A study of the conditions of the hundred million people inhabiting this region is of great interest in itself; it gains even more from the fact that such a study throws light, from a new vantage point, on the Russian reality. Napoleon said: 'Une armée dehors, c'est l'État qui voyage', and the study of the influence of the Soviet 'armée dehors' teaches us about the essence of the Soviet State itself. The fact that there are more chinks in the 'Iron Curtain' between the Russian satellites and the rest of the world than between the older and better preserved curtain shutting out Russia, facilitates the study of the nature of Stalin's regime through the prism of conditions in the satellite countries. These conditions must be comprehended in the dynamics of their change, the dynamics of the rise and consolidation of the rule of the Communist Parties.

Although the same Party rules in the Soviet Zone of Germany, I have not thought it advisable to cover this area in the present study, as it is impossible to survey this Zone without covering Germany as a whole, which is in itself a wide and complicated question. Another Communist-dominated State I have omitted is Albania, the reason being the scarcity and poverty of information regarding this tiny country.

A study of current history is always fraught with the risk that the absence of distance tends to endanger accuracy of knowledge and scientific detachment; the risk exists that a more unified impression is given than knowledge of the subject warrants, and that conclusions are coloured by personal values. The only counter to this is scientific scrupulousness. While the difficulties in the way of the study of current history must be borne in mind, the study itself is not to be avoided, as it is part of history itself, and the effort to understand and

criticize historical phenomena is, however imperfect, an agent of its very transformation.

In the preparation of the book I have used mainly official sources—the Governmental and Communist Party publications of the Eastern European countries—and in this regard the diplomatic representatives and information services of these countries have been of great assistance to me.

I am greatly obliged to the librarians of the British Museum and Chatham House for their ready assistance. I owe a big debt to a number of exiles from Eastern Europe, who gave me books, pamphlets and papers on the subject, many of them otherwise unobtainable, and who read and advised me on the whole or part of the typescript, particularly Mr. A. Ciolkosz, Mr. L. Slutsky and Mr. S. Vaslev. I wish to make it clear that while they have assisted me very much with their advice and criticism they are in no way responsible for any error of judgment or fact which may be found in the book. I also wish to thank Dr. O. Sheehy-Skeffington of Trinity College, Dublin, for thoroughly revising the style of the book, and my wife for preparing the manuscript for print and arranging the Index.

London
February, 1951

YGAEL GLUCKSTEIN

CONTENTS

PART I

THE ECONOMY OF THE RUSSIAN SATELLITES

CHAPTER	PAGE
I CHANGES IN PROPERTY: THE LAND REFORM	13
<i>Bulgaria</i>	
<i>Yugoslavia</i>	
<i>Rumania</i>	
<i>Czechoslovakia</i>	
<i>Poland</i>	
<i>Hungary</i>	
II CHANGES IN PROPERTY RELATIONS IN INDUSTRY, TRANSPORT, BANKING INSURANCE AND TRADE	23
<i>State Ownership Before World War II</i>	
<i>Foreign Capital Before World War II</i>	
<i>The Influence of the German Occupation on Property Relations</i>	
<i>The Effect of the Military Victory of Russia: Russian-owned enterprises—Rumania; Hungary; Bulgaria; Yugoslavia; No Rent Paid for Natural Resources</i>	
<i>Nationalisation in the Russian Satellite States—Poland; Czechoslovakia; Yugoslavia; Hungary and Rumania; Bulgaria</i>	
III SCARCITY OF CAPITAL	44
<i>Problems of Agricultural Development</i>	
<i>Problems of Industrial Development</i>	
IV RUSSIA AND THE ECONOMY OF THE SATELLITE STATES	53
<i>Lack of Capital in U.S.S.R.</i>	
<i>Dismantling, Looting, Requisitioning—Reparations from Rumania; Reparations from Hungary</i>	
<i>Trade Between Russia and her Satellites</i>	
<i>The 'Advantage' of being a Colony of an Industrially Backward Imperialist Power</i>	
V THE ECONOMIC PLANS OF THE SATELLITES	71

CHAPTER

PAGE

VI THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN THE SATELLITES

78

State Ownership and Public Ownership
Arab Feudalism—An Example of Class Society Based on State Ownership
The Abolition of all Elements of Democracy in the Factory
Piece-work
The Increasing Limitation of the Workers' Legal Freedom
Slave Labour
The Distribution of the Social Product
The Workers' Resistance
The Expropriation of the Peasantry
The Example of 'Collectivisation' in Russia
The Satellites Follow in the Footsteps of Russia
Peasant Resistance
The Primitive Accumulation of Capital

PART II

POLITICAL LIFE IN THE RUSSIAN SATELLITES

I THE INITIAL SOVIET INTERVENTION:
BULGARIA, RUMANIA, HUNGARY

131

Pre-war Political Regime in Eastern Europe
Bulgaria
Rumania
Hungary

II POLAND: THE WARSAW UPRISING

143

III YUGOSLAVIA: THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE

151

IV THE COMMUNISTS TAKE CONTROL OF
POLICE AND ARMY

157

V LIQUIDATION OF THE PEASANT PARTIES

160

VI LIQUIDATION OF THE SOCIALIST
PARTIES

173

VII SLAV AGAINST TEUTON

183

Number of Germans Expelled
The Sudeten Germans
Hysterical Chauvinism
Atrocities committed against the Sudeten Germans

CHAPTER

PAGE

VIII	OTHER NATIONALISTIC CONFLICTS	201
	<i>The Hungarians in Czechoslovakia</i>	
	<i>Conflicts Between Rumanians and Hungarians</i>	
	<i>Poles and Czechs in Teschen</i>	
	<i>In Conclusion</i>	
IX	GLEICHSCHALTUNG OF THE CHURCHES	206
	<i>Religion and Democracy</i>	
	<i>Religion in U.S.S.R.</i>	
	<i>Religious Denominations in Eastern Europe</i>	
	<i>The Communists' Attitude to the Orthodox Church</i>	
	<i>The Communists' Attitude to the non-Orthodox Churches</i>	
	<i>In Conclusion</i>	
X	'PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES' — DICTATORSHIP OVER THE PEOPLE	222
	<i>'Free Elections'</i>	
	<i>'Freedom of press, speech, assembly, meetings and demonstrations'</i>	
	<i>Democracy—The Only Way to Socialism</i>	

PART III

THE REBELLIOUS SATELLITE

I	THE COMINFORM COUNTRIES LAUNCH AN ATTACK ON YUGOSLAVIA	233
	<i>The Excommunication Resolution of the Cominform</i>	
	<i>The Short Memory of the Cominformites</i>	
	<i>Measures Taken Against Tito</i>	
II	ON THE MOTIVES OF THE TITO-STALIN CONFLICT	240
	<i>Tito Against the National Oppression of Yugoslavia</i>	
	<i>'Russia Wants to Keep Yugoslavia a Backward Colonial Country, a Source of Cheap Raw Materials'</i>	
	<i>'Capitalist Exploitation Among Socialist States'</i>	
	<i>The Conflict Between Tito and Stalin over Yugoslavia's Agricultural Policy</i>	
	<i>'The Yugoslav Communist Party is Dissolved in the People's Front'</i>	
	<i>The Problem of Balkan Federation</i>	
	<i>The Macedonian Question</i>	
III	THE TITOISTS EXPOSE STALINISM	258
	<i>Praise for Russia and Stalin</i>	
	<i>U.S.S.R's Foreign Policy is Hegemonic</i>	
	<i>Exposure of the 'Trials'</i>	
	<i>The Messianic Role of Russia</i>	
	<i>Exposure of Russia's Internal Regime</i>	

CHAPTER

PAGE

IV	TITOISM IS NOT A BASIC NEGATION OF STALINISM	273
	<i>Efforts to Overcome Some Traits of Stalinism in Yugoslavia</i>	
	<i>Squaring the Circle</i>	
V	THE EPIDEMIC OF TITOISM IN EASTERN EUROPE	281
	<i>Poland</i>	
	<i>Bulgaria</i>	
	<i>Hungary</i>	
	<i>Czechoslovakia</i>	
	<i>Rumania</i>	
	<i>Albania</i>	
	<i>'Free Greece'</i>	
VI	ANTI-TITOIST SHOW TRIALS	294
VII	'TITOISTS' BEFORE TITO	303
VIII	STALIN'S EMPIRE HAS NO FUTURE	311
	<i>An Empire with a Backward 'Mother' Country</i>	
	<i>The Inquisition is a Symptom of Decline</i>	
	<i>The Communist Parties and the Kremlin—Latent Antagonisms</i>	
	<i>The Leader Cult is a Symptom of Decline</i>	
INDEX		323

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Permission has been granted to quote from:

O. S. Morgan, Editor, *Agricultural Systems of Middle Europe*, MacMillan & Co., New York, 1933.

D. J. Dallin & B. I. Nicolaevsky, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia*, Yale University Press, New Haven, and Hollis & Carter, London, 1948.

R. P. Casey, *Religion in Russia*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1946.

PART ONE

THE ECONOMY OF
THE RUSSIAN SATELLITES



CHAPTER I

CHANGES IN PROPERTY: THE LAND REFORM



A DESCRIPTION of the economic condition of Stalin's satellites must begin with a consideration of the changes brought about in property relations after the overthrow of the rule of Hitler and his vassals in the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. As most of the population in these countries earn their living in agriculture* it is convenient to begin with an examination of the changes in land ownership.

There is a widely held belief that the feudal system, with the characteristic feature of the large latifundia, continued to prevail east of the Elbe until the arrival of the Soviet army. The prevalence of this idea is due partly to ignorance, but also to the propaganda spread since the war by the governments of this region, who try to paint as black a picture as possible of the property relations which previously prevailed there in order to magnify the importance of the land reforms they have carried out. This view is incorrect, since before World War II, and in some areas even before World War I, a series of land reforms had already to a large extent changed the system of land-holding in the countryside. On the other hand it would not be correct to minimise the extent of the land reforms carried out since the war.

To arrive at a balanced estimate of the extent of land reforms each country will have to be dealt with separately, even though for lack of space only a brief statement of the facts can be given. The countries will be dealt with in order, beginning with those in which the changes in the ownership of land after World

*Of the total population those engaged in agriculture, fishing and forestry made up: in Bulgaria (1934) 80 per cent; Yugoslavia (1931) 79 per cent; Rumania (1930) 78 per cent; Poland (1931) 65 per cent; Hungary (1930) 53 per cent; Czechoslovakia (1930) 38 per cent.

War II were the least, and ending with those in which the changes were the greatest. This order illustrates the course of historical development, since the countries in which the changes were very small after World War II were those in which the greatest changes had been wrought in the past, and those where big changes took place had known but few before.

Bulgaria

The national uprising of the Bulgarians in 1878 destroyed feudalism. The Turkish beys fled for their lives and left the Bulgarian serfs in full and free ownership of the land they tilled. The few feudal remnants that were not eliminated in 1878 were swept away by the Agrarian Union Government of Alexander Stamboliisky (1920-23). This government fixed a maximum of 30 hectares of land for any one household (i.e., an area smaller than that fixed as a maximum by the land reforms in any country except Bulgaria herself after World War II). The political instability of this government, ending in its overthrow by a military *coup d'état* and the murder of its leader as well as of tens of thousands of peasants and workers, resulted in the law of the maximum not being fully applied, so that a certain concentration of ownership took place after 1923. Nevertheless, Bulgaria remained a country with very few 'estates' of more than 30 hectares, a country of small peasant ownership par excellence:

LAND OWNERSHIP IN BULGARIA BEFORE THE 1944 REFORM
(IN PERCENTAGES)

	<i>Below 5 ha.*</i>	<i>5-10 ha.</i>	<i>10-30 ha.</i>	<i>30-50 ha.</i>	<i>50 ha. and over</i>
Number of Owners	63.1	26.2	10.3	0.3	0.1
Area	30.0	36.9	29.5	2.0	1.6

(L. Bojkoff, *Bulgaria is not the Land of Roses Only*, Sofia, 1946, p. 69.)

Wilbert E. Moore, in *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (League of Nations, Geneva, 1945), gives an even lower percentage for the big properties: in 1934 only 2.7 per cent of the land was in the hands of people owning more than 30 hectares each (p. 251).

There were very few tenants in Bulgaria. According to an official report of 31st December, 1926, the cultivated rented

*ha. = hectare = 2.4711 acres.

land comprised only 1 per cent of all privately owned land. (O. S. Morgan, editor, *Agricultural Systems of Middle Europe. A Symposium*, New York, 1933, p. 50). The number of agricultural workers was also negligible.

After World War II the Communist government fixed a new maximum of 20 ha. for all parts of the country except Dobrudja where the maximum fixed by Stamboliisky was in force. But although the government hoped to increase its influence among the peasants, the real results of this land reform were not considerable. In his Report to the Second Fatherland Front Congress (Feb. 2-3, 1948) Premier Georgi Dimitrov said that '127,000 families received 1,258,000 decares of land (1 decare = 1/10 hectare—Y.G.) in compliance with the agrarian reform, while 7,863 families were housed and given about 12,000 decares of land. 71,000 decares of land were distributed among 381 State farms, establishments and institutions'. (*Second Fatherland Front Congress*, Sofia, 1948, p. 42). Thus altogether 1,341,000 decares, or 134,100 hectares, were distributed. Since the total arable land in 1947 was 7.8 million hectares, the redistribution was relatively small. The land reform affected only about three per cent of the agricultural land.

The limited extent of the last land reform in Bulgaria is shown by the statistics of land ownership before and after it:

CULTIVATED LAND (IN PERCENTAGE)					
			1926	1934	1946
Small farms	28.62	28.90	30.70
Medium „	41.63	41.13	40.60
Large „	29.75	29.97	28.70

Professor Petko Spirkov, who cites this table, draws the obvious conclusion from it: '... during the period 1926-1946 there are practically no changes in the distribution of land'. ('Class Structure of our Village,' *Free Bulgaria*, Sofia, March 15, 1949).

Yugoslavia

Serbia achieved virtual national independence in 1830 and full sovereignty in 1877. Then the Turkish feudal lords fled from the country and as in Bulgaria the land remained the property of the former serfs, so that many years before World

War I, Old Serbia was a country of small peasants with very few tenants or agricultural workers. A similar situation was created in Montenegro and Dalmatia by their union with Serbia (1918). Only in Croatia and Slovenia, which were torn from the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Empire and added to Yugoslavia in 1918, did there remain big estates to be divided in the inter-war years. There, as a result of the agrarian reform law of 1919 and a number of subsidiary laws which followed, 1,805,000 hectares were distributed among 497,000 peasant families. (O.S. Morgan, *op. cit.* p. 361). This area made up about a quarter of the total area of Croatia and Slovenia, and about 12.5 per cent of the total agricultural area of Yugoslavia.

The agricultural area of Yugoslavia, prior to World War II, was distributed thus:

	<i>Up to 2 ha.</i>	<i>2-5 ha.</i>	<i>5-10 ha.</i>	<i>10-20 ha.</i>	<i>20-50 ha.</i>	<i>50 and over</i>
Area ..	6.5%	21.5%	27.0%	22.3%	13%	9.6%

A series of laws was passed by the Federated Republic of Yugoslavia in August 1945 by which the maximum land allowed to any individual was 45 hectares, of which either 30-35 hectares were to be arable and 10-15 hectares forest, or 45 hectares arable. All the German settlers and quislings were expropriated and the land owned by the banks, joint stock companies and the Church* taken over by the state.

The final result of the reform was not very great. About 850 thousand hectares changed hands, i.e., about 6 per cent. of the agricultural land of Yugoslavia (of which about half was the property of German peasants who were expelled although they had lived in Yugoslavia for hundreds of years).

Rumania

In the Old Kingdom of Rumania as well as in the territories added to it as a result of the first World War (Transylvania, taken from Hungary, and Bessarabia from Russia), a land reform on a very large scale was carried out after the first World War. Altogether 20,976 large estates with an area of 6,008,098 hectares were expropriated and handed over to 1,368,978 peasants. The agricultural area was distributed thus:

*except that each congregation was allowed to keep 10 hectares.

	BEFORE THE REFORM		AFTER THE REFORM	
	Less than 100 ha.	More than 100 ha.	Less than 100 ha.	More than 100 ha.
Ancient Kingdom	4,593,148	3,397,851	7,369,549	621,450
Bessarabia ..	2,337,811	1,844,539	3,829,731	352,619
Transylvania ..	4,689,855	2,751,457	6,363,664	1,087,648
Bucovina ..	405,000	115,000	480,967	39,033
Total	12,025,814	8,108,847	18,033,911	2,100,750
In % ..	59.77	40.23	89.56	10.44

(O.S. Morgan, *ibid.* p. 323).

In the provinces annexed to Rumania after the first World War, social and national differences were largely identical, since the landlords were Hungarians and most of the peasants Rumanians. The peasants belonging to the national minorities were not excluded from the land distribution carried out by the Rumanian governments, even though these governments were far from internationalist in outlook. In Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bucovina 206,165 peasant families belonging to national minorities received land in the redistribution side by side with 532,700 Rumanians.

After the first world war a considerable amount of land again changed hands: the poor peasants lost a lot of their land to the rich peasants. But even so landownership was much less concentrated than before 1918.

The second World War resulted in the loss of Bessarabia and Bucovina to Russia. Within the new boundaries of Rumania, estates of more than 100 hectares (calculated from the table given above) comprised an area of 1,709,098 hectares, or 11.07 per cent of all the land. Properties of more than 50 hectares, (about 1,970,300 hectares in all) comprised 17.5 per cent of all the agricultural land. (Rumania, Ministère de l'Information, *La Réforme Agraire en Roumanie*, 1946, p.16).

The land reform law of 22 March, 1945, fixed the maximum land holding allowed at 50 hectares. People owning more than 50 hectares had to give up all land over this amount. Church property, state property and the royal estates were excluded, but the last-named, an area of 132,112 hectares, was expropriated after the abdication of King Michael (December, 1947). All German owners (the German peasant colonies of Transylvania) were expropriated, as well as all 'traitors and war criminals'.

Up to September, 1947, land reform affected about 1.4 million hectares, and afterwards, with the distribution of the royal estates, etc., altogether 1.6 million hectares, i.e., about 10 per cent of the agricultural area of Rumania, or a third of the relative extent of the land reform after World War I.

Czechoslovakia

As a result of the Battle of the White Mountain (1620) the Czech nobility was almost completely wiped out and replaced by German Catholic landlords. Thus, when the Czechoslovak Republic was established, there were German landlords and Czech peasants in the Czech areas, and in the Sudetenland—the Border area—mainly German peasants and German landlords. In Slovakia (taken from the Hungarian part of the Hapsburg Empire) there were Magyar landlords and Slovak peasants, and, in the region bordering on Hungary, Hungarian peasants and Hungarian landlords. So that here, the land question and the national question were one, as in other parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire: Magyar landlords exploited Slovak, Rumanian, Croat and Ruthenian peasants; German landlords exploited Czech, Ruthenian, Slovene and Polish peasants.

In 1919 the Land Reform Act was passed. It provided for the dividing up of all large estates of more than 100 hectares. But this law was only partially and half-heartedly carried out. Yet, as a result of the land reform, 1.7 million hectares, or 12 per cent of the area of Czechoslovakia, were expropriated, and by 1 January, 1937, 1,272,934 hectares had been redistributed. At the same time in 1930, 13.8 per cent of the agricultural area still remained in properties of over 100 hectares. It was mainly Hungarian and German landlords who were expropriated, but the German and Hungarian peasants, tenants and agricultural workers not only were not excluded, but even benefited from the redistribution. As Miss L. E. Texter writes: 'The German farmer received land even from a Czech landowner'. (*Land Reform in Czechoslovakia*, London, 1923, quoted by E. Wiske-mann, *Czechs and Germans*, London, 1938, p. 152).

In 1945 (as a result of the decrees of 19.5.45, 21.6.45, 20.7.45 and 3.9.45) an area of 2.6 million hectares was taken from Germans, landlords and peasants alike. Practically no

land belonging to non-Germans was touched in Bohemia and Moravia. As a result of the agrarian reform in Slovakia, three hundred thousand hectares were expropriated, of which two-thirds belonged to Hungarians and Germans.

For two years the property of Czech and Slovak landowners was left untouched by the government. Land reform was identified with the national struggle of all the Slavs—Czechs and Slovaks alike—against all the Germans and Hungarians.

Later on it was necessary to reduce the maximum holding in order to pave the way for the total annihilation of the bourgeoisie in Czechoslovakia, and the integration of Czechoslovakia in the Russian Empire. On July 11, 1947, the maximum of 100 hectares fixed in 1919 was reduced to 50 hectares, and as a result another 919 thousand hectares were redistributed.

Thus until July, 1947, land redistribution was aimed at achieving an internal colonisation by the expropriation of 'foreign' proprietors, and the extent of the second wave of land redistribution was only about a quarter of the first.

Poland

After the First World War, Polish governments carried out, if somewhat timidly, certain land reforms. A maximum holding of 180 hectares of arable land was fixed with two exceptions—in suburbs the area allowed to a household was 60 hectares and in the Eastern districts it was 300 hectares. The landlords in the Eastern districts were treated gently because their peasants belonged to the national minorities—Ukrainians and White Russians. The administration was empowered to decide annually what estates should be divided. In fact, Polish landlords were able, by pulling strings, to escape the land reform, and in general only the estates of Russian landlords in Eastern Poland were redistributed. Altogether between 1919 and 1938, 2,654,000 hectares were divided up. (F. Zweig, *Poland between Two Wars*, London, 1944, p. 133).

In spite of this measure of land reform, a not inconsiderable proportion of land remained in the hands of big landowners. In 1931, about 4.6 million hectares, 18.0 per cent of all agricultural land, belonged to farms of more than 50 hectares. But as a single owner might own several farms, each of less than 50 hectares but totalling more than 50 hectares, the area

comprised by properties over 50 hectares after the land reform was even greater than 4.6 million hectares. The lack of statistics on the subject (resulting from the Polish government's attempt to gloss over the reactionary and half-hearted way in which the land distribution was carried out) makes it impossible to estimate more exactly what area was covered by properties of more than 50 hectares. It is, however, evident that the redistribution of land carried out between the two world wars affected 2.6 million hectares, and left about twice that area untouched.

The frontier alterations resulting from World War II fundamentally changed property relations. Eastern Poland, an area of big estates, was lost to Poland, and a new area was gained in the west which—after the expulsion of 8.5 million Germans—was only very sparsely populated.

By the decrees of 6 September, 1944, and 17 January, 1945, all Germans and traitors were expropriated, and 50 hectares of arable land was fixed as a maximum individual holding in Old Poland and 100 hectares in the 'Regained Territories'. The Church land was not affected. Polish landlords who had more than 50 hectares received very little compensation for the area they ceded—the equivalent of one year's yield of grain. According to the terms of these decrees, in Old Poland the area to be redistributed was more than 3 million hectares, of which agricultural land (excluding forests) made up 2,131,285 hectares. About 1,256,000 hectares of this belonged to Polish landlords, and 875,000 hectares belonged to Germans. In the Western Territories more than 5 million hectares of agricultural land was taken from Germans and either distributed to Polish peasants (4.5 million) or converted into state farms, agricultural schools, etc.

Thus internal colonization, or expropriation on a nationalist basis, is the key to the change in land ownership in Poland, even more than in Czechoslovakia.

Hungary

Unlike her neighbours, Hungary did not undergo any land reform after World War I. The communist government of Béla Kun (1919) did not divide the large estates among the peasants—one of their serious mistakes which made the victory of the

White Terror easier. If the land had been divided, it would have remained peasant property even after Béla Kun had been overthrown. No power on earth could have changed this. But by a paradox of history, the only country of Eastern and South Eastern Europe that had a Communist government at that period was the only one in which the feudal land structure remained intact.

The pattern of land distribution in Hungary is revealed by the following table:

DISTRIBUTION OF HOLDINGS ACCORDING TO AREA, 1930

Groups of holdings according to area	Number of Farms Thousands	% of total	Total Area Thousands of yokes*	% of total	Average area of holdings yokes
Up to 1 yoke	552	34.5	287	1.8	0.52
1-2 yokes	278	17.4	428	2.7	1.54
2-5 "	313	19.6	1,034	6.5	3.30
5-10 "	200	12.5	1,460	9.2	7.30
10-20 "	157	9.8	2,241	14.0	14.27
20-100 "	84	5.3	3,093	19.4	36.82
100 and more yokes	14	0.9	7,390	46.4	527.88
Total	1,598	100	15,933	100	10.00

(International Agrarian Institute, *Six Years of the Agrarian Crisis*, Moscow, 1935, p. 109)

Thus, on the one hand there were 1,143,000 lilliputian holdings (71.5 per cent of all the farms), each less than 5 yokes, making up 11.0 per cent of the total area, and on the other hand, 14,000 large estates (0.9 per cent of all the farms), making up 46.4 per cent of the area.

After World War II the time was overripe for the abolition of large estates oppressing the mass of agricultural workers and tenants.

On 17th March, 1945, the Hungarian government passed a law confiscating the land of gentry with estates of more than 50 hectares, as well as the estates of the Church bodies of more than 50 hectares, and of peasant land over 100 hectares. The maximum individual land holding was fixed at 100 hectares, except for those who distinguished themselves in the war against Germany, in which case the maximum was 150 hectares. The so-called 'model farms', that is, vineyards, orchards and other intensive cultures, were exempt from redistribution. As a result, an area of 5.7 million yokes,† i.e.,

*yoke=0.575 hectares=1.422 acres

†Of this area, only 456 thousand yokes were expropriated from Germans who were expelled from the country. The rest was the property of big Hungarian landlords.

more than a third of all the cultivated land of Hungary, was distributed among 640,000 families. Thus in Hungary there was a real revolution in agricultural property relations.

To sum up the changes in land ownership brought about since the end of World War II: in Hungary the transformation of property relations in land by the elimination of large estates was tremendous, and a progressive step; the land reform in Rumania, which was the completion of a much wider land reform after World War I, was less extensive but of the same character; in Czechoslovakia and Poland the changes constituted in the main an act of internal colonisation and of the expropriation of millions of Germans and Hungarians; in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria the changes were very small indeed.

CHAPTER II

CHANGES IN PROPERTY RELATIONS IN INDUSTRY, TRANSPORT, BANKING INSURANCE AND TRADE



THE CHANGES in land ownership dealt with above had a relatively simple result—the predominance of small peasant ownership. By contrast, the property relations in industry, transport, etc., are much more complicated. In order to understand the present situation, it is necessary briefly to survey the property relations before the war, the influence of the Nazi occupation, and the immediate effects of the Red Army's victory.

State Ownership before World War II

In Eastern Europe the bourgeoisie developed late and, in comparison with its Western competitors, was weak and poorly equipped with capital. Thus there arose two antagonistic, but complementary, phenomena. On the one hand foreign capital infiltrated into the region, and on the other hand, in an attempt to avoid relying too much on foreign capital which tended to undermine national independence, the state became the owner of certain means of production, and not, as in the West, mainly a watchman or regulator of the activities of private capitalists. And between and under the pressure of the two—powerful foreign and state capital—private “national” capital managed somehow to keep alive.

The part played by the state in industry was greater in Poland than in any other Eastern European country :

GOVERNMENT-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN PRE-WAR POLAND (1938) AND THEIR PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRIES

Per Cent	
100	production of potassium salts, alcohol; tobacco; aircraft; automobiles; air transportation; post; telegraph; radio.
97	maritime transportation

95	production of dyestuff
93.3	railroads
91	fire insurance
84	production of common salt
73	telephones
70	smelting
52	insurance other than fire
50	spas and health resorts
45.8	financial institutions
30 (approx.)	production of tool-making machinery*
32	quarries, export of lumber†
25	production of natural gas, coal and chemicals‡
10 to 20	production of plywood, cotton goods, electrical implements, lumber, processed oil
7.9	production of electric power

(S.L. Sharp, *Nationalisation of Key Industries in Eastern Europe*, Washington, 1946, pp. 4-5)

There were many mixed enterprises owned partly by the state and partly by local authorities, private companies and individuals.

The value of state enterprises in Poland in 1930-31 was about 12½ milliard zloty, or 22.5 per cent of all the industrial-commercial wealth of Poland, and in the most important undertakings (heavy industry, metal, chemicals, transport), its share was even bigger, as the table shows.

In Yugoslavia the state owned the railways and the telephone and telegraph system. Public utilities were owned by the city authorities. In the very important timber and lumber industry, the state played a considerable part, owning 37.8 per cent of the forest area. A further 27.9 per cent was in the hands of the local authorities. The state owned thirteen coal mines and two iron mines yielding about 25 per cent and 90 per cent respectively of the country's total output of coal and iron. Tobacco, salt and raw silk were all state monopolies. The production of iron and steel (through the Yugoslav Steel Company), and of armaments, was state controlled and the state had a very large share in the cellulose and sugar industries.

State ownership in the other Eastern European countries was far less extensive, nevertheless it cannot be ignored. For instance, in Czechoslovakia, practically the whole railway system was state owned. Trams, electricity, gas and water,

*Another source gives the percentage of state ownership of the metal industry, as a whole, as 50 per cent (F. Zweig, *op. cit.* p.109).

†Zweig gives the following figure for the state ownership of forests: three-eighths (*Ibid.*).

‡According to Zweig the larger part of the chemical industry was state owned (*Ibid.*).

were owned by the local authorities. State capital was of major importance in the powerful Zivnostenska Bank and in the Skoda Works. In industry as a whole, the state owned at least a tenth of all capital invested.

Similar conditions obtained, to a greater or less extent, in the other countries.

Foreign Capital before World War II

Before the War in all the countries nearly all the key positions in industry, transport and banking were controlled by foreign capital. Thus Zweig writes:

'The share of foreign capital in the total capital funds owned by all joint-stock companies in Poland amounted to 33 per cent. The share in the total capital of all active joint-stock companies is given as 44.8 per cent in 1935 and 40.1 in 1937' but '... the controlling power of this capital covered a much wider range than 40.1 per cent of productive capacity'. (Ibid. p. 121). This was because foreign capital, being concentrated in certain key positions, could control a much larger volume of capital. Companies in which foreign capital predominated constituted 63.1 per cent of the capital of all joint-stock companies. The preponderance of foreign capital was particularly great in certain branches of industry—in mining and foundries foreign capital controlled 63.6 of all joint-stock industry; in petroleum extraction, 89.9 per cent; in the chemical industry, about 80 per cent; in the electro-technical industry, about 90 per cent; in electricity and water-supply, about 95 per cent; in the textile industry, about 40 per cent (ibid. pp. 121-2); in insurance, 85.1 per cent; communication and transport, 68.9 per cent (L. Wellisz, *Foreign Capital in Poland*, London, 1938, p. 145). Only in light industries (foodstuffs, paper, glass, ceramics, etc.) and trade was foreign capital of small importance.

The other countries of Eastern Europe were in a similar position. Boris Kidrić, Chairman of the Planning Commision, at the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, said of his country that foreign capital 'participated in the mining industry of the old Yugoslavia and in the building materials industry with 77.9 %, in the metallurgical industry with 90.9 %, in the processing of metals with 55.8 %, in the

ceramics and glass industry with 28.3 %, in the timber industry with 51.4 %, in the paper industry with 15.1 %, in the chemical industry with 73.6 %, in the food and agricultural industry with 27.1 %, in the textile industry with 61.4 %, in the leather and fur industry with 40.9 %, in the electric power industry with 43.5 %, in the remaining industries with 32.3 %, giving an average of 49.51 %. (B. Kidrić, *On the Construction of Socialist Economy in the FPRY*, Belgrade, 1948, p. 31).

The publication of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean* (London, 1944), states: 'Only from 15 to 20 per cent of the capital in Roumanian industry was in Roumanian hands' (p. 81).

'In 1936 paid-up foreign capital in Bulgarian companies amounted to . . . 42.6 per cent of the total paid-up capital of companies'. (Royal Institute of International Affairs, *South-Eastern Europe. A Political and Economical Survey*, London, 1939, p. 173). The share of foreign capital in large manufacturing industry was 48.03 per cent, in wholesale trade 38 per cent, in insurance 24 per cent, in banking 22 per cent, and in transport 63 per cent. (According to Dobri Terpeshev's Report to the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Sofia, 1948).

Similar conditions prevailed in Hungary.

Czechoslovakia was the only country in which foreign capital in banking and industry was of relatively small importance.

The Influence of the German Occupation on Property Relations

So great was the influence of the German occupation that, in the words of S. Perlman: 'European capitalism was finally killed by Nazism', which 'so churned up all existing property rights that their restoration even approximately . . . is unthinkable.' ('Some Reflections on Russia', in *Problems of the Post-War World*, Symposium, New York and London, 1945, p. 334). That these words are no exaggeration is proved by the following passage in Mr. Sharp's book:

'The extent of the upheaval in property relations caused by the Germans in the Eastern European countries may be seen from a few examples of the acquisitions made by German capital since the Munich Agreement and the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia.'

'In addition to the outright confiscation of Jewish property and the acquisition of important Czechoslovak financial claims and capital assets in southeastern Europe, the Germans assumed control and ownership of the main financial and industrial establishments in Bohemia-Moravia.

'Czech banks were forced to merge, so that finally only four banks remained. German capital (Creditanstalt, Dresdner Bank and Deutsche Bank) owned roughly 18 billion of the total capital of 33.6 billion crowns (Koruny) invested in the banks.

'Most of the industrial property and interests came under control of the Hermann Goering Werke (Vitkovice Works, Mining and Foundry Company, the Pobrezova foundry in Slovakia, the armament factories of Skoda and Brno, the steel mills and coal mines of the Poldihuette A.G.). I.G. Farben took over the chemical works of the former Aussiger Verein and the Bratislava plants of Dynamit Nobel.

'In the Sudetenland, which was incorporated into the Reich, a specially-created firm, Sudetenlaendischer Bergbau, controlled by the Hermann Goering Werke, took over the former property of the Czech state, of the Zivnostenska Banca and of the Petschek family interests.' (op. cit. pp. 6-7).

At the same time the Germans developed certain industries for war purposes, because Czechoslovakia was relatively immune from air attack. For instance, the aircraft industry which before the war employed about 5,000 workers, in 1944 employed more than 100,000. This increased the proportion of industry in Czechoslovakia controlled by Germans.

Since even before Munich, 40 per cent of the industry of Czechoslovakia was owned by German citizens, it is clear that the proportion of German capital at the end of the war was not less than 60 per cent of industry and almost 100 per cent of financial institutions (banks, insurance, etc.).

Of Poland, Mr. Sharp writes: 'Polish banks in the incorporated areas were swallowed by the Ostbank A.G., a subsidiary of the Dresdner Bank. A special organization was set up to take over industrial property, either outright or in the form of compulsory administration by the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost. Coal mines were taken over by the Hermann Goering Werke in Silesia and by the Pruessische Bergwerks- und Huetten A.G. in the Dombrowa basin. The Schlesische

A.G. fuer Bergbau and Huettenbetriebe concentrated in its hands the zinc industry (with the exception of some interests left with the Giesche works). By April 1942 not less than 230,000 Polish industrial and commercial enterprises of all sizes were reported Germanized in the annexed part of Poland (this includes very small businesses and presumably also Jewish-owned undertakings).

'In the General Government, a state-managed organization, the Werke des Generalgouvernement, took over the largest industrial plants. Two artificial silk factories came under the control of Vereinigte Glanzstoff Fabriken of Wuppertal. Oil was exploited by Karpathen-Oel A.G. and electric power plants by Ost-Energie A.G.' (Ibid. pp. 7-8).

By taking possession of French, Belgian and Austrian capital (which in 1937 amounted to 56.9 per cent of all foreign capital), as well as Jewish-owned enterprises (constituting about 10 per cent of all industrial-commercial wealth) and the enterprises owned by the state before the war, the Germans gained control of more than half of all industrial and banking capital and nearly all industry, transport and banks of real importance.

Of Yugoslavia Mr. Sharp writes: 'Yugoslavia was dismembered after the German attack in 1941 and public and private property grabbed by the successor states in the detached provinces. In puppet Serbia the Germans controlled the state-owned railways and mines. Through possession of French interests they acquired the Bor copper mines. German capital infiltration in Serbia was estimated at about 45 million dollars and in Croatia at approximately 35 million'. (Ibid. p.9)

German capital also invaded the economy of the German allies, Hungary and Rumania. 'In Hungary, for instance, German investments were estimated in February, 1944, officially at about 692 million dollars and unofficially at more than twice the amount'. (Ibid. p. 8). Thus about a third of all Hungarian industry was controlled by German capital: six very large metal enterprises, nine mines, three transport companies, three food industries, ten textile enterprises, and thirteen miscellaneous industries. (N. Clarion, *Le Glacis Soviéétique*, Paris, 1948, p. 89). German capital was especially active in the expansion of the aluminium and oil industries,

which were practically new industries for Hungary. The extent to which German capital gained control of the Hungarian economy is revealed by the fact that while German capital was estimated at more than a milliard dollars, the total national wealth of Hungary, excluding land and buildings, was estimated in 1943 at 4.4 milliard dollars.

'In Rumania the Hermann Goering Werke came into possession of large shares in a number of industrial enterprises through the seizure of the Czech-owned stock. Similarly in banking and mining the Germans "bought" French and Belgian interests and some Dutch oil interests. One sixth of the capital invested in Rumanian banks and industries was German-owned or controlled, according to an estimate early in 1944. In the oil industry German interests rose from less than 0.5 per cent before the war to 38 per cent (1942). Jewish property was "Rumanized".' (Sharp, *op. cit.* pp. 8-9).

Before the war more than half the foreign capital invested in Rumania was invested in her oil industry, and foreign capital as a whole made up nearly 85 per cent of the capital of all Rumanian industry. Therefore German capital in the oil industry alone made up in 1942 nearly a fifth of all the capital in Rumanian industry, or a quarter of the foreign capital. Moreover, it controlled a few other, not unimportant, enterprises, such as the Malaxa metal enterprise and the mines of Resitza and Copsa Mica-Cugir companies, as well as another two hundred new medium-sized enterprises. (Clarion, *op. cit.* pp. 90-91).

Two countries practically escaped any large-scale infiltration of German capital during the war—Bulgaria and Finland, the former because it lacked the heavy industry needed for the German war effort, the latter because the foreign capital invested in it was not French or Belgian but English and American, and it was impossible for the Germans to buy British and American shares during the war.

The Effect of the Military Victory of Russia: Russian-Owned Enterprises

The military defeat of Germany left a very great part of industry, transport and banks of the East European countries ownerless. The larger part of German property in Czecho-

slovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia passed into the hands of the national states, while in the countries which were formerly allies of Germany as well as in the Soviet Zone of Germany and Austria it was mostly taken over by the Russian government. Even Czechoslovakia and Poland did not escape having to contribute German booty to Russia. Yugoslavia was the only exception, because the Russian army never occupied the whole of the country, but merely a small part of it and for a few months only. Of the industries formerly owned by Germans and now claimed by Russia, some were dismantled and the rest left intact under Russian control.

The question of dismantling will be dealt with later. Here it is proposed to deal only with the ownership by Russia of certain industrial, transport and banking interests.

Rumania

Since during the war German capital had controlled 38 per cent of all investments in Rumanian oil (as well as a number of industries and banks), Russia was able to obtain almost complete control over a third of the Rumanian oil industry. She also became the owner of much of the metal industry and the banks. For various reasons, Russia found it preferable to build up in Rumania (and Hungary) enterprises in which she owned half, while the other half was in the hands of Rumanian (or Hungarian) private capitalists or the state (the latter from the nationalisation laws of 1948). This enables the Russian state to control a much greater sector of industry than if she had relied on companies with 100 per cent Russian capital. Thus in May, 1945, Russia and Rumania came to an agreement about the establishment of mixed companies in certain branches of industry, first of all the petroleum industry. Sovrompetrol was established which owns the lion's share of the oil fields and refineries of Rumania. The far-reaching law of nationalization passed on 11 June, 1948, did not apply to the mixed companies. In the significant words of *The World Today* (January, 1949) the monthly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs:

‘... the only capitalist in Rumanian industry is Communist Russia. Only the Russian Government has the right to own private shares, and only the company in which Soviet Russia

has private shares is allowed to make profits and distribute them to the shareholders. Sovrompetrol has now the best fields and concessions and the right to export in free currency areas. It is also officially subsidized by the Rumanian Government in the event of loss. Thus it can be seen that Sovrompetrol has the best of the bargain. The second sector belongs in principle to the Rumanian State. Its task will be to prospect for, and explore, new fields as well as to exploit the exhausted wells left by the expropriated companies. Its personnel is untrained. Its trade will be limited to the adverse one with Soviet Russia and the other satellites. Therefore, while both sectors are working for the benefit of Soviet Russia, it is not difficult to guess which has the best chance of successful working, which is doomed to failure'.

Although oil is the main industry of Rumania, and Russia directed her main attention to it, she did not overlook other industries. Because of the close fusion of industrial and banking capital in Rumania, the Sovrom Banco was established, as the best means of controlling industry—besides oil—as a whole. Fifty per cent of the shares of the bank are held directly by Russia, and fifty per cent by Rumanian companies. But since Russia, as the heir of the German owners, had part ownership of a number of the latter companies, she has, even formally, the majority of the shares.

In addition there were established Sovrom companies for shipping, air communications, timber, coal, steel, chemicals, gas, building materials, glass, and a few other industries. In all these enterprises the share of Russia has been paid solely by surrendering the claim to German assets in each industry.

Hungary

Under the Potsdam Agreement Russia was entitled to take over all German-owned property in Hungary, officially estimated in February, 1944, at 692 million dollars, and unofficially at double this sum, out of an estimated total wealth in 1943 of 4.4 milliard dollars. Russia exercised her rights partly by dismantlement and partly by taking control of industries which continued to operate in Hungary. By an economic agreement between Hungary and Russia in September, 1945, mixed Russian-Hungarian companies were to be established

in fourteen branches of industry and transport: oil, bauxite-aluminium, coal, chemicals, the large metal industries Weiss-Manfred, Ganz and Rimamurany, electricity, railways, Danubian shipping, air transport. While their importance in the economy was great, it was considerably less than that of their counterparts in Rumania.

As a political weapon for the subjugation of Hungary to Russia, the mixed companies are of first-rate importance.

Bulgaria

In Bulgaria there are Soviet companies and mixed companies in certain mines and transport undertakings. When the U.S.S.R. took over the assets of the German companies, they did not take over their liabilities, the biggest of which were their debts to the state. Thus while a large part of the assets which were transferred to Russia of the German companies came from open robbery of the Bulgarian people in the past, the liabilities were borne by the Bulgarian taxpayer. This was revealed in the Kostov Trial (December, 1949) during which Prof. Stefanov, former Minister of Finance, was accused of opposition to this state of affairs. He was accused further of wishing to impose the same taxes on the Soviet enterprises as the Bulgarian enterprises had to pay. The Prosecutor took it for granted that Russian enterprises in Bulgaria should enjoy special privileges in taxation.

Yugoslavia

In Yugoslavia there were two mixed Soviet-Yugoslav transport companies, 'Juspad' and 'Justa', formed on February 4, 1947, with the alleged intention of 'contributing to the recovery and development of productive possibilities of Yugoslavia'. They were liquidated after the rupture with Moscow. After this some light was thrown on the working of the companies. Joze Vilfan, Yugoslav delegate to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, referred to the two mixed companies in a speech before the Council. The participation of the two Governments in the companies was to have been equal, but in practice the companies did not do what they were intended to do. Thus, for example, although by May, 1948, the U.S.S.R. had paid up only 9.83 per cent of its participation

in Juspad while Yugoslavia had paid up 76.25 per cent, only 40 per cent of the services of both companies went to Yugoslavia, the remainder going to other countries. Whereas Juspad charged Yugoslav industry 0.40 dinars per kilometre-ton, the U.S.S.R. was charged only 0.19 dinars, and other countries 0.28 dinars. With the liquidation of both companies, Yugoslavia took over all the liabilities, though the U.S.S.R. drew its share of the capital, as far as it was paid up, in full. (*Tanjug*, 11 October, 1949).

No Rent Paid for Natural Resources

This is an important aspect of the exploitation exercised by the Russian Government through the mixed companies. The prices of certain commodities whose production is dependent on natural resources which exist only in limited quantities and which are the property of individuals (or states)—such as grain, cotton, timber, coal, oil—always include not only wages for the workers, and profit for the owners of the capital, but also rent for the owners of the natural resources. When the Russian state takes from Sovrompetrol, for instance, half of what remains after the cost of production (wages, depreciation of machinery, etc.) is covered, it actually gets not only half the profit, properly so-called, but also half the rent of the oilfields. Thus it becomes part-owner of the natural wealth of Rumania. The enormous rent accruing from oilfields is well known. One example will be sufficient to show this. In 1946 the U.S.S.R. concluded an agreement with Iran to build a mixed Iran-Soviet oil company. It was agreed that the share that Iran would contribute to the company would be that of providing the oil-bearing soil, and for this alone she would get 49 per cent of all the shares of the company, i.e., 49 per cent of the profit and rent. In the case of the Sovrompetrol Company, Rumania had to supply half the capital and in addition to give the oil-bearing soil gratis. It would not be difficult to calculate what portion of the shares Rumania would have received had she had the same conditions as were granted Iran. She would have had 49 per cent of the profit as rent for the oilfields and half of the rest—i.e., $25\frac{1}{2}$ per cent—for ownership of half the capital, making altogether $74\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Instead she gets 50 per cent. And the portion the U.S.S.R.

would have received would have been 25½ per cent instead of 50 per cent. This would have been the case if the mixed companies were established on the principle of legal equality usually prevailing between capitalist partners. The extra profit the U.S.S.R. gets from the Sovrompetrol Co. and from a number of other mixed companies is the result of political pressure.

Nationalisation in the Russian Satellite States

The appropriation of industries, transport and banks by the Russian state has been described. Now it is necessary to deal with the transfer of industries to the 'national' states, states which are, at least formally, distinguished from the Russian state. This transfer is usually described as 'nationalisation', although the term is far from appropriate as it assumes that the state enjoys national independence and that it is identified with the nation, or the majority of it. But if these reservations are borne in mind, there is no danger in using this rather loose term.

As the national states of the satellites are subordinated to the Russian state, one would expect to find that the progress of the nationalisation of industry is subordinated to the needs of Russian infiltration into the national economies. And so in fact it is. In all Eastern Europe only three countries, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, were allies of Russia during the war. Because of this, Russia could not exact any reparations from them or claim control over German assets in them. They were therefore encouraged to nationalise their industries, and as early as 1945 the majority of their industries were nationalised. (In two of these countries—Czechoslovakia and Poland—the nationalisation was accompanied by a wide-scale and chauvinistic expropriation of the 'Teutons' by the 'Slavs'.)

In the four countries which had been allied to Germany—Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland—the course of events was different. There was no nationalisation in Finland, which was never occupied, nor was there much propaganda by the Communist Party for it. In Rumania and Hungary, Russia's interests in exacting reparations as well as in building up mixed companies (together with a number of socio-political factors which will be dealt with later) led to the postponement of nationalisation on a large scale until 1948, more than three

years after the beginning of the Russian occupation. The fear that the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Bulgarian masses (which, except in Yugoslavia, was unparalleled in this region after the war) would lead to too much independence of Russia, and the Russian bureaucracy's confidence that nationalisation could be carried out whenever they wished, caused them to postpone it until the revolutionary wave had ebbed at the end of 1947.

The timing of nationalisation in Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria was determined by another very important factor—the Marshall Plan. The urge to trade with Western Europe, as expressed in the *unanimous* decision of the Czechoslovak government on 4 July, 1947, to take part in the Marshall Conference (a decision revoked when Gottwald and Masaryk visited Moscow on 10th July) made it necessary for Russia to strengthen her control over the economy of Eastern Europe, and this could be done only through state ownership of industries in all these countries. Hence the nationalisations in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary.

Poland

It is impossible to understand the process of nationalisation in Poland without taking into account two factors, namely, in the area of pre-war Poland, the existence of many industries previously controlled by German capital now remaining ownerless, and, what is even more important, the changes in Polish industry brought about by the annexation of the German area east of the Oder-Neisse and the expulsion of the German population from it. This area will be referred to as the Western territories of Poland, and the area of pre-war Poland as Old Poland.

The importance of the industry of the Western territories compared with the industry of Old Poland is shown by the following table :

ACTUAL PRODUCTION IN 1937 (IN THOUSAND TONS)			
Pre-War Poland			Western Territories
Coal	36,218.0		29,793.0
Coke	2,328.0		3,229.0
Briquettes ..	17.4		368.6
Brown coal ..	18.4		7,594.0
Zinc and lead ..	200.0		722.1
Iron ore	791.6		73.1

(*The World Today*, March, 1947)

The production of pig-iron in the Western territories was about 50 per cent of the production of Old Poland, and of steel 70 per cent. An important chemical industry, with a wide range of products, came to Poland through the annexation of the Western Territories. The sugar refining capacity of the Western Territories was the same as that of Old Poland. In fact, 'The total capacity of this industrial belt (i.e., of the Western Territories—Y.G.) is equal to that of the whole of pre-war Poland'. (*The World Today*, May, 1948).

Out of the two million people employed in 1937 in all the mines, industry and handicrafts of Poland, the majority, 1,177,858 people, worked in small-scale industry and handicrafts (employing fewer than 15 workers), while large and medium-sized industry (which includes all enterprises with more than 15 people) employed only 830,000 people. By contrast, the industries of the Western territories employed before the war over 1,000,000 workers, the great majority of them in large enterprises, hundreds of which employed more than a thousand workers each.

It is therefore clear that when, after the expulsion of the German population (the great majority of them workers and their families), the industry of the Western territories was declared state property, an important—if not the major—part of the industry of new Poland was by that act removed from private ownership. If this had been the only nationalisation undertaken, state ownership in industry proper, i.e., excluding handicrafts and industries employing less than fifteen people, would already have far outstripped private ownership. This was not immediately clear because a certain time-lag was inevitable before enough Polish workers could be found to man the industries of the Western territories. Thus, for some time after the war the nationalised industry of the Western Territories played a less important role in the total industry of the new Poland than would have been expected.

Of the territory of Old Poland Clarion writes: 'When we take into account the fact that large and medium industry in Old Poland mean medium and small industry in the West, the nationalisation measures left outside state property 45 per cent of the total number of industries, or at the very least 60

per cent of the total number of workers employed in industry'. (op. cit. p. 94).*

Clarion would seem to exaggerate the part played by private industry in Old Poland. Even there at least half of all the workers in mining, industry and transport, are working in state enterprises, and so the *overwhelming majority* of all the industry of present-day Poland is state-owned.

Boleslaw Bierut, the President of the Polish Republic, emphasized in a speech on New Year's Eve, 1946, that the expropriation of the Germans was a key factor in making the Polish state the owner of the majority of the industry. He said: '... the war completely overturned the system of our pre-war production relations . . .' 'After the expulsion of the occupant a huge majority of the industrial plants, even the smallest, had to be classified as abandoned property, taken over by the state, and reopened through the efforts of the state, territorial self-government, co-operatives and new private firms. After investing public money in the plants, the state feels compelled to regulate their judicial form and title of ownership. The only way out of the situation, especially in the case of large enterprises, is nationalisation'. Thus nationalisation is 'a legal act sanctioning already existing facts and procedures. It is an adaptation of the law to realities'. This was the situation in 1945 and the nationalisation law of 3 January, 1946, gave it legal sanction. First, all German property, both in the Western territories and in Old Poland, in industry, mines, transport, banking, insurance and trade was declared the property of the Polish state. Further, a number of other enterprises belonging to Polish citizens was taken over by the state: all firms with more than 50 workers were affected. The situation was summed up by Roman Zambrowski, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party (Communist Party) in a speech he made on July 12th, 1948, when he stated that 85 per cent of the total industrial output is produced by state and co-operatively owned enterprises (the latter not more than 5 per cent), the same proportion in communication and finance, and 100 per cent in banking. Only small-scale industry and

*Probably the ground for Clarion's estimate was the declaration of the Polish Minister of Industry, Hilary Minc, on January 2nd, 1946, that after the nationalisation bill, only 40 per cent of all industrial workers would be employed by the state, while 60 per cent would continue to work for private employers.

handicrafts were in the hands of private owners. (*Glos Ludu*, 13th July, 1948).

Czechoslovakia

As a result of the defeat of the German army and the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, the major part of industry, transport and banking was left without an owner. As President Beneš wrote in an article in the *Manchester Guardian* of 15th December, 1945: '... the Germans simply took control of all main industries, and of all banks... If they did not nationalise them directly, they at least put them in the hands of big German concerns... In this way they automatically prepared the economic and financial capital in our country for nationalisation... To return this property and the banks into the hands of Czech individuals or to consolidate them without considerable State assistance and without new financial guarantees was simply impossible. The State had to step in...'

Three decrees of October 24th, 1945, made all banks, insurance companies, joint stock companies, key industries and large-scale enterprises the property of the state. All the enterprises in the key industries (mines, iron and steel, electricity, etc.), whatever their size, were nationalised. In other industries, all the enterprises employing a certain number of workers, or with certain technical capacities, were nationalised.

The ownership of industry on November 1, 1946, in terms of percentage of total employment, was as follows:

Industries producing (including communes)	CZECH LANDS				SLOVAKIA Nationalised industries
	State owned	State administered	Co-operatives	Private	
Industries producing means of production	79.2	10.3	0.2	10.3	83.1
Industries producing means of consumption	44.2	14.3	1.0	39.5	32.9
Food processing industries	31.9	10.8	20.7	36.6	28.6
Industries not directly affected by nationalisation	11.9	13.2	2.0	72.9	18.9
Total industry	61.6	11.6	2.4	24.4	57.7

Between 24th October, 1945, and February, 1948, no new nationalisation laws were passed, so that it can be assumed that throughout this period not more than a quarter of industry

(reckoned by the number employed) was privately owned. Since private enterprises were small compared with state enterprises (on the average every industrial enterprise owned by the state employed eight times as many people as the private enterprises), their economic importance in the total industry of the country was even less.

After the establishment of the new government in February, 1948, further nationalisation took place, and the proportion of private industry decreased from about 25 per cent to 7 per cent of all industry, according to the number employed.

Thus the really large-scale state acquisitions took place in 1945 and were directed almost entirely against ownerless enterprises, i.e., formerly German-owned enterprises.

The 1945 nationalisation hardly touched the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie and did not affect the Czechoslovak owners of middle and small industry at all. After it the Communist leaders declared that no more nationalisation measures would be taken. Thus on March 27th, 1947, 'In an interview the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, Klement Gottwald, declared that from the programme of the present Government it is clear that it considers *the statification* in the field of production closed' (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 29th March, 1947). A few weeks later, at a general meeting of the Central Trade Union Council, Antonin Zapotocky, the President, said: 'We agree that medium-sized, and even some big enterprises should remain in private hands, and we see no reason why we should change these views'.

But in February, 1948, Gottwald and Zapotocky 'forgot' all this, and for the first time the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie, including the owners of middle and small industry, was seriously affected by nationalisation. This second nationalisation was a relatively small operation after the big one of 1945.

Yugoslavia

No nationalisation law was published in Yugoslavia, until 5th December, 1946, when the two Houses of the National Assembly adopted a bill for the nationalisation of private enterprises which applied to 42 branches of industry, transport and banking, and wholesale trade. But it would be wrong to conclude that until then these sectors of the economy were in

private hands. In practice, nationalisation was carried out without legal sanction and under cover of a law passed on 24th November, 1944, for the expropriation of the property of the national enemy and his collaborators. On 19th January, 1946, *The Economist* estimated that the proportion of state and co-operative industry in Yugoslavia was 70-80 per cent, and the Moscow journal *New Times* of 15th March, 1946, wrote: 'The Government is in possession of 82 per cent of all industry, while private establishments account for only 18%.'

After this survey of the ownership of industry in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, a brief examination is necessary of the control of trade. In all three countries private property lingers on to a large extent in one sphere besides agriculture, that of retail trade. In his speech mentioned above, Roman Zambrowski pointed out that in Poland the state and the co-operatives handle only 25-30 per cent of retail trade (in wholesale trade private ownership is negligible, the state taking 59 per cent of the turnover, the co-operatives 36.6 per cent, a total of 95.6 per cent). A similar situation exists in Czechoslovakia. Of the situation in Yugoslavia, B. Kidrić, said: 'Whereas in 1945, 85% of trade was still carried on through private shops, 12% through co-operatives and only 3% through state shops, in 1946 state shops already participated in trade with 19.2%, cooperative with 32% and the private shops dropped to 48.8%' (B. Kidrić, op. cit. p. 29).

'... on March 31st, 1948, private shops still participated with only 1.78%, the state shops with 39.91% and the co-operative with 58.31%' (Ibid. p. 31).

In May, 1948, a new law nationalised all the remaining private trade in Yugoslavia.

In these three countries, the proportion of the economy in private hands was no greater than in Soviet Russia during the N.E.P.*

Hungary and Rumania

In Hungary and Rumania, Russia's demand for reparations and her schemes for the building of mixed companies which

*According to the Comintern weekly, *International Press Correspondence*, of 26th November, 1927, the percentage of private industry in the total industrial production of Russia in 1925/6 was 18.7 per cent. The proportion of wholesale trade in private hands was 9.4 per cent of the turnover and of retail trade 38.8 per cent (In 1927/8 the figures were respectively 1.5 and 27.0).

would give her direct control of certain key positions in their economies, resulted in the postponement of any nationalisation until requisitions, dismantling, etc., had been terminated, the reparations payments were nearly completed, and the mixed companies were already established. Then, in the first half of 1948, nationalisation was carried out on a large scale.

For the Russian government nationalisation is only a *means* to the end of the extraction of surplus value and the accumulation of capital, and the purpose of nationalisation is fundamentally no different from that of the mixed companies, whose function is openly that of the extraction of 'reparations'. This is illustrated by the following incident.

After the big defeat of the Hungarian Communist Party in the general elections (November, 1945) when it polled only 17 per cent of the votes, the Hungarian bourgeoisie felt self-confident, and the government, headed by the Smallholders' Party, tried to delay agreement to the Mixed Companies. Suddenly, the Communist Party began an intensive campaign for the nationalisation of industry on a large scale. The General Secretary of the Party, and Vice-Premier, Mátyás Rákosi, in a speech over Radio Budapest, on 4th March, 1946, demanded the nationalisation of exactly the *same* industries in which Russia demanded the establishment of Mixed Companies. To the demand for nationalisation was added a demand for the removal of reactionary elements from the Smallholders' Party. As a result the Hungarian Government gave way, the Mixed Companies were established, and the Communist Party forgot about the nationalisation (for the time being).

Nationalisation was introduced piecemeal into Hungary. The coal mines were nationalised in January, 1946, the power stations a little later in the year. Five big heavy industrial firms were brought under state control as a temporary measure, 'until the end of reparations', in November, 1946. In September, 1947, all the banks were nationalised. Even so, until the nationalisation law of March 25th, 1948, a quarter of heavy industry and four-fifths of the rest of industry remained private property. According to this law, all industrial enterprises employing more than 100 persons became state property. The state now owned 78 per cent of industry, according to the

number employed. On December 28th, 1949, the Government decided to take over all enterprises employing more than ten workers and all those owned by foreign capital. Of course the nationalisation laws did not affect the property of the Mixed Companies.

The way the nationalisation was carried out in Hungary illustrates the tactical methods of the Hungarian Communist Party leaders and their view that the active participation of the workers in the nationalisation is unnecessary. Easter Monday, 1948, was declared a holiday, and when the workers were not in the factories, state officials came down and took them over. The next day the workers arrived to find a new master. (*Continental News Service*, April 16th, 1948).

In Rumania the first step towards the nationalisation of industry was the creation in the summer of 1947 of a number of industrial boards which grouped together the factories of different branches, controlled the allocation of raw materials and framed the production plans of the various factories. This prepared the ground for the first nationalisation law for industry of 11th June, 1948. On that date, without prior warning, the government introduced a bill in parliament which became law after only three hours discussion, providing for the nationalisation of the overwhelming majority of industries. A few months earlier at the Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party (Communists) on February 21-23, 1948, which had to decide on the policy of Rumania for the immediate future, no mention was made of early nationalisation on a large scale. All oil companies, including those in which foreign capital was invested (except the Sovrompetrol Company) were nationalised, as well as all metallurgical factories employing more than 100 workers, textile factories using more than 100 horse power, timber plants using more than 20 horse power, all the shipping companies (except the Sovrom Shipping Company) and railroads, radio and telephone companies, and all the banks (except the Sovrombank).

Bulgaria

The Bulgarian State owned only 6 per cent of the total industry of the country until December 23rd, 1947, when, at one stroke, practically all industry was nationalised. 93 per

cent of industry was taken over by the state (2 per cent owned by cooperatives and 5 per cent was in private hands), 100 per cent of the banks and insurance companies and 100 per cent of foreign trade. (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* the Cominform organ, 15th December, 1948). Cyril Lazarov in *Rabotnicheskoye Delo* of October 31st, 1948, estimates the state share of wholesale trade at 64 per cent and of retail trade at 22.3 per cent.

Austria and Finland, although they are outside the region under review, throw valuable light on the motives determining the attitude of the Communist Parties to nationalisation.

In Austria Russia is the main impediment to nationalisation, while the Austrian bourgeoisie and the Western Powers appear as its enthusiastic supporters.

The Austrian parliament hoped, by a large-scale nationalisation of industry, to stop the dismantling of factories and the taking over of industries by Russia. In July, 1946, therefore, a bill was passed, which was based on the election programme of the three parties of the Coalition Government (including the Communist Party) and provided for the nationalisation of 71 major enterprises. The Soviet High Command protested against the law on the grounds that it would affect Russian reparation rights, and the Soviet vote prevented the law from coming into effect. Thereupon the Communist Party changed its policy to opposition to nationalisation.

In Finland, the Popular Democratic Party (Communist Party) was in a better tactical position, as the Russian Control Commission informed the Finnish Government at an early stage that 'nationalisation is contrary to Soviet interests', and the Popular Democratic Party was therefore warned in time to oppose nationalisation.

The difference between the nationalisation policies in the various countries shows how this policy has in every case been determined by the interests of the rulers of Russia. It is clear, therefore, that for Russia nationalisation is only a device for the transfer of industry into the hands of the state, which means the appropriation of the industry by the owners of that state—the Russian ruling class.

CHAPTER III

SCARCITY OF CAPITAL



Problems of Agricultural Development

AN EXAMINATION of the economic situation of the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe will make it obvious that no redistribution of the national income and wealth will by itself radically improve the condition of the people. For example, if the total agricultural land of the countries (and not, as has been the case, merely the large estates) were distributed equally among the peasants ('Black Distribution' in the phrase of the Russian revolutionaries under the Tsar), the main result would be the equalisation of poverty. As long as the majority of the people are engaged in agriculture and the productivity of labour in agriculture is as low as it is today, no real improvement of their condition is possible.

The level of output of agriculture per head of the agricultural population in Eastern Europe is very low, as can be illustrated by comparing it with other regions. It is, of course, difficult to compare the agricultural productivity of different countries, which produce various products in differing proportions. Fortunately Wilbert E. Moore has undertaken an important statistical work, attempting to fulfil this task for different European countries (*op. cit.*). He weighs the quantities of agricultural goods produced according to a uniform set of value ratios which he calls the Crop Unit (C.U.). For the years 1931-5 on the average, the results were as follows (see top of page 45) (the index calculation has been made from Moore's absolute figures).

Although there are differences in the productivity of agriculture as between the different countries of Eastern Europe, there is a much greater *inequality* between Western Europe as a whole and Eastern Europe as a whole, the latter's productivity being 4-5 times lower than the former's.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER PERSON DEPENDENT ON AGRICULTURE AND PER MALE ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE

Crop	Units	Per Person Dependent on Agriculture		Per Male Engaged in Agriculture	
		Index	Denmark = 100	Units	Index
		Denmark = 100		Denmark = 100	
Denmark	..	152	100	411	100
England and Wales	..	137	90	306	74
Netherlands	..	114	75	302	73
Switzerland	..	84	55	213	52
Belgium	..	95	62	230	56
France	..	75	49	204	50
Germany	..	84	55	244	59
Czechoslovakia	..	45	30	146	36
Hungary	..	33	22	96	23
Poland	..	21	14	72	17
Rumania	..	21	14	67	16
Bulgaria	..	20	13	70	17
Yugoslavia	..	17	11	55	13
Albania	..	10	7	32	8

(p. 35).

The large extent to which this is the *direct* result of the greater density of the agricultural population in Eastern than Western Europe becomes clear if the number of hectares of agricultural land per person dependent on agriculture in the different countries is compared. Taking the number in Denmark as 100, the comparative figures are:

Denmark	..	100	Czechoslovakia	..	54
England and Wales	..	112	Hungary	..	59
Netherlands	..	47	Poland	..	44
Switzerland	..	35	Rumania	..	46
Belgium	..	57	Bulgaria	..	20
France	..	108	Yugoslavia	..	37
Germany	..	71	Albania	..	22

It is clear that there is no exact correlation between countries arranged according to productivity per person dependent on agriculture and according to the quantity of agricultural land per person dependent on agriculture. But that there is a certain correlation can be seen by comparing the countries of Western Europe as a group and the countries of Eastern Europe as a group. In the first group there is twice as much agricultural land per person dependent on agriculture as in the second.

The great density of the agricultural population in Eastern Europe compared with Western Europe goes some way to explaining the low productivity per head of the agricultural population in the former compared with the latter. There is another factor that must be mentioned if the explanation is to be complete, namely, that the agricultural output per unit of

area is much smaller in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. This is shown clearly in the following table:

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER HECTARE OF AGRICULTURAL LAND					
	Crop Units	Index		Crop Units	Index
Denmark	57	100	Czechoslovakia ..	31	54
England and Wales ..	46	81	Hungary ..	21	37
Netherlands	91	160	Bulgaria ..	19	33
Switzerland	89	156	Poland	18	32
Belgium	63	111	Rumania	17	30
France	26	46	Yugoslavia	17	30
Germany	44	79	Albania	17	30

If the agricultural population of Eastern Europe is to have the same quantity of agricultural products per head as in Western Europe, not only must half of them be removed, but the agricultural output must be doubled.

The low productivity in Eastern Europe is not the result of infertility of the soil. On the contrary, the soil of Eastern Europe, and especially the excellent black soil of the Danube Plain, is on the whole much richer than the naturally poor soil of Western Europe. The low productivity is due to three main causes, the scarcity of livestock, the scanty use of fertilizers and the lack of agricultural implements and machinery.

LIVESTOCK DENSITY (1938)

	Cattle per 100 ha. Agricultural Area	Pigs per 100 ha. Arable Land
Czechoslovakia	59.1	* 65.3
Hungary	24.9	55.3
Poland	41.3	40.6
Rumania	23.5	23.5
Bulgaria	41.0	22.1
Yugoslavia	29.8	46.0
Germany	69.8	122.5
France	45.2	34.4
Denmark	103.1	106.1

(PEP—Political and Economic Planning—*Economic Development in S.E. Europe, 1945*, p. 34).

In this table the figures for the countries of Eastern Europe include a large number of oxen and buffaloes which are used mainly as draught animals. In the quality of its livestock Eastern Europe compares even more unfavourably with Western Europe than in the quantity.

On the question of agricultural implements and machinery, the PEP study states :

‘The value of all agricultural equipment used per hectare of arable land was estimated by a Roumanian source at Lei 1,000

(about £1) for Roumania, Lei 2,000 for Bulgaria, Lei 3,000 for Poland; as against Lei 15,000 for Germany and Lei 42,000 for Switzerland. So far as mechanical equipment is concerned, the disparity was even greater. According to a German source, taking the mechanical equipment per hectare of farm land (in terms of weight) as 100 for Germany, the figure for Bulgaria would be 14, for Yugoslavia 5, for Roumania 3.' (Ibid. p. 32).

A comparison of the extent to which fertilizers are used is equally unfavourable, as can be seen from the following table :

USE OF ARTIFICIAL FERTILIZERS, 1930-1940
(KILOS PER HECTARE OF ARABLE LAND)

		Nitrates	Phosphates	Potash
Czechoslovakia	..	4.4	8.9	5.0
Poland	..	1.1	2.3	1.4
Hungary	..	0.1	0.9	0.1
Yugoslavia	..	0.1	0.4	0.1
Roumania	..	0.02	0.06	0.01
Bulgaria	..	0.01	0.00	0.00
Germany	..	18.0	21.4	31.3
France	..	7.0	17.6	8.7
Denmark	..	10.7	24.1	7.9

(Ibid. p. 31)

There are a number of other factors which influence the welfare of the agricultural population. The Eastern European peasants suffered from the bad organisation of the marketing of their produce. Two examples will suffice. In Zürich 63 per cent of the retail price of milk went to the milk producer (the rest was divided between wholesale trade, retail and transport), and in Copenhagen 65 per cent; even in the United States where milk is delivered over very great distances the farmer got 46.8 per cent. As against this in Warsaw he got only 30 per cent, and in Belgrade 37.5 per cent (Ibid. pp. 94-5). The Survey of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *World Agriculture* (1932), tells of a typical Rumanian barley farm, from which barley to the value of Lei 1,006 was sold. But the middlemen's profits and transport charges before the grain left Rumania amounted to Lei 1,202 (p.106).

The high prices of essential industrial goods further militated against the prosperity of the peasants.

The expensiveness of industrial compared with agricultural products in the period before the second world war is revealed by the following index figures of the variation of agricultural and industrial prices in Hungary (July figures):

	1913	1925	1929	1933	1936	1937
Agricultural ..	100	125	114	57	71	80
Industrial ..	100	138	133	107	117	125

(E. Hertz, *The Economic Problem of the Danubian States*, London, 1947, p. 194)

The same phenomenon was expressed some time before World War II by a Croatian peasant speaking thus to an English investigator:

'Life is getting more and more difficult. The prices we can obtain are so very low. Look, before 1914 I could get two pair of boots for a hundredweight of wheat. Today I must give two hundredweights of wheat in exchange for one pair of boots. For one kilogram of nails, I must give one kilogram of wool. When I sold a sheep before 1914, I could buy fifty metres of cottons in exchange. Now I cannot get fifty metres of cotton-stuff even for four sheep.'

'Things are no better on the coast of Dalmatia either. Before 1914 they could get a suit of clothes for a hectolitre of wine. Today they must give three hectolitres of wine for a suit. Before 1914 they could get ten boxes of matches for a litre of wine, today they must give a litre of wine for every single box.'

(P. Lamartine Yates and D. Warriner, *Food and Farming in Post-War Europe*, London, 1943, p. 28).

High taxation added to the difficulties of the mass of peasants in Eastern Europe.

Last but not least, there was the burden of debts, a result of the poverty of the peasants and a very important contribution to it.

There are two main groups of countries today whose agricultural populations enjoy a relatively high standard of living—on the one hand the corn and meat producing countries with large, highly mechanized farms (U.S.A., Canada and Australia), and on the other hand, countries like Denmark, Switzerland, Holland and Belgium which go in for intensive production of dairy products, meat and vegetables. In both cases only 20-30 per cent of the whole population is engaged in agriculture, the well-organised and highly developed agriculture being the accompaniment of an advanced industrial organization. The highly mechanized, extensive producers are dependent on a huge, world-wide market, the intensive producers are dependent on the existence of an urban population

with a high standard of living which is able to pay good prices for the dairy products, meat, eggs, etc. (Thus the prosperity of Holland and Denmark depends on the prosperity of the urban population in Britain). In Eastern Europe the growth of grass and root crops is made difficult by the dry climate, and so, intensive production of meat, as in Denmark, Holland, Eire, England, etc., is impossible. But this does not preclude the production of milk and the raising of pigs. In some areas, there are excellent natural conditions for specialised crops, e.g., in Bulgaria and Serbia for tobacco and grapes. Other areas—and these form the greater part of Eastern Europe—are more suitable for growing corn, which could be done on the American model with tractors and combine harvesters, instead of with draught animals whose feeding takes up a lot of the arable land. In many places the best results could be achieved by mixed farming, combining mechanized corn growing with intensive production of milk, pigs, vegetables and fruits. But however agriculture develops in this area, experience has shown that the decisive factor in raising the standard of living in the countryside is the accessibility of expanding urban markets. No raising of the rate of agricultural production, no improvement in the standard of living is possible without rapid industrialisation, which will enable the surplus agricultural population to be absorbed, will provide a market for agricultural products and will supply agricultural implements and machinery as well as industrial consumption goods for the peasants. In addition the peasants need 'cheap government' and a cheap marketing system.

Problems of Industrial Development

If Eastern Europe is to be industrialised, large amounts of capital will be needed, which can be estimated by considering the number of people to be absorbed into industry. Obviously any such calculation can be only approximate and be put forward by way of illustration.

First there is the surplus population in agriculture. W. E. Moore calculated this by estimating what was a 'reasonable' European standard of agricultural population. The result was as follows :

'STANDARD' AND 'SURPLUS' AGRICULTURAL POPULATIONS,
EASTERN EUROPE, AROUND 1930

	Population Dependent on Agriculture ooo's omitted	'Standard' Population ooo's omitted	'Surplus' Population Number ooo's omitted	'Surplus' Population Per cent
Czechoslovakia	.. 4,812	5,038	—226	—4.7
Hungary	.. 4,472	3,471	1,001	22.4
Poland	.. 19,347	9,425	9,922	51.3
Rumania	.. 13,069	6,348	6,721	51.4
Bulgaria	.. 4,088	1,921	2,167	53.0
Yugoslavia	.. 10,629	4,097	6,532	61.5
Albania	.. 800	178	622	77.7
Total	57,217	30,478	26,739	46.7

(op. cit. pp. 63-4).

46.7 per cent, nearly half the agricultural population of Eastern Europe, is 'surplus' population.

Out of its active population, employable in industry and services, agriculture can dispense with about 12 million people.

This calculation of W. E. Moore is based on the assumption that if the average level of production of agricultural goods for Europe as a whole were to prevail in Eastern Europe, there would be a surplus population of 26.7 million, of whom 12 million would be employable. But if it is assumed that the level of output remains unaltered, then the resulting calculation of surplus employable population will be different. Such a calculation was made by PEP which estimates that in 1937 the agricultural overpopulation in the Eastern European countries was 14-15 million (i.e., about half W. E. Moore's figure) of which about 6 million were employable in industry and services.

The war led to a considerable change as regards the 'surplus' agricultural population in Poland. The population of Poland dropped from an estimated 35,090,000 in 1938 to an estimated 23,800,000 in 1948, as a result of the killing of 6 million inhabitants by the Nazis and changes in the eastern frontiers which transferred 6 million Ukrainians and White Russians to the U.S.S.R. About 32,100,000 people lived within the present frontiers before the war. It seems, therefore, that Poland has 'solved' the problem and may be excluded from the list of countries with an agricultural overpopulation. Even so the overpopulation in the countries of Eastern Europe as a whole remains a vast problem: according to W. E. Moore there is a

'surplus' agricultural population of 17 million, according to PEP, 9 million.

Another factor is the natural increase of population. Eastern Europe is undergoing the so-called 'vital revolution'—more precisely its first half. During this stage (through which Western Europe passed during the nineteenth century) the death rate declines steeply (as a result of better hygienic conditions, etc.), while the birth rate does not fall. The natural increase of population is therefore very high. In the second half of the 'vital revolution' the birth rate falls quickly (the stage which Western Europe has reached). Today the annual increase of population is three times higher in the East than in the West of Europe. Only after the majority of the population has been urbanised (with the resulting increase in the use of birth control) will Eastern Europe get over the first half of the vital revolution. Meanwhile, according to the PEP study, there is in Eastern Europe an annual increase of 610 thousand people of working age, employable in industry and services (free professions, etc.). They will have to be absorbed in the course of industrial development, as well as the present 6 or so million surplus agricultural population. The dimensions of the problem will be appreciated when it is realised that the estimated annual intake into mining and manufacturing industry in the years 1935-7 in these countries was only 270 thousand. If there were an annual intake of 700 thousand into mining and manufacturing industry and services, it would take two generations merely to absorb the surplus agricultural population, without lowering the density of the agricultural population to the level prevailing in Western Europe.

Even this modest industrialisation would require vast capital expenditure. K. Mandelbaum in his book *The Industrialisation of Backward Areas*, Oxford, 1945, estimated the capital requirement per newly employed worker in modern large scale industry in Eastern Europe at £450. In calculating the total cost of the industrialisation of East Europe, account must also be taken of investments needed in public utilities connected with industrialisation (houses, roads, electricity, gas and water supply, etc.), which would, at least, double the amount. On this basis the employment of 700 thousand additional people per year would require about £600-650 million (in pre-war

prices) or 2,400-2,600 million dollars. This is a huge sum in relation to the national income of the East European countries, which Colin Clark estimates at:

Country	National Income in Internation Units*					
	(ooo,ooo)					
Poland	3,428
Czechoslovakia	2,680
Hungary	1,205
Rumania	1,471
Yugoslavia	1,352
Bulgaria	524
					Total	10,660

The 2,400-2,600 million dollars which would have to be invested in order to provide employment for 700,000 additional people per annum in industry and services makes up 22-24 per cent of the real national income.[†] Before the war, the average yearly investments in Eastern Europe equalled only 4 per cent of the (real) national income.

Obviously industrialisation on this scale without help from abroad would require an investment of far greater sums than the inhabitants of the region would be prepared to save voluntarily. The process of capital accumulation would appear to the majority of the people as a coercive driving force alien to their interests. Forced industrialisation on a large enough scale to absorb in two generations the yearly natural increase of the employable population and the agricultural overpopulation can be carried out only by forcing people to save. It will have a fundamental influence on all economic relations between people—between the workers and peasants on the one hand and the state on the other, between the rulers and the ruled—as well as on the economic and therefore political relations between different states, and between the satellites and the 'mother' country. But before considering all these problems, it is necessary to examine the influence of Russia on the accumulation of capital in Eastern Europe.

*'International Unit' is defined as the amount of goods and services that could be purchased for 1 dollar in the U.S. over the average of the decade 1925-34. (Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress*, London, 1940, p. 40).

[†]K. Mandelbaum, who dealt specifically and in great detail with the industrialisation of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Greece, calculated that the absorption of 700,000 annually into industry and services would require 'rather more than 15 per cent of the combined national income'. (The substitution of Czechoslovakia for Greece would not fundamentally alter the calculation as the national income per head would be only 9 per cent higher on the basis of Colin Clark's figures.)

CHAPTER IV

RUSSIA AND THE ECONOMY OF THE SATELLITE STATES



Lack of Capital in U.S.S.R.

The extent to which Russia can assist in the industrialisation of Eastern Europe is determined primarily by the level of her national income compared with that of her satellites. On this point Colin Clark has given an unequivocal reply:

Country			Period	Real Income per Head of Working Population in International Units
Czechoslovakia	1925-27	455
Hungary	1925-34	359
Poland	"	352
Yugoslavia	"	330
Bulgaria	"	284
Rumania	1925-39	243
<hr/>				
Average		344
U.S.S.R.	1937	379

(*Ibid.* pp. 40, 86).

The average real income per head of occupied population was lower in U.S.S.R. than in Czechoslovakia but higher than in the other Eastern European countries. The average figure in these countries was about 10 per cent lower than in U.S.S.R. For the sake of comparison it is important to remember that the real income per head of occupied population over the period 1925-34 (i.e., including the 1929-33 slump) was in Britain 1,069 and in U.S.A. 1,381, 182 per cent and 264 per cent higher respectively than in U.S.S.R. in 1937.

Another consideration must be taken into account. The accumulation of capital is dependent not only on an income level which makes it possible to save by abstaining from immediate consumption, but equally necessarily requires that there should be available to the saver (directly or indirectly) the capital goods which he needs. If peasants abstain from consuming half their products, they cannot invest the surplus

in railway construction, unless there is somebody ready to supply, in exchange for their agricultural products, the rails, locomotives, etc. In this connection, the supply of capital goods, the ability of Russia to help the countries of Eastern Europe, is even more limited. Russia's income is not big enough for part of it to be devoted to investments in Eastern Europe. Her heavy industries producing capital goods—the main constituent of any new investment—are much too weak to spare much for her satellites. This would have been absolutely clear had we been able to compare the amount of capital goods produced per capita in the U.S.S.R. with that produced in the countries of the West, but the necessary statistics for such a comparison are not available, and we shall have to resort to a less exact means of comparison to throw light on the subject. We shall compare the production in different countries of steel, the chief material from which capital goods are made. In the U.S.S.R. in 1937 105 kgs. of steel per capita were produced, as against 397 in the U.S.A. (1929), 291 in Germany (1929), 279 in England (1929), and 188 in France (1929).

The *Manchester Guardian* of 19 May, 1949, dealt with the need of the satellite states for capital goods and Russia's inability to satisfy it:

'... Russia's satellites do genuinely want more trade across the Iron Curtain. They badly need both machinery from Western Europe itself and raw materials from the British Commonwealth. Trade with Russia has quite failed to take the part in their economy that the West, and Germany especially, used to do. The Russians cannot make enough capital goods both for their own needs and for the industrialisation of Eastern Europe; it is, of course, the satellites who go without.'

This explains why at least two of the satellites, Czechoslovakia and Poland, showed clearly that they wished to take part in the Marshall Plan. On 4th July, 1947, the Czechoslovak Government decided *unanimously* to accept the invitation to the Paris Conference convened to discuss the Marshall Plan. A few days later Gottwald and Masaryk left for Moscow and three days later Prague declared that the Government declined to take part in the Conference. Even when, under Moscow's orders, the satellites fell into line on this question, the

incapacity of Russia to supply their needs made it more and more pressing for them to try to get equipment from Western Europe. This need expressed itself in the case of Yugoslavia in a revolt against the Moscow ukase (see Part III, *The Rebellious Satellite*) and in the case of the other satellites in an appeal to the West to supply the goods—an appeal that, because of its expediency, was not vetoed by Moscow. At the Conference of the Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations, the Polish and Czech delegates asked for trade with Western Europe, by which they could obtain capital goods. The Bulgarian delegate stated that his country could not improve her economic position to any extent without increasing her imports, especially of machines, from the West. (United Nations Documents, E/ECE/SR4/1-25).

Russia, with the majority of her population engaged in agriculture, is faced with the same problem as her satellites (apart from the Czech lands of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria)—large-scale industrialisation. The terrible destruction suffered by the U.S.S.R. in World War II, as well as the preparations for World War III, which require the same materials as industrialisation—steel, coal, machinery, etc.—render Russia even less able to help the countries of Eastern Europe.

Dismantling, Looting, Requisitioning

When the populations of Eastern Europe, mainly of the ex-enemy countries, first met the Russian Army and State officials, they did not see them bringing gifts, supplying machinery, locomotives, etc., but looting their country.

Stalin forgot that the Communist International had preached for years against the reparation articles of the Versailles Treaty, and had reiterated that the German workers bore the real burden of reparations, although they did not profit in any way from the war. In World War II the crimes of the Nazi Army were incomparably worse than those of the Kaiser Army in World War I, yet the German people drew no benefit at all from this. On the contrary, the first victim of the Hitler terror was the German people itself. The 800 thousand German Communists, Socialists, trade unionists, Catholics, etc. (not including the German Jews) who passed through prisons and

concentration camps in the twelve years of Hitler's rule are testimony to this. What magnificent heroism on the part of unarmed and helpless people to challenge the brutal state machine with its all-seeing eye and unlimited terror!

The Communist Parties knew all this very well. Immediately after June 1941 they emphasised that this time, because of Russia's part in the war, no new Versailles Treaty with reparations clauses would be imposed and that the German people would not be made to pay for the crimes of their rulers. The German proletariat, they said, was not more responsible for the war than the English or the French, and they repeated the same views on the question of reparations as the Communist International had after World War I. At that time the leaders of the French Communist Party explained why the French workers should oppose the exaction of reparations from Germany. Thus Gabriel Peri wrote in an article entitled 'On the Eve of the Reparations Conference': '... the workers of France and Germany have only *one* interest, viz., that of forming a revolutionary front against financial capital and the heavy industries in both countries. For the enormous sums at stake (the reparations—YG) will naturally be squeezed out of the working masses'. (*International Press Correspondence*, February 1st, 1929).

But all this changed with the hope of Russian victory. With Russia becoming the Power able to extract reparations, her opposition in principle to reparations vanished. Instead she decided to take reparations on a far larger scale than ever the French Government had dared after World War I.

Edward Charles in his article 'Reparations, 1919-31', in *The Banker* of April, 1945, writes on the reparations that Germany paid after the first world war: 'Reparations before the Dawes Plan brought in some 8 milliard gold marks. From September, 1924, to the end they yielded a further 10 milliards'. There is no reliable calculation of the national income of Germany between the end of the first world war and the introduction of the Dawes Plan. It is therefore impossible to calculate what proportion of the national income reparations made up. But for the years 1924-32 this figure is available. The total national income of Germany for these 9 years was calculated at 564.3 milliard marks, and in the same period

Germany paid reparations to the extent of 9.8 milliard marks, or 1.7 per cent of the national income. In no year after the first world war did the reparations paid by Germany exceed 4 per cent of the national income. To calculate the burden of these reparations, other criteria besides the national income, such as budget revenue or exports, can be applied. The reparations Germany paid rose from 12.9 per cent of the budget revenue of Germany or 9.9 per cent of the value of its exports in 1924-5, to 25.7 per cent and 18.4 per cent respectively in 1928-9.

With regard to Germany's looting of Europe during the second world war, German official statistics admit that up to 1943 the Reich got from the occupied countries 'special incomes' amounting to 50 milliard marks. British official estimates give a figure of 12.8 milliard dollars for the same period. The two figures thus nearly tally. Nearly all the German robbery took place immediately after the occupation. If we, therefore, assume that the annual looting of the occupied countries by Germany after 1943 was the same as the annual average of 1939 to 1943, we shall certainly not underestimate it: on this basis the total German looting amounted to 20-25 milliard dollars.

A comparison between the reparations paid by Germany after the first world war—about 18 milliard marks or 3.6 milliard dollars—with the 'reparations' that Germany took from Europe in the second world war—20-25 milliard dollars—reveals the increasingly plunderous character of declining capitalism, as exemplified by the Hitler regime.

Russia's attitude to the question of reparations after the second world war was expressed clearly by Prof. Varga in an article published in *War and the Working Class*, 15th October, 1943. He concluded that Germany must pay reparations to the tune of 90 milliard marks or about 22 milliard dollars, and he stated that the Russian government asked in addition for ten million German workers to be sent to Russia for reconstruction work.

A claim for such large reparations, coupled with a demand for ten million workers, i.e., nearly a third of the total German working class, was incompatible with the existence of Germany as an important industrial country. At Yalta, consequently,

Stalin had to demand that 80 per cent of German industry should be dismantled within two years of the cease-fire. (James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, London, 1948, pp. 26-7).

In view of the division of Germany between East and West, Russia did not want to exclude the possibility of the Communist Party's influencing the German people, and so she did not press her claim for ten million slave labourers or the dismantling of 80 per cent of German industry. Nevertheless the total sum lost by Germany directly and indirectly under the post-war arrangements in the East exceeded the total sum for which Varga asked.

It is difficult to get a full picture of this looting, as it was carried out in many guises, and those responsible for it were of course extremely anxious to conceal what was happening. But the following facts are incontestable.

First, millions of Germans were expelled from their homes and lost their property. The President of Poland, Bierut, estimated that Poland's gains in the West, i.e., from Germany, have an investment value of $9\frac{1}{2}$ milliard dollars. The property of the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia was estimated at 4 milliard dollars. If we assume that the rest of the Germans who inhabited the former territory of Poland, Hungary, Rumania, etc., were on the average as wealthy as the inhabitants of the portion of Eastern Germany that was annexed to Poland and the Sudeten region, their property must be evaluated at about 6 milliard dollars. Therefore the expulsion of the Germans alone brought in 'reparations' amounting to about 20 milliard dollars.

The Yalta Agreement decided in principle that Germany would pay reparations amounting to 20 milliard dollars, half of which would go to Russia.

Unlike what happened after the first world war, after this war no figures were published of the quantity of reparations taken or the form in which they were taken.

Reparations from Rumania

The armistice imposed on Rumania required payment to Russia of reparations in the form of goods amounting in value to 300 million dollars in 1938 world market prices, or 700-800 million dollars today. The reparations were made up as

follows:—petroleum products, 50 per cent; ships, barges, locomotives and industrial equipment, 32 per cent; agricultural goods and timber 18 per cent. The second group did not make up even as much as 10 per cent of Rumanian exports before the war.

There are no estimates of the proportion of the national income which these reparations represent. The only clue is that given in June 1947 by the vice-Premier, Tatarescu, who gave the proportion as 50 per cent of the total production of Rumanian industry. It would be very unwise to accept this figure uncritically, as it was given on the eve of Tătărescu's conflict with the Communist Party which ended in his expulsion from the Government. Even if it were accurate, this figure would not be very useful as it relates only to industrial production, and not to the whole national product.

In addition to the reparations, Rumania had to give as restitution for goods looted from Russia 100,000 wagon loads of cereals, 260,000 head of cattle, 5,500 wagon loads of sugar, 250 tractors. (Of course, most of the loot taken from Russia by the Rumanians when they occupied it had already been destroyed and lost, and 'restitution' meant taking new products or those in good condition.)

The most important machinery of the Ploesti Oil Refineries was dismantled by the Russian military authorities, and the Rumanians also had to hand over a fifth of the machinery of the textile and metallurgical industries. It must also be remembered that the Russian army lived off the land. There are no statistics of the total cost thus incurred by the country, but it was certainly very great. According to the estimate made in February, 1946, by La Guardia, who was the head of U.N.R.R.A. at the time, the four occupation armies in Austria cost the country 200 million dollars a year. For three years the Russian army in Rumania was not smaller than all the four occupation armies in Austria put together at the beginning of 1946. In view of the complete silence of the Russian authorities about the amount of reparations they took from Rumania, it is impossible to ignore the estimate given by the U.S. delegate to the Paris Peace Conference, Willard L. Thorp, who said on September 23rd, 1946, that Rumania paid in reparations of all kinds 1,050 million dollars and that he estimated that

950 million dollars remained to be paid. E. D. Tappe wrote: 'It has been estimated that in fact Roumania, from the armistice to 1 June 1948, paid the U.S.S.R. \$1,785 million in goods, etc.; a figure which would represent 84 per cent of Roumania's national income for that period.' (R. R. Betts, editor, *Central and South East Europe, 1945-1948*, London, 1950, pp. 20-21).

Reparations from Hungary

Hungary had to pay reparations in goods amounting to 300 million dollars at 1938 prices, 200 million to U.S.S.R., 50 million to Czechoslovakia and 50 million to Yugoslavia. Industrial goods constituted 83 per cent and agricultural goods 17 per cent of this total. Yet in 1936-7, the proportion of agricultural goods in the total exports of Hungary was 62 per cent, while industrial goods did not make up even a third of all the exports. From this it is clear that Hungarian industry had to make a tremendous effort to supply the reparation goods, especially in view of the terrible devastation her industry suffered in the war, and her own great needs.

An U.N.R.R.A. estimate shows that in 1945, 94 per cent of the working capacity of the metal and engineering industries in Hungary was being used for reparation-goods for Russia. The British parliamentary delegation which visited Hungary in the spring of 1946 estimated that reparation demands amounted to 18 per cent of the national income.

The Hungarian budget for the year 1946-7 set aside for reparations a sum eight times bigger than that allocated to reconstruction (and we must not forget that a large part of the Russian loot is not even included in the budget as it was taken from industries officially in Russian hands). On 23 July, 1946, in a note to the Soviet Government, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow pointed out that half the current industrial production of Hungary was absorbed in meeting Russia's demands. In some industries, including coal, iron and machine production the proportion was 80-90 per cent. At the Peace Conference in Paris in October, 1946, the U.S. representatives claimed that in the year since the armistice about 35 per cent of the national income of Hungary was spent on the costs of Soviet reparations, occupation and requisitions. The British parliamentary delega-

tion mentioned above estimated the occupation costs at 12 per cent of the national income of Hungary, making with reparations a total of 30 per cent. Now that the Russian Army has been very much reduced and production has passed the pre-war level, the importance of reparations, acquisitions, etc., in the national income has very much declined. According to T. Mende, who was not unsympathetic to the post-war regime in Hungary, they amounted to 7-11 per cent of the national income (*Fortnightly Review*, July, 1948). When Ernö Gerö, the Minister of Finance, introduced the budget for 1949 in the Hungarian parliament on December 15th, 1948, he said that in 1948, 25.4 per cent of the total expenditure went to pay the reparations, while in 1949, 9.8 per cent of the budget would be allocated for this purpose. This reduction is due largely to the fact that Russia cancelled 50 per cent of the remainder of the reparations from July, 1948.

The value of dismantled machinery, locomotives, wagons, etc., taken by the Russian army in Hungary was estimated at 124 million dollars, and the requisitions of the Russian army that lived on the country were very great. According to the American note of 23rd July, 1946, the Soviet forces had up to June, 1945, taken out of Hungary four million tons of wheat, rye, barley, maize and oats (the total pre-war annual production of these grains was a little over 7 million tons). Of the foodstuffs available for the urban population in the second half of 1945 the Soviet army had appropriated nearly all the meat, one-sixth of the wheat and rye, one-quarter of the legumes, nearly three-quarters of the lard, a tenth of the vegetable oils and a fifth of the milk and dairy products. The note added that extensive requisitioning of food was going on as late as April, 1946. And we must not forget that at the same time the food shortage in Hungary was so serious that not more than 850 calories a day per person were provided, which was even fewer than in Germany and Austria. The death rate, especially among babies, reached alarming proportions.

Even countries which were not allies of Germany during the war did not escape the Russian appetite for loot. 60 big industrial enterprises in the Sudeten region and a number of enterprises in other parts of Czechoslovakia were dismantled by the Russian army. In the part of Germany annexed to

Poland the Russian army dismantled, according to the estimates of the Communist Minister of Industry, Hilary Minc, 25-30 per cent of all the industrial equipment of the area. (Speech delivered in Warsaw on 20th October, 1945). In Old Poland too, the Russian army dismantled machinery, notably in the Lodz and Bialystok textile works.*

Trade Between Russia and her Satellites

An important feature of the foreign trade policy of Russia and her satellites is the tendency towards self-sufficiency or autarchy. The following table illustrates this as far as Russia herself is concerned:

U.S.S.R. FOREIGN TRADE (IN MILLION PRE-1914 GOLD RUBLES)					
Year				Export	Import
1913†	1520.1	1375.0
1924/5..	577.8	723.4
1927/8..	791.6	945.5
1932	574.9	704.0
1937	377.2	294.2
1938	287.8	300.4

The tendency towards economic isolation from the West on the part of the satellites is shown by the following table dealing with the foreign trade of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria: (see top of page 63).

As Yugoslavia did not publish figures of foreign trade for the years 1947 and 1948 it was not possible to take them into consideration in drawing up this table. Otherwise the tendency of these countries to trade mainly among themselves and with Russia and to restrict trade relations with countries independent of Russia would have been even more pronounced.

It would of course be one-sided to conclude that this tendency is entirely the result of the choice of these countries them-

*Incidentally, even backward China was not left untouched by the greed of the Russian bureaucracy. In June, 1946, Edwin Pauley, U.S. Reparations Commissioner, visited Manchuria and inspected 80 per cent of the Japanese war industry. In his report he stated that the Russian removal of equipment was on such a scale as to retard Manchuria's development by a generation and reduce the country to an agricultural economy. The principal items of equipment removed were machine tools and electrical equipment, although in some cases whole plants were completely stripped. Steel production was reduced by more than 50 per cent. Pauley estimated that altogether the machinery dismantled by the Russians was worth 850 million dollars. (*The World Today*, August, 1946). That this was a very heavy burden for Manchuria is clear from the fact that in 1932-1943 the total Japanese investments in Manchuria were evaluated at 5,393 million yen (about 1,200 million dollars).

†In the pre-1914 boundaries.

EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES' FOREIGN TRADE
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN 1938 PRICES)

	Import			Export		
	1938	1947	1948	1938	1947	1948
Trade among themselves and with U.S.S.R. ..	154	184*	355*	161	162*	314*
Trade with other countries ..	750	458†	411†	920	276†	384†
Total	904	642	766	1,081	438	698
And in percentages:						
Trade among themselves and with U.S.S.R. ..	17.0	28.6	46.3	14.9	37.0	45.0
Trade with other countries ..	83.0	71.4	53.7	85.1	63.0	55.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

(Calculated from the table on pp. 66-7 of United Nations *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, Geneva, 1949).

selves. To a very considerable extent it was imposed on them by impediments to East-West trade, for which the U.S.A. is responsible. She herself and all the countries who get Marshall Aid enforced an embargo on the export to Eastern Europe of strategic goods, as defined by the secret list of the State Department which covers, apparently, nearly all capital equipment.† This has been denounced on many occasions by the governments of Eastern Europe. (See, for instance, the speeches of the representatives of the Russian bloc of countries in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe).

But equally certainly the 'Iron Curtain' created by the United States is not the only, or even the chief, cause of the tendency of members of the Russian bloc to trade mainly among themselves. This becomes clear from an examination of the trend of Russian foreign trade since 1929, when it was not faced by conditions of economic blockade. During the world depression it was very easy for any country willing to *buy* to come to bilateral trade agreements with other countries. This is illustrated by Germany's trade with the countries of Eastern

*excluding Yugoslavia.

†excluding trade between Germany and Yugoslavia.

†According to Poland's Foreign Minister, Modzelewski, this term is interpreted to include 'cotton linters, synthetic resin, condenser tubes, radio valves, measuring apparatus, gramophone recording discs, needles for the textile industry, ball bearings, etc.'. (Speech in the second committee of the United Nations General Assembly, 2nd November, 1948).

Europe since 1936. Yet Russia took advantage of this to only a small extent. (See table above).*

In 1938, U.S.S.R. and the countries of Eastern Europe bought 17 per cent of their imports from each other (in this case including Yugoslavia), in 1948 they bought 46.3 per cent (in this case excluding Yugoslavia), while the corresponding percentages for exports were 14.9 per cent and 45 per cent.

An analysis of the item 'Trade among themselves and with U.S.S.R.' reveals a very illuminating fact. The trade between the Eastern European countries themselves is not much larger today than it was before the war, but their trade with U.S.S.R. has increased tremendously:

	IMPORTS (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN 1938 PRICES)			EXPORTS		
	1938	1947	1948	1938	1947	1948
Trade among Eastern European countries themselves ..	147	87	186	147	87	186
Trade between Eastern European countries and U.S.S.R.	7	97*	169*	14	75*	128*

*excluding Yugoslavia.

While the foreign trade of the countries of Eastern Europe with each other was 27 per cent higher in 1948 than in 1938, their imports from U.S.S.R. rose by 2,314 per cent, and their exports to U.S.S.R. by 814 per cent. It must be remembered that 'reparations' to Russia are not included in these figures and that while Yugoslavia's trade with the other countries of Eastern Europe is included, her trade with U.S.S.R. in 1948 is not. Otherwise the rise would have been even bigger.

The long-term trade agreements between U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European countries stipulated a continuation of the expansion of their mutual trade in 1949 over 1948. Thus the trade of the U.S.S.R. with Poland was due to rise by some 35 per cent, with Czechoslovakia by more than 45 per cent, while trade with Rumania was to be more than doubled and that with Hungary to be trebled. U.S.S.R. trade with Yugo-

*This shows how demagogic is the slogan of the Communist Party in Britain today—'Trade with U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies!'—which assumes that these countries, in contradistinction to the U.S.A., indulge in trade with no political strings attached, that they are ready to trade on a large scale with Britain or any other country that is not under the same political system. Yet U.S.S.R. and her satellites broke nearly all trade relations with Yugoslavia after the Stalin-Tito clash. See pp. 238-9.

slavia on the other hand was to be curtailed in 1949 to a bare eighth of the 1948 value.

The economic needs of these countries will tend to lead in time to increasing integration of their economies and increasing trade among themselves (already today there is a considerable increase in the trade of Czechoslovakia with Poland and a number of other satellites). But so long as their political systems remain unchanged, trade between the satellites will remain subordinated to the trade of each of them with Russia. The pattern of the trade is moulded within the framework of an increasingly autarchic Empire. The establishment of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (or 'Comecon') in January, 1949, to co-ordinate the trade of the 'People's Democracies' with each other and the U.S.S.R. came to fortify Russian *Grossraumwirtschaft*.

Let us now pass from the quantities of goods exchanged to their quality. The commodity composition of the present trade between Russia and her satellites is very different from that between an industrial imperialist power and her agrarian colonies. Thus while Britain is a great importer of raw materials and foodstuffs from her colonies and supplies them with manufactured goods, and while a similar relationship existed between Germany and the countries of Eastern Europe before the second world war, Russia both exports and imports primary products and manufactured goods to and from her satellites. She supplies them with tractors and industrial machinery as well as raw materials such as cotton, iron ore, manganese, chemicals and grain. She also imports from them machinery (Czechoslovakia, Hungary) and manufactured consumer goods. Russia supplies raw materials and gets a portion of the manufactured goods produced from the raw materials, e.g., she gives cotton and gets cotton goods, gives leather (especially to Czechoslovakia) and gets shoes, etc. This composition of Russia's trade with her satellites shows that she is faced with a problem similar to theirs—the industrialisation of the country.*

The prices Russia pays for the commodities she buys from her satellites and the prices she takes for what she sells to them

*In the future, it seems, it will be impossible to find out how the foreign trade of the Russian satellites is divided among different countries, as instead of the foreign trade being evaluated in dollars it will be evaluated in rubles (as is already being done in Poland).

are, for some reason, kept secret. While it is easy to find out, for example, how many yards of cotton goods Britain sold in 1948 to various countries, and at what prices, information about the quantity of cotton goods supplied to Russia by Hungary and their price is as jealously guarded as a military secret. Tito, after the rift with the Cominform, could say that there was 'capitalist trade among socialist countries'. No official of the Cominform has denied that capitalist principles of trade prevail among the 'People's Democracies' and between them and Russia, far less attempted to show what other principles prevail. One of the essential characteristics of capitalist trade is that when one side is in a monopolistic position it can generally buy more cheaply and sell more dearly than the other. The tendency towards autarchy of Russia and her satellites and the political power of the Kremlin over the governments of the satellites—which are, of course, connected phenomena—put each of the satellites into a position of utter dependence on the monopolist trader. This explains both the scarcity of information on prices and the deleterious character for Russia of the information which did leak out and which would otherwise have been inexplicable.

The Polish-Soviet agreement dated August 16th, 1945, stipulated that from 1946 onwards, Poland was to deliver to U.S.S.R. at a special price the following quantities of coal: 1946, 8 million tons; from 1947 to 1950, 13 million tons each year; and subsequently 12 million tons annually as long as the occupation of Germany continued. This coal, however cheap it was, was not to be paid for by Russian products but by reparations taken from Germany by Russia and transferred to Poland. According to Prof. W. J. Rose, the price agreed on was said to be 2 dollars per ton (*Poland Old and New*, London, 1948, p. 290). Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, who was Vice-Premier of Poland at the time, reports that the agreement was for an even lower price, 1.25 dollars a ton (*The Pattern of Soviet Domination*, London, 1948, pp. 158-9). As far as is known, Poland did not get anything on this account. Russia's excuse could be very simple: the Western Powers did not carry out their obligations to supply Russia with reparations from Western Germany. Anyhow, 12-13 million tons of coal at 2 or 1.25 dollars a ton, was extremely cheap. At the time of the

signing of the Polish-Soviet agreement Denmark and Sweden were offering Poland 12 dollars a ton, subsequently to be raised to 16 dollars. The robbery of Poland through this transaction alone amounted to over 100 million dollars a year*. In 1948, Russia cut her demands for Polish coal to 7 million tons a year; even so this is a heavy commitment for Poland.

Another example of these sharp trade practices is given by Felix Belair in the *New York Herald Tribune* (quoted by E. Germain, 'L'Europe orientale depuis deux ans', *Quatrième Internationale*, Paris, March-April, 1949). He quotes the case of the agreement of U.S.S.R. with Czechoslovakia by which shoes manufactured from leather supplied by U.S.S.R. to the former Bata Plants were sold to Russia at a price fixed at 170 Crowns although the actual cost price per pair was 300 Crowns. At the same time, when Czechoslovakia was forced by the severe drought of 1947-8 to buy 600 thousand tons of grain from Russia, she was made to pay more than 4 dollars a bushel, while the United States sold a bushel of grain for 2.5 dollars. The price charged was thus over 50 per cent higher than that prevailing in the world market. Another example is that of Bulgarian tobacco. Russia bought four-fifths of Bulgaria's 1948 tobacco crop so cheaply that she could afford to sell it to Italy for dollars at a price which undercut by 35 per cent the Bulgarians who were also trying to secure dollars with the remainder of their tobacco. 'Borba' of 31 March, 1949, remainder of their tobacco. 'Borba' of 31 March, 1949, printed the following fact: while it cost Yugoslavia 500,000 dinars to produce one ton of molybdenum—the essential ingredient of steel—Russia before the Stalin-Tito rift, paid only 45,000 dinars a ton.

The 'Advantage' of being a Colony of an Industrially Backward Imperialist Power

The industrial backwardness of the imperialist country can have one good result for the colonies which is not usually offered by a highly industrialized imperialist country. *Because* of her backwardness the imperialist country looks upon the colonies as an *additional source of industrial strength*, supporting

*To get some idea of this amount, it is worth mentioning that British capitalists never got such a large annual profit out of their investments in India.

her in world competition. She is therefore more kindly disposed towards industrial development in her colonies than a highly industrialized imperialist country.

The best example of this is Japan's policy in Manchuria. F. Sternberg in his book *The Coming Crisis*, London, 1947, writes: 'When Great Britain and France founded their empires they were both leading industrial countries. Their empires were never intended to strengthen their own industrial position. Japan was in a very different situation. Her aim was to achieve a rate of development which would reduce the industrial gap between her and the other capitalist countries, and to become at least as strong and if possible still stronger than they were'. (p.73).

The result was an unparalleled export of Japanese capital to Manchuria :

JAPANESE INVESTMENTS IN MANCHURIA
(MILLION YEN)

1932	97.2
1933	151.2
1934	271.7
1935	378.6
1936	263.0
1937	348.3
1938	439.5
1939	1,103.7
1940-43	2,340.0

(For 1932-9, G. C. Allen, M. S. Gordon, E. F. Penrose, E. B. Schumpeter, *The Industrialisation of Japan and Manchuria, 1932-1940*, New York, 1940, p. 399; for 1940-43, A. J. Grajdanzev, 'Manchuria: An Industrial Survey', *Far Eastern Survey*, December, 1945).

The Manchurian Five-Year Plan (1937-41) provided for an investment of 2,800 million yen, which was subsequently raised to 4,800 million in the revised plan, and then, in September, 1938, to 6,000 million yen. This could not be achieved because of Japan's lack of equipment, and her scarcity of labour in general and of skilled labour in particular. Investments reached only about 3,000 million yen in the period laid down by the Plan. But even this expressed a very big rise in production, as the following table shows:

Year	OUTPUT OF SOME PRODUCTS OF MANCHURIA			
	Coal (million tons)	Iron Ore (million tons)	Pig-iron (thousand tons)	Electricity (million kwh.)
1932	..	7.1	0.7	368.2
1936	..	13.6	1.3	633.4
1940	..	21.0	—	1,061.2
1944	..	30.0	5.3 (1943)	1,174.9

(K. L. Mitchell *Industrialization of the Western Pacific*, New York, 1942, pp. 75-78; Allan Rodgers, 'The Manchurian Iron and Steel Industry and its Resource Base', *Geographical Review*, New York, January, 1948; A. J. Grajdanzev, op. cit.)

The steel industry, established in 1935, was after a few years producing more than a million tons per annum. Machinery factories were established, which supplied the majority of equipment for Manchurian industry; in 1939 a car industry was established which planned to employ 100,000 workers; a large aeroplane factory was begun; the railways of Manchuria increased from 5,570 kilometers in 1932 to 15,000 kms. in 1943—more than the whole railway system of China proper.

In view of this development, it is clear why one writer could say: 'Manchuria . . . was to be developed as an extension of the homeland'. (Allan Rodgers, *op. cit.*) Sternberg remarked:

'The given historical conditions in which Japanese imperialism developed caused it to encourage and force the development of industrialisation in its empire, whilst different historical conditions caused the European imperialists to prevent or retard industrial development in their empires.' (*op. cit.* p. 74).

'In the ten years between Japan's invasion of Manchuria and her entry into the Second World War (1931-41) she so accelerated the industrialisation of Manchuria that although Manchuria's population is only about 10 per cent of British India's, as much, if not more, industry was created there in one decade as was created in India in a century of imperialist rule.' (*Ibid.* p. 73).

The industrialisation of Manchuria was not left to the blind, unorganised activity of the different Japanese companies, but was carried out by mixed companies of the state and the trusts according to a plan. Such organisation was necessary for rapid industrialisation. (At the same time, while Japanese imperialism encouraged the industrial development—mainly of heavy industries—in Manchuria, it hampered and even ruined the industries of other regions of China: thus in Shanghai, after the textile industries were bombed, the machinery that remained intact was looted and taken to Japan proper. Thus the policy of industrialisation was not all-sided, but distorted and limited to the interests of Japanese capitalism).

Two examples nearer home may be cited—the great development and importance of Ukrainian industry and that of Polish light industry in backward Tsarist Russia; the part of Poland which fell into the hands of industrially advanced Prussia remained very backward, lagging far behind Russian Poland.

Russia's need 'to reduce the industrial gap between her and the other countries' will compel her to look upon the satellites as 'an extension of the homeland', to try to develop them industrially, even if because of her poverty, bureaucratic mismanagement, and various other factors, she can do so only in a very unsatisfactory way. All the time she will of course reserve for herself the first fruits of their industrial development.

CHAPTER V

THE ECONOMIC PLANS OF THE SATELLITES



ALL THE satellite countries have introduced economic Plans. These plans are of two kinds: the short-term plans, which ran from 1947 to 1948-9, whose aim was recovery, and the long-term plans, which began in 1949 or 1950, whose aim is to raise production considerably above the pre-war level. Yugoslavia alone did not undertake the two kinds of plans but started with a Five Year Plan (1947-51), while Rumania has not yet gone beyond the scope of one-year plans (she intends to introduce a Five Year Plan in 1951). Let us examine the main features of the plans.

The long-term plans have very ambitious targets of output. They fix an annual increase in the gross national product of 8 per cent in Czechoslovakia, 10 per cent in Hungary and Poland, 12 per cent in Bulgaria and 14 per cent in Yugoslavia. As regards the annual increase in manufactured products, it is 9 per cent in Czechoslovakia, 11 per cent in Poland, 13 per cent in Hungary, 17 per cent in Bulgaria and 37 per cent in Yugoslavia.

To arrive at a correct conception of what these percentages mean, it is necessary to know on what basis these percentual calculations have been made. For instance, the industrial production in the U.S. and British Zones of Germany rose between December, 1946, and December, 1948, by 137 per cent, or on a yearly average by 68.5 per cent, but this in itself does not signify any really spectacular achievement for Germany, since in December, 1946, the level of production was exceptionally low, and even after the increase of 137 per cent, it did not reach the pre-war level. It is difficult to discover what is the exact starting point from which the plans of the Eastern European countries set out, as there is very little

information available on the subject. It is known that the agricultural output in the basic year was, in percentage of pre-war output, in Bulgaria, 70 per cent; in Czechoslovakia, 80 per cent; in Hungary, 85 per cent; in Poland, 70 per cent; in Yugoslavia, 69 per cent. As regards the industrial output in the basic year, it was, in comparison with the pre-war level, in Czechoslovakia, 102 per cent; in Poland, 133 per cent; in Bulgaria, 170 per cent. As far as Poland is concerned, it must be borne in mind that the addition of the 'Regained Territories' doubles her industrial capacity. It is not known how much weight is given in the plans to industrial as compared with agricultural output in the total national output. The rise of the total national production would have been considerably less proportionately if any year *before* and not *after* the war had been chosen as the basic year, since agricultural output in the 'basic year' was in each country below the pre-war level of output and industrial output was above while only a small minority of the population was engaged in industry.

In addition, it is obvious that in general any calculation in percentages of the rise of output that does not take into consideration the absolute magnitude of the basis will paint a rosier picture the more backward the country is. Thus if Yugoslavia's Five Year Plan envisages an increase in the output of crude steel of 223 per cent in 1951 above the level of 1939, it might leave the impression that the achievements of Yugoslavia's steel industry will be four times greater than that of the United States between 1937 and 1948, when she increased her output by 56 per cent. But if the achievement of the industries of the two countries is described in absolute magnitudes, a totally different impression is given. The production of Yugoslavia's steel industry will rise, if the Plan is fulfilled, from 240 thousand tons to 760 thousand tons, i.e., by a little more than half a million tons; while that of the U.S.A. rose from 51.4 million tons to 80.3 million, i.e., by 28.9 million tons. André Philip, French delegate to the Economic Commission for Europe, illustrated this point by saying that his grandson had recently cut a second tooth, thus increasing his dental production by 100 per cent—but he still had less teeth than most people.

There is another aspect to the question. Figures of the rise in output, when the amount of investment or disinvestment is

not taken into account, can be misleading. If the owner of a factory does not renew its machinery, buildings, and so forth, but instead builds a new factory which is equal in value to the depreciation of the old, then the *immediate* result is that two factories are producing instead of one, and the output rises, although the amount of his capital remains unchanged, and after the total depreciation of his old factory, output will decline to the level of only one factory. The same principle holds good for the countries of Eastern Europe, where the rise in output over the past few years has not been accompanied by a parallel increase in the investment of capital. In some cases, it has even been accompanied by disinvestment, as the following table, dealing with agriculture, shows:

	LEVEL OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION			ESTIMATED NET INVESTMENT IN FIXED CAPITAL IN AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES	
	INDEX NUMBERS.	1934-8 = 100		(IN MILLION DOLLARS, 1938 PRICES)	
	1946/7	1947/8	1948/9	1947	1948
Bulgaria ..	67	71	—	—13	—11
Czechoslovakia ..	80	62	80	—21	—19
Hungary ..	57	67	85	—11	—5
Poland ..	46	59	70	—5	11

(U.N. *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, Geneva, 1949, pp. 17, 51)

(In order not to get a false picture one should bear in mind that the negative balance of investments in agriculture in fixed capital may have been offset by an increase in livestock, which is not included in the figures).

Another example of the same phenomenon is the textile and clothing industry of Poland. This showed a big rise in output in 1947, and at the same time a net disinvestment of 10 million dollars in 1938 prices (Ibid. p. 53).

Another factor must be taken into account. In the backward conditions of Eastern Europe, even a small addition to the net investment may bring about a disproportionately large addition to the output, the more so—in the short run—if certain whole new industries are built while other plants or branches of industry are starved of capital.

Even with these reservations, the investment plans of the countries of Eastern Europe should not be underestimated, though the statistics are really related to gross new investments (without depreciation being taken into account). In absolute figures the targets were:

CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
(MILLION DOLLARS 1948 PRICES)

Country	Period	Total	Yearly
Poland ..	1947-9	1,950	650
	1950-5	—	—
Czechoslovakia	1947-8	1,340	670
	1949-53	5,800	1,160
Hungary ..	1947-9	570	190
	1950-4	2,200	440
Rumania ..	1949	450	450
Yugoslavia ..	1947-51	2,900	580
Bulgaria ..	1947-8	221	111
	1949-53	850	170

(Ibid. p. 203)

Thus every year a gross investment is planned of about 4 thousand million dollars in 1948 prices. This is a tremendous figure, making up about 20-25 per cent of the national incomes of these countries. Such a large investment, of course, places a heavy burden on the shoulders of the population.

How do these investment targets compare with actual investments in other countries? The gross annual investment, according to the Plans, will be about 45 dollars (at 1948 prices) per head of population. As against this in 1948 the *net* investment *at 1938 prices* (which are about half of 1948 prices) in the countries of Western Europe was: Norway 55 dollars, Sweden 42, United Kingdom 36, Denmark 32, Netherlands 27, France 16, Belgium (1947) 16, Italy 10. (Ibid. p. 48). Thus compared with investments in Western Europe the investments planned in Eastern Europe are not very spectacular.* To realise them will require great sacrifices on the part of the populations and yet are far too small to help, in the foreseeable future, to bridge the gap between the levels of development of Western and Eastern Europe.

The magnitude of the investments planned fall short of these countries' needs of rapid industrialisation. This is clearly revealed by considering the question of how many people will be absorbed in industry in proportion with the agricultural over-population and the natural increase of population. The Polish Plan fixes a total increase of 300,000 in the number of people

*This was reflected most clearly in a comparison of the actual net investments in fixed capital per head of population in 1949 (dollars in 1938 prices): Norway 59, U.K. 41, Sweden 36, Denmark 32, Netherlands 31, France 24; the corresponding figures for the countries of Eastern Europe were: Yugoslavia 12, Hungary 12, Poland 9, Czechoslovakia 8. (United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1949*, Geneva, 1950, p. 39).

in manufacturing industry, the Czechoslovak Plan an increase of 250,000, the Bulgarian Plan an increase of 90,000 and the Hungarian Plan an increase of 300,000 (including industries other than manufacturing). The U.N. Survey that gives these facts, remarks: 'These figures, if related to present employment in manufacturing, indicate a substantial increase. If, however, the figures are related to the total populations of the countries, they are less striking. In the four countries mentioned, additional employment in industry over the plan period accounts for only 1 to 2 per cent of the total population, which in itself is expected to rise by some 5 per cent in the same period' (p. 206).

On many points the plans are silent. Unlike Russia's first Five Year Plan or the plans of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation for Western Europe, the Plans of the 'People's Democracies' contain no information about foreign trade either among themselves or between each of them and Russia, or the West. They also blur over the question of how the total national income will be divided between consumption and accumulation (investment), but contain only some scattered information about the planned consumption of some particular goods. This silence speaks volumes. The non-publication of information about foreign trade is intended to cover up the exploitation of these countries by Russia; the non-publication of information about the division of the national income between consumption and accumulation is intended to cover up the exploitation of the masses under the banner of industrialisation.

This last point about the division of the national income between consumption and accumulation is of vital importance when we attempt to discover the factors determining the living conditions of the masses. Burdened with a terrible backwardness, an autocratic bureaucracy and the yoke of Russian imperialism, industrialisation will inevitably be carried out in such a way that compulsory savings will far surpass what the people themselves would be ready to save of their own free will. In such circumstances, consumption must be subordinated to accumulation, as the experience of Eastern Europe over the past few years (and of twenty years' planning in Russia) has clearly shown. The following table illustrates the 'capital

starvation' of the industries producing consumption goods, while the new capital investment is directed into the capital goods industries:

ESTIMATED NET INVESTMENT IN FIXED CAPITAL IN INDUSTRY IN 1947
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN 1938 PRICES)

		Hungary	Poland
Food processing, etc.	..	-1.7	-1.4
Textiles and clothing	..	0.5	-10.0
Leather and rubber	..	0.1	0.2
Paper and printing	-0.4	-0.5
Timber and timber products		-0.1	0.2
Building materials, etc.	..	-0.7	-1.0
Metals and engineering	5.3	7.4
Chemicals	0.5	6.2
		5.8	13.6
Total manufacturing	3.5	1.1

(Ibid. p. 53)

This is a foretaste of the future.*

As regards agriculture the Plans for all the countries, except Poland, provide that the output shall exceed the pre-war level, by about a sixth in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and a third to a half in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. In Poland it may not exceed its pre-war level in present territory. (Ibid. p. 206).

* In U.S.S.R. the relatively great lag in industries producing means of consumption behind those producing means of production is shown by the following official data of the division of the gross output of industry :

DIVISION OF GROSS OUTPUT OF INDUSTRY INTO MEANS OF PRODUCTION
AND MEANS OF CONSUMPTION (IN PERCENTAGES)

	1913	1928	1932	1937	1940	1942 (Planned)
Means of production	33.3	32.8	53.3	57.8	61.0	62.2
Means of consumption	66.7	67.2	46.7	42.2	39.0	37.8

It is very difficult to check the *absolute* change in the production of different means of consumption. In Russian statistics a number of simple tricks are used to describe the situation in more glowing terms than is true. The output of a number of consumption industries is given only in monetary terms; the production of the small factories which, till 1928, made an important contribution to the production of means of consumption, is not included.

Official statistics can therefore show a tremendous rise in the output of shoes, which, however, cannot be squared with the facts. The number of animals slaughtered annually after the big 'collectivisation' drive never reached the number slaughtered previously, as it was not until 1938 that the total number of livestock reached the 1929 figure (in 1929 cattle numbered 68.1 million, in 1938, 63.2; sheep and goats numbered 147.2 and 102.1 million respectively). At the same time the surplus of imported hides, skins and leather over exported was 54.3 thousand tons in 1928 as against only 15.6 thousand tons in 1938. Only Stalinist staticians can produce the 'miracle' of tripling the number of leather shoes out of a decreasing quantity of leather. The Russian government, relying on the 'short memory' of the people, or more correctly on the oppressive machinery which ensures that past memories remain unuttered, adds insult to injury. While promising a tremendous rise in the production of means of con-

A technical revolution in agriculture is also planned for the coming few years (except in Yugoslavia). This is shown by the tremendous rise in the number of tractors:

ACTUAL AND PLANNED NUMBER OF TRACTORS IN RELATION TO ARABLE LAND

Country	Year	Number (thousands)	Arable land per Tractor (hectares)
Poland	1946	5.5	3,000
	1955	76.5	220
Czechoslovakia	1946	11.8	460
	1953	45.0	120
Hungary	1947	11.9	490
	1954	21.0†	280
Rumania	1948	11.0	850
	1949	12.5	740
Bulgaria	1946	4.6	920
	1953	10.0	430
Yugoslavia	1946	4.0	1,800
	1951	4.5	1,710
Total	1946	44.9	1,100
	Last year of plan	169.5	290

(*Ibid.* p. 208).

†state tractors only.

Agriculture will be reorganised on the new technical basis, state and co-operative farms replacing the small peasant farms.

sumption with every Five-Year Plan, it fixes the actual target of the Plan at a volume of production which does not exceed the target of former Plans. This is shown clearly by the following table:

TARGETS OF PRODUCTION FOR THE END OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS

	First 1932-3	Second 1937	Third 1942	Fourth 1950
<i>Some Means of Consumption</i>				
Cotton goods (milliard metres)	..	4.7	5.1	4.9
Woollen goods (million „)	..	270	220	177
Linen (million metres)	..	500	600	385
Vegetable oil (thousand tons)	..	1,100	750	850
Sugar (million tons)	..	2.6	2.5	3.5
<i>Some Means of Production</i>				
Electric Current (million kwh.)	..	22	38	75
Coal (million tons)	..	75	152.5	243
Pig iron (million tons)	..	10	16.0	22
Steel (million tons)	..	10.4	17	28
Oil and gas (million tons)	..	21.7	46.8	54

(Actually in the territory of the U.S.S.R., in 1913, 2,854 million metres of cotton goods and 95.110 million metres of woollen goods were produced; in 1937 the corresponding figures were 3,181 and 98).

Therefore, when the Russian government boasts that 'in 1950 we will reach the level of 4.7 thousand milliard metres of cotton goods' it does not prevent them from having made the same promise twenty years ago, when the population of U.S.S.R. was about fifty millions less than now.

CHAPTER VI

SOCIO-ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN THE SATELLITES



State Ownership and Public Ownership

Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution states: 'The land, its deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, railways, water and air transport, means of communication, large state-organized farm enterprises (state farms, machine-tractor stations, etc.) and also the basic housing facilities in cities and industrial localities are state property, that is, the wealth of the whole people'.

The Constitutions of the People's Democracies all contain similar clauses with one difference, that the land is not, or rather, *not yet* included in the state-owned properties.

Part of the article quoted is self-evident—that the land, factories, railways, etc. are state-owned. Part of the clause, however, is not self-evident although it is proclaimed as if it were—'state property, that is, the wealth of the whole people'. The words 'that is' signify that state ownership can be nothing other than people's ownership. But this does not stand the test of logic or of history. From the standpoint of logic, the middle term is missing. The factories, railways, etc., are state owned; the people (or the workers and peasants and intellectuals) own the state; therefore the people own the factories, railways, etc.

From the standpoint of history, the article stands the test no better. There are numerous examples in the history of the East of economic systems with deep class differentiations, based not on private property but on state property. Such systems existed in Pharaonic Egypt, Moslem Egypt, Iraq, Persia and India. That the state owned the land was, it seems, mainly due to the fact that agriculture depended entirely on the irrigation system, which in turn was dependent on the activity of the state. The example of Arab feudalism under the Mamelukes (1250-1517) is sufficiently instructive to warrant the apparent digression.

*Arab Feudalism—An Example of Class Society
Based on State Property*

In this society the subjugation of the peasants to the strong feudal state was much harsher than in medieval Europe, but the individual member of the ruling class had no individual property rights whatsoever. The Sultan was the only landowner and he used to divide the right to collect the rent in the various regions among the different nobles (called *Multazims*). While in Europe every feudal lord was the owner of a certain domain, which was handed down from father to son, in the Arab East the feudal lord had no permanent domain of his own, but was a member of a class which collectively controlled the land and had the right to appropriate rent. In Syria and Palestine the area from which these feudal lords collected rent was changed from year to year. In Egypt they received the right to collect the rent in a certain area for their whole lives, and their heirs had a prior right in the appointment of the deceased's successor. While in Europe the feudal lord was relatively an independent power as against the king, who was no more than the 'first among his equals,' in the Arab East only the feudal collective was a factor of any consequence; as individuals the Arab nobles were weak, because they were dependent on the state for their positions. The weakness of the feudal lord as against the state was clearly indicated by the way in which the fiefs were allocated: the Sultan distributed them by lot among the emirs and knights, each getting a portion of land differing in size and quality according to his rank. The Arab nobles were thus divided into different groups with different incomes, the distinction between them being very great (for instance, the 'emirs of the hundred' got 80,000 to 200,000 dinar *jayshi* a year, 'emir-al-tabl' 23,000 to 30,000, 'emirs of the ten' 9,000 and below, 'emirs of the five' 3,000 and so on). The form of appropriation was much more like that of a state official than that of the European feudal lord. As a result of this dependence of the nobles on the state, an unusual phenomenon recurred in the Arab East. From time to time whole feudal strata were 'purged' and annihilated, others arising in their place. The Arab lords were replaced by the Sultan's freed slaves—the *Mamelukes*—who were not of Arab origin and did not speak Arabic but Turkish. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries

they mostly originated from the Mongolian state, the Golden Horde, whose centre was on the banks of the Lower Volga; in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries they were mainly Caucasian. With the Tsar's increasing resistance to conscription in the Caucasus for the Sultan, the Balkan element (Albanians, Bosnians, etc.) predominated.

The ownership of the land by the state not only prevented the rise of feudalism based on private property, but also of any social group with any individualist tendencies whatsoever. The town was a military camp; the majority of the artisans were not independent. Even when the guilds (Hirfeh) did arise, they did not attain any importance at all in the towns and did not become an independent force of any importance. The government subordinated them to itself by appointing many of the heads of the guilds, making them its officials and turning the guilds into government organisations.

The fact that the chief means of production—the land—belonged not to individuals, but to the state, and that the Arab nobles did not own property and therefore did not have the right to inherit, did not improve the position of the peasant masses. Nor did the plebeian origin of the Mamelukes make any difference. The concentration of the ruling class of the Arab East in the towns afforded them great military power over the peasants, and furthermore, increased their appetite for wealth and power. In this too, they differed from the European feudal lords in the Middle Ages. The produce which the European serfs gave to their feudal lords as rent was in general not sent out to be sold; the serfs therefore did not need to give their feudal lord more than he and his household needed for their daily use. Marx says of the European feudal lord: 'The walls of his stomach set the limits to his exploitation of the peasants'. The Arab feudal lords had different tastes, as they traded extensively in their agricultural produce, and their point of view might best be summed up in the words used by Khalif Suliman to his emissary about the peasants: 'Milk till the udder be dry, and let blood to the last drop'.

The mode of production, the form of exploitation, the relation of the toilers to the means of production in the Arab East, was the same as in medieval Europe. The source of income of the ruling class was also the same; the only difference

was in the mode of appropriation, in the legal expression of the right to exploit.*

Another example of class exploitation based not on private but on 'public' ownership is the Church of the Middle Ages. The Church acquired about a third of all the land of Europe as a whole, and in some countries even the majority of the land (e.g. Hungary, Bohemia). Formally, this was public property, the property of the Christian community, and it bore the official name of 'patrimonium pauperum'—the inheritance of the poor. This, however, did not make the conditions of the serfs on Church land fundamentally different from those of the serfs on the private feudal estates. For even though the clergy did not have the right of inheritance (not being allowed to raise families) and were often of plebeian origin, they were not less harsh exploiters than the feudal nobility. Thus 'public' property by itself does not exclude the exploitation of man by man.†

The first part of this book attempts to show that the chief means of production and exchange in the Russian satellites are in the hands of the state (in part the Russian state), and that they will be more and more so concentrated. The second part attempts to show that these countries have undemocratic, totalitarian police regimes, which means that they are not 'owned' by the people—workers, peasants and intellectuals—but by the self-appointing and self-perpetuating bureaucracy itself. From these two propositions, if they can be proved, the

*Sources used on feudalism in the Arab East:

A. N. Poliak—*Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Lebanon*, London, 1939
 A. N. Poliak—*Les Révoltes Populaires en Egypte à l'Epoque des Mamelukes et leurs causes économiques*. Appeared in *Revue des Etudes Islamiques*, Paris, 1934.
 A. N. Poliak—Various articles that appeared in the Hebrew periodical *Hameshek Hashitufi*, Tel Aviv.
 A. Kremer—*Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islam*, Leipzig, 1868.
 A. Kremer—*Culturgeschichte des Orients unter den Chalifsen*, Wien, 1875-7.
 C. H. Becker—*Beiträge zur geschichte Aegyptens unter dem Islam*, Strassburg, 1902-3.

†There have even been cases of state-ownership of the means of production with *equality* between the different 'owners' of the state, equality in the right collectively to exploit those whom the state owned. Spartan society was a case of 'communism' in slave ownership. Kautsky characterized this regime in the following terms: 'The Spartans made up the minority, perhaps a tenth of the population. Their state was based on real War Communism, the barrack communism of the ruling class. Plato drew his ideal of the state from it. The ideal differed from real Sparta only in that it was not the military chiefs, but the 'philosophers', that is, the intellectuals, who directed the war communism'. (*Die Materialistische Geschichtsauffassung*, Zweiten Band, Berlin, 1927, pp. 132-3).

only conclusion possible would be that the Bureaucracy is the owner of the wealth of these countries, that as well as being the ruling class politically, it is the ruling class economically.

The Abolition of all Elements of Democracy in the Factory

The relations between the state-bureaucracy and the people in the economy as a whole permeate each sector of it down to the individual enterprise. The macrocosm and the microcosms are governed by the same rules.

In Russia from 1917 to 1928 the running of the industries was, formally at least, in the hands of what was called the Troika (that is, trio)—the workers' factory committee, the Party cell and the manager. With the disappearance of all democracy in the Party and trade unions, the Troika gradually lost its functions till it became a mere label. Nevertheless it did not cease to stand officially at the head of the plant, nominally running it, and even to show signs of life by acting as something of a brake on the high-handedness of the plant manager, until 1929. Thus Dr. A. Baykov, in *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (London, 1946), states:

'*De facto*, during that period (before the Five Year Plan—Y.G.) the director was largely dependent on the works' trade union organ, the "Zavkom" (the factory trade union committee) and on the Party cell, the organ of the Communist Party at the enterprise. Representatives of these organizations considered it their duty to supervise the director's activities, and usually interfered with his decisions'. (p. 115).

But even the remnants of workers' democracy in the plants disappeared with the Five Year Plans, which were called . . . 'The Victory of Socialism'. A resolution of the Central Committee of the Party decided that the workers' committee of the factory 'may not intervene directly in the running of the plant or endeavour in any way to replace plant management. They shall by all means help to secure one-man control, increased production, plant development, and, thereby, improvement of the material conditions of the working class'. (*Pravda*, 7th September, 1929).

The manager is in full and sole charge of the plant. All his economic orders are unconditionally binding on all the workers. He alone shall select, promote and remove personnel

'taking into consideration' 'the opinion of the Party and the trade union organizations', but he is not bound by them. (Quoted by A. Feiler and J. Marschak, editors, *Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture*, New York, 1944, p. 36).

The Troika was officially buried in 1937. At the Plenum of the Central Committee, Stalin's second-in-command at that time, Zhdanov, declared: ' . . . the Troika is something quite impermissible . . . The Troika is a sort of administrative board, but our economic administration is constructed along totally different lines'. (*Pravda*, 11th March, 1937, *Ibid.* p. 44).

The new management of industry was very clearly defined by an official manual thus: 'Each plant has a leader endowed with full power of decision, hence fully responsible for everything: the plant manager' (Economic Institute of the Academy of Sciences, *Economics of Socialist Industry*, Moscow, 1940, p. 579, *ibid.* pp. 12-13). Further, 'one-man control implies strict demarcation between the administration, on the one hand, and Party and trade-union organisations on the other. This strict demarcation must be applied on all levels of industrial management. Current operations in fulfilment of Plan are the task of the administration. The chief of a workshop, the manager of the plant, the head of the Glavk, have full powers, each within his field, and the Party and trade-union organisations may not interfere with their orders'. (*Economics of Socialist Industry*, p. 563, *Ibid.* p. 19).

In the 'People's Democracies' the workers' committees never acquired the authority they had in Russia, and the Troika never existed at all. The tendency against *any* element of workers' democracy in the factory was more pronounced and its progress much quicker than in the 'vanguard' country.

In all the countries of Eastern Europe the overthrow of Hitler inspired many workers to strive to participate in the management of industry, and in many places they achieved their aim of having the plant management democratically elected by the employees. Thus, for instance, *The Economist* of February 9th, 1946, writes of Czechoslovakia: 'The Employees' Committees tried, in the first fine careless rapture of revolutionary enthusiasm, to dictate how the factories should be managed . . . '

This could not be tolerated by the Communist Party leaders in the government and trade unions. The following process took place:

'... the Workers Councils were... in control of management for some months, indeed almost until the end of 1945.' 'The situation was transformed by the Government's Nationalisation Decree of 24th October, (1945), which provided for the appointment of National Managers of the public enterprises'. 'So at one step the management of the industries was taken out of the hands of the Works Councils, nor did they retain any semblance of control over the Manager. This was a radical change and brought with it the undisguised hostility of a number of Works Councils'. (*Czechoslovakia. Six Studies in Reconstruction*, The Fabian Society, London, 1947, p. 49).

To reduce still further any remaining efficacy of the Works Committees, every element of democracy in them was abolished. At the general meeting of the Central Trade Union Council of Czechoslovakia at the beginning of April, 1947, the General Secretary complained that in the first round of the elections 32 per cent of the official candidates (no other candidates were allowed) were voted down in the Czech lands and 26 per cent in Slovakia. The Social Democratic Party now came forward openly with a proposal that more than one list be allowed in the Works Council elections, and that each party be free to put forward its own list of candidates. Antonin Zapotocky, the Communist Chairman of the Trade Unions (today the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia) decided on another tactic as a result of the elections. He proposed to prolong the term of office of the Works Councils from one to two years.

Having established one list of candidates for Works Council elections, the Communist Party not only increased the use of terror in the elections, but also employed various devices for falsifying their results. The Social Democratic daily *Pravo Lidu* of 9th January, 1948, carried across the front page the Party protest against the Communist Party's methods in the factories: 'It is impossible to be silent. Fanatics are breaking up the unity of labour unions. New wave of political oppression in factories'. Of the recent Works Council elections the paper said: 'As developments in the elections are reported to us,

especially in the large industrial concerns, it is evident that all the questionable practices were used, which were calculated to upset the democratic form of election and to force on the voters a selection (of candidates-Y.G.) that is not free. The meetings are usually called after working hours when the majority of workers are leaving or have left.

'Furthermore, the methods of voting are controlled, which is practically equivalent to direct intimidation'. (Quoted by *The New York Times*, 10th January, 1948).

After the February coup the mouths of the Socialists were closed.

The secret ballot too was abolished at that time, and elections to Works Committees were carried out by acclamation, candidates in many cases being trade union officials. Small wonder that at the May 1949 session of the Central Council of the Czechoslovak Trade Unions, Josef Kolský, Deputy General Secretary, could say that in recent Works Council elections 97.3 per cent of the official lists of candidates were accepted (the official *Czechoslovak News Letter*, 19th May, 1949).

After these steps were taken, nothing more stood in the way of complete one-man management in the plant. In place of the workers' management that had arisen in the first months after the liberation of Czechoslovakia from the German occupation, came the Production Board (set up by the Decree of October 24th, 1945), only a third of whose members were elected by the workers. After the 'Democratic Victory of February', the Minister of Industry, A. Kliment, announced a new plan: 'We are abandoning the system of collective management and we are going to abolish the Production Boards, instead of which we are going to introduce the system of personal responsibility of the works director, the technicians, the foremen and the workers'. This harks right back to unadulterated capitalism.

In Hungary the 'iron' Minister Ernö Gerö declared in his report to the Central Committee of the Party (June, 1950): 'A factory . . . can only have one manager who in his own person is responsible for everything that happens in the factory.' In all the other satellites too one-man management is the rule.

Democracy having duly been stamped out, the governments could without further ado follow this up by imposing on the

workers all the known methods of exploitation, old and new. First of these was the introduction on an unprecedented scale of piece work in place of time work.

Piece Work

Marx once said that piece work is 'the most suitable to capitalist methods of production.' The leaders of the 'People's Democracies', however, teach otherwise. Thus *Scanteia*, the Rumanian Communist Party daily, of January 13th, 1949, says: 'Piece-work is a revolutionary (!) system that eliminates inertia and makes the labourer hustle. Under the capitalist system loafing and laziness are fostered. But now everyone has a chance to work harder and earn more' (Quoted by R. H. Markham in *Christian Science Monitor*, 31st January, 1949). 'Socialism', then, is superior to capitalism in that it uses the piece-work system!

The volume of work done at piece-work rates is continually increasing all the time.

In Czechoslovakia in February, 1946, 30.2 per cent of the total number of working hours came under the piece-work system, in January, 1947, 41.7 per cent, in June, 1947, 48 per cent, and the Two-Year Plan (1947-8) provided for the extension of piece-work so as to include 70 per cent of all working hours in industry. The aim is not 100 per cent only because in certain processes it is not possible to implement it. That this emphasis on piece-work was not welcomed by the workers is clear from the following attack made on 18 January, 1949, by the Minister of Justice, Alexej Čepička, on workers who show 'false solidarity' and a striving for 'equalisation of incomes' by opposing the piece-work system. 'Equalisation in wages hampers higher productivity. The piece-work system must be extended so as to give every worker an incentive. It is now used in only 58 per cent of our factories. To extend it to all is our task'. This was not all, for the workers were going slow to keep the norm low: 'Our workers have got to quit stalling and fight against equalitarianism in pay'. (*Christian Science Monitor*, 31st January, 1949).

The piece-workers par excellence, the Stakhanovites, are not loved by the workers. In his report to the 9th Congress of the Party (May, 1949), the General Secretary, Rudolf Slansky,

revealed that out of 900,000 members of the Party's factory organisation only 65,000 were listed as Stakhanovites. Their unpopularity becomes manifest from a perusal of *Rude Pravo*, the Communist Party daily, which finds it necessary constantly to repeat that Stakhanovites should be placed in more responsible positions and that they should be protected against attacks made on them by 'politically immature' workers. 'There are officials and directors who, being snugly ensconced in their jobs or afraid for their popularity among politically undeveloped elements, fail to defend Stakhanovites as they ought to'. In letters from Stakhanovites published in the press, a frequent complaint is the hostile attitude of the workers towards them. When a reporter of *Lidové Noviny* went to interview Marie Zemancová, a young Stakhanovite in the Prague radio factory 'Tesla' who had been included in the Czech delegation to the Paris 'Peace Congress' as a reward for her work, it turned out that she was completely unknown in her factory. 'This proves', comments the paper, 'that we have been unable to popularise our Stakhanovites and pioneer workers'. (Quoted by *News from Czechoslovakia*, No. 6, April, 1949, published by the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party in Exile, London). In view of these facts, it is no wonder that at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party open war was declared on people 'who run down the work of Stakhanovites and who even try to put a spoke in their wheel'.

In Poland the piece-work system reached a stage at which the basic wage almost entirely disappeared. As Clarion describes it: 'It should be emphasized incidentally, that with regard to salaries the whole system rests upon the maintenance of basic salaries at an abnormally low level and upon a huge inequality in the bonuses both of money and in kind. The periodical *Études et Conjoncture* in this regard pointed out, in a study of the economic situation in Poland, published in November, 1946, that 'on the average for the whole of industry in May, 1946, the total benefits granted (to the workers) in Poland represented from 6.8 to 14.6 times the basic salary, which thus became a mere supplementary item instead of being the main element of the total remuneration'. (op. cit. pp. 106-7).

The hatred felt by the Polish workers for these extreme forms of piece-work was displayed openly in the spring of 1946 and

in September, 1947, when tens of thousands of workers went on strike in Lodz, the biggest industrial city in Poland, in spite of the police terror, the mass arrests, the beatings, etc.

In Hungary, when the workers did not show sufficient enthusiasm for the piece-work system, they were accused by Rákosi of being 'lazy' (*N.Y. Herald Tribune*, Nov. 30th, 1948, reporting a speech delivered on November 27th); the factory directors were 'capitulating' to the lazy workers; the production quotas were too low. 'We cannot eat up the future of the nation', he declared. That Rákosi's speech was not effective enough can be seen from the continual harping on the theme of piece-work and its norms by the Hungarian leaders. Thus in the above-mentioned report to the Central Committee of June, 1950, Minister Ernö Gerö said: 'The enemy succeeded in opening a new front against the 'People's Democracy; that of wage and norm swindling'. 'That wage and norm swindling has spread among the masses can be attributed to a great degree to the underground work of right-wing social-democratic elements and to their rallies, the clerical reactionaries ...' It appears that Party members are also in league with 'right-wing social-democratic elements' who 'swindle' the norms: 'That such an unsavoury situation in the field of norms could arise is partly because in many cases the economic leaders of the factories, party functionaries and trade union members are among those who slacken the norms.' '... in more than one case they go as far as to protect and support the wage swindlers'. This vituperation was followed by a considerable increase in the basic norm.

It is interesting to note that Stalinism is not the only system having extreme recourse to piece-work, Nazi Germany had too. Franz Neumann in his book *Behemoth* (London, 1942) writes: 'The class wage of the Socialist trade unions has been replaced by the "performance wage" (Leistungslohn) defined in Section 29 of the (Nazi-Y.G.) Charter of Labour. "It has been the iron principle of the National Socialist leadership", said Hitler at the Party Congress of Honour, "not to permit any rise in the hourly wage rates but to raise income solely by an increase in performance". The rule of the wage policy is a marked preference for piece-work and bonuses, even for juvenile workers. Such a policy is completely demoralizing,

for it appeals to the most egoistic instincts and sharply increases industrial accidents'. (pp. 352-3).

Neumann explains why the Nazis went to such extremes in using the piece-work system (no more, however, than are resorted to in the Stakhanovite system): 'The preponderance of the performance wage brings the problem of wage differentials into the forefront of social policy. It is essential that this problem be understood not as an economic question but as the *crucial political problem of mass control* (my emphasis—Y.G.) . . . Wage differentiation is the very essence of National Socialist wage policy . . . the wage policy is consciously aimed at mass manipulation'. (p. 353).

The piece-work system 'is completely demoralising', 'it appeals to the most egoistic instincts,' it is a most important means of 'mass control', of 'mass manipulation', of atomization of the working class, of the creation of elite above elite even within the oppressed class. That is why the Nazis were so keen on its extension, and there is no other explanation of the enthusiasm of the Stalinist rulers for it.*

The Increasing Limitation of the Workers' Legal Freedom

In Russia, until the First Five-Year Plan every worker could freely change his place of work and could migrate unhindered from one part of the country to another.

On the right to change the place of work at that time, the Labour Code (1922) stated:

'The transfer of a hired person from one enterprise to another or his shipment from one locality to another, even when the enterprise or institution moves, can take place only with the

*As an indication of the purpose for which piece-work was so widely introduced, it is interesting to note that it was introduced even before the nationalisation of industry. It would be good, the Communist Party leaders thought, to discipline the workers in advance, in 'the interests of the nation'. In Rumania and Bulgaria, at the beginning of 1945, before the nationalisation decrees, production competitions were introduced, and 'labour heroes' were honoured with medals and money grants conferred by the heads of the governments. The 1st of May, 1946, was celebrated in Hungary as a production competition in the private industries. In these measures the Communist Party leaders got the whole-hearted support of the bourgeoisie. Then, after harassing them in this way, they used the same workers as their support in their onslaught on the bourgeoisie, which resulted in its expropriation. This shows the united attitude of the bourgeoisie and the Communist Party bureaucracy towards the exploitation of the masses (piece-work) and the united attitude of the bureaucracy and the working class towards private property (see Part II of the book).

consent of the worker or employee concerned'. (Article 37, *Labour Code*.)*

On freedom of movement, the *Small Soviet Encyclopaedia* (1930 edition) wrote:

'... the custom of internal passports, instituted by the autocracy as an instrument of police oppression of the toiling masses, was suppressed by the October Revolution'.

But already in 1931 no worker was allowed to leave Leningrad without special permission, and in 1932 this system was adopted in all parts of Russia. An internal passport system much more oppressive than the Tsar's was introduced. Now no one could change his place of residence without permission.

As early as September, 1930, all industrial enterprises were prohibited from employing people who left their former place of work without permission. In 1932 Labour Books were introduced which every worker must give to the Director when he is taken on, and in which the director can write whatever remarks he likes when the worker leaves the job. No worker can be taken on at another job without showing his Labour Book. Victor Serge, who lived in Russia for many years as a prominent Communist and then was arrested, and who was finally allowed to leave Russia, writes:

'The passport is visaed at the place of work. With each change of employ, the reason for the change is entered into the passport. I have known of workers discharged for not having come on the day of rest to contribute a "voluntary" (and, naturally, gratuitous) day of work, in whose passports is written: "discharged for sabotage of the production plan"'. (*Russia Twenty Years After*, New York, 1937, p. 68).

On 4th December, 1932, the Government issued another decree designed to subjugate the workers. The factory's supplies of food and other necessities were put under the sole control of the Director 'in order to strengthen the powers of Directors of enterprises' (*Pravda*, 5th December, 1932).

Under a law of 26th June, 1940, a worker is prohibited from leaving his job, unless he is physically unfit to work, is accepted into an educational institution or is given special permission by higher authorities. Any absence without a satisfactory excuse,

*This article was abolished on 1 June, 1932. (Collection of Laws, "Labour Code," Moscow, 1937, p. 20.)

even for a day, makes the culprit liable to six months' corrective labour—which means a cut of 25 per cent in his earnings during that time. It is symptomatic that a few months after the promulgation of this law a few women wrote a letter to *Izvestia* suggesting that domestic servants also be subject to this law. *Izvestia*, in its comment on this question (December 30th, 1940), although disagreeing with this suggestion, showed no astonishment as to its content in this period of the 'transition from Socialism to Communism'.

Not only are workers prohibited from calling strikes, but strikers are liable, according to law, to be sentenced to death for such an offence. (Item 14 of Article 58 of the Criminal Code. As capital punishment has now been abolished, twenty years penal servitude is given instead).*

The Russian model is now being copied in the 'People's Democracies'. This time it will not take so many years to reach perfection. Until 1928, strikes in Russia were legal and were conducted without police intervention, even though the bureaucratic rulers opposed them more and more as their power grew.†

The 'People's Democracies', however, from the beginning avoided the mistake of allowing strikes. Not one of the new Constitutions includes the right to strike. The explanation is simple, and was put in a nutshell by the spokesman of the Yugoslav Government when he was replying to a proposal to include 'freedom to strike' in the Constitution: 'Now when our

*The following article is the only item in the "Collection of Laws" which touches on or covers any cases that can be interpreted by the courts as strikes: "Counter revolutionary sabotage, i.e., knowingly *omitting to discharge a given duty* or discharging it with deliberate carelessness, with the specific object of weakening the authority of the government or the operation of the government machine, entails—deprivations of liberty for a period of not less than one year, and confiscation of property in whole or in part, provided that where there are aggravating circumstances of a particularly serious nature the penalty shall be increased to the supreme measure of social defence: death by shooting, with confiscation of property". (My emphasis—Y.G. Criminal Code, Article 58 (14), June 6, 1927, "Collection of Laws", No. 49, Article 330, Moscow, 1937, p. 31).

†In 1922-3 there were 500 strikes with 150,000 participants in 1925, 196 strikes with 37,600 participants; in 1926, 337 strikes with 43,200 participants; in 1927, 396 strikes with 25,400 participants. More than 90 per cent of the participants in these strikes were workers employed by the State. Not only were strikes allowed, but at that time the Bolshevik leaders insisted on the active support of Party members for strikes whenever the majority of the workers of an enterprise took this step. (See, for instance, the speeches of Lozovsky and Tomsky to the 11th Congress of the Russian Communist Party, 1922).

constitution fully guarantees the rights of the working class, such a proposal is outright reactionary and anti-national' (20th January, 1946). In opposing strikes the Communist Party leaders showed themselves very willing to use the help of the bourgeois politicians, and these, on their side, did not hesitate to use the authority of the Communist Party leaders in opposing strikes. For instance, the Czechoslovak Minister of Justice, Dr. Drtina ('purged' in the coup of February, 1948) said on 17th March, 1947, about recent unofficial strikes: 'They were . . . in effect strikes against the Government and Premier Gottwald . . . What is more serious is the fact that these strikes against the legal order occurred after the Revolution. Therefore, they are of a terroristic and anarchic character' (*East Europe*, 26th March, 1947). Of course, from the suppression of the 'anarchic' strikes, the real benefactors were not Dr. Drtina and his friends, but Gottwald and his. In Rumania Decree No. 183 bans strikes, defining them as 'an economic offence'. Participation in strikes is punishable by imprisonment of 1 to 12 years and by fines of Lei 10,000 to 100,000. A member of the Communist Party of any of the Western countries, making use of the double thinking so common to him, will find it quite consistent to support the banning of strikes in Russia and the People's Democracies (except of course, Yugoslavia after 28 June, 1948—the day of the excommunication of Tito by the Cominform) and at the same time oppose any limitation of the right to strike in any enterprise owned by a democratically elected public body in his own country.

The first steps have also been taken to abolish the right of workers to change their place of work. On April 16th, 1948, a law was passed in Yugoslavia prohibiting any state employee from leaving his place of work without permission from a special government commission. On August 19th Sofia Radio reported that the Labour Directorate had decided that the workers 'have no longer the right to leave their working places without permission' of the factory administration. Permission to employ or to dismiss will be granted only in accordance with the needs of production. Workers who leave their employment without permission of the Labour Directorate must be sent back to their original jobs, in accordance with Cabinet Decree No. 7.

If they do not return voluntarily, they can be called up by the branch labour office (that is, assigned to compulsory labour groups). In Hungary the government published a decree on January 9th, 1950, laying down severe penalties for workers who leave their place of employment without permission. In all the 'People's Democracies' the labour book was copied from Russia. In Yugoslavia an 'improvement' was introduced: every citizen has a *karakteristika*, a record of his political reliability which has to be shown every time he takes a new job. As it is sealed, he does not know its contents, and is not even able to appeal against what is written in it.

Slave Labour

An institution which is of paramount importance in Russia, which is beginning to appear in the satellites and is bound to increase in importance as time goes on, is slave labour.

Some figures regarding the number of slave labourers in Russia are given by D. J. Dallin in a book that he wrote with B. I. Nicolaevsky, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia*. (London, 1948). 'Kiseliev-Gromov, himself a former G. P. U. official in the northern labor camps, states that in 1928 only 30,000 men were detained in the camps . . . The total number of prisoners in the entire network of camps in 1930 he gives as 662,257 . . . ' (p. 52). Dallin comes to the conclusion on the basis of available evidence that the number of people in labour camps in 1931 was nearly 2 million, in 1933-35 about 5 million. He says that in 1942 there were from eight to fifteen million (pp. 53-62). The former Yugoslav Communist leader, Anton Ciliga, who was for many years in a Russian concentration camp, estimates that the number of prisoners was about 10 million (*The Russian Enigma*, London, 1940, p. 249).

A conclusive proof of the existence of slave labour on a big scale in Russia can be gained from the following quotations from *Pravda*. On June 4, 1947, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. passed a decree on 'Protection of Citizens' Private Property' the first article of which reads: 'Theft—that is, covert or open appropriation of the private property of citizens—is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for a period of five to six years. Theft committed by a gang of thieves or for a second time is punishable

by confinement at a reformatory labour camp for a period of six to ten years.' (*Pravda*, 5th June, 1947).

On the same day another decree was passed on 'Embezzlement of State and Public Property' which includes the following articles:

'(1) Theft, appropriation, defalcation or other embezzlement of state property is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for 7 to 10 years, with or without confiscation of property.

'(2) Embezzlement of state property for a second time, as well as when committed by an organized group or on a large scale, is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for 10 to 25 years, with confiscation of property.

'(3) Theft, appropriation, defalcation or other embezzlement of collective farm, cooperative or other public property is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for 5 to 8 years, with or without confiscation of property.

'(4) Embezzlement of collective farm, cooperative or other public property for a second time, as well as that committed by an organised group or gang or on a large scale, is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for 8 to 20 years, with confiscation of property.' (*Ibid.*).

A month after these decrees were passed the U.S.S.R. Public Prosecutor's Office gave ten examples showing how the decrees were carried out in practice (*Pravda* July 9th, 1947):

'(1) In the city of Saratov, V. F. Yudin, who had been previously convicted for theft . . . stole fish from a smoke factory. On June 24th, 1947, . . . Yudin was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps . . .

'(2) On June 11th, 1947, an electrician on the power lines of the Moscow-Ryazan railroad, D. A. Kiselev, stole fur goods from a railroad car . . . On June 24th, 1947, the war tribunal of the Moscow-Ryazan railroad sentenced D. A. Kiselev to ten years' imprisonment in the corrective-labour camps.

'(3) In the town of Pavlov-Posad in the Moscow region, L. N. Markelov . . . stole clothing from the Pavlov-Posad textile factory. On June 20th, 1947 . . . Markelov was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(4) In the Rodnikov district of the Ivanov region, Y. V. Smirnov and V. V. Smirnov . . . stole 375 pounds of oats from

a collective farm. On June 26th, 1947 . . . both were sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(5) In the Kirov district of Moscow, E. K. Smirnov, a chauffeur, was arrested for stealing 22 pounds of bread from a bakery. The people's court . . . sentenced E. K. Smirnov to seven years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(6) In Saratov, E. I. Gordeyev . . . stole various products from a warehouse. On June 21st, 1947 . . . Gordeyev was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(7) In Kuibyshev, E. T. Poluboyarov stole a wallet from a train traveller . . . On 4th July he was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(8) On June 7th, 1947, in Kazan at the collective farm market, V. E. Bukin snatched money from the hand of Citizeness Pustinsky . . . On June 20th, 1947 . . . Bukin was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(9) On June 6th, 1947, in the village of Subovka in the Kutuzovsk district of the Kuibyshev region, A. A. Chubarkin and V. G. Morozov stole from a cellar 88 pounds of potatoes belonging to Citizeness Presnyakov. On June 17th, 1947 . . . both were sentenced to five years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(10) On June 5th, 1947, in Moscow . . . K. V. Greenwald, who had been previously convicted for theft, took advantage of the absence of his neighbour, entered the room of Citizeness Kovalev and stole various household articles . . . Greenwald was sentenced . . . to ten years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.'

That people steal bread and other elementary necessities of life under the cruel threat of a minimum of five years' slave labour if caught, shows what dire proverty they are suffering.

That slave labour in U.S.S.R. is very widespread is clear not only from the large amount of evidence given by former inmates of these camps (collected in the above-mentioned book of D. J. Dallin and B. I. Nicolaevsky) and from the facts published in the Russian Press of heavy punishments for the most elementary crimes—if the theft of bread can be so called. There is further evidence which is conclusive even if indirect. Soviet

law grants the franchise to everyone above the age of 18 with the exception of the inmates of forced labour camps. In the 1946 elections 101.7 million people had the franchise. The population of U.S.S.R. was 193 million in the same year. The census of 1939 says that 58.4 per cent of the population were 18 and over. In 1946 the percentage of people above 18 was higher, as, firstly, the age distribution of the population in the new areas added to U.S.S.R. (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, etc.) was such that the percentage of children was lower than in the population of U.S.S.R. in its 1939 boundaries, and, secondly, the war caused a relatively greater decline in the birth rate and increase in the death rate of children as compared with the death rate of the adult population. If we assume that the proportion of people aged 18 and over was the same in 1946 as in 1939, there were altogether 112.7 million people in this category. Seeing that only 101.7 million had the franchise, it is clear that at least 11 million were inmates of slave labour camps.

Up to now news from official sources of slave labour camps in the satellite countries has been very scarce. The Czechoslovak news agency reported on October 5th, 1948, that forced labour camps were to be set up under a Bill approved at the same day's meeting of the Cabinet.

In the debate on the new Penal Code, passed by Parliament on June 27th, 1950, the deputy Dr. Patchova said: 'The Law expressly states that convicts must be given useful employment which will, after their release, make it possible for them to join the ranks of the workers. On the other hand, a prisoner sentenced as an enemy of the People's Democracy, who, by his work and behaviour while serving his sentence, does not show improvement justifying the hope that he will lead the life of a decent working man, *can be sent to a forced labour camp after he has served his sentence*'. This speech alone proves the existence of the forced labour camps in Czechoslovakia. The best-known camps are at Joachimov and Kladno.

In Rumania a law of 14th January, 1949, fixes very severe sentences—as much as the death penalty—for negligence in fulfilling service obligations in industry. Many of those who are arrested under this law will of course not suffer the supreme penalty, but will supply recruits for the slave labour camps. That other 'crimes' besides economic negligence are paid for

by forced labour, is illustrated by the fact that several thousand Jews, including some Zionist leaders, have been sent to forced labour camps in Rumania. (*London Jewish Chronicle*, 4th August, 1950).

Of forced labour in Yugoslavia *The Times* of 13 June, 1950, wrote: 'To root out Cominformist opposition within the Communist Party and to enforce the collection from the peasants of produce quotas the Government has made numerous arrests, which, although no doubt dwarfed by comparable figures in Russia, make the prison population far greater than anything found in the west. In Britain, with a population about three times as great as in Yugoslavia, the prison population is now about 20,000. Most observers estimate the number of persons now in prison in Yugoslavia at anything from 100,000 to 200,000.' 'Most of the prisoners are employed as a useful reserve of labour on public works . . .'

Indirect official confirmation appears from time to time of the existence of forced labour camps in Hungary, as well as of the pettiness of the 'crimes' that open the gates to them. Thus on 21st August, 1950, Radio Budapest announced that in the wagon factory of Gyöv, a worker, I. Olajos, had been sentenced to six years' compulsory labour for a wage swindle.

In Bulgaria the most notorious forced labour camps are at Kuznian near Pernik, and at Belene.

In Poland the camp at Milecin is the most well-known.

The fact that so little is known of slave labour in the 'People's Democracies' is primarily because the governments are doing their very best to hide the ugly truth which is such an outrage to the concept of 'Socialism' and 'Democracy' which the Communist Parties claim to have established. Another two factors must also be taken into account. To quote Juvenal, 'No one reached the climax of vice at one step'. It took Russia many years to establish camps with millions of inmates. If it is assumed that the proportion of prisoners in the population in all the 'People's Democracies' is about the same as in Yugoslavia, there must be $\frac{1}{2}$ -1 million prisoners altogether. The U.S.S.R. with a population double that of the 'People's Democracies' had less than a million slaves in 1930, and two million in 1931. Secondly, it is very probable that although slave labour will be more widespread in Eastern Europe than at

present, it will not reach the Russian dimensions. It is, as Adam Smith clearly showed, very unproductive, being suitable mainly for manual labour which does not require modern industrial equipment, such as lumber work, road and rail construction, large-scale industrial construction, irrigation works, or canals. The more abundant the machinery and the supply of cultured and skilled workers, the less profitable the use of slave labour. Hence in all probability Czechoslovakia will have less slave labour than Bulgaria or Rumania, and the 'People's Democracies' as a whole less than Russia.

It is very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between voluntary and forced labour in a totalitarian regime. If it is not obvious in itself, the following declaration of Tito (to the Joint Congress of the Union of Communist Youth and the People's Youth, December, 1948) will make it plain: 'There are, of course, also such students who are not very keen on voluntary work, or who refuse to take part in voluntary work activities . . . Such was the case of a small number of students whom we had to expel from Belgrade University and other universities . . . '

The Distribution of the Social Product

Many Communists admit that the bureaucracy in Russia and the satellites have complete control of the state machine and thus of the running of the economy. But they claim that they act entirely in the interests of the people.

To assume that a group of people who are in absolute control of the means of production will not take as much as they can out of the national product for themselves, is tantamount to explaining man's economic conduct by his intentions—a strange method of argument for those who claim to hold the materialist conception of history. The more so when from the same lips we hear that in America and elsewhere, under capitalism based on private property, mere crumbs from the table of the bourgeoisie are a sufficient inducement to bribe and corrupt the 'aristocracy of labour'—the trade union bureaucracy, and so forth—and alienate them from the working-class. Stalin and his associates have all the food on the table within their reach, and their reach alone, but apparently they are incorruptible, and will remain forever loyal to the working

people. This double vision sees the molehill as a mountain, and the mountain as a molehill!

All the experience of history in this connection points to the inescapable conclusion that if a group of people are in absolute control and ownership of the means of production they will inevitably take for themselves all the benefits they possibly can out of production.

The division of the national income among different income groups is kept strictly secret in the 'People's Democracies', although if the British Government did not publish such statistics the Communist Party would certainly, and justifiably, criticize it for keeping the truth from the people. Nevertheless from fragments of news in the press it is possible to get some idea of the great differentiation of incomes.

The official *Free Bulgaria* of 15th March, 1947, states that in Bulgaria the ratio between minimum and maximum salaries in Government employment is 1:5. 'New Yugoslavia, which had adopted a ratio of 1:3.2, is gradually introducing a greater differentiation. France has a ratio of 1:6, the United States—1:10, U.S.S.R.—1:11'. The U.S.S.R. leads all the rest, and is praised for it by the Bulgarian Communists!

Departmental chiefs in Bulgaria got 17,000 leva a year, counsellor-reporters 19,500, counsellor-specialists 21,000 and general secretaries 25,000. This was increased in many cases by a 'supplementary salary' of 13,200-22,800 a year, which raised their salaries to 30,000-47,000 leva a year. As against this the average worker's wage was 357.7 leva a month or 4,292.4 leva a year (*Free Bulgaria*, October 1st, 1947) and many unskilled workers earned 150-200 leva a month, or 1,800-2,400 leva a year (*Free Bulgaria*, April 1st, 1948), i.e., twenty times less than the *parvenu* rulers. There is, of course, no record of the value of the benefits the high bureaucrats get not in money but in kind, such as houses, cars and servants.

In Rumania the minimum salary of a civil servant is Lei 3,328 a month, the maximum Lei 42,600 (*Rumanian News*, 6th February, 1949). Many workers earn as little as Lei 2,000-2,500 a month.

Some information about income differentiation in Poland can be gained indirectly from the table giving the rate of income tax payable by people falling within the different

income groups. This gives an insight into the difference between maximum and minimum incomes, but does not reveal the number of people falling within each group. Incomes of persons or enterprises up to 72,000 zlotys are tax-free (there are many who earn even less than 36,000 zlotys). The rate of tax goes on :

72,000—	80,000 zlotys—	2	per cent income tax
100,000—	110,000	” — 3.5	” ”
150,000—	170,000	” — 7	” ”
190,000—	210,000	” — 9	” ”
250,000—	300,000	” — 13	” ”
500,000—	600,000	” — 23	” ”
1,000,000—	1,200,000	” — 33	” ”
1,400,000—	1,600,000	” — 37	” ”
2,400,000—	3,000,000	” — 43	” ”
3,600,000—	4,200,000	” — 47	” ”
over 4,200,000	” — 50	” ”	” ”

(H. W. Robinson, Chief, Division of Operational Analysis, U.N.R.R.A. European Regional Office, London, *Finance in Poland*, p. 21).

To paraphrase Orwell: all men are equal, but some men are more equal than others!*

In Czechoslovakia, as has already been mentioned, it was not uncommon (in 1948) to find factory managers earning 40 thousand crowns a month, while two-thirds of the workers in 1948 got less than 2,900 crowns a month gross (i.e. before payment of taxes, dues, etc.). In addition, those earning 40,000 crowns were given the free use of a villa, a car with a chauffeur and other perquisites.

Beneš's bourgeois liberal paper, *Svobodné Slovo*, stated, not unjustifiably, that the bureaucracy were 'living in the style of millionaires . . . enjoy every comfort and luxury, thanks to the villas and limousines which they have been allocated by the authorities and to their high incomes'. These people, the paper continued, are 'propertyless—in form only . . .' (6th September, 1947). The standard of living of the masses, on the other hand, is very low, as even the official statisticians have to admit. As early as June, 1946, the monthly average wage of an industrial worker was 2,540 while the *food ration alone* of a family of three cost 2,721 crowns. And many earned less than the average of 2,540 crowns! Since June, 1946, the condition of the masses has deteriorated. The correspondent of *Associated Press* in Prague, did not exaggerate when he said on 15 July,

*In Russia the scale of income-tax starts with taxes on less than 1,800 roubles a year and ends with taxes on more than 300,000 roubles. (*Izvestia*, 6th April, 1940).

1948: 'Czechoslovakia today can fairly claim to be the hungriest country in Europe—hungrier than even Austria'. The Viennese Socialist paper *Arbeiter Zeitung* wrote on 23rd June, 1948: 'Travellers who often come from Prague to Vienna report that in the last few weeks, for the first time, they have not taken goods from Prague to Vienna, but on their return from Vienna to Prague'. The paper adds particulars of prices on the black market in Prague. It is possible to cite innumerable facts to the same effect.

There can be no doubt about who suffered from the shortages, which were the result partly, but only partly, of the drought of the winter of 1947-8. The drought fails to explain either the acute shortage of textiles, shoes (in the country of Bata!) and other consumer goods, or the duration of the shortages.

It is clear from official data that the portion of the social product going to the workers is decreasing. In January, 1946, the total product of Czechoslovakian industry was sold for 9.09 milliard crowns; wages and salaries in industry itself came to 2.83 milliard crowns, i.e. 31.6 per cent of the turnover. A year later, in January, 1947, the total sales amounted to 15.66 milliard crowns; wages and salaries came to 4.03 milliard or 25.7 per cent of the turnover. This decline in the portion of wages and salaries was accompanied by an increase in the turnover per hour of work from 50 crowns to 78 crowns, a rise of 56 per cent (*Statistical Bulletin of Czechoslovakia*, published by the State Statistical Office, Prague, July, 1947). If the statistics had included only wages and not salaries as well, the decline would have been even bigger.

The journal *Učetnictví a Kontrola*, issued by the trade union publishing house, *Práce*, submitted the state budget to a detailed analysis in order to get an approximate estimate of the cost of the bureaucracy. This reveals that the travelling expenses of the administration proper—that is, the ministries, not including the administration of the nationalised industries—amounted to not less than 780 million crowns, the maintenance of automobiles to 180 million. How large these amounts are is clear from the fact that the expenditure on travelling of these bureaucrats would cover the difference between the meagre wages of about 300,000 families and a minimum living

standard. In summing up, the article states: 'The public administration swallows 48 per cent of the national income. How will it be possible to raise the standard of living of the whole people, how will the wide layers of the toilers be satisfied, how will it be possible to pay proper salaries to government clerks?' (From an article, 'Let us think about the Figures', quoted by V. Salus in the theoretical paper of the Czech Social Democracy, *Cil*, August 15th, 1947, under the interesting heading, 'Economic Democracy and the New Nobility').*

The division of the national income in Yugoslavia is not less unequal than in the other 'People's Democracies.' Vernon Bartlett, when in Belgrade, described the situation in the

*For a time the Communist Party leaders tried to cushion the conflict between the workers and the 'new nobility' by directing the hostility of the masses exclusively against the bourgeoisie. For example in October, 1947, in connection with the relief to the peasants who were suffering from the drought, the Communist Party raised the slogan 'Let the millionaires pay', and proposed as a solution the imposition of a property levy. Of course the bureaucracy, being 'propertyless—in form' would not have to pay anything. The Communist Party tried to overlook the fact that the portion of the national income of Czechoslovakia in the hands of the bourgeoisie was so small, only a quarter of industry being left in their hands, that the only possibility of seriously improving the conditions of the masses was by 1. cutting into the income of the bureaucracy; 2. raising the general national income; 3. preventing Russia from taking her cut from the national income.

The Communist Party claimed that there were 35,000 millionaires in Czechoslovakia. This is a large number, but it is much less impressive when it is realised that they were not pound sterling or dollar millionaires, but crown millionaires. A million crowns in July, 1947, was equal to five thousand pounds sterling. Even according to the Communist Party estimate the wealth of these 35,000 'millionaires' was only 50 milliard (According to the bourgeois paper *Slobodné Slovo* there were only 12,000 millionaires with a property of 22 milliard crowns). 50 milliard crowns is only about a quarter of the *annual national income* of Czechoslovakia.

The conditions of the masses could not therefore be substantially improved at the expense of the bourgeoisie, but only by improvements in the nationalised sectors of the economy and at the expense of the bureaucracy. This is proved by the distribution of the national income:

PERSONAL INCOME AT FACTOR COST (THOUSAND MILLION OF CROWNS.) 1947

1. Entrepreneurial profits in industry, trade and professions and private income from capital	22.0
2. Rentals and sub-rentals (including net rental value of owner-occupied dwellings)	5.2
3. Independent agriculturists	25.4
4. Wages and salaries	125.9
5. Pensions of Government employees	5.7
6. Unfreezing of blocked accounts to people of limited means				6.3

In addition there were a number of other small items.

(Statistical Office of the United Nations, *National Income Statistics of Various Countries, 1938-1948*, Lake Success, New York, 1950, p. 59).

The figures speak for themselves. The possibility of increasing item 4 at the expense of item 1 is very limited indeed.

following terms: 'Here, as in Moscow during the war, I am shocked that leaders who boast so much of the dictatorship of the proletariat should enjoy privileges that are relatively far greater than those enjoyed by any privileged class in Britain or in most of the other countries condemned by Moscow as Fascist and imperialist'. (*News Chronicle*, 26th April, 1949).

The situation was described sixteen months later by the correspondent of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* in the following terms: 'The social revolution in the eastern countries, which pretended to have the abolition of exploitation and inequality as its aim, leads in actuality to the erection of a *hierarchically ranked social order* with a whole number of privileged layers. This can be observed daily in Yugoslavia in the same way as in the Cominform countries and one will always be astonished at the way in which the bearers of the system take the privileges they enjoy for granted. The proletarians who stand in the queues near the bus stops look with greedy eyes at the lit-up American cars of the state leaders, resplendent in chrome and coloured varnish, which pass swiftly by them. The higher-ups of the State and Party travel in the latest model cabriolets, the great ones of second rank travel in limousines. Skoda and Opeldienst cars are at the disposal of high officers and officials.

'In the entrance to the People's Front Street in Marshal Tito Boulevard stands a big warehouse. Men in khaki or white uniforms with gold epaulettes go in and out. The *warehouse* is reserved for *officers* and their families. There they can buy clothes, shoes, furniture, carpets and other goods of better quality and cheaper price than the common mortal can buy. The officers get their food rations there too—far larger rations than those of workers and clerks. So large are these rations, that in the spring, at the time of the great food scarcity, peasants came to town in order to buy from the officers their surplus fat and flour at black market prices.

'It is obvious that the police and high officials also have their own store. The *warehouse of the political police* is even better supplied than that of the officers. Naturally these categories of the population also have their special rations. It is the same here as in the other Eastern countries: one who has a higher post and a higher salary also gets larger food rations and is less directed to the expensive free market than the poorly-salaried

small man. Reductions in prices for the higher-paid instead of for those with smaller means . . . ' (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 30th August, 1950)*

One aspect of the problem of the mode of distribution of the social product is this: to what extent is the differentiation between different income groups concomitant with national differences? How much of the cream of the milk produced in the satellites is in the form of higher personal incomes for Soviet officials? These facts are unfortunately covered by a veil of secrecy. Some facts, however, have emerged. A letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (dated 13th April, 1948) stated: 'The wages of the Soviet experts (working as advisers in Yugoslavia—Y.G.) were four times as high as the wages of the commanders of our armies and three times as high as the wages of our Federal Ministers. The commander of one of our armies, a lieutenant-general or a colonel-general, then had 9,000 to 11,000 dinars a month, and a Soviet military expert, lieutenant-colonel, colonel and general had from 30,000 to 40,000 dinars. At the same time our Federal Ministers had a salary of 12,000 dinars a month.' The reply of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (dated 4th May, 1948) did not deny the correctness of these figures, but claimed as an extenuating circumstance the fact that the Yugoslav generals also got 'apartments, servants, food, etc.'

The paper *Glas*, the organ of the People's Front of Serbia, in its issue of 16th December, 1949, gave another example of the same thing. Near Sofia an automobile factory employing Russian, Czech and Bulgarian specialists was being built. The salary of the Russian specialists was 2,000 levas an hour, of the Czechs 2,000-3,000 levas a day, and of the Bulgarian 250-300 levas a day. These differences were certainly not due mainly to differences in skill.

*Since then a big change has taken place. On 14th October, 1950, Marshal Tito signed a decree abolishing special privileges in the supply and distribution of rations and consumer goods, doing away with the special shops of the upper bureaucracy, and transferring all villas and rest homes hitherto reserved for the privileged to the tourist industry. Whether this is a temporary measure resulting from the terrible drought and famine of the 1950-51 winter, it is too early to say.

It might yet be claimed that even these differences in income are smaller than those prevailing in the countries of capitalism based on private property. There is not sufficient statistical information about income distribution in the 'People's Democracies' accurately to check this contention, but some general remarks may be made. To compare the ratio between the income of an American capitalist and his workers on the one hand, with the ratio between the incomes of a manager in the 'People's Democracies' and his workers is to compare two qualitatively different things. Let us assume that the American capitalist gets a million dollars' profit, of which he ploughs back into the enterprise 700 thousand dollars. For his personal consumption he thus takes 300,000 dollars. The boss in the enterprise in the 'People's Democracies', on the other hand, would claim that as he does not own the factory the profits ploughed back into the enterprise must not come out of what he gets, but out of the profit made by the whole of society. If the American capitalist argued that the 700,000 he ploughed back was in the interests of society, the communists would reply that he gets the main benefit from it. But it appears that the same argument must not be applied to bureaucratic state capitalism.

Since a group of people in control of the means of production will take for itself the biggest possible share of the national cake, and as under the rule of the Communist Parties the workers are faced with the most concentrated capital, while they lack the right to defend themselves through democratic organisations independent of their rulers or by strike action, the inequality in incomes will inevitably reach its most extreme forms.

The Workers' Resistance

Reference has already been made to the way in which the workers of Czechoslovakia expressed their rising dissatisfaction with the Communist Party leaders by rejecting the official list of candidates to Works Committees in 1947, thus driving the Party to abolish the secret ballot. But the workers found other ways of expressing their dissatisfaction, the most important being greatly increased absenteeism, which reached the proportions of an epidemic in Czechoslovakian industry. At

the 9th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Slansky, the General Secretary, disclosed that whereas before the war absenteeism in the foundries totalled 2.4-3.5 per cent, it had risen in January, 1949, to 12 per cent and in March to 15 per cent. The position was even more critical in the building industry: in the four principal building undertakings in the Moravská Ostrava district alone 53,420 working-shifts had been lost, while another building enterprise at Tábor registered 50 per cent of absentees. (Quoted by *News from Czechoslovakia*, May, 1949). On September 21st, 1949, Premier Zapotocky told the Czechoslovak Trade Union Council that absenteeism among the workers so far that year was already more than 37 per cent higher than in 1947. (*Lidové Noviny*, 22nd September, 1949). Even the National Assembly's decision of 24th March, 1950 to deduct from the holiday days missed without good reason would probably not altogether stop this expression of the increasing 'enthusiasm' of the workers for the regime.

It is not only the Czechoslovak workers who put up some resistance, however limited it must be by the totalitarian character of the regime. *The Times* of 5th September, 1949, gave a report from its correspondent in Budapest of a conference of the Communist Party of Greater Budapest—in which more than 60 per cent of Hungary's industry is concentrated—which was attended by all the foremost leaders of the Party. 'The report (of the Conference) says that productivity is stagnant in most industries and declining in some. Between February and July it fell throughout the manufacturing industry by 17 per cent . . . ' 'Far too many workers were applying for sick relief—in a recent week in one factory 11 per cent, in another 12 per cent. Instances are given of self-inflicted wounds'. Rákosi in his speech claimed that in many factories the number of days missed for sick leave was two to three times higher than before the war. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 6th September, 1949). On August 31st, 1949, he said that in the previous few months productivity had fallen by 10-15 per cent.

In Poland an epidemic of absenteeism drove the government to adopt harsh measures. On April 19th, 1950, the Sejm passed a law concerning the 'Socialist discipline of labour.' Extremely heavy punishments are imposed on absentees. A worker who

has been absent from his work for four or more days in a year without a satisfactory excuse suffers a wage cut of 10-25 per cent which may last for three months.

The Yugoslav workers also use the weapon of absenteeism in their struggle against their bad conditions. *The Times* of 1st November, 1950, quoting the Belgrade trade union paper *Rad*, said: ' . . . absenteeism in the coal mines in Serbia reached 19%; Croatia—17½%; Slovenia—15%; and Bosnia-Herzegovina—14%. The plan allowed for a maximum absenteeism of 11%.' In his speech to the Federal Assembly on 17th April, 1950, Tito said: 'In 1949, there was a 26.26% loss in working time. In Croatia, this percentage reached 33%, of which 21% was spent in holiday-taking and absenteeism. This proves the weak struggle for discipline . . .' The workers also frequently change their place of work. In a speech to the Serbian parliament, Jovan Vesilinov, Vice-Premier of Serbia, reported that during ten months of 1949 state enterprises in Serbia took on 628,064 persons but lost 430,050 workers who had left their jobs. (*The New York Times*, 29th January, 1950). *Borba* of 21st August, 1950, stated that in the Trepcha lead mines and refinery—one of the largest in the world—some 11,000 workers were taken on in 1949, of whom 10,500 left before the end of the year because of very bad conditions, irregular pay 'usually between the fifteenth and twentieth of the month, often between the twenty-fifth and the thirtieth', and the irregular distribution of the rations (in August the rations were distributed ten days late, and in the meantime the workers had to do without bread).

The Government took strong measures to fight against absenteeism and the frequent changes in the place of work. On 26 January, 1950, it passed a decree stating that food ration cards would be withdrawn from persons leaving their place of employment without permission, and no new cards would be issued them. The decree further stated that a clause might be included in labour contracts obliging a worker to reimburse the enterprise for any loss in production resulting from his unjustifiable absenteeism.

Another symptom of the increasing dissatisfaction of the workers is the decline in the *quality* of what they produce. For example, in the speech quoted above, Rákosi stated that the

percentage of waste in the Manfred Weiss iron foundry, the second biggest metal factory in Hungary, had risen from 10.4 to 23.5 per cent. In Poland, in 1948, of 67 million tons of coal, 1,100,000 tons were stones; in 1949 the percentage of stones in the coal reached 5 per cent. In 1948 and 1949 a sizeable proportion of the exports of Czechoslovakia—the country with the reputation for products of good quality—was returned as below standard.

The admonitions of the leaders to the workers are often of such a character as to leave no doubt about their indocility. Istvan Kossa, Hungarian Minister of Industry, said in a speech at Debrecen on December 6th, 1948, that 'The workers have assumed a terrorist attitude to the directors of the nationalised industries', and he threatened them with forced labour.

Chivu Stoica, Rumanian Minister of Industry, addressing the workers of the Resita plant, the largest metallurgical establishment in the country, on December 25th, 1948, accused them of not having fulfilled the plan and of being 'capitalist agents'.

In Yugoslavia, Vice-Premier Edvard Kardelj, in his report to the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party (July, 1948), attacked those workers who showed 'resistance to realistic norms, against competition, and on the other hand—in exaggerated demands in regard to pay'. 'It is clear that the consequences of such a stand are a decrease in work discipline, insufficient aid to rationalisers and innovators in the realization and application of their proposals, an incorrect and unfriendly attitude toward the heads of the enterprise, an incorrect attitude toward competitions'. (*The Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Struggle for New Yugoslavia, for People's Authority and for Socialism*, Belgrade, 1948, pp. 87-8).

That the workers nevertheless remain members of the Communist Parties—as the official statistics show—is not because of their enthusiasm for them, but because it is too dangerous to leave. Anyone who leaves the Party faces the threat of economic sanctions (at least). This is shown clearly by some figures issued in October, 1948, by József Révai, editor of *Szabad Nép*, the Hungarian Communist Party daily. He says that the paper is read by only 12 per cent of the Party members. At the big M.A.U.A.G. factories, for example, where 6,000

out of the 8,000 workers are Party members, only 780 read the Party newspaper. (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* 15th October, 1948). Thus a large number of workers are merely nominal members of the Party.

The large-scale 'purges' in the Parties also express the increasing hostility between the leaders and their 'supporters'. In the 'purge' in Hungary nearly half a million members were expelled from the Party. In Czechoslovakia, there was a 'purge' of a quarter of a million members in 1948 and the first half of 1949. In Rumania, 'over 192,000 hostile elements', that is, over a fifth of the total membership of the Party, were 'purged' between November, 1948, and May, 1950. In Bulgaria, 92,500 members and candidates, out of a total of 442,183, were expelled from the Party between June, 1949 and June, 1950.

While the workers within the 'People's Democracies' cannot express their dissatisfaction through the police-controlled plebiscites, miscalled general elections, those on the other side of the frontier, who are close enough to know the reality of the regime inside the 'People's Democracies', and free enough to express their opinion of it—as in Austria and Berlin—have decisively shown their disapproval.

The Expropriation of the Peasantry

The parvenu ruling class in Eastern Europe, in order to add to its wealth and comfort, devotes all its energy to increasing the number of workers employed in state industries. Hence it comes into conflict with the masses of the peasantry.

As has been pointed out, the progress of agriculture in the Eastern European countries depends on their industrialisation. Their inherited backwardness, their separation from Western Europe by the division of the Continent into two spheres of influence, Russian imperialist exploitation, the greed of the local bureaucracy—all these factors impede the accumulation of capital, necessary for industrialisation. Had industry already existed on a big scale, the countryside would voluntarily have supplied agricultural products to the urban population in exchange for industrial products, and would also have supplied the necessary labour power for industry, as the surplus population would have been attracted to the towns by their higher

standard of life and culture. Conversely, if the village supplied the agricultural products and labour necessary for the towns, industrialisation would have been much accelerated. These two conditions are mutually dependent. But the bureaucracy cannot tolerate a gradual development of agriculture and industry, and prefers to try to escape from the vicious circle by forced 'collectivisation'.

All previous land reforms had, for a number of years at least, the effect not only of not increasing the agricultural surpluses available for the towns, but actually of reducing them. This is because large estates, based either on tenants' or workers' labour, obviously have relatively larger surpluses than the small peasant farms, even if both have the same productivity. Land reform, by dividing the large estates into many small peasant farms has, as an immediate consequence, a decline in the marketable agricultural surpluses. The surpluses necessary for industrialisation could be obtained by the encouragement of *kulak* farming, but this would be unwise from the standpoint of the bureaucracy, as socially and politically it would raise a new ruling class clinging tenaciously to private property, and economically it would lead to a demand by the kulaks for industrial goods in exchange for their surpluses. The bureaucracy needs a cheaper way of getting this surplus. It might have recourse to taxation and requisitions. But this too can hardly be relied on to provide large enough quantities of agricultural products for quick industrialisation, for the disgruntled peasant can 'go on strike' and decrease his sowing area, or neglect his fields, so that the surplus available for requisition decreases, or he can hide part of his yield, for it is impossible to supervise millions of small peasants scattered in thousands of villages. These drawbacks are virtually eliminated and the obligatory deliveries much more easily secured if millions of peasants are concentrated in some tens of thousands of large farms. The peasants, it is true, may react to their expropriation and herding in semi-serf camps by slaughtering their livestock. This may reduce the total agricultural production for a number of years and famine may stalk the land bringing death in its train, but no matter. If the quantity of agricultural goods in the hands of the state increases, everything is satisfactory. 'Collectivisation' also enables the state

to supervise the labour power in the countryside, and, if the wages in the towns are not high enough to attract people from the countryside, they will be drawn there by the mechanisation of agriculture and the elimination of superfluous mouths in the 'collective farms'. Further, if capital construction is being undertaken, which demands very little skill and can be done by a large number of workers with very little or no machinery (for the bureaucracy likes to 'waste' as little of the expensive machinery needed for industrialisation and militarisation as possible) the 'collective farms' can provide an ample supply of this cheap labour from the 'kulaks,' i.e. all who dare to show any resistance to the bureaucracy. As yet it is scarcely possible to prove from experience that this will be the fate of agriculture in the satellites, because the process is only in its early stages. That this is the tendency, however, is clear enough, from the developments so far and from the history of agriculture in Russia since 1928.

The Example of 'Collectivisation' in Russia

The influence of the collectivisation of agriculture on the agricultural output in Russia is clear from the following table:

Year	Sown Area			Gross Output of Grain	Cattle
	Total	Grain	Technical Crops		
	million hectares			million centners	million heads
1928	113.0	92.2	8.6
1929	118.0	95.9	8.8
1930	127.2	101.8	10.5
1931	136.3	104.4	14.0
1932	134.4	99.7	14.9
1933	129.7	101.6	11.9
1934	131.4	104.7	10.7
1935	132.8	103.4	10.6
1936	133.8	102.4	10.8
1937	135.3	104.4	11.2
1938	136.9	102.4	11.0

(S. N. Prokopovicz, *Russlands Volkswirtschaft unter den Sowjets*, Zurich, 1944, p. 133).

This shows that, ten years after the drive towards 'collectivisation' began, the number of cattle was 10 per cent lower than before, while gross grain output was 16 per cent higher. The main reason for the rise was the cultivation of new steppe lands which required agricultural machinery. The total

sown area rose by 21 per cent and the grain area by 11 per cent.

That the productivity of labour in Russian agriculture, despite the mechanisation, was not higher in 1931-5 than in the countries of Eastern Europe is confirmed by the following calculation made by W. E. Moore:

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER PERSON DEPENDENT ON AGRICULTURE AND PER MALE ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE, 1931-5 AVERAGE

	Per Person Dependent on Agriculture	Per Male Engaged in Agriculture
	Crop Units	Crop Units
Czechoslovakia	..	45
Hungary	..	33
Poland	..	21
Rumania	..	21
Bulgaria	..	20
Yugoslavia	..	17
Albania	..	10
U.S.S.R.	..	17
	(op. cit. p. 35)	53

Even if the improvement in Russian agricultural production after 1931-5 is taken into account, it is clear that her output per male engaged in agriculture was not more than that of Rumania, Bulgaria or Poland, and must have been far short of that of Hungary or Czechoslovakia.

Does this mean that the rulers of Russia failed to achieve what they aimed at by 'collectivisation'? This question can be answered by examining the proportion of the agricultural output taken by the state in the form of obligatory deliveries:

Year	Total Yield		Obligatory Deliveries			Retained by Agriculturists	
	gross	net*	Quantity centners	% of Total	% of Total	after obligatory deliveries	Index
				million	million		
1927/8	728.0	605.9	112.2	15.4	18.5	493.7	100
1932/3	698.7	570.1	185.2	26.5	32.5	384.9	77.9
1933/4	808.2	677.1	228.7	28.3	33.8	448.4	90.8
1934/5	804.6	669.5	226.6	28.1	33.8	442.9	89.7
1935/6	810.9	677.5	249.3	30.7	36.8	428.2	86.7
1936/7	744.6	612.5	260.0	34.9	42.4	352.5	71.4

*After deduction of seeds from gross yield.
(Prokopovicz, op. cit. pp. 136, 138).

From 1927/8 to 1936/7 these obligatory deliveries taken by the state from agriculture increased from 112.2 million centners to 260 million (i.e., by 131.8 per cent) and the proportion in the gross yield of agriculture which they represented from

15.4 per cent to 34.9 per cent, and of the net yield from 18.5 per cent to 42.4 per cent.

The obligatory deliveries are virtually direct taxes, as the prices paid by the government for the products delivered is only a small percentage (not even 5 per cent) of the price which the government charges the consumer.

It is interesting to note that Lenin writes in his book, *The Agrarian Question in Russia at the End of the Nineteenth Century* (1908): 'The horseless and one-horse peasants (i.e., the very poor peasants—Y.G.) pay in the form of taxes *one-seventh and one-tenth* respectively of their *gross* expenditure. It is doubtful whether serf dues were as high as that . . .' The agricultural toilers in the 'Socialist Fatherland' pay much more than that!*

Collectivisation not only transformed into proletarians those who came into industry, but also those who remained in agriculture. The overwhelming majority of agriculturists are in reality, if not in theory, people who do not own any of the means of production: they are compelled to work an ever-increasing number of days on the kolkhozes for very low payment, below even that of the unskilled worker in the towns. The constant rise in the number of days that every household works in the kolkhoz compared with the quantity of grain per household remaining to it after the obligatory deliveries is shown in the following table:

Year	Average Number of 'Labour Days' [†] per Household		Grain Retained per Household after Obligatory Deliveries	
	Number	Index	Centners	Index
1932 ..	257	100	15.8	100
1933 ..	315	122.5	19.3	122.1
1934 ..	354	133.4	20.1	127.2
1935 ..	378	147.1	20.5	129.7
1936 ..	393	152.8	17.3	109.5

†A 'Labour Day' is equivalent to the physical labour day of an unskilled kolkhoznik. The physical labour day of a skilled worker is equivalent to two, three or more 'Labour Days'.

(*Prokopovitz*, op. cit. pp. 136, 138, 164).

*Although the total quantity of products retained by the agriculturists in 1936/7 was lower than in 1927/8 (352.5 million centners and 493.7 million centners respectively) the quantity per household did not decline, and per capita of the agricultural population even rose. This happened because the number of households declined from 25.0 million in 1927/8 to 20.4 million in 1936/7, i.e., by 24 per cent, and the agricultural population decreased from 122.4 million to 78.6 million, i.e., a decline of 35.8 per cent. The fact that the per capita quantity of agricultural products retained by the peasants after making obligatory deliveries rose, does not mean that the conditions of the majority of agriculturists improved, because it was distributed more unevenly to the disadvantage of the masses. This cannot be dealt with here.

To add to the difficulties of the poor agriculturists, not everyone has to give the same number of labour days. The higher strata of kolkhozniki give far fewer labour days than the poor kolkhozniki. The reward for their labours, however, is in inverse proportion to the time contributed.

There is less justification in calling the Russian agriculturists of today owners of the means of production than the serfs of the nineteenth century.

Miss D. Warriner in 1940 noted as regards the productivity of Russian agriculture: 'Russia both before and after collectivisation had a lower productivity than Eastern Europe . . . Russian collectivisation has not really achieved much increase in productivity through reforming the peasant system. Yields are still lower in Russia than in every part of Eastern Europe, cattle density is still much lower . . .' (*Eastern Europe after Hitler*, London, 1940, p. 4). In another place Miss Warriner writes: ' . . . the physical output per man in corn is slightly higher in Russia than in the very poorest regions of Eastern Europe, and the value in terms of industrial products certainly lower'. (*Economics of Peasant Farming*, London, 1939, p. 188). As regards the standard of living of the Russian agriculturists in relation to those of Europe Miss Warriner says: 'As things are at present, on the basis of purchasing power, the Russian farmer is certainly not so well off as the peasants in Poland'. 'On the Russian farms meat consumption must be much lower than in Poland, and milk consumption must be lower also'. (*Ibid.* pp. 188, 189).* To gain a rough idea of what the standard of living of the Polish peasant was before the war, we quote the following passage: The Polish peasants' 'poverty was proverbial. It was said that during the depression the peasant would split a match four or five times, and would boil potatoes over and over again in the same water to save the salt . . . According to the Polish Minister of Finance the average cash income of the peasant in 1934-5 was eleven groszy (about one penny) a day . . .' (Henryk Frankel, *Poland, The Struggle for Power 1772-1939*, London, 1946, p. 134).

Miss Warriner's analysis, based on Soviet statistics, conforms

*It is regrettable that Miss Warriner in her new book *Revolution in Eastern Europe* (London, 1950) in the chapter 'Collective Farming' overlooks what she herself wrote on the question of collectivisation in Russia in *Economics of Peasant Farming* and also in *Eastern Europe After Hitler*.

with the conclusion Victor Serge reached from his direct contact with Russian toilers: 'The vast majority of the peasants live more poorly than before the collectivisation, that is, on the whole, at a level lower than pre-war' (i.e., pre-World War I) (op. cit. p. 37).

The peasants did not gain anything out of the 'collectivisation', but that does not detract one iota from the success of 'collectivisation' from the standpoint of bureaucratic state capitalism.

Miss D. Warriner was quite right when she said of the results of 'collectivisation' in Russia: 'Apparently, then, most of the increase in output could have been achieved by extending the State farms in the sparsely settled and uncultivated regions, without collectivizing the peasant villages in the already settled parts; had there been no collectivization, then all the loss of capital through livestock slaughter would have been avoided and corn production in 1931 and 1932 would have been maintained'. (*Economics of Peasant Farming*, op. cit. p. 174). This is true. But then the state would not have got such a large part of the agricultural output for nothing!

The Satellites Follow in the Footsteps of Russia

Undoubtedly the circumstances in which the collectivization of agriculture is being and will be carried out in the satellites are to some extent different from those in which it was carried out in Russia. In part they will moderate its results, and in part will render them more severe. The moderating influence will be the lesson learnt from the experience of Russia, which will prevent the Communist Party from making similar mistakes in the satellites; namely, rushing through 'collectivisation' at a feverish pace, far outstripping the development of the necessary technical basis for large-scale farming, and then hastily retreating;* and secondly taking all the livestock—cows, sheep, poultry—away from the peasants and putting them into the kolkhozes, and then reversing their policy after half the livestock had already been slaughtered.

*In October, 1929, 4.1 per cent of all the peasants were included in kolkhozes. Five months later, on 10th March, 1930, 58.0 per cent were. There followed a hasty retreat, and in September of the same year only 21 per cent of the peasants were in kolkhozes. Only after this mismanagement did the tempo of collectivization begin to be less erratic, even though the compulsion to enter the kolkhozes remained very strict for the peasants.

The Eastern European governments will avoid such damaging twists and turns. According to the Plans, the technical basis for collectivisation will be much better prepared than it was in Russia. In 1933 in Russia, when 65.6 per cent of the peasants were in kolkhozes, there was one tractor per 615 hectares of arable land. When the current Plans are completed, the *minority* of peasants in the satellite countries will be in co-operative farms while there will be one tractor per 290 hectares. The co-operative farms in the 'People's Democracies' are leaving the majority of the livestock to the peasants as their private property, and are even compromising with the private interests of the peasants on the question of co-operative cultivation of the land, as can be seen from an examination of the types of co-operative farms in these countries.

In Hungary there are three types of co-operative farms:

1. The lowest, in which ploughing and sowing alone are done collectively while further cultivation and harvesting are done by the individual peasants. Draught animals or machines for the ploughing and sowing are obtained from the members or from the nearest State Tractor Station. In the former case, the members who own the draught animals or machines are paid a customary rent for them. Each member pays the cost of ploughing and sowing according to the quantity and quality of land he owns.

2. The intermediary type is similar to the lowest type except for the fact that harvesting and threshing are also done collectively.

3. In the highest type all the land is pooled for common cultivation, except for about two acres which are kept by each member as his private plot. Members are paid wages according to the amount and quality of work they do and rent according to the quantity and quality of land they contributed. No more than 25 per cent of the profit may be set aside for rent.

In Russia the peasant belonging to the lowest form of 'co-operative farm'—the kolkhoz—is allowed less private property than members of the highest form in Hungary. In many districts no kolkhoznik is allowed to own more than 0.6 acres, in others 1.2 acres and, in a small number of districts,

2.4 acres, and no rent is paid for the land contributed to the kolkhoz.

In Yugoslavia there are four types of co-operative farms. In the first and second types, the land remains the private property of the co-operative member, and rent is paid for it. In the third type the land remains private property but no rent is paid for it. The fourth type is like the Russian kolkhoz. At present the overwhelming majority of co-operatives belong to the first two types.

In the Bulgarian co-operative farms the net income is generally divided thus: 60 per cent is distributed among the members according to the number of working days they contribute, 30 per cent is paid out in rent in proportion to the quality and quantity of land brought by each peasant into the collective farm. The 'Model Statute of the Co-operative Farms' (adopted by the Second National Conference of Co-operative Farm Representatives, held on April 5-7, 1950) describes another mode of distribution of the income: ' . . . a number of working days, from 1 to 5 per decare (1 decare = 1/10 hectare—Y.G.) of land, depending on the quality of the land, fixed by the General Meeting as rent is given as a bonus to every co-operative member. In this way the working days given to every co-operative member for his pooled land are added to the working days contributed by him with his labour, and for the sum of these working days he receives agricultural and animal products and cash'. (Article 17b). For a hectare the owner gets a rent of 10 to 50 days. Since the maximum amount of land permitted a person is 20 hectares (except for Dobrudja where it is 30 hectares), a peasant who gives 20 hectares to the co-operative farm will receive a rent equal to the wages of 200 to 1,000 working days. The co-operative farm thus does not equalise the peasants and abolish exploitation (even if we discount the exploitation of the co-operative as a collective by the state bureaucracy through obligatory deliveries, the fixing of prices for agricultural goods, etc.).

There is another important difference between the agricultural working co-operatives in Eastern Europe and the kolkhozes in Russia. When a peasant leaves the kolkhoz or is expelled from it he loses all rights to the kolkhoz's property;

when a peasant leaves the agricultural co-operative, he is allowed, at least according to the law, to detach or sell the property he contributed or the plot he received in exchange.

On the other hand there are two factors which will render the results of 'collectivisation' in the satellites more severe than in Russia: 1. As we have seen, the increase in the grain output which followed upon 'collectivisation' in Russia was due in the main to the great extension of the area cultivated; but such an extension is out of the question in the countries of Eastern Europe. 2. Although Eastern Europe is not as suitable for meat and milk production as Western Europe, but, like Russia, is much better for growing corn, it already has many more branches than Russia of intensive farming (milk, pork, vegetables, wines, tobacco, etc.) whose prosperity is dependent on the existence of an urban population with a high and rising standard of living. The present regimes do not augur well for such a development.

Peasant Resistance

Although 'collectivisation' has hardly begun in the 'People's Democracies', the agricultural policy of the governments has already met with a peasant resistance which is on the increase. It is partly resistance to requisitioning and a protest against the lack of industrial goods and partly resistance to 'collectivisation' (of course these two reasons cannot be separated in practice).

Just as it was natural that the resistance of the working class to the industrial policy of the governments of Eastern Europe appeared earliest and was strongest in Czechoslovakia, the most industrialised country in the region (except for the Soviet Zone of Germany and Austria), so is it natural that the peasant resistance to their agricultural policy is boldest in Bulgaria. The reasons for this are: first, Bulgaria is the country least affected by the land reform, so that the peasants have not much to thank the Government for on this score; secondly, Bulgaria has the highest percentage of peasants engaged in small-scale intensive farming—tobacco, grapes, roses—so that the inducement needed to break their opposition to

'collectivisation' is the greatest; thirdly, the basis upon which the industrialisation of the country is taking place is the weakest (except for Albania), and the industrialisation plan is the most ambitious (except for Yugoslavia), so that the need to squeeze the peasant is the most desperate.* This last point is clearly illustrated by the targets of the various Plans, all of which aim at the 'collectivisation' of only a minority of the peasants—except the Bulgarian plan, which by 1953 aims to have 60 per cent of the peasants in co-operative farms.

The peasant resistance took the characteristic form of non-delivery of their quota of products. Despite the good harvest in 1948, by October 10th only one district had delivered its quota, 13 districts had delivered between 80 and 90 per cent, but many more had not even fulfilled half the quota. (*Rabotnicheskoye Delo*, organ of the Communist Party, October 15th and 17th, 1948). 1948 was bad enough, but 1949 was much worse. The sowing quotas were nowhere near completion on the final date, March 15th. Only 56 per cent of the wheat quota was completed, 45 per cent of the rye, 55 per cent of the barley, 51 per cent of the oat, and 14 per cent of the sunflower quotas. (*Otechestvennyy Front*, 25th March, 1949). The Ministry of Agriculture reported that many villages met great obstacles in collecting grain. In the village of Dimitrievka, for instance, the Village Council showed no effort to fulfil its duty and barely 1,200 kilos of grain were turned in. The co-operative of Yaborovo village refused to give up its allocation. Many villages had very inadequate granaries, etc., etc. (*Otechestvennyy Front*, 31st July, 1949).

That even members of the Communist Party were taking part in the resistance of the peasantry to the Government's agricultural policy was made clear in Dimitrov's speech at the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party (December 19th, 1948): 'In some villages there were "Party members" and even Party leaderships who did not head the campaign for ensuring food to the people and even de facto sabotaged the delivery of cereals. The same holds true for some village Communists who do not help and sometimes impede the creation

*Yugoslavia, too, did not undergo an extensive land reform, and its very ambitious plan for industrialisation is also based on a very low technical level. But there the peasants are much more tolerant towards the government, because of the threat of Moscow to it.

of co-operative farms'. (G. Dimitrov, *Political Report to Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, Sofia, 1948, p. 80).*

The extent of the peasant resistance and its causes were admitted to at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party on June 11th and 12th, 1949, where in an excess of 'Bold Self-Criticism', the Party laid bare its 'mistakes' and promised to relax its stringent policy towards the peasantry.

Shortly before the Plenum the Acting-Premier had said that 'no progress was registered since September 9th, 1944, in the output of cereals despite the import of tractors and other agricultural machinery and considerable agro-technical improvements'.

One of the reports to the Plenum says:

'We must admit that we have fastened the screw too tightly in our relations with the medium farmer . . . We must unloosen the screw and switch over to methods which will induce the farmer and especially the medium peasant, by an appeal to his self-interest, to improve and increase his production.'

The Plenum Resolution says:

'Excesses have occurred in the system of quota purchases, which have led to the requisitioning of practically the entire

*Two years later, in his report to the Plenum of the Central Committee (7th and 8th October, 1950) the new General Secretary, Vulko Chervenkov, gave many more details about the sabotage of the agricultural deliveries by Communist Party members and organisations. He said: ' . . . the former Minister of Home Trade last year, under pressure of various appeals from local organs, arbitrarily, quite irresponsibly, without the permission of the Central Committee of the Party and the Government, reduced three and a half times the plan for state grain deliveries. He was unable to grasp the fact that the appeals of the local organs reflected the pressure of private landowners and kulaks against the interests of the state.' ' . . . the party organisations in the districts of Bourgas, Gorna Oryakhovitsa, Rousse and Kolarovgrad . . . yielded to the pressure of a number of primary organisations which expressed private and kulak interests and attempted to wreck the plan for collecting the deliveries . . .' The same crimes are attributed by Chervenkov to the first secretary of the Stalin District Party Committee, the vice-chairman of its People's Council and the representative of the Central Committee of the Party and Government whose special task was to inspect the collection of the state grain deliveries in the district. 'The District Party Committee and the District People's Council' of the Pleven district 'fell into the hands of the kulaks'; 'the inspector of the Central Committee of the Party attached to the Pleven district played an unenviable role'. In every possible way he supported the local leadership in its 'attempt to attain a reduction of the plan . . .' The same crimes are attributed to the leadership of the Party and People's Council in Vratsa district and the representative of the Central Committee there, Dimiter Dimov, who was at the same time a secretary of the Central Committee of the Party and a member of the Political Bureau. And this happened after the big 'purge' of 'Kostovists' in 1949!

marketable part of the produce at fixed low prices. This applies especially to grain farmers, who constitute the huge majority of our peasantry. In this way agricultural producers have been to a large extent deprived of their personal interest in developing and increasing production, improving its quality and generally raising the productivity of agricultural labour . . .'

'In the formation of the co-operative farms, instead of strict compliance with the laws, Government directives and Party instructions, throughout almost the whole country there have been irresponsible requisitionings of the best and most favourably located land, which is incorporated in the co-operative areas, while the private farmers are given in exchange distant and barren plots. Farmers are not being compensated in accordance with the quantity and real value of the land.' ' . . . peasants are forced to join co-operative farms while they are still unconvinced of their advantages . . .

'To this end the Plenum decides:

'1. That fundamental changes be made in the system of quota purchases so that, while preserving the principle of progressive quotas, agricultural producers shall be left the greater quantity of their excess stocks to sell them freely to the state, cooperatives and consumers at free prices.

'2. That a real and fair correlation be established between the price of cereals and the price of other agricultural products, industrial goods and artisan services; that the prices of cereals be raised . . .

'5. That producers be guaranteed the freedom to sell their surpluses directly to consumers, after delivering their quota to the state . . .

'8. That the supply of the village with staple industrial products, both from local industry and from abroad, be improved . . .

'10 . . . returning in certain places fields wrongly requisitioned from private farmers who received in exchange land of less value'. (Quoted by *Free Bulgaria*, 1st July, 1949).

The extent to which the Government overdid the exploitation of the peasantry was revealed even more clearly both by the evidence given during the Kostov Trial about the position of the agricultural population, and from the rise in the official prices for agricultural products after the June Plenum.

In the Trial the defendant Nikola Pavlov stated that for some years up to the end of 1948 there had been 'a strict quota system which oppressed the peasants'. ' . . . the quota system attained such proportions, that almost everything produced by the peasants was taken away from them, according to this order, and only such a part was left to them, which could only cover the current needs of their families. The quota system included almost all rural produce which served for direct consumption by the population, such as wool, eggs, meat, milk, potatoes, even including apples, chestnuts and peanuts . . .' This produced a sharp reaction. 'The peasants not only did not sow all areas that they had sown till then, but began to diminish them'. The deposition of Kostov showed very clearly that the poor peasants suffered no less from the quota system than the rich and medium peasants, and were no less discontented. 'The discontent of the poor peasants was also caused by the decree for the collection of wool . . . according to which even peasants owning 1 or 2 sheep were not exempted from the delivery of wool'.*

The extreme hardship the quota deliveries imposed on the peasants is illustrated by the fact that in 1948 they totalled about 11 milliard leva, while free market sales totalled only 715 million.

How low had been the prices paid for the products taken from the peasants is revealed by the extent to which they were raised after the June Plenum: hard wheat was raised from 19 leva per kilogram to 25 (31.6 per cent); ordinary wheat from 17 to 23 leva (35.3 per cent); rye and oats from 15 to 20 leva (33.3 per cent); barley, millet seed and corn from 13 to 18 leva (38.5 per cent); sunflower seed from 25 to 30 leva (20 per cent); dried beans from 30 to 60 leva (100 per cent); lentils from 44 to 55 leva (25 per cent). (*Otechestven Front*, 2nd July, 1949).

*The question arises why we accept this part of the evidence when we consider the Trial as a whole to be a frame-up. (See pp. 301-2). It is one thing to believe in the reality of the meat shortage, the obnoxious character of the quota system and so on—which are known to everyone who lives in the country—and another to believe that only Kostov and his co-defendants were responsible for it, while the rest of the leadership saw nothing of it for three or four years. If we look back at the 'trials' of 'witches' in the middle ages, we may disagree with the 'prosecutor' when he accused the 'witch' of causing the outbreak of a plague, but still accept the accusation as evidence of the existence of a plague at the time.

The resistance of the peasantry has also compelled the government to slow down its drive for 'collectivisation'. On November 15th, 1949, *Otechestven Front* said that eighty-six government commissions had been set up to remedy mistakes in connection with the collective farms. They had to inquire into the activities of 1,264 co-operative farms (two-thirds of all the co-operative farms in the country) and examine 61,854 complaints of illegal requisition of land from peasants who had not joined the co-operatives. In 35,311 cases the land had been restored to its previous owners and those responsible for the mistakes punished.

The Bulgarian government is, it seems, compelled to go gently with the collectivisation drive, but it nevertheless does not renounce its aim. While on January 1st, 1950 there were 1,600 co-operative farms with 156,500 families and 1,377,050 acres, on October 1st, the number of co-operative farms reached 2,249, with 474,800 families and 4,707,700 acres. Thus 43.4 per cent of the agricultural population is in co-operative farms. (Vulko Chervenkov's Report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, October 7th and 8th, 1950).

Bulgaria is not the only country to experience peasant resistance to government policy. There is a food shortage in Czechoslovakia. The Russians are not responsible for this, as they buy scarcely any agricultural products from Czechoslovakia. Nor does Czechoslovakia export much food to other countries. There was a drought, it is true, but that was two years ago, and even at that time the number of livestock compared with pre-war was better than in any of the other satellites. Moreover the population was much below its pre-war number owing to the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. The reason for the shortage must therefore be ascribed, at least partly, to the resistance of the peasants to delivering their products to the Government. The peasant resistance also expresses itself in the slowness of the progress of collectivisation. The Minister of Agriculture, Julius Duriš, said at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party, that in only 208 villages out of 13,000 were farm co-operatives operating (*Lidové Noviny*, 28th May, 1949). There had been many cases of almost open revolt at village meetings convened by the Communist Party to launch

cooperatives, while other meetings had been boycotted by the peasants. The General Secretary of the Party, Rudolf Slansky, went as far as to say: 'The Party has failed to organise an explanatory campaign within its own rank and file, with the result that some Party members, not having been made to understand the significance of the co-operatives and not having been persuaded of their usefulness, have begun to waver and to fall under reactionary influences.'

Poland has had its troubles too. The Government was obliged to supply the wheat growers with far more industrial products than it had planned to do, and at lower prices than were prevailing on the free market. (*Glos Ludu*, May 4th, 1948). Other manifestations of peasant resistance disturbed the countryside. According to *The Times* of 25 January, 1949: 'During the last few weeks of 1948 at least 20 cases were published in the Government-controlled newspapers of Communist organizers killed while on duty in country districts. Most people think the figure much higher'. The Government in alarm retreated, and instead of carrying out its ambitious plan of organising 7,400 co-operative farms in 1949, reduced its target to a mere 200. (*The World Today*, August, 1949). The peasant resistance, although strong enough to slow down the collectivisation drive, did not divert the Communist leaders from their aim. On April 1st, 1949, there were 40 producer co-operatives in Poland; by October 1st, 145; by February 1st, 1950, 332, and by March 5th, 590. Of these 590 co-operative farms, 345 have been founded on a statute similar to that of the Russian kolkhozes, 192 are of what is called the second lowest type: 30-40 per cent of their net income is distributed as rent for land and implements pooled in the co-operatives and 60-70 per cent as wages for labour. 53 were of the lowest type: common cultivation of privately-owned land. (Roman Zambrowski, Secretary of the Central Committee of the P.P.R., in *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* March 10th, 1950). We may assume that the tempo of 'collectivisation' will be accelerated after the first experiments have been completed. An important step in hastening the 'collectivisation' was the decree that put the zloty at par with the Russian rouble: every peasant had until 13th November, 1950 to give up 100 old zloty for one new one, while as regards workers'

wages and prices three new zloty were changed for 100 old zloty. With their meagre savings swept away, the peasants' resistance to collectivisation will be weakened.

Rumania has also experienced great peasant resistance to 'collectivisation'. In June, 1949, the government had to take strong measures against a partisan movement in the countryside, strongest in the Banat region. The government called the resisting peasants 'kulak hooligans', but a mere glance at its extortionate demands from the peasants belies this accusation. Every farm, down to the very smallest, must deliver large amounts of grain for low prices. For example, a peasant who has a farm of only 3 hectares must deliver 22 per cent of the yield for less than 20 per cent of the free market price. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 7th April, 1949). No wonder the peasants rebel. The 'collectivisation' of Rumanian agriculture is still at its beginning: in September, 1949, the number of co-operative farms was only 55.

In Hungary the government was very careful in approaching the problem of 'collectivisation' and for a long time denied any intention of proceeding with it. Thus, for instance, in a speech before a peasant meeting in Debreczen on June 29th, 1947, Premier Lájos Dinnyes said: ' . . . if the Government had any intention of creating kolkhozy it would not have carried out the land reform. What is good in one country is no use in another. A Hungarian Government which aimed to give up the principle of private property would be digging its own grave and the nation's. We aim to fortify the new peasantry'. (*The Times*, 30th June, 1947). After a certain amount of manoeuvring, nevertheless, the Hungarian Government did proceed to 'collectivise' agriculture, but it did so carefully and slowly. Up to November 1st, 1949, co-operative farms made up only 3.5 per cent of all the arable land of the country, and state farms another 3.5 per cent. Since then it has advanced considerably. In May, 1950, co-operative and state farms made up 17.8 per cent of all the land under cultivation.

In general it can be said that the process of 'collectivisation' is full of contradictions. Its aim is to secure food supplies and agricultural raw materials for the towns and for export, in order to facilitate industrialisation, as well as to get the necessary supply of labour power for industry and public work.

The greater the speed of industrialisation, and the smaller the existing amount of capital relatively to labour, the greater the speed of 'collectivisation'. Hence Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have gone much further along this road than the other 'People's Democracies'. At the same time, the greater the tempo of industrialisation, and the greater the subordination of the people's consumption to the needs of capital accumulation, the less the readiness to wait for the establishment of 'collectives' until the technical conditions for large-scale agricultural production (sufficient tractors, combines, etc.) exist, and until the peasants are convinced that large-scale agricultural production is superior, a conviction which depends largely on the readiness or otherwise of the government to supply the peasantry with industrial consumption goods. Social-political factors—the fear of the government, first of all, that it will be isolated or strongly opposed by the peasants—can modify the extent, the speed and the ruthlessness of the 'collectivisation' process.*

The Primitive Accumulation of Capital

When the British bourgeoisie first arose it had to drive the peasants off the land in order to get the surplus agricultural produce for the towns as well as the reserves of labour it needed for its growing enterprises. Britain went through this phase of development mainly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of which Marx wrote: 'The history of this . . . is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire'. (*Capital*, Vol I, p. 786). In its rise the Stalinist bureaucracy must repeat the same process so as to get the wealth of the country under its control.

But much more blood flowed in Russia during this 'primitive accumulation' than in Britain. Stalin accomplished in a few hundred days what it took Britain a few hundred years to accomplish. The scale on which he did it and the success with which he carried it out completely dwarf the actions of the English landlords who let the 'sheep devour man'. They bear grim witness to the superiority of modern industrial economy concentrated in the hands of the state, under the direction of a ruthless bureaucracy.

*See pp. 246-8

Engels made a prognosis about the future of primitive accumulation in Russia which has been completely realised, although in different circumstances from those which he ever imagined. In a letter to Danielson dated 24th February, 1893, he wrote:

‘... the circumstance of Russia being the *last* country seized upon by the capitalist *grande industrie*, and at the same time the country with by far the *largest peasant population*, are such as must render the *bouleversement* caused by this economic change more acute than it has been anywhere else. The process of replacing some 500,000 pomeshchiki (landowners) and some eighty million peasants by a new class of *bourgeois* landed proprietors cannot be carried out but under fearful sufferings and convulsions. But history is about the most cruel of all goddesses, and she leads her triumphal car over heaps of corpses, not only in war, but also in “peaceful” economic development’. (*Marx-Engels Selected Correspondence*, London, 1941, pp. 509-10).

Marx and Engels were not describing the historical transition from class society to socialism, but the development of class society, of which Bureaucratic State Capitalism is another stage.

PART II
POLITICAL LIFE IN THE
RUSSIAN SATELLITES



CHAPTER I

THE INITIAL SOVIET INTERVENTION: BULGARIA, RUMANIA, HUNGARY



NAPOLEON'S WORDS, 'Une armée dehors c'est l'État qui voyage', apply very well to the Russian armies which overran the countries of Eastern Europe as a result of the Second World War. If the Russian state had been a liberating democracy where power was in the hands of the people, the entry of the Red Army into the Eastern European countries would have inspired their populations to take their fate into their own hands, put an end to the military police dictatorships that terrorized them and establish the full sovereignty of the people. But the policy of the Russian occupation authorities was entirely different. For the first two or three years their primary objective was to preserve as strong an army and police force as possible under the control of the Communist Parties. With this task in mind the Communist leaders skilfully manipulated the pressure of the masses to introduce 'loyal' elements into the army and police and at the same time allied themselves with reactionary, even ex-fascist, heads of the old army and police. The second aim of the Kremlin was to call a halt to any action of the peoples which bore a really democratic and spontaneous character and which might therefore impede the Gleichshaltung of all public life. To achieve this, the same method was adopted of making alliances with the most right-wing, reactionary elements against the authentic Socialist Parties, Peasant Parties and, above all, against the peoples themselves.

A study of political life in the satellite states must begin with an analysis of this policy.

Pre-War Political Regime in Eastern Europe

Before the war, all the countries dealt with (except Czechoslovakia) had lived under a military dictatorship camouflaged

by a parliamentary facade. Workers' parties, peasant parties and trade unions were all persecuted or forbidden, strikes were suppressed in blood, and brutal mass executions were not unknown. To give only one example, 20-30 thousand workers and peasants lost their lives after the overthrow of the Peasant Government of Alexander Stamboliisky in Bulgaria in 1923. The secret police of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria could boast of rivalling the Gestapo in all the refinements of torture. The press was gagged. Parliamentary elections were a farce, as votes were bought, electors were terrorized, and voting was open, although the counting of the votes was secret. It was no accident that in only one out of the many national elections held in Rumania between the two world wars, did the government that was called upon by the king to arrange the elections fail to get the expected majority! The corruption and depravity of the public administration was immense. Symbolical of this corruption was King Carol's notorious mistress, Magda Lupescu, who appointed and dismissed Ministers and high officials, distributed government contracts, etc. National minorities in general, and the Jews in particular, suffered from official oppression and from 'spontaneous' outbursts of hooliganism organised by government agents. The alliance with Hitlerite Germany of Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and many of the rulers of Yugoslavia seemed natural.

In view of these facts, it is not surprising that the collapse of the German military machine was greeted with joy by the overwhelming majority of the peoples of Eastern Europe, who hoped to get rid of the previous shameful political and social order. The breakdown of the Gestapo unleashed a tremendous, independent upsurge of the people. The first task of the Russian occupation authorities was to grapple with this mass activity.

Bulgaria

In Sofia and other towns armed workers arrested fascists *en masse*, held mass demonstrations, set up elected people's tribunals, disarmed the police and established a workers' militia. Local committees took over the administration and the red flag was hoisted over all public buildings. The ferment was equally great in the Bulgarian army. Thus *The Economist* of October 7th, 1944, could write:

'Reports on the Bulgarian forces of occupation in Western Thrace and Macedonia vividly recall the picture of the Russian army in 1917. Soldiers' councils have been set up, officers have been degraded, red flags hoisted, and normal saluting has been abolished.'

But the Russian and Bulgarian Communist leaders did not welcome the initiative of the masses. On the contrary, they did everything to stop 'anarchy' and restore 'order'. When Molotov met the Bulgarian armistice delegation, he made the following declaration: 'If certain Communists continue their present conduct, we will bring them to reason. Bulgaria will remain with her democratic Government and her present order . . . You must retain all valuable army officers from before the *coup d'état*. You should reinstate in service all officers who have been dismissed for various reasons'. (*The New York Times*, January 16th, 1945). And earlier, on September 21st, 1944, *The New York Times* correspondent in Sofia reported that 'Communist leaders are doing everything they can to prevent extremists in the party from agitating for sovietization of the country'. Of the Red Army he said: 'On several occasions when local Communists in the provinces tried to displace city officials and take matters into their own hands they were ordered by the Russian military authorities to return the jobs to the old officials until orders were received from the Fatherland Front Government in Sofia'. The Fatherland Front government hastened to establish order.

As regards the restoration of 'order' in the Bulgarian Army, the same article in *The Economist* states: 'M. Velchev (Minister of War in the Fatherland Front Government—Y.G.) has issued a stern order to the troops to return immediately to normal discipline, to abolish Soldiers' Councils and to hoist no more red flags. Now Sofia reports that the Bulgarian army has been placed under the supreme command of Marshal Tolbukhin. Apparently, the Soviet commander has no patience with Balkan repetitions of 1917 . . . The Bulgarian Left seems to be ready to accept this policy, but it may be questioned whether it would have agreed to it so easily if its author had been Colonel Velchev and not Marshal Tolbukhin.'

In its programme, the Fatherland Front Government was careful to emphasize that it stood for the social *status quo* and

for the maintenance of private property. Immediately after its establishment, the Communist leader, Anton Yugov, the Minister of the Interior, declared: 'This government, of which I am a member and on whose behalf I speak, categorically denies that it has any intention of establishing a Communist regime in Bulgaria. There is no truth in rumours that the government intends to nationalise any private enterprise in the country.' (*The New York Times*, 22nd September, 1944).

A few months later, at the national congress of the Fatherland Front in March, 1945, another Communist leader declared: 'We are building a democratic country based on private property and private initiative. Consequently the Government by its very nature is reformist.' He severely attacked those members of the Communist Party who opposed the Fatherland Front Government and wanted 'to establish a completely Communist government.' An article in the official paper of the Fatherland Front, *Otechestven Front* (9th March, 1945) described the programme of the Front in these words: 'It is the programme of the Bulgarian workers, peasants, craftsmen and women, honest, intellectual, patriotic individuals, industrialists, merchants and patriotic soldiers.' In a congress of the industrialists of Bulgaria on September 27th, 1945, a Communist Minister, Dobri Terpeshev, said on behalf of the Supreme Economic Council: 'Private initiative will not be handicapped but supported. The Communists intend to revive it because our economy needs your initiative . . . Let us all work without being led on by thought of gain alone.' A year later the Communist Prime Minister, Georgi Dimitrov, declared: 'The immediate task is neither the realisation of Socialism nor the introduction of the Soviet system but the consolidation of a truly democratic and Parliamentarian system.'

From September, 1944, to October, 1946, the Fatherland Front Government was headed by General Kimon Georgiev who not only played a leading part in the military, semi-fascist *coup d'état* of Tsankov in 1923, as a result of which tens of thousands of workers and peasants were massacred, but was also the author of the military coup of 1934 which led to the immediate dismissal of Parliament, the terrible persecution of Communists, Agrarians and others, and, for the first time in

Bulgarian history, the dissolution of the trade unions and their illegalisation.* Georgiev's supporters wielded such power in the Fatherland Front Government that *The Observer* of 10th September, 1944, could remark: 'The composition of the Government suggests that the group that has now taken over in Sofia is the famous Military League which took power by a *coup d'état* in 1934.' But *The Observer* did not mention one very important exception. The Minister of the Interior, who controls the police, was the Communist leader, Anton Yugov. The Communist leaders joined hands with the old Military League in order to keep 'order', the first victims of which were any workers who demanded an improvement in their condition, or—even worse—dared to press for immediate steps in the direction of socialism. Thus Constantine Poulos, writing from Sofia on June 2nd, 1945, said: 'Bulgarian Socialists (are) far to the left of the Communists . . . The Greek workers who demanded "bread and work" last fall are now dead, in jail or terrorized into silence. The Bulgarian workers who recently made similar demands were publicly denounced by the Communists as diversionists and enemies of the state; a handful of coal miners who struck for higher wages in March were castigated as "anarchists" and rushed off to jail by the Communist-controlled militia.' (*The Nation*, June 23rd, 1945).

In spite of these precautions, the transfer of Bulgaria from the German side to the Russian was not carried out as smoothly as the transfer of Finland, Rumania and Hungary, because Bulgaria does not belong geographically to the Russian sphere proper, but is on the border between the Russian and Anglo-American zones. Hence when the Germans retreated, many members of the ruling strata of Bulgaria hoped to switch over from the side of Germany, not to Russia, but to England and the United States. Russia therefore could not rely implicitly on the Bulgarian state machine, and between September, 1944, and March, 1945, a large-scale purge was carried out by

*This is what *Imprecor*, the official Comintern paper, wrote about the 1934 coup: 'A new military-fascist *coup d'état* has been carried out in Bulgaria. In the night prior to May 19th the Muchanov-Gitchev government was overthrown and a military-fascist dictatorship established under the leadership of *Kimon Georgiev*, a Lieutenant-Colonel of the Reserve'. 'The leading elements in the present coup also played a leading role in the 1934 coup'. (*Imprecor*, 1st June, 1934). Now the official *Free Bulgaria* describes Georgiev's role in the 1934 coup in these words: 'In 1934 he took the post of Prime Minister and re-established diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.' (August 1st, 1949).

the law courts. As a result, two thousand people were condemned to death and executed and another few thousands sentenced to very long terms of imprisonment.

That the Bulgarian people were successfully 'kept quiet' is illustrated by the fact that until April, 1948, the Communists did not find it necessary to hold even sham elections to local authorities; heads of villages and members of local councils were officially appointed by the Minister of the Interior!

Rumania

Rumania was the first of the Eastern European countries reached by the Red Army, and Russia hastened to declare its intention of non-intervention in her internal regime. On April 2nd, 1944, Molotov declared: 'The Soviet Government declares that it does not pursue the aim of acquiring any part of Rumanian territory or of changing the existing social order in Rumania. It equally declares that the entry into Rumania of Soviet troops is solely the consequence of military necessities and of the continuation of resistance by the enemy forces.'

Russia's intention of keeping 'order' was reciprocated by the willingness of the Rumanian King and governing circles to collaborate with her. With scarcely a ripple Rumania changed her allegiance from Germany to Russia, the whole state apparatus—army, police and administration—going over to the Russian side when King Michael on 23rd August, 1944, arrested the Prime Minister, Marshal Ion Antonescu and appointed General Sănătescu in his place.

In March, 1945, after a number of changes in the Rumanian government, brought about by direct threats and pressure from the Russian army of occupation numbering a million men, Petru Groza became Premier, supported by Vice-Premier Gheorghe Tătărescu and four of his friends from the so-called 'Liberal Party', an equal number of Communists, and a number of individuals representing nobody.

Of Tătărescu, the Comintern paper, *Imprecor*, of December 8th, 1933, had said: 'In 1907 the Liberal Party, at that time led by Sturdza, caused no less than 11,000 peasants to be murdered. The bloody suppression of the peasant insurrection in Tatar-Bunar was also the work of the Liberals, under the leadership of Tătărescu, who is now the Minister for Trade and

Industry. The Liberal Party is also responsible for the volleys fired on the 13th of December against striking workers, as a result of which over 100 were killed.

'In December, 1927, it was the Liberal Party which organised the bloody anti-Jewish pogroms. Bands of students roamed through the streets beating up passers-by. The Minister of the Interior at the time was Duca, and the Secretary of State, Tătărescu. Under Liberal government corruption and jobbery reached their culminating point. The same Liberal Party exercised a brutal repressive terror against the revolutionary organisations; it suppressed all revolutionary newspapers and caused numerous workers to be murdered. Under Liberal government the class courts of the Rumanian bourgeoisie have sentenced many of the best leaders of the working class to long years of hard labour or to long terms of banishment in the salt mines.'

Tătărescu represented the extreme authoritarian wing of the Liberal Party and helped King Carol to establish his dictatorship. His foreign policy was oriented towards Hitler Germany. The British Communist weekly *World News and Views* of November 19th, 1938, described him thus: 'Tătărescu, the leader of the Right pro-Hitler wing of the National Liberal Party.'

Mihail Ralea, Minister of Culture in the March, 1945, Cabinet, was formerly a Minister under King Carol and an open admirer of the Hitler regime. Today he is Rumanian Ambassador to Washington. Father Burducea, the Minister of Cults in the March, 1945, Government, was one of the most notorious Iron Guardists (he had the decoration of the Buna Vestire, which was awarded to only thirty-two Guardists). Lotar Radaceanu, the Minister of Labour, was in Carol's totalitarian 'Renaissance Front.' One of the chiefs of the Propaganda Ministry, responsible for controlling the press, was Gheorghe Macovescu. Under Antonescu's fascist regime he held the same position, writing articles hailing the German-Rumanian alliance against Russia. Groza himself, the Premier since March, 1945, was before the war a very rich man, an owner of a big estate, factories and large hotels, and with big banking interests. He had been a Minister in two extremely right-wing governments under General Averescu (1920-1, 1926-7).

Groza repeatedly stated that his government was against any socialisation and stood for the defence of private property. For instance, in an interview with the correspondent of *The New York Times* on 26th September, 1945, 'Premier Groza said his Government did not intend to apply either collectivization of land or nationalisation of banks or industries and that the mere question showed an ignorance of its program. Claiming to represent all social strata, he said, the program was to "concentrate all the forces of the nation for the reconstruction of the country and to consolidate a democratic regime" and "in the Government's program there is no nationalization of banks or industries and no collectivization of land"' (*The New York Times*, 30th September, 1945).

Radio Bucharest reported that in a description of his recent talks with Stalin, Premier Groza had said that it was Stalin who had advised him to 'keep the system of private enterprise and private property.'

Nearly three years after the advance of the Russian army into Rumania, Groza still openly opposed the nationalisation of any property belonging to either Rumanian or foreign capitalists, even though the nationalisation of foreign property is part of the program not only of socialists but even of many nationalist movements in countries in which a great deal of foreign capital is invested, such as Mexico, Argentine, India, etc. In a statement to the Bucharest paper *Timpul* he said: ' . . . the Government and the Parliament will make every effort possible in order to realize a fruitful field of collaboration for foreign capital . . . (There will be—Y.G.) conditions intended to secure to this foreign capital a guarantee of investment and a just rentability.' (*International News*, Bucharest, 8th January, 1947).

Even capitalists who collaborated wholeheartedly with Germany were left untouched for more than three years, and the Communist Minister of Justice, Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu went so far as to point out that Nazi collaborators were far more leniently dealt with in Rumania than, for instance, in France. *The New York Times* correspondent reported on 17th March, 1945: 'Industrialists, business men and bankers will escape punishment as war criminals, under a law being drawn up by Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, Minister of Justice, and Communist

member of the Government, it was learned today. Rumania could not afford to lose the services of merchants and industrialists, M. Pătrășcanu said. He expressed the opinion that the country would pursue a more liberal policy toward this class than the French have.' What an outcry there would have been in the Communist press if a similar announcement had been made by a non-Communist Minister in the West!

Tătărescu did not hesitate to attack 'anarchists' (i.e., workers). In an interview with *The New York Times* correspondent in Bucharest on 21st October, 1945, he declared that a strenuous discipline must be introduced in industry and an end brought to the 'excesses' of the workers' committees.

It was hardly surprising that the capitalists faced the future with perhaps a little anxiety even if they were satisfied with the existing state of affairs. There was great optimism among businessmen, as the serious Swiss paper *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* pointed out (10th February, 1947) giving this illustration: 'As the Bucharest economic journal *Finanțe și Industrie* reports, in the last year (1946—Y.G.) in Rumania there were established 355 new stock companies with a total capital of 20.3 milliard Lei.'

For years business continued to be good and speculation in the free market active, although the conditions of the working people were appalling and, after the drought of 1946-7, starvation stared them in the face. Some idea of the conditions of the people at this time can be got from '*A Survey of the Health of the People in Several European Countries affected by the War*' published on November 19th, 1948, by *La Documentation Française* and consisting of reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross which describes the dreadful tragedy which overtook Rumania, the country most affected by the drought: 'It is difficult to convey the misery of the Rumanian population in 1947: famine prevailed in whole sections of the country, in some regions people were eating grass and the bark of trees and even clay. It is estimated that 6,000,000 persons were dependent on the government in 1947-48. Here are some of the consequences of the famine and misery which prevailed in this country: 1. The complete disappearance of little children in some districts . . . infant mortality actually reached a rate of 80% . . . 2. An increase of

all kinds of diseases and a steep rise of the mortality rate; corpses were thrown into sewers adjacent to the houses. 3. Universal poverty conducive to the spread of venereal diseases . . . one out of twelve persons is syphilitic according to recent reports furnished by the Minister of Health . . . '

All this time the fortunes of the capitalists were not touched as they were working for reparations for Russia. They and the new state bureaucracy flourished, while the lion's share of the surplus value produced in Rumania was taken, of course, by the Kremlin.*

The bureaucratic and militarist character of the Rumanian state was not altered and many of the former officials remained in office. Of the legal system, Pătrăşcaru could say: 'The procedures, methods, traditions and structure of Rumanian jurisprudence have remained unchanged since a Communist became Minister of Justice. No more than 20 new judges out of 2,000 have been appointed. About a quarter of the old staff have been purged or pensioned'. (*Christian Science Monitor*, 12th December, 1945). This policy is symbolised by the fact that 'Just two weeks before the start of the trial of Iuliu Maniu . . . a discreet announcement was published in Bucharest newspapers recording the appointment of a new chief of the military tribunal of the second army corps district (the one to preside over Maniu's trial—Y.G.) . . . the wartime director general of all prisons and concentration camps in Rumania'. (*New York Herald Tribune*, 7th November, 1947).

The structure of the army remained hierarchical, with the complete subordination of the soldiers to their officers, and with no soldiers' committees. For three years even the composition of its personnel showed a marked continuity with the past. For instance, Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolae Cambrea, commander of the Rumanian units fighting against Russia at Stalingrad, was promoted by the Groza government to the rank of General, and appointed Assistant Chief of Staff. Major Popescu-Argetoia, an active Fascist in the past, was put at the head of the secret police. General Vasiliu Rascanu, Chief of Military Police during the war against Russia, was appointed Minister of War. Another old general, Pretorian, was appointed Chief of Staff at the same time. General Lascar,

*See above pp.

Brigadier-General on the anti-Soviet Front in 1941, who received the Knight Cross of the Iron Cross from Hitler, was, after joining the Communist Party, considered 'loyal' enough to be appointed Minister of War!

The enthusiasm of the Communist Party for 'law and order' is illustrated by their ardour for the monarchy. On November 3rd, 1946, Premier Groza declared: 'The King, the Church, the Army, the People and the Government are one'. A few days later, at a meeting of the Communist-controlled Front organisation, the National Democratic Bloc, Vice-Premier Tătărescu said: 'From Gheorghiu Dej (leader of the Communist Party—Y.G.) to myself we shall all fight together for the consolidation of the Monarchy, because we are convinced that the King is the strongest factor that rallies all Rumanians. We shall fight for the consolidation of the National Church and of private property, the source of all creative enterprise'. (*East Europe*, an informative London weekly, 13th November, 1946). On November 8th, King Michael's birthday, the Communist daily *Era Noua* said: 'The people of Rumania have faith in their King.' (*East Europe*, 20th November, 1946). In the election demonstrations of the National Democratic Bloc, a constantly repeated slogan was 'Trăiască Regele!'—'Long live the King!' On 17th November, 1946, at an army electoral meeting in Bucharest, Gheorghiu Dej concluded his speech appealing for a vote for the 'King's Government': 'Long live the King!' 'Long live his commanders and soldiers! Long live the Army which is his and the people's!' The monarchist enthusiasm of the Communist Party reached such heights that they attacked the Peasant Party leader, Maniu as . . . anti-monarchist. Thus *Era Noua* of December 3rd, 1946, referring to the withdrawal of Maniu and his followers from parliament, suggested that 'in fact, Maniu's unparliamentary attitude is only a guise for his anti-dynastic policy. Maniu has already tried his first obstructive move in King Michael's reign . . . Neither Ferdinand nor King Carol were exempt from Maniu's political tactics'! (*East Europe*, 18th December, 1946). To crown the hypocrisy of the leaders of the Communist Party, on November 8th, 1947, their paper, *Scanteia*, wrote: 'The people wish to His Majesty the King a long life, good health, and a reign rich in democratic achievements' (*The New York Times*, November 9th,

1947). A few weeks later the Communist leaders compelled Michael to abdicate (30th December).

Hungary

The policy of the Communist Party in Hungary in the first stage of Russian intervention was similar to their policy in Rumania and it is therefore unnecessary to describe it in detail. The following quotation from the report of Nagy Imre, a member of the Political Bureau of the Party, to its congress in September, 1946, is typical of many declarations: 'While the war was still being fought, we have determined, and this is one of the basic principles, that in Hungary this is not the time for transition from capitalism to socialism, for struggle between the two social systems, but for uprooting the powerful remnants of feudalism. It is not a question then of struggle between the two social systems but of the struggle between democracy and reaction within capitalism.'

The connection between this policy and Russia's interest in gaining control of the Hungarian economy (through mixed companies) and in extorting reparations from her, has already been described. Here it is only necessary to repeat that for three years the Communist Party leaders continued to harp upon the same theme, that they were against abandoning the capitalist structure of the country.

CHAPTER II

POLAND: THE WARSAW UPRISING



THE OPPOSITION of Russia and its agents to any spontaneous, independent and democratic action by the masses was revealed in the most damning way when the people of Warsaw, organised and led in the main by the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.), rose in arms against the German Army of Occupation. Russia's attitude towards the heroic uprising shows up the sinister and anti-democratic character of her policy during the critical stages of the process by which the Communists took control of the state machine.

In July, 1944, the Soviet Army advanced towards Warsaw, and in the second half of the month, German troops began to be evacuated *en masse* from the city and its environs. On 29th July the Soviet Army under the command of Marshal Rokossovsky entered Otwock, 20 kilometres from Warsaw. The next day they reached Miłosna, 10 kilometres from Warsaw. On 31st July, mobile patrols of the Soviet Army had advanced as far as Praga, a suburb of Warsaw on the east bank of the Vistula. Every night military targets in Warsaw were bombed by the Soviet air force. The Germans continued to withdraw their exhausted troops, but held on to the eastern end of the bridges in Praga. Then the Russian artillery began to bombard Praga. The Vistula was crossed near its confluence with the Pilica and this threatened the German garrison from the south, while on 1st and 2nd August the Vistula was crossed higher up near Sandomierz.

The situation in Warsaw itself was described thus: 'The Germans were evacuating Warsaw at high speed. Railway installations and industrial plants were dismantled and removed . . . All the German offices in the city, including the Post Office, closed down. Newspapers published by the Germans ceased. The Gestapo burned documents in the

greatest haste and prepared to decamp . . . German civilians besieged the railway stations. On account of the inadequate number of trains, they fled by all possible means of transport, offering sky-high prices for the hire of a horse and cart'. (T. Bor-Komorowski, *The Secret Army*, London, 1950, p. 206).

The Germans ordered the mobilization of 100,000 Poles for the fortification of the suburbs of Warsaw, but not a single Pole presented himself. A Soviet broadcast reported later that prior to the last week in July 'a tense atmosphere could be felt in Warsaw. The Germans, it was said, were obviously preparing a new massacre of the population'. (Statement by Colonel Tarnawa, a Polish officer, who was in Warsaw at that time, Soviet Home Service, September 2nd, 1944. Quoted by the Duchess of Atholl, *The Tragedy of Warsaw and its Documentation*, London, 1945).

During this period the Polish organisation which acted as the mouthpiece of the Kremlin—the Union of Polish Patriots—issued increasingly urgent appeals to the population of Warsaw to rise and fight the Germans. On July 29th, Radio Moscow broadcast an appeal of the Union: 'Appeal to Warsaw. Fight the Germans. No doubt Warsaw already hears the guns of the battle which is soon to bring her liberation. Those who have never bowed their heads to Hitlerite power will again, as in 1939, join battle with the Germans, this time for the decisive action.

' . . . For Warsaw, which did not yield but fought on, the hour of action has already arrived.

'The Germans will no doubt try to defend themselves in Warsaw. . . It is therefore a hundred times more necessary than ever to remember that in the flood of Hitlerite destruction all is lost that is not saved by active effort, that by direct active struggle in the streets of Warsaw, in its houses, factories, and stores we not only hasten the moment of final liberation but also save a nation's property and the lives of our brothers.'

On July, 30th, the radio station of the Union of Polish Patriots, Radio Kościuszko, declared: 'Warsaw trembles from the roar of guns. The Soviet armies are pushing forward and are near Praga. They come to us to bring us liberation. The Germans, when pushed out from Praga, will attempt to hold

Warsaw and will try to destroy everything. In Bialystok they sacked everything for six days. They murdered thousands of our brothers. We must do everything to avoid a repetition of these horrors in Warsaw. People of Warsaw, to arms! 'Attack the Germans . . . Assist the Red Army in crossing the Vistula'. (*Manchester Guardian*, 22nd August, 1944).

On 1st August, Warsaw rose against the Germans. Women and children took their place among the fighters. Although poorly armed, with only home-made mortars and hand grenades, the people of Warsaw fought heroically, and by the 3rd the insurgents had control of the greater part of Warsaw.

On 2nd August, the Germans launched a counter-attack against the Soviet Army and on the eastern and north-eastern fronts drove it back to a distance of 50 miles from Warsaw (where the Soviet Army remained until 28th August). But on the south-east of Warsaw the Soviet Army maintained its position at a distance of some 15 miles from the city. The retreat of the Soviet Army made it impossible for it to give immediate direct support to the Warsaw insurgents. But it was in a position to do a great deal to help them. The Luftwaffe had been bombing the town incessantly since August 4th, and Soviet fighters could have intercepted the German bombers, and Soviet bombers could have bombed both the airfields from which the German bombers took off and the gun sites from which the Germans bombarded the city. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. could have supplied the insurgents with the arms they needed so desperately.

On 5th August, a Soviet officer of the Intelligence Service, Captain Constantin Kalugin, was sent to the insurgents' headquarters in Warsaw. He despatched the following telegram to Moscow (via the British authorities in London, reaching Moscow on 8th August):

'Comrade Marshal Stalin, Moscow. On 5th August, 1944, established personal contact with the commander of the Warsaw garrison who is leading the heroic struggle of the Polish nation against the Hitlerite bandits. After acquainting myself with the general military situation, have come to the conclusion that in spite of the heroism of the army and entire population, there are certain difficulties to be overcome if we are to hasten on the victory over our common foe. The needs

are as follows: motorised weapons, ammunition, grenades and anti-tank guns.

'Places for dropping arms by parachute: Wilson Square, Invalids' Square, the Ghetto, Krasinskis' Square, Iron Gate Square, Napoleon Square, the Mokotow Field, the Light Cavalry barracks, Bielany.

'Recognition signals: white and red sheets.

'German aircraft are causing destruction in the town and among the civilian population. Bomb from the air the bridges over the Vistula in the Warsaw area, the Saxony Park and Jerusalem Avenue, Wolska Road, where the enemy troops are concentrated. Bomb the aerodromes of Okecie and of Bielany. The population of Warsaw hopes that you will come to their help within the next few hours. Help me to come in touch with Marshal Rokossovsky. Captain [Constantin Kalugin of the Czarny Group, Warsaw, 66.804]. (Z. Zaremba, *Powstanie Sierpniowe*, London, 1946, pp. 30-32).

All the appeals of the insurgents to Moscow for arms, for fighter aircraft to be sent to defend Warsaw from the terrible bombardment, and for the German airfields and gun sites to be bombed were in vain. The Soviet Air Force which throughout August and September occupied airfields only a few minutes' flight from the city and which, until the insurrection, regularly bombed military targets in Warsaw, now completely ceased activity in and around Warsaw.

Moscow's very lame excuse for not sending arms to the insurgents was the danger that the arms dropped would fall into the hands of the Germans. At a foreign press conference in Lublin on August 28th, General Michal Rola-Zymierski, Commander of the Polish forces under the high command of the Red Army, said: 'If the insurgents had one entire district, it would be possible to help them, but when they held only isolated buildings, everything must fall into German hands'. (*The Daily Worker*, August 30th). This explanation is proved to be specious by Captain Kalugin's telegram cited above, by *The Times* statement that it was the Germans who held only 'widely scattered islands' and above all by the fact that in the middle of September, when the area in the hands of the insurgents was much smaller, Russian arms were dropped in Warsaw.

Another excuse for the Kremlin's policy was put forward by Anna Louise Strong (for twenty-three years an apologist for Russian policy, but since 'purged' as an 'American spy') in an article in *The Nation* of September 2nd, 1944: 'The Red Army thus far has taken many cities, some by storm and more by outflanking, but the Red Army never took a city by the correlation of a frontal attack with an uprising within the city. The Red Army always discouraged such tactics'. That is the revolutionary Red Army!

From 4th August, British and American planes based in Italy began to reach Warsaw—a flight there and back of 1,300 miles. Such a distance was beyond the range of fighter cover, so that the flights had to take place at night, thus increasing the number of casualties and detracting from their effectiveness. For only three days did the R.A.F. supply Warsaw adequately. After that only single planes reached the city from time to time. It was evident that 'if the (Allied) planes, after dropping their loads, could fly on the short distances to behind the Russian lines and "shuttle" back, the operation would be far easier, and the casualties far lighter'. (*Daily Herald*, 30th August, 1944). Such a 'shuttle' service already existed elsewhere. British and American planes bombing the Rumanian oilfields, Koenigsberg, Gdynia and other German centres, used to come down in Russian-held territory. But *forty* days elapsed before Moscow agreed to allow these planes to carry supplies to besieged Warsaw or to bomb German bases in the city and its surroundings, and then to fly behind the Russian lines and 'shuttle' back, or even to allow damaged British and American planes to land on Russian-held airfields.

On 14th September, the Soviet Army occupied Praga and in the next three days they forced the Germans back a number of miles to the north-west. Soviet planes cleared the sky above Warsaw of German planes, and began to drop arms and food. But after a few days there was another sudden change in Russian policy. The Soviet Army holding Praga halted, its artillery ceased fire, its aeroplanes disappeared almost entirely and the Luftwaffe reopened its murderous attacks. Occasional consignments of arms and food were the only help given by the Russians. The Soviet Army which occupied the eastern quarters

of Warsaw for another month stood by while the German army murdered the Warsaw rebels.

After a heroic and unequal struggle lasting 63 days Warsaw fell. 240,000 of its inhabitants were killed and 630,000 deported by the Germans. The city was destroyed systematically, house by house and street by street.

During the period of the uprising, any Polish partisans who tried to reach besieged Warsaw were stopped by the Soviet Army, disarmed and arrested. (Altogether the Russian army arrested 50,000 of the Polish partisans fighting the German army and deported them to Siberia).

The Communists use two main arguments to justify Russian policy towards the uprising: first, that it was ill-timed, and secondly, that it had a reactionary character.

The first argument is belied by the appeals, quoted above, sent out by Radio Moscow to the population of Warsaw to rise, and by the fact that the Soviet liaison officers who were sent to Warsaw at the beginning of the uprising (of whom Captain Kalugin was one) supported the rising unreservedly. Further, the small group of Communists in Warsaw itself declared in favour of the uprising. The official Communist organ *Armia Ludowa* stated on 15th August: 'The armed uprising has found the support of the broadest masses of Warsaw's people, quite independently of who started it and for what purpose, and that is its strength.' (This, incidentally, is in sharp contrast to the ridicule which the Communist papers in Moscow, London and New York heaped on the uprising). Seventeen days after the beginning of the uprising the Kosciuszko radio station declared its support: 'Our camp, the camp of fighting democracy, has always welcomed any sign of fighting against the German invader. We have always called you to arms and have seen in an active struggle the surest means of saving men and national property. We see in the present rising in Warsaw a manifestation of the fighting spirit of the democratic camp and the Warsaw fighting is to us as sacred as any act of combat against the enemy'. Two days later the Lublin radio of the Union of Polish Patriots proclaimed: 'The Warsaw uprising proves the fighting spirit of the democratic camp. Our (Polish—Y.G.) infantry burns with the desire to help Warsaw. Also the soldiers of the Red Army are hurrying to assist the capital.

Warsaw will be liberated . . . Polish soldiers and the Red Army are coming to assist you.' (Quoted by L. M. Oak in the American *New Leader*, November, 13th, 1944).

Even more monstrous than the description of the rising as untimely is its condemnation as reactionary and fascist in character. If the Warsaw uprising had really been reactionary the Kremlin's attitude to it would have been very different. It is enough to recall the goodwill manifested to General Béla Miklós of Hungary and King Michael of Rumania. Russia was hostile to the Warsaw uprising precisely because it was quite independent of Communist influence, was dominated by the P.P.S. and was a socially progressive movement.

After the military defeat of September, 1939, which marked the disintegration of the dictatorial semi-fascist regime of the 'Colonels', the workers and peasants, organised in the P.P.S. and in the Peasant Party, became the backbone of the underground army, called Armia Krajowa (A.K.), the Home Army. The extreme right did not belong to the A.K. but to the National Armed Forces (Narodowe Sily Zbrojne). Military units of the P.P.S. and the Polish Peasant Party joined the A.K. and retained their identity as autonomous units. The clandestine parliament—the Council of National Unity—relied mainly on the workers and peasants.

The programme of the Home Army was described in its underground organ, *Biuletyn Informacyjny* of 9th September, 1943, in an article entitled 'What Kind of Poland are we Fighting for?' This clearly stated that the future Poland must have 'freedom of speech, freedom of opinion, freedom of association; it will be a Poland of social justice and welfare for the wide masses, liberated from capitalistic chaos; a Poland which will nationalise its great factories and plants; a Poland which will fundamentally transform its agrarian regime, modernize its system of distributing goods, expand its network of co-operatives and industrialize the country'.

On 15th August, 1944, after the Warsaw Commune's 15 days' existence, the Council of National Unity issued a manifesto to the people which included the following statement:

'In this war, Poland is not only fighting for her existence and political independence, but also for loftier aims. The Atlantic Charter, which defined the military aims of the United Nations,

assures to Poland its legitimate aspirations and its historic needs. Threatened by repeated aggression of imperialist Powers, she must be certain of security and the possibility of working in peace for generations. She wants to be able to govern herself according to her own principles and laws. These principles have already been published in the declaration of 26th July, 1944. They guarantee the regime of the future Republic based on political liberty and social justice.

'The principles of the Polish democratic Republic are as follows:

'1. A constitution guaranteeing governments in accordance with the will of the people.

'2. A democratic electoral law faithfully reflecting public opinion through general and municipal elections.

'3. Agrarian reform covering all estates of over 50 hectares as well as German landed property determined by a preliminary decree; the surplus population being directed towards industry and handicrafts.

'4. Socialisation of key industries.

'5. Participation of the workers in the management of enterprise and control by the workers of industrial production.

'6. All citizens have the right to work and to a decent standard of living.

'7. A just redistribution of the social income.

'8. All citizens have the right to education and culture.'

(Zaremba, *La Commune de Varsovie* (Fel.) Paris, 1947, pp. 39-40).

Although the Warsaw uprising had basically a national-liberatory and social revolutionary character, it nevertheless had many negative, reactionary elements in its leadership. The P.P.S. leaders, with their inclination to compromise, and in the name of 'national unity', agreed to keep the military leadership in the hands of army experts headed by General Bor-Komorowski. The Russian Government let Hitler murder the rebels of Warsaw, not because their commander came from the old Polish Army, but because the rebellion was an expression of new forces, nationally and socially independent of the Kremlin.

CHAPTER III

YUGOSLAVIA— THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE



UNLIKE THE Communist Parties in the rest of Eastern Europe, the Yugoslav Communist Party took power not through the agency of the Russian army of occupation, but through the support of the masses who had rallied round it during the years of struggle against the German and Italian invaders and their collaborators.

The invasion of Yugoslavia by the Axis armies led to the complete collapse of the old state structure. Croatia and Bosnia split off and formed an 'independent' Croat state headed by Ante Pavelić; Slovenia was absorbed into the German Reich; Dalmatia was occupied by the Italians; south-eastern Serbia and eastern Macedonia were annexed by Bulgaria; Baranya, Bačka and Medjumurje were taken over by Hungary; and the province of Banat and Serbia proper were ruled by a quisling government under General Milan Nedić.

It was obvious that there had not been much love lost between the non-Serbs of Yugoslavia and the old chauvinistic Serbian rulers. The fascist elements among the non-Serbs used this hostility to divert the hatred felt for the Belgrade administration into a general national hatred of the Serbs, and one of the most sordid incidents in Yugoslav history ensued. The Ustashe—the Croat fascists—began a pogrom on a huge scale against the Serbs, during which 810 thousand Serbs, men, women and children, were callously murdered and whole villages razed to the ground. Moslem fascists in Bosnia also took part in the carnage. Some villages saved themselves from annihilation at the hands of the Croats by renouncing the Greek Orthodox Church and embracing Catholicism. The Catholic hierarchy of Croatia and Bosnia undertook an

energetic crusade against Serb 'infidels.' Serb fascists retaliated by murdering Croats and Moslems *en masse* in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia and elsewhere. While engaged in this communal slaughter, the quislings of each nation—Croats, Slovenes, Moslems and Serbs—collaborated with Berlin or Rome or with both.

Unlike them General Draža Mihailović, the military commander of King Peter and his government in exile, stood for a united Yugoslavia including all the nations, but united under the rule of Serbia. His Chetniks were ready to take an active part in the massacre of Croats and Moslems, and Mihailović himself called upon the Allies to bomb Zagreb, the Croat capital, in revenge for their treachery. He even circulated propaganda maps of a future Yugoslavia in which Croatia was reduced to a small strip of land. To the Croatian, Montenegrin, Slovenian and also Serbian peasants and workers the old centralised administration symbolised by Mihailović represented the tax-collector, the gendarme and the corrupt local official. Mihailović's policy condemned him to increasing isolation and so to impotency, and finally to collaboration with the Germans and Italians against Tito's Partisans.

The only Party which fought for the unity of Yugoslavia on the basis of the equality of all its component nations was the Communist Party. The refugees from the pogroms constituted the first Partisan units, and the communal conflicts faced Tito's movement squarely with the problem whose solution proved to be decisive for its successes in the struggle for the liberation of the country from Axis occupation.

By a policy of national equality and of opposition to all communal conflicts, whether led by Ustashe and Moslem pogromists or Nedić and the Chetnik 'avengers', the Communist Party of Yugoslavia succeeded in welding the different peoples together. As Lieutenant-General Svetozar Vukmanović (better known as 'Tempo') said in his speech on the occasion of the celebration of 'Yugoslav Army Day' on 22nd December, 1947: 'The fighting of the Serbian and Montenegrin proletarian and shock brigades in Bosnia and Croatia; the fighting of Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin units in Serbia; the fighting of Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Macedonian, Montenegrin and Slovene units on the Srem front and beyond, for

the ultimate liberation of Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, etc.—all this was an enormous contribution of the Yugoslav Army in the struggle for the establishment of unity among the peoples of Yugoslavia.' The unity of the peoples and their equality was symbolised in the fact that a Croat (Tito) led the revolt in Serbia, a Serbian Jew (Moše Pijade) led the rising in Montenegro, and a Montenegrin (Vukmanović) led the partisans in Macedonia.

This policy explains the phenomenon that military units of Italians, Hungarians and even German partisans fought in Tito's army. A large number of Italian soldiers joined the Partisans after the fall of Mussolini and formed the Garibaldi Volunteer units which were large enough to consist of a number of divisions. In the Slovene littoral, where Slovenes and Italians live side by side, Italian and Slovene Partisans formed common units, and Italians took an active and equal part in the work of the People's Committees, the embryonic administration of the new state. In spite of the cruelty displayed by the Hungarian occupation armies in the zone which they annexed, a cruelty greater even than that of the German armies, Tito succeeded in recruiting a battalion of Hungarian volunteers, the Petöfi Sandor battalion. There was also a Czech battalion in the Partisan Army. In July, 1943, a campaign was launched to enlist members of the German minority living in Yugoslavia in the Partisan army and this campaign met with some success, a Volksdeutsche battalion being organized to fight with the Partisans.

The social programme of Tito's Partisans was conservative. The Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation (A.V.N.O.J.)—the Partisans' parliament—at its first meeting in Bihać on 26th November, 1942, proclaimed a programme, two of whose points were:

'The inviolability of private property and the providing of every possibility for individual initiative in industry, trade and agriculture.

'No radical changes whatsoever in the social life and activities of the people except for the replacement of reactionary village authorities and gendarmes who may have gone over to the service of the invaders by popularly elected representatives truly democratic and popular in character. All the most

important questions of social life and State organisation will be settled by the people themselves through representatives who will be properly elected by the people after the end of the war.'

These aims were constantly reiterated by the Partisan press and radio during the remaining three years of the war.

To illustrate the conservative character of the Partisans' social programme, it is only necessary to quote the oath taken by the new Croat volunteers: 'I swear by God Almighty and by all I hold dear that on my word of honour I shall always be true to the traditions of my ancestors. I will always fulfil trust towards the Croat people and will defend with my blood my national home from the German, Italian and Hungarian oppressors, and the traitors of my people. So help me God'. (Radio Free Yugoslavia, 13th June, 1943).

To reinforce this appeal to tradition a confessor or chaplain (vjerski referent) was attached to all the large military units.

This policy met with opposition from some members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. An uprising in July, 1941, in Montenegro raised the banner of 'Soviet Montenegro', and in Herzegovina, deviations from the Party line by the Party organisation called forth harsh criticism from Aleksandar Ranković, one of the foremost leaders of the Party and today Minister of the Interior. (*Proleter*, December, 1942). In spite of some leftist deviations, however, the Bihać programme was consistently implemented until the liberation of all Yugoslavia.

Until the end of 1944, no social changes or changes in property ownership were introduced. On 14th February, 1945, Vice-Premier Kardelj insisted in a broadcast that in her economic structure Yugoslavia had not abandoned and would not abandon the general framework of capitalism.

The Bihać programme could be adhered to with comparative ease because the areas in the hands of the Partisans were those to which social conservatism was most acceptable. Both the most industrialised parts of Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Northern Croatia, came into the Partisans' hands only at the end of 1944 or beginning of 1945. The area in which there was a considerable number of rich peasants and German settlers, whose land would have been suitable for redistribution among the poorer peasantry, was also in the North. Thus until the end of 1944 or beginning of 1945 there were not many capitalists

or rich peasants under their control and therefore no obvious targets for social discontent.

After that the industrial bourgeoisie was expropriated, without a formal renunciation of the Bihać programme, by the legal confiscation of the property of traitors. It was not until 5th December, 1946, that a nationalisation law was passed and this simply registered what was already an accomplished fact.

Because the Partisans operated far from the industrial centres, they consisted almost entirely of peasants. Although the workers of Yugoslavia supported the Communist Party almost to a man, they played a very small part in the movement. In the words of Bogdan Raditsa, a former press service director of the Tito government: ' . . . the working class was far from being a vital factor in the resistance, as the Communists allege in their propaganda. For the workers remained in the big-city factories or were sent into Hitler's labor camps'. (*New Republic*, September 16th, 1946). The peasant character of the Partisan movement explains its original plebeian and democratic character. It also explains why the Communist Party of Yugoslavia could easily impose its conservative programme upon it during 1941-44 and why the Partisan Army was easily transformed into a stratified army, a development common to many peasant guerillas, for instance, the Spanish guerillas fighting Napoleon.

In the beginning there was real democracy in the army. There were no ranks and no medals and after each operation meetings were held at which each partisan had the opportunity of making a public criticism of any aspect of the operation. For two years during the first four Offensives which put the Partisans to their severest test, this procedure was followed. But on May Day, 1943, the ranks of officers and N.C.O.'s were introduced, and in the next four months about 5,000 officers and 11 generals were created; Tito was raised to the rank of Marshal in November, 1943. In the state administration, the principle of electing People's Committees was rigorously adhered to in the countryside until the Partisans advanced from the mountainous and backward areas to the large towns, when they were no longer elected but *appointed*. When, as sometimes happened, elections were held, they were only a formality, as there was only one list of candidates. The

generals, colonels and other officers of the army became the backbone of the new state administration and monopolised all political power. It was this new bureaucratic caste which carried out the nationalisation of industry, transferring all the industrial wealth of the country into its own hands.

Thus the Partisan movement passed from being a plebeian democracy with a progressive policy on the national question and a conservative social programme, to bureaucratic state capitalism.

CHAPTER IV

THE COMMUNISTS TAKE CONTROL OF POLICE AND ARMY



AT THE END of the war, the Communist Parties were participating in governments with bourgeois parties not only in the 'Peoples Democracies,' but in France, Italy, Belgium, Austria and Finland. For about two years the Communist leaders called for 'national unity' and 'order' against strikes and workers' struggles in general. In France, Italy, Belgium, Austria and Finland, at the end of the honeymoon period, the Communist Party representatives left the governments or were thrown out of them and went over to the opposition, while in the 'Peoples Democracies' they took full control into their hands. This difference was due to the fact that the Communist Party did not take control of the police and army in any of the Western European countries as they did in the East. In none of the first group of countries did the Communists succeed in getting control of the Ministry of War and only in Austria and Finland did they for a time hold the portfolio of Minister of the Interior and hence control of the police. Even in Finland they did not completely succeed in 'purging' the police of 'unreliable' elements and introducing their agents, so that when the Communist Minister of the Interior—Leino—lost his position in the government, his power to use the police as a means of resistance was very limited.

The situation in all the satellite states was very different. Almost from the beginning, the Ministers of the Interior were Communists. They used their positions to recruit the old police officers into the Communist Party, or to replace them by new Communist Party members. As there are, of course, no statistics to show the changes in the party composition of the police in these countries, one can only rely for information on fragments of news in the press. However, in the case of Czechoslovakia there is the evidence of Hubert Ripka, who was the

Minister of Foreign Trade in Czechoslovakia until February, 1948, and who is now in exile. He states that on the eve of the Communist coup of February 'All the important posts in the Ministry of the Interior were occupied by Communists; in the division of the security police, of nine departmental heads, five were Communists. At the head of the three branches of the Corps of National Security Police (S.N.B.) there were only militant Communists: Colonel Krystof, Dr. Hora and Dr. Goerner. In one of the particularly important sections of the security police (Section III-2), of nineteen officers, fourteen were Communists. In the directing office of the Corps of the National Security Police, of thirteen officers, nine were Communists. At Central headquarters of the political police, the three chief posts were in Communist hands. In the intelligence services the Communists dominated, even in the lower ranks. In the Prague headquarters of the provincial S.N.B., of five high officers, four were members of the Communist Party. Of seventeen regional directors of the S.N.B. in Bohemia, twelve were Communists. Of a total of seventy high officers of the S.N.B., about sixty were members of the Communist Party'. (*Czechoslovakia Enslaved*, London, 1950, p. 195). In the other satellites, there is no doubt that the Communist infiltration into key positions in the police was even more thorough. It is an apt comment that Andrassy Ut in Budapest, in which the dreaded headquarters of the Special Security Police is found, now bears instead the name of Stalin!

A similar situation existed in the army. A symbol of the complete control of the Kremlin over the armies of the satellite countries was the appointment of the Soviet Army Marshal, Constantin Rokossovsky, as Polish Minister of National Defence (7th November, 1949) in place of Marshal Michal Rola-Zymierski.* Rokossovsky was born in Warsaw when it was part of Russian Poland, but has had as much to do with Poland as the Irish-born Field-Marshal Montgomery with his native country. He became famous, or more exactly notorious, in Poland, at the time of the Warsaw uprising, as the commander

* Rola-Zymierski was one of the few of Pilsudski's Legionnaires who took an oath of allegiance to the Germans in World War I. He was a commander of the Polish Army in the war against Russia in 1920. In 1927 he was tried and convicted on a charge of bribery, degraded, cashiered and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. The Kremlin raised him to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Polish forces and Minister of National Defence.

of the Russian armies which passively looked on while the Nazis massacred the rebels. After the war he was groomed for command of the Polish Army by being kept in Poland as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops guarding Russia's lines of communication with the Soviet Zone of Germany.

The Chief of Staff of the Polish Army, General Korczyc, and the Vice-Minister of Defence, General Poplawski, are also former commanders of the Soviet Army. On April 24th, 1950, the emigre Hungarian Communist monthly *Magyar Komunista* reported that Soviet Commander General Mensikov, had been appointed 'Supervisor of the Hungarian Army.'

Besides controlling the 'national' armies the Kremlin keeps troops in four of the satellite countries, officially to protect the lines of communication leading to the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria. These are Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland. The only two countries with no Russian army are Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The former, bordering on the U.S.S.R. and squeezed between Poland, Hungary, the Soviet Zone of Germany and the Soviet Zone of Austria (with a short frontier with the American Zone of Germany) is from the military point of view well 'looked after'. In Yugoslavia, the non-existence of a Russian army and the fact that there is no frontier with the U.S.S.R. were of no small importance in the daring revolt of Tito against the Kremlin.

Secure in their control over army and police, the Communists could proceed to the elimination of all other parties.

CHAPTER V

LIQUIDATION OF THE PEASANT PARTIES



A VERY SEVERE and prolonged struggle took place between the Communist Parties and the Peasant Parties. The latter were neither as black as the Communist leaders painted them, nor as white as the majority of the western capitalist press tried to represent them. The peasant parties were of very diverse character and each of them was far from being homogeneous. Progressive and reactionary, democratic and totalitarian elements were mingled in the same parties. To follow the Communist Party policy towards them it is necessary first to understand the complex character of the peasant parties.

Since the economic, cultural and political leadership of a country rests with the towns, and since the peasants of Eastern Europe were dispersed in small, isolated villages, the leadership of the peasant parties mainly came from the towns. The urban population was divided into conflicting social and political groups, and so the question always arose of which class the peasantry would make its ally—the urban bourgeoisie or the workers' parties. The peasantry is divided amongst itself, the rich peasants naturally looking to one camp, and the poor, semi-proletarian majority, to the other. A whole series of socio-political problems is bound up with this. So long as the big estates were not divided up, the peasantry as a whole remained united in the fight for land reform, and their party had a more or less revolutionary character. But with the carrying out of large-scale land reforms after World War I in Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (see pages 13-8), there was very little to hold the peasantry together and no common political platform. Another factor must be taken into account. For centuries, the peasants in many countries, as for instance in France at the time of the Great Revolution, wanted to get rid of

their feudal overlords, take possession of their lands and thus gain the freedom to produce for themselves and sell their products in the towns. Such a programme would have been quite inadequate for the East European countries in the period between the two wars, because of the catastrophic fall in agricultural prices as a result of the world crisis and of the great agricultural over-population. The solution of the problems of the peasantry today is not in land distribution alone, but also in industrialisation which will absorb the surplus agricultural population and open up wide markets for agricultural products. There is a contradiction, at least temporarily, between these two factors and different layers of the peasantry have different attitudes towards industrialisation as well as towards the policy of keeping agricultural prices high (by tariffs).

The poor peasants who need to work at least partly for wages and do not produce enough food even for their own needs, have an interest in industrialisation and low prices for agricultural goods, while the rich peasants who want cheap labour do not care about industrialisation and support any policy which results in a rise in the cost of food. Large scale industrialisation is impossible under present conditions in Eastern Europe without State planning, so that the poor peasant naturally tends to support the socialist forces of the towns while the rich peasant looks in quite a different direction for leadership. After the land reform and in face of widespread unemployment, open and hidden, the rich peasants could not propose any positive programme to rally the mass of the peasantry to their side. Another factor contributed to the bankruptcy of the Peasant Parties of Eastern Europe. While on the whole they favoured democracy, the market for the agricultural products of Eastern Europe in the thirties was mainly fascist Germany. Hence the attitude of many of the leaders of the peasant parties to the pro-German policy of their governments was ambiguous, to say the least. To add to the contradictions in which many of the peasant parties found themselves, was the national question which the conservatism and narrow outlook of the peasantry, especially of its rich and well-satisfied section, precluded them from tackling. In Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia this factor was of the utmost importance in leading the official peasant parties into a blind

alley. If any of the peasant parties succeeded at all in escaping control by the wealthy townsmen or by the rich peasants, capitulation to their semi-fascist government, entanglement in a hopeless and reactionary fight against other nations, as the peasant parties of Poland and Bulgaria did to a large extent, and the terrorism of the government rendered them powerless. Unlike the workers' parties, the peasant parties were loose organisations of widely scattered individuals with the control of the organisation concentrated in a few hands (in the towns) and so they were an easy target for the police.

Some facts about the peasant parties in East Europe before the end of World War II will illustrate these generalisations.

The Rumanian National Peasant Party came into being in 1926 by the fusion of the chauvinist, anti-Hungarian National Party of Transylvania led by Maniu, and the Peasant Party of the Old Kingdom of Rumania led by Ion Mihalache. The Party was led entirely by lawyers, journalists, etc., and a small group of rich peasants. For years it was sharply opposed to the dictatorial King, and there were frequent and bloody clashes with the fascist organisations and the police. But a party under the leadership of rich peasants and their urban allies in a country where eighty per cent of the population was poverty-stricken could never consistently pursue a democratic policy. During his short periods of office between the two world wars, Maniu ruthlessly suppressed the strikes of the miners and railway workers in 1929 and 1933. Although he had been for years one of the leaders of the democratic opposition to King Carol and his agents, yet at a time when there were armed conflicts between the peasant members of his own party and the Iron Guard fascists, Maniu suddenly in 1937 declared an election pact with the Iron Guard, simply as a tactical manoeuvre against his old opponent Tătărescu and after the assassination of the Iron Guard leader, Codreanu, by the King, Maniu offered a refuge in his party to the Iron Guardists. The Peasant Party behaved with extreme brutality towards the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. During the 1930's when democracy in Rumania was reduced to a sham and when the dictatorship became increasingly open and brutal and millions were looking to Maniu for a call to rebel, he went no further than to writing some articles of protest in the press.

During the German-Soviet war, he supported the alliance of Marshal Antonescu with Germany. It was only after the Rumanian army reached the Dniester (the pre-war border of Rumania which Russia had violated by annexing Bessarabia—in which Rumanians constituted the majority—in 1940 and which many Rumanians still claimed as the boundary of Rumania) that Maniu called on Antonescu to stop the war. But he was content with publishing 'open letters' to Antonescu and made no appeal to the people for action.

The Croat Peasant Party under the leadership of Stepan Radić, and after his assassination, of Vladko Maček, had mass support, but the national question proved to be its Achilles heel. After the land reform in Croatia, the leadership of the Party was in the hands of rich people who were generally nationalistic and opposed to Belgrade. Most of the nationalist bourgeoisie of Croatia also joined the Party. Hence in the words of H. Seton-Watson: 'Originally a social revolutionary movement, the party became a nationalist organisation directed by the urban middle class'. (*Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 1918-1941*, Cambridge University Press, 1945, p. 227).* The Party became more and more chauvinistic and anti-Serbian in its propaganda, and when in 1941 the quisling Croat Pavelić massacred the Serbs, many of the leaders of the Croat Peasant Party collaborated with him. The Party as a whole, if not collaborationist, was at least a passive spectator of the German occupation.

The record of the Serbian Peasant Party was no better, but as it never had such a mass influence and revolutionary character it had a lower level from which to decline. H. Seton-Watson describes it in these words: 'It had its full complement of business men, small-town traders, urban intellectuals and public officials. It was a party of the peasantry only in the sense that it relied on peasant votes, and that its leaders possessed proficiency in a style of tavern oratory which commended itself to some, but increasingly few, peasants'. (*Ibid.* p. 241).

The Smallholders' Party of Hungary, headed by Tibor Eckhardt in the days of Horthy and later by Ferenc Nagy, had

*H. Seton-Watson's is by far the most objective and profound study of the politics of Eastern Europe between the two world wars that has been written, and I am very much indebted to it.

an even worse record than the National Peasant Party of Rumania. Eckhardt himself took an active part in the White Terror against workers, peasants, communists, socialists and liberals, after the downfall of Béla Kun's Government (1919). For years he and his supporters clamoured for a revision of Hungary's frontiers at the expense of Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. During the war, Eckhardt appeared in America and led an agitation for the restoration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire ruled by the Hapsburg dynasty. The Smallholders' Party was a rich peasants' party par excellence, not concerned to defend the poor and oppressed amongst the peasantry. On the contrary, it willingly collaborated with the Horthy regime in stifling any peasant resistance.

Between the wars the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party was so completely controlled by the rural and urban rich that it became the most important party of the ruling bourgeoisie which directed the state.

The two mass peasant parties in Poland and Bulgaria were of a somewhat different character. The peasant movement in Poland was split into three groups: on the right there was the conservative wing, Piast, and on the left there were the two organisations *Wyzwolenie* and *Stronnictwo Chłopskie*. In face of the strengthening dictatorship of Pilsudski the three organisations united in 1931 into one called *Stronnictwo Ludowe* (S.L.) The world economic crisis drove the members of the *Stronnictwo Ludowe* to more and more radical demands: the partition of all the large estates, the strengthening of the peasant co-operatives, drastic cuts in taxation and improvement of social services. The party co-operated with the Polish Socialist Party, which at that time was leading struggles with wide popular support against the Government of the Colonels and against the ruling classes generally. The co-operation between the *Stronnictwo Ludowe* and the P.P.S. reached its climax in the mass ten days' peasant strike of August, 1937, against the government, a strike in which the workers in many big towns joined as an expression of their solidarity. The police suppressed the strikes, killing many strikers (officially the casualties were 42 but actually they were much greater), and wounding an even greater number. There can be

little doubt that if war had not threatened, the struggles of the peasants and workers would have resulted in the overthrow of the dictatorial regime.

In Bulgaria the peasant party—the Agrarian Union—took many years to recover from the overthrow of Stamboliisky in 1923. The majority of its leaders were either assassinated or forced into exile and it was not until 1933 that the government, in response to popular pressure, allowed the uncompromising Agrarian leaders to return. Opposition developed between the right wing Agrarian leaders such as Dimiter Gitchev and Alexander Obbov who were ready to collaborate with the Government, and the left wing Agrarians, the most important of whom were G. M. Dimitrov and Nikola Petkov. Because of their radicalism, these two were called 'fellow-travellers' of the Communist Party. The *Central European Observer* of 12th January, 1945, wrote of their party that it 'has always made friendship with Russia and Yugoslavia its chief aim.' (See also *International Press Correspondence* of November 13th, 1937, praising G. M. Dimitrov as the leader of the left wing of the Agrarian League, the 'Pladne' group, called after its paper).*

There were two other very small radical peasant groups, the Hungarian 'village explorers' (now united in the National Peasant Party) and the Rumanian Ploughmen's Front.

Without taking into account the internal contradiction in the peasant parties between their progressive, democratic and reactionary chauvinistic elements and the consequent splits, it is impossible to understand how the Communist Parties destroyed such big movements so easily and quickly.

An important feature of the Communist Party policy towards the peasant parties was that of 'divide and rule.' They split each peasant party into different wings, so that they could play one off against the other. The Communists did not necessarily co-operate with the more progressive and democratic group against the other. Their policy was determined solely by expediency and not principle. For instance, in Bulgaria,

*Ten years later the Communist-controlled Agrarian Union paper, *Zemedelsko Zname* wrote: Nikola Petkov 'In 1931 belonged to the agrarian "Pladne" group, whose connections with foreign reactionary circles were all too well known.' (Quoted in *Free Bulgaria*, 1st October, 1947). It seems it was only to *International Press Correspondence* that this was not well known.

Nikola Petkov* was very popular, and so could be more independent than the Communist Party liked. This objection did not apply to Kimon Georgiev, who, as stated above, was one of the leaders of the 1923 and 1934 coups and, after 9th September, 1944, was an influential member of the Bulgarian Government. Similarly Obbov, the leader of the right wing of the Agrarian Union, was so unpopular as a reactionary that the Communist Party felt safe in establishing around him a National Agrarian Union. To have some idea of how restricted was the popularity of Obbov and Co. compared with that of Petkov, we need but compare the circulation of the official paper of the Agrarian Union *Zemedelsko Zname* with the paper of the Opposition Agrarian Union *Narodno Zemedelsko Zname*: on November 1st, 1945, the circulation of the former in Sofia was 1,900 copies, and of the latter 35,250 copies. To 'ally' with the publishers of *Zemedelsko Zname* rather than with those of *Narodno Zemedelsko Zname* was therefore more convenient for the Communist leaders. (Of course, when this 'coalition' ceased to be necessary for Moscow's agents, it could easily be dismissed; and since December, 1947, Obbov has disappeared from public life and according to repeated rumours is under house arrest).

Black as his record was, Maniu was a progressive and consistent democrat compared with Tătărescu. To prove this, Maniu had only to quote some of the declarations of the Rumanian Communist Party before the war, such as that of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Rumania, on November 18th, 1937:

'The Tătărescu Government is a Government hostile to the people and hated not only by the masses of the workers and peasants but also by great sections of the middle class. Its domestic policy, consisting in a fascist transformation of the country coupled with the starvation of the masses and its foreign policy, consisting in preparation for war and for a gradual steering of Rumania into the wake of Hitler Germany, have given rise to considerable discontent among the broad masses of all sections of the population.'

'In consideration of the growing menace of fascism and war, the *Communist Party of Rumania* again appeals to all democratic

*Nikola Petkov's brother, Petko Petkov, a minister in Stambolijsky's government and after the latter's assassination the general secretary of the Agrarian League, was murdered in 1924 by Georgiev's supporters.

parties and organisations to concentrate all forces for the mobilisation of the masses. The Party appeals to the Social Democratic Party, the trade unions and all other working-class organisations to bring about immediately unity of action and trade union unity. The Party appeals to all democratic forces of Rumania to act in concert for the immediate mobilisation of the workers, peasants and all other sections of the labouring masses of the Rumanian people and of all other nations living in Rumania in order to prevent the interference of Nazi Germany in the internal affairs of Rumania, in order to achieve the dissolution of all Nazi agencies in Rumania (the fascist and Trotskyist parties and organisations), the prohibition of their propaganda and the arrest of their leaders, and in order to set up in place of the pro-fascist Tătărescu Government a government which would adopt the slogan "for peace, liberty, bread and land" and would unite all democratic parties and organisations with the national Zaranist Party (Maniu's Party—Y.G.) in the lead.' (*International Press Correspondence*, 27th November, 1937).

In defending himself against the Communist Party's attack, Maniu tried to quote such statements as this, but of course the Communist-controlled censorship and police were on the alert. On January, 1946, the censor of the Russian Occupation Authorities struck out an item in the Opposition paper *Ardealul* which gave a verbatim quotation from the 1938 edition of the *Small Soviet Encyclopaedia* in which Maniu's party was described as anti-Fascist, democratic and pro-Soviet. (*Manchester Guardian*, 14th January, 1946). The Communists obviously could not allow Maniu to quote what they had repeatedly said about him in the years 1936-39. Now the slogan of their alliance with Tătărescu in the General Elections of 1946 (which allotted 75 seats in the new Parliament to Tătărescu's party as against 68 to the Communists) was: 'Do not vote for Maniu, who shot the workers in 1933.'

When the Russian Army entered Poland, a group headed by Andrzej Witos, Wladyslaw Kowalski, Wincenty Baranowski, Antoni Korzycki, Jozef Putek, Bronislaw Drzewiecki and Stanislaw Banczyk proclaimed themselves the leaders of *Stronnictwo Ludowe*, (S.L.), the Peasant Party. Some of them, like Kowalski, Korzycki, or Baranowski were simply Communists in

disguise. Banczyk left the group at the end of 1945 when Mikolajczyk, the genuine leader of the S.L., came to Poland, and he joined Mikolajczyk's new Party. The choice of Andrzej Witos to be the Chairman of the S.L. was a clever step from the Kremlin's point of view. He was the brother of the old popular Peasant Party leader Wincenty Witos. He had been a member of the Peasant Party 'Piast'. When he was expelled from the party in 1928 he joined the 'Colonels', who suppressed the movement of the workers and peasants and condemned Wincenty Witos to a long period of exile. After a time, when it became clear that the peasants did not fall for the trick, and recognized the difference between the two brothers, Andrzej Witos was dropped from the S.L. leadership. To assure success to Kowalski and his friends, the authentic leadership of the old S.L. had to be removed from any political activity. Consequently the Soviet Army arrested the General Secretary of the real Peasant Party, Kazimierz Baginski, and two members of its Central Council, Stanislaw Mierzwa and Adam Bien; Baginski and Mierzwa belonged to the left wing of the Party. They were later released after having obviously been ill-treated in prison. But the threat of arrest still hung over the heads of the real leaders of the Peasant Party. When Mikolajczyk was allowed to come back to Poland (the Kremlin had to keep up an appearance of 'democracy'), he organised the old Peasant Party under the name 'Polish Peasant Party'—P.S.L. In a short time, the Party had hundreds of thousands of members and its strength was revealed in the general elections of January, 1947. In preparation for the election, the Polish security police (Urzad Bezpieczenstwa, headed by the Communist official, Stanislaw Radkiewicz) arrested tens of thousands of P.S.L. supporters. In Cracow alone, for instance 15,000 P.S.L. supporters were arrested on January 18th and released on January 19th, too late to vote. Of 864 P.S.L. candidates only 428 were allowed to stand. At 97 per cent of all the polling stations—6,430 out of 6,726—the P.S.L. was not allowed any representatives. Of the 296 polling stations which admitted scrutineers from the P.S.L., in only 35 were they allowed to be present at the count itself; at these 35 the official results gave the P.S.L. 62 per cent of the votes and the Government bloc 38 per cent.* When

*For a full report on the elections see L. M. Oak's articles in the American weekly *New Leader* of February 15th and 22nd, 1947.

this failed to break the morale of the P.S.L., the security police began to arrest more and more regional leaders of the Party. Mikolajczyk had to flee the country, and the P.S.L. offices and papers were transferred to the subservient S.L. which could thus declare, without fear of opposition, that there was a 'unanimous' will in the two parties for fusion.*

The liquidation of the P.S.L. was not a difficult task for the Kremlin's agents, as the P.S.L. had the characteristics of the other peasant parties mentioned above which made it an easy prey for anyone seeking its destruction—the atomisation of the peasantry, its dispersal in small villages, its lack of a positive programme after the land reform was instituted, the influence of the division of the peasantry into different and antagonistic layers, etc. In its hopelessness the P.S.L. resorted to opportunism. This was illustrated by the position it took in a referendum held on 28th July, 1946. The Communist leaders decided to put three issues before the country aiming at a demonstration of unity: the abolition of the Second Chamber (Senate), the land reform and nationalisation and the new western frontier. Mikolajczyk called upon his supporters to approve the second and third issues, but to vote against the first. The peasant movement had always been against a Second Chamber, and it was the sheer opportunism of 'Realpolitik' which made Mikolajczyk flout the tradition of the movement. The same opportunism revealed itself in another, much more dangerous tendency, a readiness to accept the support of fascists and semi-fascists who opposed the Communists and looked for a legal framework for their activity. The P.S.L. was not very much strengthened by this, and it lost many of its more progressive supporters among the peasantry, the intellectuals, and of course the workers, because of it. Its disintegration was facilitated by such policies.

In Hungary the once powerful Smallholders' Party which in the general elections of November, 1945, won 59 per cent of all the votes, was transformed by 'purges', arrests and suppression of free speech at meetings and in the press, into a mere sham of a party. The spurious character of the present Smallholders' Party is most clearly revealed by the fact that

*For very detailed reports on the regimentation of the Polish Peasant Party see the series of articles of A. Rudzienski in the American weekly *Labor Action*.

although the present Prime Minister is a member of this party, he is rarely mentioned in the Hungarian press and his name, István Dóbi, is hardly known to the people.

The peasant parties of Yugoslavia, which in the past were very strong, apparently exist officially even today, but none of them has a daily, weekly, or any other paper and none of them is represented in Parliament. Their last representative was Dragoljub Jovanović, whose record included years of imprisonment under King Alexander's dictatorship. He was a secretary of the People's Front and a Minister in Tito's Government. But how could Tito forgive him when he declared in Parliament: 'The Communists are wonderful. They liberated us from the King and the Church; it only remains for them to liberate us from the Communist Party'? He was immediately expelled from the Government, from the People's Front, from his own Serbian Peasant Party and from his position as a professor at the University of Belgrade. Thus he became the one-man opposition to the Government in Parliament. But Tito could not tolerate any dissentient voice and steps were taken to close his mouth. In February, 1947, he was beaten up and severely wounded by hooligans. (The Yugoslav press did not mention this incident). Immediately afterwards he was tried and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

The fate of Stalin's quislings in the sham peasant parties was often grim. Thus, for instance, Romulus Zăroni, Minister of Agriculture in the first Groza Government, and Moga and Belea, the people who had led the Ploughman's Front since its foundation in 1934 in South Transylvania, when it was a small organisation with genuine peasant support at least locally, were removed from any positions they held after Moscow found they had served their purpose. The two most prominent leaders of the Hungarian 'village explorers' (after the war renamed the National Peasant Party) were Imre Kovács and Péter Veres: the former resigned his post as General Secretary and succeeded in escaping abroad; the latter was driven out of public life.

The important part played by the Communist-controlled police in the liquidation of the peasant parties not only in Yugoslavia but also in the other 'People's Democracies' is clear from the following testimony of Peter Koev, an M.P. and a

close friend of Petkov's. As Koev himself was too weak after his 'interrogation' to read his own statement in Parliament, Petkov read it for him:

'I shall first describe to you how the interrogation at the Militia Prison was carried out, so that you may have an idea of how "confessions" are produced, and of how Communist charges are built up. You reach a state of utter physical and moral collapse. You become completely indifferent towards your own life and fate, and you long only for an end, any end, which will bring a reprieve from suffering. But the complete collapse comes only at the moment when you realize that you are defenceless, that there is no law and no authority to protect you, and that you are in the hands of your interrogators for ever. This is actually what they try to make you believe right from the very beginning.'

'The procedure is different from the one we have known so far. Now they first explain your guilt and then they ask confessions to prove it. The methods to obtain the confessions are mainly three: physiological—hunger, thirst, and lack of sleep; physical—torture; psychological—hints that your family have been arrested, will be tortured, etc.'

'But let me tell you exactly what happened to me. For two days after my arrest I was confined to a small dark cell and given no food whatever. On the third day I was taken to the office of the chief of the Department of State Security. There I met Ganev, the chief of the Department "A" and the militia inspector, Zeev. They told me that I had been found guilty of an act of sabotage—the burning of Russian cotton stocks at the port of Burgas, in 1945, and that I had also taken part in the organization of a planned *coup d'état* against the Government by Generals Velchev and Stanchev. They told me that I was the link between General Velchev and General Stanchev. Then they read confessions written by several officers giving details of their own guilt as well as of my own "participation" in the conspiracy.'

'Immediately after that I was sent back to my cell and was not bothered with any interrogations for twenty-one days. I was left to "ripen". The first method used to achieve this was hunger—I was given only a little bread and water every day. On the twenty-second day, a Saturday, at eight o'clock in the

morning, I was taken up to the fourth floor for the second interrogation. It lasted without a break until eleven o'clock of the following Thursday morning. The interrogation went on, day and night, for twenty-four hours round the clock, without a stop, the interrogators themselves being changed every three hours. During all this time I was left standing, without any sleep, without any bread and, what is worse, without any water. I was handcuffed and I was not allowed to lean either on the wall or on the table. Every three hours the new interrogators asked the same identical questions, so that in the end I knew every question by heart. After the first twenty-four hours I did not feel any hunger. The lack of sleep makes your head feel hollow, and then it starts making funny noises. The interrogators insist that you repeat the same dates, the same names, the same hours, etc. On the fifth day I collapsed and was taken back to my cell, where I immediately fell asleep and slept for twelve hours.

'Waking up I thought the interrogation was over, but the same night, at eleven o'clock, they took me upstairs again into a bigger room. The Inspector Zeev, who was in charge of my interrogation said my obstinacy had obliged him to change his methods to something really tough. At his orders I was put on the floor. My hands were tied behind my back, and I was gagged. Then, for about two hours, I was beaten on the feet with a thick rubber whip. During the beating Inspector Zeev asked the same questions. The interrogations and the beatings were repeated four nights in succession. During the last night, besides many inspectors and militiamen, the Chief of the Sofia Militia, Veselin Georgiev, was also present. I was then thrown back into my cell, and I was not disturbed until 4th November, at half-past ten in the evening, when I was set free. After ninety days under arrest I was not asked any more questions, nor have I been given notice of any official charge against me.

(Signed) PETER KOEV.

Sofia, 29th November, 1946, National Assembly.'

(Michael Padev, *Dimitrov Wastes no Bullets*, London, 1948, pp. 93-4).

CHAPTER VI

THE LIQUIDATION OF THE SOCIALIST PARTIES



BEFORE THEIR LIQUIDATION by the Communist Parties, the different Socialist Parties of Eastern Europe varied greatly in strength, both absolutely and relatively to the national Communist Parties. The Polish Socialist Party was incomparably stronger than its Communist rival; the Hungarian Socialist Party was much stronger than the Communist Party; in Rumania they were of about equal strength; in Czechoslovakia the Socialist Party was much weaker than the Communist Party and in Bulgaria it was weaker still; in Yugoslavia a Socialist Party scarcely existed. It is, therefore, most instructive to examine in detail the fight of Moscow against the Polish Socialist Party, while referring only briefly to the fate of the Socialist Parties in the other countries.

For various reasons the Communist Party of Poland (K.P.P.) was never as strong as the Socialist Party (P.P.S.) The forerunner of the K.P.P. was the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (S.D.K.P.i.L.) whose founder and teacher was Rosa Luxemburg. This great Marxist thinker had one very mistaken conception which proved to be a serious impediment to the Polish Party; this was her opposition to any fight for Poland's independence from Russia, Germany and Austria. The ill-fated invasion of the Red Army in 1920 further convinced the masses that the K.P.P. was indifferent to Poland's independence. Karl Radek, who knew Poland well, told the Bolshevik leaders that the Red Army's advance on Warsaw would only isolate the K.P.P. and advised against it. Although he was supported by Trotsky, his warning was ignored by the Bolshevik Party leadership. This was an important cause of the failure of the K.P.P. to gain the support of the majority of the Polish workers. Since the S.D.K.P.i.L.

was older than the Russian Social Democracy, and hence older than the Bolshevik Party which was originally a faction of the Russian Social Democracy, it had traditions of independent thought that inevitably clashed with the rising absolutist bureaucracy in Russia. In 1923 the majority of the Central Committee of the K.P.P. supported Trotsky against Stalin in the internal Party fight, and after his triumph, Stalin liquidated the Luxemburgist-Trotskyist leadership. Later he had to liquidate the supporters of Bukharin, the President of the Comintern. Later still even the new leadership of the K.P.P. appointed in 1930, did not conform to the 'Line' and had to be liquidated. As Poland lay on the Russian border and the K.P.P. was illegal, the most important leaders of the Party were usually in U.S.S.R., and were thus involved in the big purges of the thirties. Many of them were executed or perished in forced labour camps—Domski, Sofia Unschlicht, Warski-Warszawski, Kostrzewska-Koszutska, Prochniak, Huberman (brother of the violinist), Winiarski, Sochacki, Lenski, Rval, Zarski, Wandurski and Jasienki. (For full details of the fate of the Polish Communist leaders in Russia see the article of P. Olchowski in *Narodnaya Pravda*, Paris, September, 1950). Apparently the purge so decimated the K.P.P. leadership that the Russians found it necessary officially to dissolve the Party (1938). (Their excuse that a large number of police spies had infiltrated into the Party would have been a reason for reorganising, not abolishing it). Shortly after the liquidation of the K.P.P. an event occurred which made any Kremlin supporter hateful to the Poles—the Stalin-Hitler Pact which laid Poland open to invasion. No Pole could forget Molotov's glee when he said before the Supreme Soviet on October 31st, 1939: 'Instead of the enmity that was fostered in every way by certain European powers, we now have a rapprochement and the establishment of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany . . . One swift blow to Poland, first by the German Army and then by the Red Army, and nothing was left of the ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty . . .' Nor could any Pole forget or forgive Molotov's message to the German ambassador in Moscow at the end of the invasion of Poland by Germany and Russia: 'I have received your communication regarding the entry of German troops into Warsaw. Please convey my congratulations

and greetings to the German Reich Government. Molotov.' (R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddie, editors, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-41*. Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office, U.S. Department of State, Washington, 1948, p. 89). Or: 'Today our relations with the German State are based on friendly relations, on our readiness to support Germany's efforts for peace . . .' (Speech by Molotov on October 31st, 1939, *Soviet Peace Policy*, London, 1941, p. 33). Nor could any Pole forget how the responsibility for starting the German-Polish war was put on Poland. The *Small Soviet Encyclopaedia* (1941 edition) wrote: ' . . . in autumn 1939, the unwise leaders of a landlord *Poland*, ordered by Anglo-French imperialists, started the war against *Germany*.' (My emphasis).

Looking ahead to the time when Poland would be a Russian province the Kremlin decided in 1942 to establish a party for Poland, but in order to conceal its connections with the past, it was called the Polish Workers' Party (P.P.R.) instead of the Communist Party of Poland.

As we have seen, Russia allowed the Warsaw uprising to be crushed by the Nazis, because of the weakness of the Party among the insurgents. This, of course, further weakened it.

The position of the P.P.S. was very different. Between the two world wars it enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of the Polish workers. On the eve of the war it led the general strikes in Cracow, Tarnow and other towns and supported the peasants' strike (August, 1937). The municipal elections of 1938 and 1939 resulted in a crushing defeat for the Government and victory for the P.P.S. There can be no disagreement with the evaluation of the election results by the P.P.S. leader Adam Ciołkosz, that 'were it not for the threat of the German invasion they would have a far-reaching result, similar to that of the municipal elections in Spain in 1931.' (Introduction to C. Poznanski, *The Flaming Border*, London, 1944). The left wing of the P.P.S. was so strengthened in the thirties that the Party included in its new official programme adopted at the Radom Congress, February, 1937) the slogan of social revolution and dictatorship of the toiling masses. Unlike the Kremlin, the P.P.S. did not identify the rule of the proletariat with a one-party system, but with consistent democracy.

The war was a great test of strength, moral and physical, for the P.P.S. The Party was mainly responsible for the decision to defend encircled Warsaw in September, 1939. The 'Colonels' recognised this and their spokesman said: 'The workers' defence smacks of socialist revolution'. Having had long experience in illegal work since the time of Tsarism, the P.P.S. quickly accommodated itself to the new conditions of struggle under the German heel. For conspiratorial purposes, the Party adopted the name 'The Movement of the Working Masses of Poland', and was generally called the W.R.N. from the initial letters of its slogan: 'Freedom (Wolność) Equality (Równość) Independence (Niepodległość)'. The following quotation describes the activity of the W.R.N. under the German occupation: ' . . . a large secret organisational network of the W.R.N. comprised, already at the end of 1940, over 2,000 units. The underground Socialist Press and pamphlets reached, in the course of the war, the amazing figure of 2 million copies. A Socialist military organisation was created under the name of O.W.P.P.S. (Socialist Insurgent Military Detachments), which was included, as a separate and distinct organisation, in the national scheme of the Underground Home Army (A.K.). There was, besides, a Socialist Militia, organised both on a territorial and on a factory basis. All these organisations played an outstanding role, *inter alia* in the Warsaw Uprising of 1944.' (A. Ciolkosz, *The Expropriation of a Socialist Party*, New York, September-October, 1946, p.3). The price paid by the P.P.S. for this resistance to the German occupation was high. 'Notwithstanding the strict observance of all conspiratorial rules—in which the P.P.S., owing to her old revolutionary tradition excelled anyone else—heavy losses could not be avoided. Three members of the Central Executive Committee of the Party (Niedziałkowski, Czapiński, Topinek) and 28 other members of the Supreme Council of the Party, perished at the hands of the invaders. Altogether about 700 prominent leaders of the Party met their death under the occupation. From these figures the losses amongst the rank and file can be imagined.' (Ibid. p. 4).

When the Soviet Army entered Poland in 1944, one of the main objectives of the Russians was to destroy the P.P.S. and, to achieve this, they used the same technique as they used

against the Peasant Party. While the major part of Poland was still under German occupation, a congress was held at Lublin, in the Russian Zone of Occupation on 10–11th September, 1944, which called itself the 25th Congress of the P.P.S. A new Party executive was elected. Edward Osubka-Morawski was elected chairman of the Central Executive Committee, Boleslaw Drobner Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Party, and Stefan Matuszewski, Secretary of the Central Executive Committee. Their friends filled the other places in the leading committees. Osubka-Morawski became Chairman of the Lublin Committee and afterwards of the Provisional Polish Government in the name of the P.P.S.

But the credentials of Osubka-Morawski and his friends were forged. Before the war Osubka-Morawski was a minor co-operative official and a member of the P.P.S. but by no means one of its leaders. During the war, he left the P.P.S. and joined a tiny new group called Polish Socialist Workers' Party (R.P.P.S.). Drobner joined the P.P.S.—after having been excluded from it in 1936—on the same day as he was appointed Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Party. In the so-called 25th Congress of the P.P.S. there was not one member of the authentic Central Executive Committee or the Supreme Council of the Party and not one Socialist member of the former Polish Parliaments.

The leaders of the authentic P.P.S. were prevented from claiming their right to reconstitute the Party or from building a new party. Instead they were cruelly persecuted. The General Secretary of the old P.P.S., Kazimierz Puzak, had given a lifetime of service to the Party. He joined it in 1903. In 1911 a Tsarist court condemned him to eight years' hard labour to be followed by lifelong exile in Siberia; he spent six years in irons and in solitary confinement in the fortress of Schlüsselburg, the most notorious of all the Tsarist prisons. He was released in March, 1917, by the Russian Revolution and became General Secretary of the P.P.S. in 1921. During the war he was chairman of the Underground Parliament, and thus one of the main leaders of the Resistance. Later he was arrested by the Russian Army, released, and then re-arrested; he died in prison in April, 1950. Antoni Zdanowski was a prominent leader of the P.P.S. between the wars, was Assistant

General Secretary of the Polish T.U.C. and editor of its paper. He too was a leader of the resistance movement during the war, and in spite of Osubka-Morawski and the P.P.R. was elected chairman of the Warsaw official P.P.S. Council in 1945 by the members of the Warsaw branch of the official P.P.S. After leaving the official P.P.S., he was arrested and was eventually murdered in prison. Cohn, another leader of the P.P.S., who was for six years in a German prisoner-of-war camp, was once more imprisoned. The same fate has befallen Antoni Pajdak, Tadeusz Szturm de Sztrem, Josef Dziegielewski, Wiktor Krawczyk, Wladyslaw Wilczynski, Stanislaw Sobolewski, Adam Obarski, Boleslaw Galaj and others. One of the most popular P.P.S. leaders was Zygmunt Zulawski, leader of the Party for forty years, for many years the chairman of its Supreme Council and General Secretary of the T.U.C. To keep up the appearance of democracy, the P.P.R. leaders allowed him to become a member of Parliament while preventing all his friends from standing for election as Independent Socialists. Single handed he fought a bitter struggle till his death in September 1949.

But even after the elimination of the real P.P.S., the official P.P.S. was a threat to the P.P.R., since of the two, the Polish workers preferred the former. For example, in 63 elections to shop committees held at the end of 1945 in the largest industrial district of Poland, out of a total of 928 seats the P.P.R. gained only 193 (21 per cent) while the Socialists gained 556 (64 per cent); the rest were divided thus: official trade union common lists of P.P.S. and P.P.R., 117 (12.6 per cent); Democratic Party, 14; Christian Labour Party, 10; Polish Peasant Party, 2; others (non-party), 36.* In many cases even members of the P.P.R. did not vote for their Party lists in the shop committee elections. This is clear from the complaint made on December 8th, 1945, by Gomulka, then General Secretary of the P.P.R.: 'There were elections to the Shop Committee of the "Fablok" factory (in Cracow). Our Party cell in that factory comprises 250—270 people. And in these elections we have not gained a single seat'. If people join a party from fear of being victimised, they will take the first opportunity of showing their real attitude to it.

*For particulars see *Robotnik Polski*, London, January, 1946.

In spite of the pressure exerted at the November, 1945, Congress of the T.U.C., the P.P.S. had the support of two thirds of all the delegates, and Kazimierz Rusinek of the pre-war P.P.S. was elected General Secretary of the new Central Committee of the Trade Unions.

The workers' support for the official P.P.S. had its effect on the Party's leaders. When at the regional conferences of the P.P.S. in Cracow, Katowice and other towns there was almost unanimous opposition to fusion with the P.P.R. or even to a united front at the elections against Mikolajczyk's party (P.S.L.), even Osubka-Morawski had to support this policy, although of course with reservations. On August 6th, 1946, he wrote in *Robotnik*: 'It seems to me that the greatest difficulties (in the maintenance of a united front—Y.G.) arise from the fact that one partner operates too much under the slogan of "the leading party" . . . A united front may not be based on the principle that the one rules, while the other subordinates himself, that the one lays down the conditions while the other submissively nods his head . . .' Two days later the P.P.R. daily *Glos Ludu* countered this by implying that the 'difficulties' to which Osubka referred were, at least in part, due to 'elements inimical to democracy' in the P.P.S. (Quoted in the article 'The fate of Polish Socialism,' by R. in *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1949). A few weeks later, on August 29th, the P.P.S. and P.P.R. leaders were called to Moscow to discuss the question of the United Front. This meeting was followed by another, and at last on November 28th, 1946, the P.P.S. leadership yielded to the pressure of the Kremlin. It seems that the fate of Puzak, Pajdak and the others impressed Osubka even more than the pressure from the rank and file of his own party.

But the P.P.R. leaders nevertheless did not forget Osubka's temerity in writing as he did on 6th August, 1946, and immediately after the victory of the 'united front' in the sham elections of 19th January, 1947, he was removed from the Prime Ministership and from being Chairman of the P.P.S. Central Executive and replaced by Jozef Cyrankiewicz.

But the pressure of the rank and file members of the P.P.S. against capitulation to the P.P.R. continued unceasingly. On May Day, in 1947, the P.P.R. strongly urged a fusion of the

two parties. It also acted; in all factories, members of the P.P.S. who opposed fusion began to be 'purged'. On 7th May, Adam Kurylowicz, a member of the P.P.S. who had been General Secretary of the Trade Unions since 1947, and previously, from 1918 to 1939, President of the All-Polish Railway Workers' Union, wrote an article in *Robotnik* called 'The Defence of the Workers against Abuses and Arbitrary Measures', in which he accused the P.P.R. of setting up a regime of terror in the factories. 'From all parts of the country, he wrote, 'fresh reports keep coming of injustices suffered by the workers. The elements alien to the working class behave in arbitrary fashion, and act "like bosses". They fire and hire workers without taking into account the opinion of the workers of the plant, scorning the laws, conquests, and social rights of the workers. A clique of self-seeking politicians is being formed. These new dignitaries have discovered that a party book is more important than technical qualifications'.

The reply to the impertinence of the P.P.S. was a political trial staged by the security police. One of the defendants, accused of membership of W.R.N., 'confessed' that there were 'no actual differences between the W.R.N. and the (official) Socialist Party'. The threat to the official P.P.S. was all too clear, and although the Party Congress of 14–17 December, 1947, did not welcome the P.P.R. call for a merger, the P.P.S. leadership knew that the game was up and on March 17th, 1948, Cyrankiewicz declared that the merger would be carried out. 82,000 members of the P.P.S. out of the total of 800,000 were expelled from the Party and many of the recalcitrant leaders were removed. Kurylowicz was removed from his post as General Secretary of the trade unions and replaced by Tadeusz Cwik, an old Communist Party agent. Rusinek, Osubka-Morawski, Stanislaw Piaskowski, Drobner and another eight members were removed from the Central Executive Committee of the Party and Szwalbe and another eleven members were removed from the Supreme Council (meeting of the P.P.S. National Council, Warsaw, September 18–22, 1948). The whole executive committee of the P.P.S. in Lodz was removed and other local committees followed suit. The heresy-hunting of Gomulka* occurred at the same time, and

* See pp. 281–3.

this increased the opposition of the rank and file members of the P.P.S. to unity with the dictatorial P.P.R. and also led to more stringent measures against oppositionists. But by December, 1948, the fusion was an accomplished fact and the 'United Polish Workers' Party' (Z.P.P.R.) was born. The quisling Cyrankiewicz said of the Unity Congress: 'This congress is the greatest event in Poland since Kościuszko's rising'. Cyrankiewicz is probably thus aspiring to get from Stalin the Order of Suvorov—the hangman of Kościuszko's rising!

The liquidation of the Socialist Parties in the other satellites followed a roughly similar course. But because these Socialist Parties were relatively weaker than the Polish Socialist Party, their collapse was due not only to police pressure and the presence in some of them of Russian armies, but to the feeling of many of the rank and file members that the parties were not strong enough to stand up to the pressure of the Communist Parties without allying with the bourgeoisie, and yet that such an alliance would be too dangerous, because a victory of the bourgeoisie over the Communist Parties which had the support of the majority of the workers, would lead to a defeat of the workers themselves and a bourgeois terroristic dictatorship, in short to fascism. The members of the P.P.S. felt confident that if it were not for the Russian army of occupation, they could get rid of the Communist Party dictatorship, and suppress any fascist elements. But many socialists in the other satellite countries thought it would be impossible to oppose at one and the same time the Communist Party dictatorship and a nascent fascist dictatorship. Hence there were different tendencies within the Socialist Parties of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria—on the one hand, the followers of right wing conservative leaders like Károly Peyer, Kosta Lulchev or C. Titel Petrescu, who collaborated with the bourgeois parties, on the other, those who worked with the Communist Party under such leaders as Zdeněk Fierlinger, Árpád Szakasits and Dimitri Neikov.* The third tendency,

*The fate of these 'fellow-travellers' in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria was not better than that of Osubka-Morawski and Co. in Poland. After they had served their purpose they were pushed aside. Fierlinger, who had been given the post of Vice-Premier as a reward for his services in the February coup, was on April 25th, 1950, relegated to the Ministry of Church Affairs. Szakasits on April 24th, resigned his post as President of the Hungarian Republic on

favouring an independent socialist policy, which predominated in the P.P.S., was very weak in the other Socialist Parties. The greater the feeling of impotence, the weaker was this wing.

The Communist Party leaders did their best to identify every opposition to themselves with resurgent fascism. This was not difficult, as remnants of the fascist bourgeoisie existed and it was always possible either to reveal or invent a fascist plot. The secret police can always keep in reserve some of the 'lunatic' fringe of fascists in order to use them at a suitable moment.

The knowledge that the Kremlin would not abdicate its authority without using all the forces at its disposal, the belief that the people of the satellites themselves could not put up a successful opposition, the conviction that their 'liberation' in a Third World War would mean in reality the destruction of the population and civilization, all these factors contributed to produce a feeling of hopelessness, and hence capitulation.

This was particularly true of the serious and thoughtful workers in the Socialist Parties. The Communist leaders are well aware of this and not only rely on the demonstration of the military strength of the U.S.S.R. but play on the real fear of war.

After years of pressure on all sides from Moscow agents of the Kremlin, there is not one Socialist Party today in the whole of Eastern Europe. All of them have been merged with the Communist Parties.

grounds of ill-health; this looks very much like an excuse as a fortnight later his son-in-law, Deputy Paul Schiffer, was expelled from Parliament. Neikov had better luck; he died on February 16th, 1948. (At the time of his death he held a relatively unimportant position, that of Vice-President of the Presidium of the National Assembly). The fate of other 'fellow-travellers' was also grim. Thus for instance in Hungary György Marosan, Deputy Secretary of the united Party and Minister of Light Industry, disappeared during a visit to Russia (his resignation was announced on August 5, 1950); Istvan Riesz, a former Social Democrat and Minister of Justice, was arrested in June, 1950, and died in prison; Pál Justus, a former Social Democrat and member of the Central Committee of the united Party, was condemned to imprisonment for life at the Rajk Trial. Similar cases from the other 'People's Democracies' can be quoted by the dozen.

CHAPTER VII

SLAV AGAINST TEUTON



ONE OF THE MOST appalling deeds of the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe—especially in Czechoslovakia and Poland—was the brutal expulsion of millions of people, both men and women, young and old, from their homes, for no reason but that they were Germans and not Slavs. As V. Gollancz says, the expulsion of the Germans is ‘among the greatest crimes since Genghis Khan.’

The Kremlin hoped to derive many advantages from this expulsion. The Slavs of Eastern Europe would naturally look for leadership to the greatest Slav nation, Russia. Moreover, the threat of the return of the millions of Germans who had been expelled would create a barrier of suspicion and hatred between Eastern Europe and the Western Powers who control Western Germany where the majority of those expelled found refuge. As a result of the expropriation of the Germans, most of the industry of Czechoslovakia and Poland—the two most industrialised countries of Eastern Europe—could be transferred to the state (i.e., to the control of the Communist Party) while ‘national unity’ and ‘order’ were maintained. The inhuman expulsion of the Germans would inevitably demoralise the Slavs, both morally and intellectually, as it would accustom them to the most brutal crimes and would involve them as accomplices in these crimes. (Of course, with its usual unscrupulousness, the Kremlin now appeals to German nationalism. Instead of Slavs against Teutons, the Russians and Germans, the two greatest peoples, as Stalin said in his message of October 13th, 1949, must stand together against the imperialist West.)

Let us begin with a description of the persecution and expulsion of the Germans in Eastern Europe after the war.

Number of Germans Expelled

R. H. M. Worsley, in an article called 'Mass Expulsion', in *Nineteenth Century* (December, 1945) gives the following summary of the expulsion of Germans:

Country of Permanent Residence	Number Involved	Statistical Source
East Prussia	2,333,301	<i>Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich</i> , census for 1933.
Pomerania	1,920,897	
West Prussia	337,578	
Lower Silesia	3,204,004	
Upper Silesia	1,482,765	
Total	9,278,545	
German minorities in the Baltic States	200,000	Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian data.
War-time German immigration to:—		
Poland	800,000	<i>I.L.O., Displacement of Population in Europe</i> p. 38
Occupied Eastern Territories	300,000	
German minority in Poland	1,059,000	Polish census, 1921.
War-time immigration to Czechoslovakia	480,000	<i>I.L.O., Displacement of Population in Europe</i> , p. 38
Sudeten	3,231,688	Czechoslovakian census, 1930.
German minorities in:—		
Hungary	520,000	Hungarian census, 1920.
Rumania	740,000	Royal Inst. of International Affairs, <i>South-Eastern Europe</i> , p. 8.
Yugoslavia	513,472	
Grand Total	17,062,716	

This table somewhat exaggerates the extent of the expulsions, for it is based on pre-war statistics, and during the war a considerable proportion of the populations of these areas was killed, and before the end of the war many had fled from the areas. In addition a number of Germans remain in Eastern Europe: 500 thousand in Rumania, 250–300 thousand in Hungary, 200 thousand in Czechoslovakia—altogether about a million. E. M. Kulischer, in his book *Europe on the Move* (New York, 1949) says that the total number of Germans expelled after the war was 11,200,000 (p. 302). (This does not include the 4 million Germans who fled in 1945–6 from the Soviet zone of Germany to the Western zone, nor those who fled after this date). Whichever figure is taken of the number of Germans who were expelled or who fled from the East, it exceeded even the number expelled and recruited for labour by Hitler during the war. On this point Kulischer writes: 'The

total number of foreign workers in Germany, including prisoners of war and foreign civilian workers officially recognized as foreigners, but excluding workers from Alsace-Lorraine and Sudetenland, exceeded six million in 1943. In 1944 the high mark of eight million was reached (of whom nearly 2 million were p.o.w.'s—Y.G.)' (p. 264). He adds: 'Altogether, it can be estimated that the displacement of 30 million or more people during Hitler's rule over Europe has resulted in the permanent shifting of 2-3 million. The final redistribution of Europe's population was due to Germany's defeat, which opened the way for a new and in this case permanent migration of another twenty-five million*', probably the greatest in European history' (p. 305).

Considerations of space make it necessary to choose between alternative methods of describing the character of the expulsions, either by relating more or less in detail the fate of the Germans in one of the East European countries, or briefly surveying the fate of the Germans in them all. The former method is preferable, and the treatment of the Germans in Czechoslovakia will be taken as the example.

The Sudeten Germans

The Sudeten Germans were not new inhabitants of Sudetenland. They came there about 700 years ago, when Spain was still in the hands of the Arabs, and some centuries before America was discovered. They were as numerous as the populations of some of Europe's small states. The 1930 census put their number at 3.2 million, as compared with Norway's 2.8 million, Finland's 3.6 million, Denmark's 3.7 million and Switzerland's 4.1 million.

The social structure of the Sudeten German community was not very different from that of the Czechs or Slovaks except that the percentage of workers was higher (a little higher than among the Czechs, and much higher than among the Slovaks). According to the 1930 census, the national communities comprised different social groups in the following proportions:—

*In this is included some millions of non-Germans: Poles who had migrated from the area annexed by Russia (about 4 million) to the Western territories taken from Germany, Czechs and Slovaks who migrated to Sudetenland, displaced persons who returned to their countries, Jewish refugees who migrated to Palestine and other countries, etc.

		Germans (%)	Czechs and Slovaks (%)
Independent	..	21.89	25.81
Tenants	..	0.40	0.28
Officials and clerks	..	16.60	18.24
Workers	..	61.11	55.67

In 1930 there were 476 thousand Sudeten Germans organised in trade unions. The Executive Committee of the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party stated: 'In their worst plight, on the eve of the Munich decision, our Trade Unions could still compare their strength with those of Switzerland, a country with four million inhabitants and with a functioning democracy.' (Introduction to W. Jaksch, *Sudeten Labour and the Sudeten Problem*, London, 1945).

The Sudeten Germans had a long socialist tradition, for Sudetenland was one of the first and strongest socialist centres in the Austro-Hungarian empire. It produced a number of the most prominent leaders of the Socialist International, among them Karl Kautsky, Viktor Adler, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner. As early as 1907, in the general elections, the Social Democratic Party polled 39.4 per cent of the votes in German Bohemia. In the general elections of 1911, it polled more than 40 per cent. In the elections of 1920 it polled 44 per cent of the Sudeten votes. Together with the Communist Party,* for more than a decade it had about half the votes in Sudetenland, which is a much higher proportion than the Social Democrats and Communists could claim among the Czechs, let alone among the Slovaks.

The world economic crisis which began in 1929 changed the situation. The industry of Sudetenland, depending as it did mainly on exports, was affected much more severely by the crisis than industry in the rest of the country. The bourgeois government of Czechoslovakia discriminated against German workers when giving employment, and this aggravated an already grave situation. The result was that 'unemployment in the Sudeten districts was at least twice as high as in the Czech interior.' (Jaksch, *ibid.* p. 17).

The great suffering caused by unemployment in Sudetenland and the existence of full employment just over the border

*An exact calculation of the strength of the Communist Party among the Sudetens is impossible, as the Party was not divided into different national groups.

in Nazi Germany (even though this was the result of war preparation) brought the Sudeten Germans to flock to the banner of Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten Nazis. In the elections of 19th May, 1935, he polled 1,249,530 votes, that is, 62-3 per cent of the total, while the Social Democratic Party polled 299,942 votes (as against 506,761 in 1929), that is, about 15 per cent of the total. The Communist Party vote is estimated at about 120,000, or about 6 per cent of the total (Wiskemann, *op. cit.* p. 206).

At that time the Communist Party leaders had not yet adopted the idea that the Sudeten Germans were inherent Nazis, and explained the victory of Henlein as the result of the social and national circumstances in which they were placed. *Imprecor* of 1st June, 1935, wrote: 'In a manifesto of the Central Committee the Party states the reasons for the election victory of the Henlein faction. The reason for this victory is the policy of the Czech bourgeoisie which has led to terrible misery and poverty and to the national oppression in the German districts . . . The Henlein fascists can be beaten only by a policy which gives the working masses of the German districts work and bread and liberates them from the yoke of national oppression.'

What was the fate of the Sudeten Germans who opposed Henlein to the end? 400,000 voted against him, and these with their families made up 700-800 thousand people. When the Munich Agreement which gave Sudetenland to Germany was signed, the most active Sudeten anti-Nazis were compelled to flee from Sudetenland to the interior of Czechoslovakia. But more than 20,000 of them were handed over to the Gestapo by the Czechoslovak Government of the time, which collaborated with Hitler, and an additional 10,000 had to return to Nazi-controlled territory because they were refused asylum. Only 4,000 Sudetens were admitted to other countries. Altogether some 40,000 Sudetens were interned in Nazi concentration camps, and about 20,000 died there. This figure bears honourable comparison with the number of victims in other countries which came under the Nazi yoke.

In 1940, Fierlinger, the Social Democratic 'fellow-traveller', who was later to head the Government which expelled the Germans from Czechoslovakia, said: 'Henlein in his struggle

for power in the Sudeten German areas used the same methods (as Hitler in the Reich). He promised the big German land-owners the return of their lands which were taken from them after the land reform; to the church he promised the return of the church property. But at the same time he promised the German peasants a just land distribution. To the factory owners Henlein guaranteed the smashing of the labour organisations and at the same time he lured the workers with higher wages and better employment.

'The Sudeten German Movement (of Henlein) cleverly exploited for its political ends the selfish urge which the capitalist order breeds in people. Where promises were not sufficient, terror helped. But what mainly influenced the fellow citizens, of Henlein was the feeling that the world did nothing about these methods, that it felt a secret sympathy for Hitler and his accomplices, that the Republic remains alone in an unequal fight against deceit and superior force. *And nevertheless there were to be found among the Sudeten Germans many brave defenders of the Republic and democracy who, for their faithfulness, received no reward: indeed on the contrary, they were horribly punished.* The picture of the desperate struggle of the Sudeten German democracy is at least from this moral aspect, for democrats today, not an unhappy thing, as it mistakenly appears to many.' (*Dnešní Válka jako Sociální Krise* Foreword, dated December, 1940, pp. 87-8, quoted by *Der Sozialdemokrat*, Halbmonatschrift der Sudetendeutschen Sozialdemokratie, London, June, 1945).

Three years later Bruno Köhler, a Sudeten Communist leader, said over Radio Moscow: 'Hitler came to the Sudeten area and he will go. But Sudetenland and the Sudeten Germans will remain . . . The Fascists will disappear but the Sudeten Germans and the Czechs will remain and live as good neighbours, whatever state system is established after the war in Europe. *Hitler's defeat, which is unavoidable, does not mean our end.* It means the liberation of the Sudeten Germans from the bloody Hitler reign. The liberation from Hitler will give us Sudeten Germans the opportunity to determine our own fate and to order our life according to the will of freedom-loving people.' (*Ibid.* January, 1944).

Hysterical Chauvinism

The war ended, the tune changed. The Communist Party discovered two advantages to be gained from the expulsion of the Germans, first the awakened political consciousness of the masses could be diverted into a reactionary, chauvinist channel, secondly, the majority of the industries (previously owned by Germans) could be transferred to the state without any need for the active intervention of the working class and without the bourgeoisie being able to oppose such a transference. Gottwald declared on 12th May, 1945: 'The new Republic will be a Slav state, a Republic of the Czechs and the Slovaks. We will deprive the Germans and the Hungarians, who have so heavily sinned against our peoples and the Republic of their citizenship and severely punish them.' The Communist Minister of Information, Václav Kopecky, speaking over Radio Prague on 25th May, 1945, said: 'The Czechoslovak army is already prepared for the purification of the border area of the Republic from Germans and Hungarians, and for the restoration of the wealth of these old Slav areas into the hands of the Czechs and the Slovaks.' In a speech at Liberec (Reichenberg) he said: 'We will clear Liberec of the German enemies, and we will do it so thoroughly that there will remain not the smallest place where the German seed could grow once more. We shall expel all the Germans, we shall confiscate their property, we shall de-Germanize not only the town but the whole area . . . so that the victorious spirit of Slavdom shall permeate the country from the frontier ranges to the interior.'

The Communist Minister of Education, Zdeněk Nejedly, said on 29th May, 1945: 'We do not know any progressive Germans, nor are there any.' 'Germany, once the most feared power in Europe, does not exist any more; for us it means that the German question is once and for all solved. We will continue the work of our predecessors; we will *purify Prague and the border districts*, and we are in the position to do so because we have a great helper in doing this—the Red Army. Not every army would have helped us in doing this. . . Now is no time for vacillation. We cannot say we will look neither to the West nor to the East, but will wait. We must today say "Yes" or "No". We must decide either for the East or for the West. I do not believe that it is a problem for the Czech people. We belong to the great

Slav bloc at the head of which the great Russian people stands with its chief, Stalin.' With a rising fervour of chauvinism he goes on: 'Consider Middle Europe—there are Hungarians. What can they do? Then the Rumanians—what can they do? And what can the Germans do? They have no future anywhere. *We are greater than all of them*; with our culture we can stand up to all of them. And they will see that they in their hopeless situation will be happy only to follow our leadership. How many composers are there in Europe who are the equal of Smetana? How many painters of the rank of Mánes and Aleš? How many historians the equal of Palacký? How many scientists of the greatness of Purkyně? . . . Our culture must be national . . . Nothing but cultural ruins surround us . . . We will first of all carry our civilization to the border regions, and there will plant our national cultural ideal.' (Quoted by *Der Sozialdemokrat*, June, 1945).

The Communist Party outdid the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie in chauvinist ardour, but the latter did its best to prove that it was not less anti-German and chauvinistic than the Communists. Thus, for instance, Dr. Ivo Ducháček of the People's Party (Catholics) said in the Provisional National Assembly, March, 1946: 'We want to exclude nobody from this success, though it is true that, for instance, the Communist Party had in the years 1939, 1940 and 1941 no such clear and uncompromisingly Slavic conceptions in this matter as it has today. However, I regard it as a downright falsification of history and as a building up of legends, which I do not hesitate to call pre-election legends, if the Communists, of all parties, assert that the credit for the transfer of the Germans from our country is due mainly to them or almost alone to them' (*Lidová Demokracie*, March 9th, 1946, quoted in *Der Sozialdemokrat*, London, May, 1946).

In this nationalistic competition, the Communist Party had certain advantages. First, it could point to the fact that nowhere, except in the Russian-controlled territories, were Germans evicted *en masse*. Secordly, and of greater importance, the expulsion was organised and German property redistributed by a Communist Minister of the Interior, Václav Nosek. The Security Corps which carried out the physical expulsion was headed by members of the Communist Party. (In Poland, too,

the Communist Party was in charge of the expulsion of the Germans from the Western territories, and the settlement of Poles in their place. There Gomulka, then General Secretary of the Party, was responsible).

Because in the popular view the Communist Party bore the greatest responsibility for the expulsion, there was a much higher percentage of Communist supporters among the new Czech settlers in the Sudeten areas than in any other part of the country, even than in the big towns where large numbers of workers were concentrated. In the 1946 general elections, in the districts of Jablonec and Turnov the Communist Party polled 70 per cent of the votes, in Kadaň 62 per cent, Falknov 59 per cent, in Aš over 50 per cent, and so on. (The situation in the Western Territories of Poland was similar, hence the Communist leaders insisted on giving highly disproportionate representation to these areas in the general elections of January, 1947).

The whole of the Sudeten population, except some tens of thousands of indispensable skilled workers, was expelled from the country. Those who remained had to do compulsory labour for a minimum of twelve hours a day, and, if the employer thought it necessary, fifteen hours. The National Committees organised this compulsory labour. According to their decrees, the German workers in Czechoslovakia were forbidden to belong to trade unions, were excluded from social benefits, had to give a quarter of their wages as reparations to the state, were not entitled to holidays, and their children were not allowed to attend school.

In the first few days after the defeat of the German army in Czechoslovakia, some cracks were made in the wall of national animosity by open fraternisation between Czech and German workers. For instance, a number of rank and file communists in Bodenbach began to publish a daily paper in Czech and German; it was called *Rudý Prapor—Rote Fahne*. It was short-lived, for Nosek immediately prohibited the publication of any German paper or of any paper in two languages one of which was German.

It is ironical to note that the excesses against the Germans in Czechoslovakia were taking place at the same time—with the Red Army's entry into Germany—as the Russian

authorities, trying now to win the ear of the German people, attacked Ilya Ehrenburg for his extremely vicious propaganda against the Germans (*Pravda*, April 14th, 1945). A contradiction? It is easy enough to wriggle out of contradictions by singing different songs in different languages and in different countries. For those Germans who were interested in the fate of their brethren in Czechoslovakia, there was a ready answer: all the Sudeten Germans were responsible for the Henlein movement! Thus, for instance, P. Reimann wrote on 2nd June, 1945: 'A German anti-fascist movement in Czechoslovakia does not exist. There were in the best case in Czechoslovakia individual people of German origin who, separated from any movement in the German population, as individuals supported the Czech national liberatory movement.' 'That also earlier layers of the working class organised by the Socialists were intoxicated by the Nazis *proves* the news in the British press of the mass flight of the German miners from Brüx region. The conception that the German working class were not an exception to the general development of the German minority under the Nazi regime is by this and similar news to our sorrow confirmed.' (Quoted by *Der Sozialdemokrat*, June, 1945). This appeared in *Einheit*, whose sub-title is 'Sudeten German anti-Fascist Fortnightly', and which for years gave out that the Communist Party had considerable influence in the anti-Nazi movement in Sudetenland. As late as 22nd May, 1945, *Einheit* published a letter from a Czech soldier who visited a German glass factory near Pilsen, saying: ' . . . we can be proud. Our people and those who were before Social Democratic functionaries—all of them, notwithstanding the terror, have held through and followed our thoughts, and all of them said to me that they waited for our return with gladness. What we built they defended and will continue to defend.' *Einheit* soon forgot this. The Communist Party policy in Czechoslovakia was now unequivocal: there was no place for Germans there. From now on any mention of the speeches given over Radio Moscow to the Sudeten Germans is betrayal of the Party line.

After the war, the Communist Party made out not only that all the Sudeten Germans—except for a few isolated individuals—were Nazis, but that they became Nazis despite the fact that

in the Czechoslovak Republic they enjoyed full equality with other citizens. Gustav Beuer, a former Communist Party Deputy from Sudetenland, wrote: ' . . . the treatment of the German minority by the Republic (of 1918-1938—Y.G.) as a whole was such as to make it possible for the Germans to adapt themselves to the new conditions and to become part and parcel of the Slav country had it not been for their deeply-rooted hostility toward everything Slav.' (*New Czechoslovakia and her Historical Background*, London, 1947, pp. 190-1). This is directly contrary to all the Communist Party had been saying for more than fifteen years about the injustice meted out to the Germans in Czechoslovakia.*

The expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia cannot be explained as the result of the people's spontaneous hatred. The majority of the Slovaks, who are not Teutons but Slavs, supported Tiso, Nazi puppet ruler of Slovakia, no less readily than the majority of the Germans supported Henlein. The number of Slovak political prisoners who died in Nazi concentration camps was smaller than that of the Sudeten Germans, and there were relatively fewer victims even among the Czechs.†

The Czechs suffered much less than the Yugoslavs under the Nazi occupation. 1,700,000 of the inhabitants of Yugoslavia died under the German occupation, while 200 thousand (of whom more than 100,000 were Jews) died in Czechoslovakia. The crimes of the Sudeten fascists against the Czechs and Slovaks reveal far less savagery than the crimes of the Croat Ustashe who murdered hundreds of thousands of Serbs, men, women and children. Yet, in Yugoslavia, as we have seen,

*See the quotation from *International Press Correspondence* of 1st June, 1935, quoted above. Or to take another example, on 13th November, 1933, the Communist Party group in the French parliament refused to associate itself with the tributes paid by the French Government on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic: 'No, we do not associate ourselves with your manifestation of sympathy addressed to the Government of Czechoslovakia . . . We do not forget that at present the masters of this country hold national minorities under a yoke . . . All our sympathy goes to the labouring masses of Czechoslovakia, to the national minorities, Slovak, Jewish, German, Hungarian, oppressed by the central power of Prague.' (Quoted by Maurice Ceyrat, *La Trahison Permanente*, Paris, 1948, p. 25).

†By the way, it must not be forgotten that after the German annexation of Bohemia-Moravia and the creation of Tiso's 'Independent Slovakia', the Kremlin closed the Czechoslovakian Legation in Moscow and appointed a Soviet delegate to Tiso's government.

national hatred and persecution of Germans was never a general feature of Communist Party policy, and for a period Tito's army even contained a unit of German anti-fascists.

Nor can the anti-German policy in Czechoslovakia be explained as the by-product of a resistance movement against the Nazis. A week before the occupation of Prague by the Russian Army there was no armed resistance among the Czechs (unlike the Slovaks) to the German occupation, and up to two or three days before the occupation Radio Prague, which was under German control, could boast of the fact that 'many Czechs are working for the defence of the Homeland' (i.e., working for the Germans). The conflict with the local German population did not occur until after the defeat of Germany. For many months, indeed for over a year, the Czech press repeatedly attacked the many Czechs in Sudetenland who were friendly to the Germans. All the evidence shows that the expulsion was imposed by the organised pressure of the Czech Communist Party and the bourgeoisie on a disoriented people.

In all two and a half million Germans whose ancestors had lived in the country for hundreds of years, were expelled from Czechoslovakia. Five hundred years after the popular democratic movement of Hus which united peasants, artisans and workers both Czech and German, more than twenty-five years after Lenin praised the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, at one time the third biggest Communist Party (after the Russian and German Parties), which united the revolutionary workers, Czech and German, Slovak and Hungarian, there took place a terrible persecution of the Germans which can be compared in severity only to the persecution of the Jews by Hitler. Hundreds of pages could be written to describe the horrors of this persecution, which constitutes a vital part of the reactionary policy of the Communist Parties in Czechoslovakia and Poland. The following quotation from '*A Petition to the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Foreign Secretaries of the Signatory Powers of the Potsdam Agreement from the Parliamentary Delegation of Sudeten Labour in Great Britain, 1st March, 1947*', gives a few examples of the sufferings inflicted on the Germans. The events in one small town—Saaz (Žatec) will be described. The population of Saaz in 1930 was 18,061.

Atrocities Committed Against the Sudeten Germans

‘Arno Behrisch, a former Secretary of the German Social Democratic Party in Saxony, collected the following facts from the famous hop-growing centre of Saaz in North-Western Bohemia. Behrisch was a refugee in Sweden during the war. He was imprisoned by the Swedish authorities for his part in pro-Allied activities. He now lives at Hof in Bavaria as socialist party secretary and is vice-chairman of the Bavarian Social Democratic Party. In 1945 and 1946, he and his wife, Hildegard Behrisch, interviewed many Sudeten refugees and the following report is the result of their investigations.

‘On Sunday, June 3rd, 1945, the Czech authorities ordered all male Germans of Saaz between 13 and 63 years of age to appear in the market place at 6 a.m. Those who were late were terribly beaten up with whips, clubs and planks. Two men were shot at once because they ventured a protest. 5,000 men and boys were marched off to the neighbouring town of Postelberg, about 11 miles away. They had to march at a quick pace in the glowing sun and those who lagged behind were shot on the road. At Postelberg, the men were interned in an old cavalry barracks. They had to spend the night in the barrack-yard, lying flat on the ground. The Czech guards threatened to shoot anybody who would get up. Every hour the guards fired volleys over the rows of prostrate men. Czech guards walked among the men and beat those who stirred a little. At dawn a command in Czech was heard; it was not clearly understood, it could have meant *zůstat*, stay put, or *vstát*, get up. Some of the men got up, others remained on the ground. At once the guards opened fire and whole rows of the victims were mown down with tommy-guns. Those who were only wounded were finished off by a shot in the neck from behind.

‘The next night, the men were herded into the stables. 400 men were locked up in a stable for 28 horses. Hundreds of men had to spend further nights in the barrack-yard. No food was given to the prisoners for the first three days; later they received a piece of bread and some potato soup. Again the guards shot men during the night and also in daylight. A German engineer was shot by a Czech soldier who shouted or all to hear: “This is the *coup de grace*, this will happen to all of

you!" Other Czechs shouted: "Our doctor, our hospital, our medicine is the shot in the neck!"

'On June 5th, the men were sorted out according to their political antecedents. Communists and former inmates of German concentration camps were sent back to Saaz. S.S.-men and Nazi political leaders, former policemen, etc. were driven back into the stables, some into a pig sty. Former German soldiers remained in the barrack-yard. The men locked up in the stables suffered from lack of fresh air. 10 men became hysterical, 50 fainted. When others shouted to the guards outside that there were some who had gone mad, the guards answered: "Kill them!" There were only two small openings in the wall for ventilation. When the prisoners asked to leave the door open for a while, the Czechs answered by shots through the holes in the wall. Several men died, some more were shot in the morning. In the stables, the troughs were filled with water. The prisoners had to dip their heads into them. When they could no longer stay with their faces under water and raised their heads, they were beaten on the neck.

'Day and night Czechs came to fetch some of the men out and beat them up. This happened practically every two hours. In this the soldiers were helped by civilians who brought sticks, clubs, whips and cables for the beatings. Several men were beaten to death.

'*June 6th.* A lorryload of Czechs with rubber truncheons and whips arrived and started an orgy of beatings in the worst S.S.-fashion. The German victims had to undress completely and were beaten terribly for a whole hour. The maltreatment lasted until they collapsed and fainted. Then they were revived with showers of cold water and the whipping of the bleeding men went on. Czechs smashed the genitals of some men by stamping on them with their boots. The cries of the tortured were frightful. Five boys, aged 13 to 16, were beaten murderously because they had moved a few steps from their place. The children groaned and yelled for their mothers. Then the five children were stood up against the wall and the Czechs raised their rifles. The boys cried: "Don't fire, let us live!" A volley was fired and the five boys fell to the ground. This was witnessed by thousands in the barrack-yard. What could have been the crime of these children?

'Then the Czechs started another sport, well-known in Nazi concentration camps, that of making the prisoners maltreat each other. They were made to box and beat each other and when they did it not thoroughly enough, they were beaten by the Czechs. Some were tortured by wooden splints being driven under the finger-nails, others again by treading on the genitals. One man was whipped on the genitals, to those of others the torturers tied a rope and pulled heavily. Tortmentors also pressed with their hands the testicles of some victims until the men fainted from pain. A German chemist was shot in the evening.

'Of 300 ex-soldiers, driven into a small stable at night and ill-treated as already described, five men died the same night. Among them was a well-known anti-Nazi. The guards amused themselves by firing shots into the room. The crime of the men was that they had been drafted into the German army.

'Gradually groups of prisoners were taken away. Some were sent to concentration camps, others to forced labour. The latter included well-known anti-Nazis and even half-Jews. A number of men were taken to nearby woods and shot. Finally, a number of men, among them Herr Krüttner, one of the witnesses, were marched back to Saaz on June 12th. On their way they were beaten without interruption. A Catholic priest was shot because he could not march fast enough.

'*June 12th.* The first transport of transferred people left Saaz. They were selected for their inability to work. Among them was a number of invalids who were not allowed to take their artificial limbs with them. The transport consisted of 200 men and 800 women and children. All their belongings had been taken away from them. At the station of Komotau a girl was fetched out from one carriage, taken to the compartment of the escorting soldiers and raped. At Ober-Georgenthal near the Saxon frontier the train stopped and the people had to march across the mountains. One woman died on the road. The marching people were beaten, especially the disabled soldiers who could not keep pace. After covering nearly 30 miles, the deported were handed over to the Germans at the frontier. They had refused to work, the Czechs said.

'*June 13th.* All women were summoned to a barracks at Saaz. There, altogether 14,000 women and children were kept during

the night, herded together in the barracks, in stables, in garages, and also in the yard. At nightfall, hordes of Czech guards entered the room where the women were, and mass rape started. By flashing torches the victims were selected and raped on the spot. There were terrible cries. Women who tried to resist were beaten unconscious and then raped. Women and girls were also taken away and never seen again. These mean acts were repeated night after night. There was no sanitation and soon diseases started. There was no food for the first three days, and very little afterwards. The women had been ordered to bring their house keys along with them; they were taken away and given to Czechs for looting the houses. Within two days 40 babies had died in their mothers' arms in the barracks. The women were kept there for many weeks and the number of deaths increased. Babies died every day, up to 15 a day. From June 25th to 30th not less than 76 children lost their lives. The mothers themselves had to carry or cart the little corpses to the cemetery. There were 32 persons in a room of 5 square yards. The mothers were constantly told that their children would be taken away from them. 70 women sent to forced labour outside had to leave their children in the barracks.

'A Catholic priest who had ministered at the interment of a Czech soldier, was approached by a sobbing old woman when he left the cemetery. She whispered: "There are prams with dead babies in the park near the cemetery. Oh, please, ask the supervisor to give them a Christian burial!"' The priest induced the supervisor of the cemetery, a Czech, to do so, but the supervisor disapproved strongly of what was going on.

'The women sent away to forced labour on farms and elsewhere received no pay and were locked up in barns and stables.

'*July 1st.* At 4 a.m. women and children were awakened by shouts and pistol shots. They were taken in groups of fifty into a room where Czech soldiers were sitting on chairs. The women were made to undress and in front of the children searched in the most shameless manner. Purporting to search for hidden valuables, the soldiers searched the women's genitals as well. There were new outrages: when the soldiers came to a menstruating woman they smeared the secretions into her face.

Only young women were searched, the older ones were only sneered at. Afterwards, the victims had to stand for hours in the sun and did not get any food that day.

‘The commandant of this women’s camp was a Czech named Marek, known as “blood-dog” and as “the executioner of Postelberg.” He kept thinking up new tortures. He selected 40 women and girls for weeding the railway track. In the evening they were driven into an empty truck and raped by Czech soldiers.

‘On the 28th July, 150 women were sent to a warehouse to sort out German army stores. Afterwards they were taken to a school and beaten up. The Czechs alleged that the women had intended to steal the stores for “werewolves”. A group of 50 women returning from farm work was later attacked by the same soldiers, also beaten up and raped.

‘It was not before November that the last survivors left the S.S. barracks in the Trnovaner Strasse in Saaz. All the time the food consisted of a little black coffee, less than half a pound of bread per day, and nothing else. Children were given 3 ounces of bread a day. The death-rate among children increased. Finally, the women with their children were distributed among Czech farmers to do slave work.

‘The head of all the camps in Saaz was a Czech named Haas, a criminal with 15 previous convictions. Now he was made Chief of Police at Saaz . . .

‘The total number of Saazers definitely murdered by the Czechs exceeds 2,000.

‘The events described in the foregoing report represent only a fraction of what happened in the stricken town . . . The outrages were not individual cases but part of a system which may well boast of having attained the fullest Nazi standard.’ (pp. 36-41).

The suffering of the Sudeten Germans did not cease after their expulsion. What they endured while being transported to Germany can be gauged from the following two testimonies:

‘By the end of August (1945—Y.G.) a transport of Sudeten Germans arrived in Berlin. It came from Troppau in Czech Silesia, and was 18 days on the way. Four thousand two hundred women, children and aged people were counted before the transport departed from Troppau. One thousand

three hundred and fifty were left when the transport arrived in Berlin.—A Sudeten clergyman now in Berlin.

'I have seen a large proportion of these people (Sudeten deportees), numbering nearly a million, who are literally starving on the road. I saw children and babies lying dead in the ditch by the roadside, dead of hunger and disease, their arms and legs often not thicker than a man's thumb.—A Dutch observer writing from Saxony.' (American Friends of Democratic Sudetens, *Tragedy of a People—Racialism in Czechoslovakia*, New York, 1946).*

*A description of the brutal methods of expelling the Germans from Eastern Europe with particular reference to the territories annexed to Poland is given with many quotations from the press in V. Gollancz's book, *Our Threatened Values*, London, 1946, pp. 96-105.

CHAPTER VIII

OTHER NATIONALISTIC CONFLICTS



The Hungarians in Czechoslovakia

THE FATE of the Hungarians who had lived in Czechoslovakia for a thousand years was better than that of the Germans, but it was nevertheless unenviable. On 27th September, 1945, Gottwald declared: 'We are trying to establish the principle that we cannot live side by side with the Hungarians in one state.' (*East Europe*, 3rd October, 1945). The Czech Communist Party daily, *Zemedelsko Noviny* said on 3rd December, 1946: 'The presence of that minority is a threat to the integrity of our State, and thus to the peace of Europe.' (*East Europe*, 11th December, 1946). The plan for their expulsion, said Gottwald, 'met with the full understanding and approval of Generalissimo Stalin and Minister Molotov.' (*East Europe*, 28th August, 1946).

These words were translated into deeds. At the Paris Peace Conference on 14th August, 1946, the Hungarian Foreign Minister made the following declaration which the representative of Czechoslovakia did not deny: '650,000 Hungarians who live in Slovakia were deprived of their citizenship and even of their most elementary rights. Their property has been confiscated. No Hungarian may undertake any manual or intellectual work. He may not claim justice, he may not become a member of a trade union, he may not exercise his civic rights. The use of Hungarian in offices and even in churches and in public places is prohibited and subject to penalties. No newspaper or periodical in Hungarian may be published in Czechoslovakia, nor is it allowed to speak over the telephone or send wires in Hungarian. Hungarians may not own radio receivers. All Hungarian schools are closed, and even tuition in Hungarian is subject to penalties. The Czecho-Slovak authorities have dismissed all civil servants and private employees of

Hungarian descent, and they have suspended payment of their pensions. Disabled servicemen, war-widows, and orphans do not receive their relief allocations.'

At the same time, the Czechoslovak government, according to the Hungarian press, was employing compulsory Hungarian labour in the mines of Kladno (Compulsory Labour Bill for 'Germans, Hungarians, traitors and collaborators', signed on February 21st, 1946).

The Hungarian press, in particular the Communist Party papers, pointed out that many of the Hungarians expelled from Czechoslovakia had been sent by the Nazis to Dachau and had been awarded high Czech decorations for this. Many were members of the Hungarian Communist Party, József Révai, editor of the Communist Party daily, *Szabad Nép*, criticising the treatment of Hungarians by the Czechs 'whose war time record is very different from that of the Yugoslavs—yet Marshal Tito grants the Hungarians full equality', asks: 'Does it make no difference to the Czechoslovaks whether they establish a democratic or a reactionary state, as long as it is a national state?' (15th July, 1945). On the same day Rákosi, General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, condemned the expulsion of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia and the 'excesses resembling the old fascist methods.' (*East Europe*, August 1st, 1945). (He was tactful enough to put the blame on the local officials). On another occasion, May 26th, 1946, Rákosi attacked *all* the parties of Czechoslovakia, including the Communist Party, when he said: 'We had a feeling that every Czechoslovak Party wanted to bake its own electoral cake by the fire of its treatment of the Hungarians. Let us hope that now the elections are over, the Hungarians in Slovakia will at last be treated in a way becoming a democratic country'. (*East Europe*, 5th June, 1946).

The brutal treatment of the Hungarians, however, continued. Even in the days of the *coup d'état* of February, 1948, the Czechoslovak Government did not omit to issue instructions prohibiting Hungarians, even if they were citizens of Czechoslovakia, and had excellent records in the anti-Nazi struggle, from being members of the Action Committees.

Altogether a hundred thousand Hungarians were expelled from Czechoslovakia.

Only after the events of spring 1947 in Hungary which consolidated the power of the Communist Party, and the February, 1948, coup in Czechoslovakia did Moscow consider nationalistic conflicts between Hungarians on the one hand and Slovaks and Czechs on the other superfluous. And duly in autumn 1948, an agreement was concluded between Czechoslovakia and Hungary regularising the status of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. In January, 1949, the Czechoslovak parliament decided to restore full civil rights to the Hungarians, and to allow them to remain permanently in the country.

Conflicts Between Rumanians and Hungarians

The bone of contention between Rumania and Hungary was Transylvania in which nearly 2 million Hungarians live. Within 24 hours of the time that the Groza government was established, northern Transylvania, taken from Rumania by Hitler and given to Hungary, was given back to Rumania, even though the majority of its population is Hungarian. Vishinsky openly admitted that this was a reward for the establishment of the Groza Government. Pătrăşcanu, then leader of the Rumanian Communist Party, gratefully acknowledged the fact that Russia was responsible for the transfer. Strange as it may seem, Rákosi also used the conflict to pay a tribute to Russia, stating on 1st June, that at the Paris Conference Britain and the U.S.A. decided on the transfer because of their interests in Rumanian oil. 'Rumania's oil production is 10 times that of Hungary and naturally those countries which are interested in oil, share out their sympathy or antipathy according to whether 100,000 or 1,000,000 tons of oil are at stake. Naturally this fact has an important bearing on their political judgment. Thus when the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier issue was raised at the Paris Conference, the U.S.A. suggested that Rumania should regain her 1940 frontiers without change. Britain immediately agreed to this proposal and the matter was settled.' (*East Europe*, 12th June, 1946).

The Hungarian Communist Party demanded on 12th August, 1946, that the Peace Settlement be changed to allow at least that part of Transylvania inhabited by Hungarians to be given back to Hungary. At the same time the Rumanian

Communist Party declared their opposition to any changes in the Peace Settlement.

But once it became absolutely clear that Russia supported the pre-1940 frontiers of Hungary and Rumania the quarrel between the two governments ceased and on the whole a very liberal attitude was taken by the Rumanian government towards the large Hungarian minority.

Poles and Czechs in Teschen

As soon as the war ended a sharp conflict broke out between Poland and Czechoslovakia over the fixing of the border between them. There were Slovaks and Czechs in Polish Špiš, in the Orava district which was divided between Czechoslovakia and Poland and in Silesian Ratibor and Hlubčice which were in the hands of Poland. In all these areas Czechoslovakia wanted to change the border in her favour. But the most serious conflict broke out over the possession of the rich area of Teschen. After World War I Teschen was divided between Poland and Czechoslovakia; in 1938, during the Munich crisis Poland walked into the part of Teschen occupied by Czechoslovakia. At the end of the war, the Polish army, commanded by Marshal Rola-Zymierski, again occupied all Teschen. The Poles and Czechs were called upon next day to send representatives to Moscow to discuss the question. It was decided to give back to Czechoslovakia the area they had held prior to Munich, as compensation for the loss of Western Ukraine (Ruthenia) to Russia. But the chauvinistic fury did not abate, and the national minority of Czechoslovaks in the Polish area and Poles in the Czechoslovakian area were the victims of it. The *Central European Observer* of October 19th, 1945, wrote: 'In Hlubčice and Ratibor, Czech people are suffering injustices: their harvest is taken away, their property confiscated. They are being arrested and taken into the interior of the country. Church services in the Czech language or in the local dialect have been forbidden. Czechs are fleeing across the frontier. There are already several thousands of refugees.' On 27th December, 1945, Radio Prague complained that the Poles had dissolved the National Committees in the part of Teschen inhabited by Czechs, had replaced them with Polish mayors appointed by themselves, and had closed all schools except the

Polish ones. On 27th March, 1946, the Czech National Council in Morawska-Ostrawa in retaliation forbade the use of the Polish language in Teschen schools which had Polish pupils. (*East Europe*, 3rd April, 1946).

In Conclusion

The policy of keeping national antagonisms alive, especially between Slavs and Teutons, was a liability for the Kremlin after its agents took full control of the satellite countries and after the main pivot of its policy became the struggle against the Western Powers over Germany. Hence since about the end of 1947, when the Cominform was established, the former policy on the national question was dropped, and was replaced by 'internationalism', which is in reality equally the instrument of Russian imperialist national policy. In June, 1948, a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the 'People's Democracies' held in Warsaw, declared its friendship to the German people. In January, 1949, Fierlinger congratulated the German Stalinists (the Socialist Unity Party) on the fact that they were 'proudly professing the old and unadulterated internationalism.' The same theme was repeated time and again by other leaders in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and the other 'People's Democracies.' Stalin himself wrote in a letter to Pieck, president of the 'German Democratic Republic', on October 13th, 1949, that the German and Russians were 'the two peoples possessing the greatest potentialities in Europe to complete great actions of world significance.' Woe betide anyone who should now mention the unity of the 'Slavs' against the 'Teutons.'

The new policy was mainly directed against the satellites who dared to strive for national independence and against the transformation of their countries into Russian gubernias.

CHAPTER IX

GLEICHSCHALTUNG OF THE CHURCHES



Religion and Democracy

ONE OF THE BASIC tenets of nearly all progressive movements, from the rise of the democratic anti-feudal bourgeoisie to the Marxist workers' movement, has been the separation of religion from the state and of education from religion. It is not accidental that this was accomplished most completely in the United States, which was free of any feudal inheritance, and where under conditions of free economic development many religious denominations existed. While Marx, as a consistent democrat, insisted on the separation of religion from the state, as a materialist philosopher he was equally strongly opposed to religion itself as 'the people's opium,' a soothing illusion which prevents men from acting for themselves, in the belief that some supernatural force watches over them. Whether one agrees with Marx's conception of religion or not, it is clear that there is no contradiction between these two elements in Marx's approach to religion. Freedom of conscience, that is, the freedom to hold any religious belief without fear of state intervention, logically implies freedom to propagate atheism. This dual policy is possible only in a democracy, where the state itself is not identical with a party. In a totalitarian society there is no autonomy and the only alternatives offered to the Church are complete annihilation, or regimentation, or a combination of elements of both; in any case, religious freedom is impossible.

This explains the fight of the Nazis, who were by no means atheists, against Catholicism, and their great efforts to subordinate the Evangelical Church to themselves. With the establishment of the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs (July 16th, 1935), it was emphasised that 'Adolf Hitler's Government does not fight against Churches or religious denominations.

It rather gathers them under its wings for protection, whenever they have mental tasks to perform'. A. Brady, who quotes these words, adds: "'Protection' here has the same meaning as in 'protective' custody, or as in ordinary gangster terminology. It means, be protected or arrested; be protected or dissolved' (*The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism*, London, 1937, p. 104). In an exchange of greetings with the new Catholic Bishop of Berlin, Konrad Graf von Preysing, the Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, made clear the basis upon which the Catholic Church was to be tolerated: 'If you, Sir, in an unbiased appreciation of the requirements of the present, cultivate among your clergy and diocesans loyalty to the new State and its Führer and respect for its authorities, you may rest assured that the German and Prussian Governments will assume full guarantee for freedom of religious exercises and will show complete understanding for the necessities of the Church.' (*Ibid.* p. 105).

Religion in U.S.S.R.

Marx saw in religion an 'illusory happiness', the inverse reflection of the 'real misery' of mankind. There are two sources of this misery, first dependence on and weakness before Nature and secondly impotence against oppressive social forces. The stupendous technical advances under capitalism which gives man ever-increasing power over nature has undermined and continues to undermine the former basis of religion. But these very advances, within the framework of capitalism, tend not to abolish, but to strengthen the latter. Poverty in the midst of plenty, insecurity and fear, lead men to seek a secure point of support, to believe in the supernatural.

When the Russian Government inaugurated the Five Year Plans which tremendously increased the power of man over nature, they believed that they were inaugurating the abolition of poverty; the establishment of socialism in Russia would thus undermine both sources of religion. When the Government announced the Second Five Year Plan (1933-37), which was to establish a fully-fledged socialist society, the League of Militant Atheists declared a parallel 'Five Year Plan of Atheism' whose aim was to increase the number of members of the League from 5½ to 15 million in 1937 and to see that 'not a

single house of prayer shall remain in the territory of the U.S.S.R., and the very concept of God must be banished from the Soviet Union as a survival of the Middle Ages and an instrument for the oppression of the working masses.'

This plan of frontal attack failed miserably. The persecution of religion did not uproot religion at all. Instead of 15 million members of the League in 1937, there were only two million, and even though after much effort the number increased to 3½ million in 1941, it never reached the level of 1932. Prof. N. S. Timasheff, in his book *Religion in Soviet Russia, 1917-1942* (London, 1943), gives many quotations from the Russian press to show the widespread influence of religion: 'During one of the few anti-religious conferences held in recent years, the chairman said that he had been appointed by mistake, that he did not see any progress and that actually the members of the League accomplished nothing. (*Antireligioznik*, 1939, No. 2). In the Petrograd (Leningrad) province, an attempt was made to revive the local organization of the League, but the provincial conference stated three months later that the attempt was futile. At the conference, the secretary of the provincial organization exclaimed bitterly that all the anti-religious work in the province was in his pocket, that is, that it consisted of a few trifling papers. (*Krasnaya Gazeta*, Nov. 15th, 1938; *Antireligioznik*, 1939 No. 1) . . .

'Early in 1940, one could read that "the enemies of anti-religious work had obtained that, in the majority of provinces, there is no anti-religious work at all. Local cells have ceased to exist, lecturers are unavailable". (*Bezbozhnik*, 1939, No. 5, *Antireligioznik*, 1939 No. 11). In September, 1940, the Central Committee of the League convoked a special conference. The report delivered to the conference acknowledged that anti-religious propaganda was dying; the Party and the Young Communist League no longer co-operated. Members of the Conference could not say anything that might mitigate the pessimistic findings of the Central Committee. (*Pravda*, Sept. 22nd, 1940). (pp. 99-101).

In 1937, Yaroslavski, Chairman of the League, declared that the number of religious people in Russia was 80 million. In 1940 another leader of the League gave the figure as 90 million, i.e., about half the population. In the same year,

Antireligioznik declared that half the industrial proletariat believed in God and it was almost impossible to find atheists in the villages.

According to Timasheff: 'In 1938, the official paper of the Militant Atheists League acknowledged that churches in rural districts were well attended and that young people often observed religious holidays. According to the same journal, a large number of children were seen in the churches of Moscow at the Easter service in 1939; and at Christmas, in the Tambov and Voronezh provinces, many children took part during school hours in processions in honour of the Nativity. In the Tambov province, seven tenths of the children were absent from school on Christmas day and celebrated the Feast in their homes. In Moscow and Tiflis, children with candles in their hands prayed in the churches. In Kursk many children were absent from school during Lent, and attended church and received Holy Communion. In the province of Riazan, many received Holy Communion at the Easter mass, and in the Smolensk province, they took an active part in ceremonies linked with Easter'. (*Ibid.* p. 67).

It is very natural that Yaroslavski met the situation with a despairing cry: 'It is impossible to build up Communism in a society half of which believes in God and the other half fears the devil.' (*Bezbozhnik*, 1939, No. 14).

The defeat of the 'Five Year Plan of Atheism' cannot be explained only, or even mainly, by opposition of the pre-revolutionary generation, as four-fifths of the present population of U.S.S.R. was either born after the October Revolution or were not yet adult when it broke out, so that they were educated in the schools of the new regime; moreover, the Communist Party had limitless means of propaganda, while the priests did not publish a single paper or book.

The 'Five Year Plan of Atheism' failed because the 'real misery' of the people did not abate. The logic of reality was stronger than all the ukazes of the Kremlin and, confronted with this, Stalin made a complete *volte face*, from the persecution of religion to its regimentation.

By 1935 it had already become clear to the Government that the policy of suppression had failed and the turn began then. At Easter, 1935, religious tokens began to be sold in both state

and co-operative shops, and at Christmas of the same year Christmas trees were to be found even in the trade union clubs. Such a thing could not happen in Russia unless a special government order were made to that effect. Such an order contradicts the principle of the separation of Church and State no less than the persecution of religion.

The war greatly accelerated the process of the regimentation of the Church. On August 21st, 1941, Radio Moscow appealed to 'all God-loving inhabitants of the occupied countries' to rise in defence of religious freedom. It charged the Nazi regime with menacing 'the very existence of Christianity and seeking the overthrow of Christ the King, to instal instead the myth of the twentieth century of Alfred Rosenberg'. On November 18th, 1941, at a banquet in honour of American and British guests, Stalin said: 'May God help President Roosevelt in his task'. The papers of the Militant Atheists League, *Bezbozhnik* and *Antireligioznik*, were closed because of 'paper shortage' (September 30th and October 6th, 1941) and at the same time, from the same press which formerly printed these papers, religious literature began to pour out. It is, incidentally, an example of the 'democracy' prevailing in Russia that although there were over three million members of the League, not one letter of protest or of doubt about the wisdom of the decision to stop the publication of their paper, appeared in the press. Who knows but that the very same officials who wrote *Bezbozhnik* and *Antireligioznik* may then have been the authors of the religious literature?

On October 8th, 1943, the Russian Government established a Soviet Council on Orthodox Affairs, which, by August 1st, 1945, had opened ten theological seminaries. Its chairman, Karpov, a Party bureaucrat, who had no previous connection with the Church, stated that there were now more churches and more priests in Russia than before the war. He declared that the Orthodox Church might 'print whatever it wishes', and stated that his Council had given 'explicit permission for the Church to order any quantity of Testaments, prayer books and liturgical books, and are ready to facilitate this step in every way.' (R. P. Casey, *Religion in Russia*, New York, 1946, p. 187).

After this it is hardly to be wondered at that the calendar of the Russian Orthodox Church includes among the saints no

other than Lenin, who wrote of that very Church: 'That shameful and accursed past when the Church was in feudal dependence on the State and Russian citizens were in feudal dependence on the established Church'. The Church, however, conveniently forgets Lenin's words and rewrites its past. Thus Karpov said: 'The Russian Orthodox Church in the days of hard trial, which our Fatherland repeatedly underwent in the past, did not break its link with the people, it lived with their needs, their hopes, their wishes and contributed its mite to the common struggle . . .'

Religious Denominations in Eastern Europe

The experience of Russia has served the Kremlin as a pattern for its handling of the religious question in the satellite countries.

In these countries there are two main religious denominations, the Roman Catholic and the Greek Orthodox.

The available statistics on the distribution of population according to religion are pre-war censuses. Since then changes in boundaries, the migration of populations, and the annihilation of many people during the war, including nearly the whole of the Jewish population of these countries (of nearly 5 million Jews only 700 thousand remained) have made these statistics obsolete. But for lack of more recent data they will have to be used, and if care is taken the margin of error need not be too big.

There are big Roman Catholic communities in all the satellite countries except Bulgaria. In Poland, Roman Catholics comprise more than 90 per cent of the population, in Czechoslovakia 73 per cent, in Hungary 64 per cent, in Yugoslavia 37 per cent and in Rumania 6 per cent. In three of these countries there are considerable Greek Orthodox communities: in Bulgaria, 86 per cent of the population, in Rumania 70 per cent and in Yugoslavia 49 per cent. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia there are important Protestant minorities (26 per cent and 8 per cent of the population respectively). In Bulgaria, Moslems form 13 per cent of the population and in Yugoslavia 11 per cent.

The Communists' Attitude to the Orthodox Church

From the beginning the Communist Parties and Governments showed entirely different attitudes towards the Greek Orthodox

and the Roman Catholic Churches. The Greek Orthodox Church was regimented, but at the same time it was supported as a loyal upholder of the Government. Numerous delegations came from the Greek Orthodox Church of Russia to the Greek Orthodox Churches of Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia.

In April, 1945, the Archbishop of Moscow, Gregory, who visited Bulgaria as a representative of the Russian Orthodox Church said (April 16th): 'The Bulgarian people are under the mighty protection of the Soviet Union . . . With the Orthodox religion and Slav feeling we must strengthen the friendship and unity between our peoples.' (*East Europe*, April 24th, 1945).

Dimitrov made an equally unambiguous pronouncement. On 28th May, 1946, he said: 'The Fatherland Front and the Communists in particular pay tribute to the patriots of our national Church. They are proud of a Church which gave to the people such faithful and honourable servants as Ivan Rilski . . . Today we have the right to demand that our Church shall continue to follow the traditions of a thousand years and that it shall indeed be a republican Church . . . Let them follow the example of the present heads of the Russian Church . . .' (*East Europe*, 5th June, 1946).

A few days earlier the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Trade Unions ordered all branches to take an active part in the celebrations in honour of the Slav apostles, Cyril and Methodius on 24th May, 'to demonstrate the unbreakable unity between all Slav peoples in their fight against reaction and for the strengthening of democracy.'

After this it was not surprising that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church called upon the public in every election to vote for the Fatherland Front lists, nor that a special trade union (Orthodox Priests' Union) was formed, nor that the Fatherland Front Government introduced the following oath for a couple of years into the Bulgarian army: 'I swear before God, my conscience and my people . . .'

The Church in Rumania followed a similar course. On 17th March, 1945, Patriarch Nicodim gave the blessing of the Rumanian Orthodox Church to the Kremlin-appointed government of Groza. In a pastoral letter he urged the clergy and the faithful to give unreserved support to the King and the Government: 'Obey your superiors for the good of all

concerned . . . cease domestic quarrels.' (*The New York Times*, 20th March, 1945).

The same Patriarch visited Russia and according to Premier Groza 'returned radiant with Christian joy at what he had seen in Russia.' (From a speech on November 10th, 1945, at the consecration of a Church in Brasov).

From then on the Rumanian Orthodox Church paid allegiance to the Moscow Patriarchate and supported the Government in every election, in every propaganda campaign.

In Yugoslavia, as many of the Orthodox Church hierarchy during the war supported General Nedić, the Serb quisling, Tito could not but punish a number of them severely. Thus, for instance, the Orthodox Bishop Nastić of Bosnia, was condemned to 11 years' imprisonment. Tito was even more severe towards the Catholic hierarchy who collaborated with the German and Italian Occupation Forces. Archbishop Stepinac, who openly collaborated with the quisling Pavelić, blessed his soldiers who murdered 800 thousand Serbs and received a high medal for his services, was condemned to 16 years' imprisonment. Another Archbishop and two Bishops were imprisoned. Because the religious division of Yugoslavia is almost identical with the national (the Croats and Slovenes being Catholics and the Serbs Orthodox) Tito could not show favouritism to the Orthodox Church without endangering the newly-won unity of the different peoples. Tito's government was the only one in Eastern Europe which passed an educational law abolishing *all* church schools and a land reform law confiscating nearly all the Church lands.

The Orthodox Church of Czechoslovakia, although incomparably weaker than in Bulgaria, Rumania or Yugoslavia, is not less vociferous in its enthusiasm for the Communist Government. Thus on New Year's Day, 1946, it gave its blessing to the establishment of socialism, Slav solidarity and the 'full eviction of all Germans without reservation'. A first-class Stalinist amalgam! After the February coup, on March 3rd, 1948, the Czech Orthodox Church issued a proclamation, welcoming the formation of the new Government as implying 'the return of the Czech nation to the Slav idea and the strengthening of our people's democracy, which is a guarantee of a happy future both for the State and the Church'.

The policy of mutual support of the Orthodox Church and the state in Bulgaria and Rumania, does not mean that the two are coming together as equal and free agents, for the state subordinates the Church to itself. This is clearly shown by the new, reactionary and totalitarian Religious Laws of Bulgaria and Rumania.

Vassil Kolarov, the Foreign Minister at the time, introduced the Religious Law into the Bulgarian Parliament on 17th February, 1949. It asserts as a basic tenet that 'The Bulgarian Orthodox Church is the traditional church of the Bulgarian people and being inseparable from their history, is in form, substance and spirit a People's Democratic Church'. (Article 3). This cuts across the concept of the equality of all denominations (as well as of agnostics and atheists) before the law. There follows a whole series of regulations whose purport is to turn the Churches into state departments. *The Economist* of May 28th, 1949, sums up these regulations very well: 'The aim of the law is briefly to hand over the governance of the church to the state—through "a governing board responsible to the state"—and ensure the complete allegiance of pastors and priests (Article 9); to give the state power to remove all ministers who "work against the democratic regulations of the state" (Article 13); to stop all church appeals and addresses contrary to state regulations (Article 16); to forbid the mention of all state authorities or leaders in church services except in forms permitted by the Minister for Religion (Article 19); to transfer all hospitals, welfare centres, kindergartens or other charitable properties to the state (Article 22); to forbid all communications with lay or religious officials and institutions outside the country except by permission of the Minister (Article 24); to prevent any religious body with its centre outside the country from maintaining missions or churches in the country (Article 25); to impose penal servitude on all who use churches for political propaganda (of course, calling for support of the Communist Party is not political propaganda—Y.G.) (Article 30); and to submit all church statutes and regulations to the Minister (Article 32).'

The Orthodox Church is totally dependent financially on its benefactor, the State. In 1948, of its total expenses of 418 million leva, 370 million were met by state subsidies.

The religious law in Rumania, enacted on 5th August, 1948, is similar to the Bulgarian law.

While the Orthodox Church is regimented as the *national Church*, as an agency of the state, the churches whose religious allegiance is not to Moscow, but to the West, inevitably become pariahs. Regimentation and persecution appear side by side.

The Communists' Attitude to the non-Orthodox Churches

The most glaring example of persecution is undoubtedly the treatment meted out to the Protestant priests by the Bulgarian Government. It is not necessary to enter into the details of the accusation made against the Protestant priests at their trial in Sofia in February, 1949, to be convinced that the whole trial was a political move by the State in its campaign to regiment religion. The Protestant Churches in Bulgaria had not the tarnished record of the Orthodox Church, which supported the monarchy in its alliance with Germany in the first and second world wars, blessed the militarists who carried out the *coups d'état* of 1923 and 1934 and slaughtered tens of thousands of workers and peasants, abetted the semi-fascist dictatorships, and so on. The Protestant community is so small and uninfluential, constituting little more than 0.2 per cent of the whole population (15,744 out of 7,022,000) that it is inconceivable that it could cause serious harm to the people. Yet the Bulgarian Government put fourteen Protestant priests on trial and punished them severely, while it left the Orthodox Church hierarchy untouched.

The Catholic Church in Eastern Europe differs from both the Orthodox Church and the weak Protestant Church in Bulgaria. When Tsar Peter the Great was considering whether to ally the Russian Church with Rome, one factor finally decided him against doing so. This was, as one writer put it, that 'The Pope was a patriarch who would be unamenable to the Tsar and could not be deposed'. (R. P. Casey, *op. cit.* p. 13). Today this consideration is no less important in determining Stalin's attitude to the Vatican.

For a number of reasons the country in which the conflict between Moscow and Rome broke out in its most dramatic form was Hungary. The Achilles heel of the Catholic Church,

which appeared to be so strong, lay in the fact that it was a big landowner connected by many ties with the big landlords. This seriously weakened it at a time when the peasants were in revolt against this medieval heritage. In such circumstances the use of religious sanctions to defend secular vested interests is sure to recoil on the Church hierarchy. History has provided ample evidence of this from the time of the Great French Revolution to that of the Spanish Civil War. In the fight against parasitic feudalism during the French Revolution, the resistance of the Church was no stronger than that of the lay nobility. Where the peasants did rally around the priests against revolutionary France, as in the Vendée, it was not because their religious feeling was outraged by the revolutionaries, but because of their attachment to their feudal masters. Where the peasants fought the nobility they also fought openly against the priests. This does not mean that the peasants were not religious. The belief that God watches over man and that there is another life after death, had much deeper roots than attachment to the priests and to the Church which was a big feudal landowning institution. This explains why the same peasants who fought so consistently against the priests between 1789 and 1794 were quite happy to accept the restoration of the Church in 1795 and the Concordat with the Vatican in 1801. When the Kremlin decided to destroy the strongholds of the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe, commonsense, if not a study of the French Revolution, showed them that the priests would be least powerful where they were most completely identified with big land ownership. This was particularly the case in Hungary. When Cardinal Mindszenty, the head of the Hungarian Catholic hierarchy, preached against the land reform and the peasants nevertheless went forward unhesitatingly to take the land which they had worked for centuries without getting all its yield, it was clear that he had lost not only this single battle but the whole war. Cardinal Mindszenty's opposition to the abolition of all titles of nobility, his insistence on being called 'Prince', went against the grain of the poor, downtrodden and suffering peasants. He could not save the day by his appeals to 'democracy' against 'communist tyranny', and so forth, for such words rang false when uttered by a man who for more than two

decades had supported the White Terror and Horthy's dictatorship, who had preached the extermination of Communists and Socialists, had fulminated as a Magyar nationalist against the Slovaks, Rumanians and other Danubian nations who acquired territory from Hungary after 1918, and had welcomed the extermination of millions of Jews by the Nazis. When the Hungarian Parliament in June, 1948, passed a bill nationalising all Church-sponsored schools, Cardinal Mindszenty, in excommunicating all the Catholic deputies who supported the bill, certainly did not stand on democratic ground. The educational systems in the United States and Britain go much farther in secularisation than this bill, which still maintained compulsory religious instruction in schools to be given by monks and nuns.

In Poland and Czechoslovakia, where the Church was not a large landowner or an ally of the feudal opposition to land reform,* the Communist Parties were much more cautious.

In Poland, where the main church is the Roman Catholic Church, the Communist leaders were forced to find a *modus vivendi* with it. In a completely opportunistic manner they pandered to the wishes of the Church to an extent which would horrify bourgeois liberals, particularly the French Radicals, to say nothing of atheists.

Polish Facts and Figures, issued by the Polish Embassy in London, reports (December 11th, 1948): 'In contrast to most countries where land reform starts with the division of church lands, Polish land reform left the large church estates amounting to 841,300 acres untouched. In addition to leaving the church's lands untouched, the government also returned lands and goods taken away from the church by the Germans.'

'Religious instruction by priests is provided in each school as part of the school curriculum (government directive of December, 1926). The only children who may be exempted from religious instruction in schools are those whose parents

*This does not mean that the heads of the Catholic Church, especially Poland, were progressive. We need but mention one of them, the late Primate Cardinal Hlond. He found the time after the Kielce pogrom of 4th July, 1946, in which 41 Jews were killed, to accuse the Jews of backing the present regime and implied that the absurd medieval tales of Jewish ritual murder of Christian children—which had played their part in the pogrom—may not have been without foundation. This was but one incident in the career of this politician-clergyman, an enthusiastic supporter of the rule of the 'Colonels'.

or guardians forward a written statement to the school that they do not wish their children to participate.

'The programme and text-books for teaching religion are prepared by church organs and submitted to the Ministry of Education. The text-books for all grades of elementary schools were prepared by a special commission attached to the Metropolitan Curia of Cracow.

'Children who attend religious classes participate in the following religious practices:—(a) On Sundays, holidays, and the beginning and end of the school year, they attend church services; (b) They participate in "recollections"; (c) A prayer is recited at the beginning and end of each school day.'

'A network of Catholic theological seminaries which prepare for priesthood and missionary work is spread throughout Poland.'

Another issue of *Polish Facts and Figures*, dated August 6th, 1949, gives the following facts about religion in Poland: 'Catholic clergymen enjoy many personal privileges which have long ago been abolished or restricted in other countries . . .

'Ecclesiastical seminaries have nearly 18,000 students. Three hundred children's homes, 15,000 pupils, 600 kindergartens with 22,000 children and 40 secondary schools with 9,000 students are under monastic management. The Catholic school system is crowned by the Lublin Catholic University.

'Poland is one of those few countries where religious teaching exists in schools. The 6,300 priests teaching religion are paid by the State.

'The number of religious orders has grown during the existence of the People's Poland. While in 1939 there were 1,742 monasteries and convents in Poland, there are now 2,010. The number of nuns has grown from 17,000 to nearly 19,000. Despite the housing shortage, nuns enjoy such privileges as enable them to live in comfortable, big houses.

'Poland holds first place in Europe for the number of Catholic periodicals. Their circulation amounts to 6,387,000.

' . . . 62 Catholic journals were published in Poland as compared with 20 such journals in France.'

In all the Army and police units of Poland there are official chaplains.

To demonstrate the devotion of the Communists to Catholicism, General Karol Swierczewski, commander of the

International Brigade in Spain and an old Communist leader, was buried on 1st April, 1947, according to Roman Catholic rite and his coffin lowered to the sound of *De Profundis* chanted by Catholic clergy! (*Glos Ludu* 2nd April, 1947).

In Czechoslovakia the Government passed a bill by which all pastors were to become salaried officials of the State. The Church hierarchy, headed by Archbishop Beran, could not prevent nearly all the priests from accepting this, for lack of any large estates or other source of income made them financially dependent on the state. (The same fact—that the poverty of the Church secures its dependence on the state—led Catherine II, who was certainly not an atheist, to confiscate most of the lands of the Russian Orthodox Church). To facilitate the transference of the clergy's allegiance from the Pope in Rome to the Government in Prague, the Communist leaders pretended to behave like devout Catholics. Thus, for instance, Gottwald, immediately after being elected President, with his wife attended 'a special *Te Deum* service in the Cathedral at St. Vitus at which Archbishop Beran officiated. Neither President Masaryk nor President Beneš did this' (*The Times*, 15th June, 1948).

In Rumania, the Government used yet another method to subordinate the Catholic Church to itself. There were two Catholic Churches in the country, the Roman Catholic Church embracing about 1,200,000 people, and the Uniate Catholic Church embracing about 1,426,000 people. The Uniates are Christians of the Byzantine rite—which is almost identical with the Orthodox rite—who owe allegiance to the Pope. The Uniate Church was founded in Poland at the end of the sixteenth century and was introduced into Transylvania about a century later. It became a focal point for Ukrainian and Rumanian nationalism; hence it was a constant thorn in the Tsar's side. In the seventies of last century Tsar Alexander II, on the advice of the arch-reactionary Count Dimitri Tolstoy, suppressed the Uniate Church in the western provinces of the Russian empire. In 1945 the Uniates of Eastern Galicia (taken from Poland by Russia) were forced to join the Orthodox Church. Three years later the Uniates in Rumania suffered the same fate. The Rumanian Government arrested all the Bishops and many of the priests of the Uniate Church, as a

result of which some priests convened a conference and decided to join the Orthodox Church. The property of the Uniate Church was also transferred to the Orthodox Church and the Uniate Church ceased to exist. The Roman Catholic Church, being very weak in Rumania (embracing not more than 6 per cent of the population) had to agree to the Government's Religious Law of August, 1948, making all priests state officials. The higher ranks of the Orthodox Church can only be filled 'after approval by the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly, given by decree, at the proposal of the government, following the recommendation of the Minister of Religion.'

The following extract from a broadcast by Radio Rumania on December 14th, 1948, symbolizes the limitation of 'religious freedom' in Rumania by police control: 'The Bucharest Police informs those whom it may concern in connection with carol singing at Christmas and the New Year that children under 12 can sing carols without authorization. Choirs and all other associations which sing carols must obtain authorization from the Bucharest Police Adminstrative Department. Applications must state, on the responsibility of the association's head, the name, age and occupation of each member and the part he takes in the choir. All members must carry identity cards.' (Quoted by *The Economist*, 25th December, 1948).

In Conclusion

From the review given above it is clear that while the regimentation of the Orthodox Churches in the satellites by the State was a simple and straightforward undertaking that has already been completed, the regimentation of the Catholic Church has been much more complicated, demanding undermining tactics instead of frontal attack, and it is not yet finished. To complete it, it will be necessary, it seems, either to include the Vatican in the Great Russian Empire, or to make the Catholics of Eastern Europe pay allegiance to another Pope (and thus repeat the case of the Popes of Avignon) or to turn the Churches into National Churches.

So far two inter-related reasons have been given for the policy of regimentation of religion in the satellites: 1. the impossibility of uprooting religious feeling in the people as long

as the 'real misery' of poverty and oppression continues unmitigated; this became clear to the Kremlin, if not from a reading of Marx, from their own experience in trying to carry out the 'Five Year Plan of Atheism'; 2. The necessity under a totalitarian regime of leaving no field of social life free of State control. A third possible reason suggests itself.

Until the French Revolution the French bourgeoisie, on the whole, supported a materialistic philosophy, it was atheistic. Here and there were some deists among them, but there were hardly any supporters of the Church. After the victory of the Revolution they changed. The Church lost its feudal property, and the priests, convinced that the old regime had gone for good, were ready to accommodate themselves to the new rulers of France. At the same time the bourgeoisie began to fear its allies of yesterday, the sansculottes, even more than its enemies, the nobility, and it began to look upon the materialist philosophy as a danger and upon religion as a shield. Thus the bourgeoisie went over very quickly from materialism to deism (1793 to 1795) and then embraced the Catholic Church (the Concordat of 1801). Napoleon Bonaparte, the exponent *par excellence* of the desires of the *nouveaux riches* explained this new devotion to religion very succinctly: 'As far as I am concerned, I do not see in religion the mystery of the incarnation, but the mystery of the social order; it attaches to heaven an idea of equality which prevents the rich from being massacred by the poor.'

It is possible that this consideration accounts to some extent for the attitude to religion of the 'new aristocracy' of Stalin's empire also.

CHAPTER X

‘PEOPLE’S DEMOCRACIES’— DICTATORSHIP OVER THE PEOPLE



ALL THE COUNTRIES of ‘People’s Democracy’ have very fine constitutions. Article 2, of the ‘Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria’ (approved by the Grand National Assembly on December 4th, 1947) states:

‘In the People’s Republic of Bulgaria all power emanates from the people and belongs to the people.

‘This power is exercised through freely elected representative organs and through referenda.

‘All representative organs of the State power are elected by the citizens, by a general, direct, and secret ballot.’

Article 88 states: ‘The citizens of the People’s Republic are guaranteed freedom of the press, of speech, of assembly, of meetings and demonstrations’. Articles similar to these two appear in all the constitutions of the ‘People’s Democracies.’*

How do these fine institutions work in practice? What is the actual interpretation of ‘free elections’ or ‘freedom of the press, speech, of assembly, of meetings and demonstrations’?

‘Free Elections’

Formally all the governments of Eastern Europe are responsible to parliaments, which are made up of representatives of the people democratically elected. In all elections the overwhelming majority of the electorate is stated to have voted and an overwhelming majority of the votes to have been given for the existing M.P.’s. In the Rumanian general elections of March 28th, 1948, 91 per cent of the electorate voted, of whom 90.8 per cent voted for the list of candidates supporting the present government. In the Czechoslovakian elections of May 30th, 1948, the corresponding figures were 90 per cent

*For a comparative analysis of the Constitutions of the ‘People’s Democracies’ see Samuel L. Sharp, *New Constitutions in the Soviet Sphere*, Washington, 1948, and A. Gyorgy, *Governments of Danubian Europe*, New York, 1949.

and 89.2 per cent; in the Hungarian elections of May 15th, 1949, 94.6 per cent and 95.6 per cent; in Bulgaria (December 18th, 1949) 98.89 per cent and 97.66 per cent; and in Yugoslavia (March 26th, 1950) 93.23 per cent and 94.2 per cent.*

But the impression of such solid support for the governments is very much weakened by the fact that in all the elections there was only one list of candidates.

The Communist leaders tried to hide their intention of establishing such a system of 'elections,' which is a manifest negation of democratic procedure. For instance, Marshal Tito, the first to establish this system, said in an interview with *The Times* correspondent on November 13th, 1945: 'I should like to see our opposition leading a full political life. I certainly expect an opposition to crystallize out of the many parties which go to form the National Front in Parliament, for we shall have to settle many controversial issues.' At that time Tito insisted on the right to put up a number of electoral lists. The Communist leaders in the last country to adopt the system—Czechoslovakia—were also vehement in denying their intentions. Thus the *Daily Worker* of 24th March, 1948—two months before the one-list elections—said: 'It was confirmed yesterday that the Communists will go to the polls as an independent party. There will be lists of candidates from the four Czech and three Slovak parties.'

Lest the existence of only one list of candidates should be insufficient guarantee of the desired electoral victory, other precautions were taken. In some countries the secret ballot was abolished. In Czechoslovakia, for instance, where the secret ballot had previously obtained, it was announced before the elections of May, 1948, that no voter was to be compelled to observe secrecy when casting his vote. Nosek, the Communist Minister of the Interior, declared a few days before the elections: 'There can be no grounds for disapproval if a voter of his own free will does not exercise the right to a secret vote

*As far as we know no candidate in any of the 'People's Democracies' polled more than 100 per cent. Stalin is the only one who can record such a 'miracle'. In the elections to the local Soviets that took place on 21st December, 1947, the constituency that 'elected' Stalin to the Moscow Soviet had 1,617 voters, but Stalin polled 2,122 votes. *Pravda* next day explained this extraordinary phenomenon thus: 'The extra ballot papers were put into the urns by citizens of neighbouring constituencies anxious to seize the opportunity to express their gratitude to their leader.'

but votes openly'. The Communist Party followed this up by declaring that only reactionaries were ashamed of their policy and would vote secretly. At the polling booths a voter had to show his identification papers and state whether he wished to cast his ballot paper into the ballot boxes exposed to public view or into boxes in a secret booth. Even if he was bold enough to choose the latter course his ordeal was still not at an end. Two ballot papers, one with the government list of candidates *printed on both sides*, the other a blank slip, were issued to him, and after throwing one of them into the secret ballot box, he had to throw the discarded one into a waste paper basket more or less in full view of the election officers.

If the elector wished to show his disapproval of the government not by voting against it—a path fraught with dangers—but simply by abstaining, he could do so only if he were prepared to pay the penalty the law demands of all who do not vote—imprisonment for a month and a fine of 10 thousand crowns (£50).

Even if the elector was bold enough to vote against the government list, what assurance had he that his vote would be counted, as the only people on the electoral commissions are those who support the official list? When there is only one list of candidates, and when voting is open and counting secret instead of the other way about, the official list cannot possibly lose. Indeed in all the general elections that have taken place since 1948 in the 'People's Democracies' there has not been a *single* case of an official candidate not being elected.

Indirect testimony to the faking of the elections is given by the following fact. In all the Constitutions of the 'People's Democracies', the electoral laws declare the right of a very small group of electors to put up a list of candidates, or a single candidate, if they wish. In Bulgaria every group of *ten* citizens is allowed to do so, in Yugoslavia every group of a hundred, and so on. But although this fine democratic law exists, and although it was stated that thousands voted against the Government (for example, in Bulgaria, in the elections of December, 1949, 109,983 blank or invalid votes were cast and in Yugoslavia in March, 1950, 613,125 voted against the Government) not one case is recorded of a group of ten or a hundred citizens putting up any candidate against the official one.

*‘Freedom of Press, Speech, Assembly,
Meetings and Demonstrations’*

Like the provisions for ‘free elections’, these rights exist only on paper. A comparison of the papers published in the different ‘People’s Democracies’, the contents of the speeches made and so on, proves this. The extent to which the ‘freedoms’ exist is particularly obvious when there is any abrupt change of policy. For instance, up to the day on which Rajk was arrested, all the papers in Hungary competed in singing his praises, at meetings his name was mentioned side by side with Rákosi’s and at demonstrations—the last, that of 1st May, 1949—his picture was very prominent and, according to the Hungarian press, the cheers he drew from the crowd were second only to Rákosi. When on 15th June, 1949, it was announced that Rajk had been arrested as a ‘Titoist-fascist’, all the press, without exception, attacked him in a most vicious manner. Within a week, the press was full of telegrams from meetings all over the country demanding ‘punishment without mercy’ for Rajk, and workers demanded ‘A rope for traitors like Rajk’, even before the date of his trial was announced. Not *one* of the thousands who had voted for him a month earlier when he headed the list of candidates in the Parliamentary elections made use of their ‘freedom of the press and speech’ (Article 55 of the Constitution) to propose to withhold judgment until the trial, far less to defend him. Furthermore, the people knew exactly what punishment would be meted out months before the trial. The rope was repeatedly demanded and he was indeed hanged. The mass meetings before Mindszenty’s trial never demanded the death sentence but severe punishment; Mindszenty received a long prison sentence. Freedom of the press, speech, assembly, meetings and demonstrations amounts to the ‘freedom’ of the people to say exactly what the Government wants them to say.

To enhance ‘freedom’ of the press, the sale of books dating from before the rule of the ‘People’s Democracies’ is prohibited by Government decree. The Czechoslovak Government on January 10th, 1950, banned the sale of all books published in Czechoslovakia before May 5th, 1945, with the exception of certain specified text-books for schools and scientific journals, ordered all booksellers to clear their shelves of them within

10 days, and required them to make a return of such books to the Minister of Education, and to keep them in a place 'inaccessible to the public'. Previously (November 22nd, 1949) all booksellers had had to make a list of all second-hand books in stock and not to sell them until they got permission from the Ministry of Information.

Even private correspondence is not immune from government interference. The Czechoslovak Government declared that from February 1st, 1950, anyone corresponding with persons abroad must deliver his letters personally to the post office, produce an identity card when handing it to the postal official and write his name and address on the envelope.

A very good description of 'freedom of demonstration' in Yugoslavia was given in the Royal Institute of International Affairs monthly journal *The World Today* (November, 1946). 'On the eve of the day fixed for the demonstration, instructions are given to the workers and civil servants, the trade unions, the ward committees, and the anti-Fascist organizations to get ready for action. They receive orders to report to fixed assembly points in the city at a stated time. Mimeographed lists of the slogans to be used are produced, and reliable persons appointed to direct the marching columns . . . The route and timing of the mass procession is carefully planned, and the school-children get busy painting the banners inscribed with the appropriate words, and decking the giant pictures of Stalin and Tito with flowers and wreaths of greenery'.

Democracy—The Only Way to Socialism

The leaders of the Communist Parties declare that the 'People's Democracies' are a stage on the path towards Socialism. To evaluate the correctness or otherwise of this assertion it is necessary to make clear the relation between the economic supremacy of the working class, its political rule and democracy.

In all previous history the class struggle has reached its climax in a fight for political power as the decisive weapon for the defence of the economic interests of the ruling class. This was the case in the bourgeois revolutions of the 16-18 centuries in Holland, England and France, and in the War of Independence in the United States. The bourgeoisie, which once

overthrew the old nobility, is now confronted with the working class, whose aim is also to win state power. In this respect, there is no difference between the character of the struggle of the rising bourgeoisie in the past and that of the proletariat in the present. But there is a vital difference in the relation between the political ascendancy and the class ownership of social wealth in the two movements. The bourgeoisie owned a large part of the means of production *before* the bourgeois revolution. The French capitalists, for example, owned manufactories, factories, land, ships, shops, etc., before the Great French Revolution. Inside feudal economy and society there existed for centuries an alien growth—capitalist economy—and the greater its wealth, the more self-confident became those who owned it. To them revolution meant the accommodation of the state power to the needs of the already dominant class. By contrast, autonomous cells of socialism do not arise inside capitalist economy and the working class remains propertyless until it gains political power and uses it to transfer wealth from the bourgeoisie to society. Whereas the bourgeoisie could be the ruling class economically but not politically the working class can not. Its economic supremacy and freedom is dependent on its political supremacy.

There is a very important corollary to this. The capitalist could maintain his ownership of property even under a hostile political regime, such as the rule of the nobility, although, because of high taxation, royal and feudal despotism, etc., he may not have gained the maximum possible benefit from it. He could maintain his ownership under widely different governments—under Louis XVI and Robespierre, the Empire of Napoleon and the Republic, Liberal and Conservative governments, Fascist and Labour governments. This is possible because these changes in government, however thoroughgoing, do not affect the link between the capitalist and his wealth, private ownership. So long, therefore, as the governments do not expropriate him economically, even if they expropriate him politically—as, for instance, under Fascism, where the capitalist gets many a hard knock from the political dictator for the benefit of the dictator's praetorian guard—the capitalist continues to be the owner of wealth. Unlike the capitalists, the feudal lords and the slave owners, the workers cannot

become the owners of the means of production as individuals, but only as a collective. It is true that a number of workers in capitalist society succeed in raising themselves in the social scale and becoming individual owners of a certain wealth. But these exceptions prove the rule; the workers who 'get on', by so doing get out of the working class. The workers as a class can achieve economic supremacy only after they take political power and this supremacy can only take the form of collective ownership of the social wealth: the workers own the state, the state owns the wealth, and thus the workers own the wealth.

Social ownership implies that the will of society is decisive in determining the general policy of production and distribution. But what is the collective will? There are those who see in the 'will of the nation' or the 'will of the class' something different from and independent of the desires of the individuals who make up the nation or the class. But this idea is untenable if one assumes that there is no will nor thought without a brain to think it.

In personifying the collective, one accepts the 'voice of the nation' or of 'the working class', however that is interpreted, but rejects the voices of the actual members of the nation or of the working class, and therefore negates the will of the collective. A collective of people can only express its will by aggregating the wills of the different individuals who constitute it. Hence the form of rule of the working class must necessarily be democracy.

The idea of political supremacy as a *prerequisite* of the economic supremacy of the working class and of democracy as a necessary form of its rule, was clearly expressed in *The Communist Manifesto*: ' . . . the first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy.'

'The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the state, i.e., the proletariat organised as the ruling class. . . . '

More than forty years later, Engels wrote: 'If anything is certain it is that our party and the working class can only come to power under the form of a "democratic republic. Precisely this is the specific form for the dictatorship of the proletariat, as

the Great French Revolution has already shown.' Another great socialist, Rosa Luxemburg, writing about the Russian revolution, said: '... socialist democracy is not something which begins only in the promised land after the foundations of socialist economy are created; it does not come as some sort of Christmas present for the worthy people who, in the interim, have loyally supported a handful of socialist dictators. Socialist democracy begins simultaneously with the beginnings of the destruction of class rule and of the construction of socialism.'

Just as the ownership by a group of shareholders of a certain capitalist enterprise is accompanied by the right to vote on its management and decide on the hiring and firing of its managers, so the social ownership of the wealth of a country must be expressed in the power of society to decide upon its management and the power to hire or fire its managers. The 'People's Democracies' are based on a different conception. A bureaucratic police dictatorship has raised itself above the people, and is independent of its will, while claiming to govern in its interests.

In Part II of Goethe's *Faust*, Faust decides to reclaim a strip of land from the sea in order to settle it with 'many millions' of people of 'free toil', and thus would 'a free people stand on a free soil'. But during the construction itself Faust deals with the builders as though they were dull-witted slaves.

'To speed the greatest enterprises
One mind for thousand hands suffices.'

With carrot and knout the workers are driven on to accomplish the mightiest achievements. Mephistopheles, the foreman, is encouraged by Faust:

'Workmen throng on throng address
Thyself to get. Put forth all vigour.
Now with indulgence, now with rigour
Encourage. Pay, entice, impress!
Let every day bring news of our successes,
How this new trench, this mighty groove progresses.'

Thus the future community of 'free people' is the Faustian aim, while the serfdom of the toilers is the Mephistophelean means. The link between them is Faust's belief in enlightened despotism—

"One mind for thousand hands suffices."

Will the means not swallow up the aim, the 'groove' become a 'grave'? Why should the despot not hold on to his knout as long as he can, why should he not use it to perpetuate the tyranny over the 'thousand hands'? And, the most important question for the fate of humanity, how long will the 'thousand hands' submit to this tyranny?

PART III

THE REBELLIOUS SATELLITE



CHAPTER I

THE COMINFORM COUNTRIES LAUNCH AN ATTACK ON YUGOSLAVIA



The Excommunication Resolution of the Cominform

ON 28TH JUNE, 1948, like a bolt from the blue, came the news, first announced in the Prague daily, *Rude Pravo*, that the Yugoslav Communist Party had been expelled from the Cominform.

The Resolution of expulsion is about as clear as the prophecies of the Oracle of Delphi, for almost anything may be read into it; it is outstanding for its demagogic jumbling together of mutually exclusive accusations. The Yugoslav leaders are accused of nationalism and Trotskyism, Bukharinism and Menshevism. They are accused of giving a free hand to the 'growth of capitalist elements in their country' and also of 'hastily decreed . . . nationalisation of medium industry and trade'. They are accused of 'glossing over the class struggle' in the countryside, thus in effect supporting the rich peasants, the kulaks, and at the same time of being carried away by 'adventuristic' plans of putting an end to all elements of capitalism in the countryside. More and more kulak elements, according to the Resolution, lay down the law in the villages, and at the same time the kulak elements sabotage the government plan for the collection of grain and other government undertakings; in short, the Yugoslav leaders are tools in the hands of the kulaks, but pass 'adventuristic' decrees against them which they sabotage. This logic has been approached in soundness in recent years probably only by the Nazis who blame the Jews for Capitalism and for Marxism.

If all the trivialities included in the Resolution and in the correspondence between the leaders of the Soviet and Yugoslav

governments* are put aside, the issue boils down to three accusations: first, the Yugoslav government had been 'pursuing an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union'; secondly, the collectivisation of agriculture was not being pursued, and, thirdly, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had no identity of its own but was dissolved in the non-party People's Front, contrary to the Marxist conception of the leading role of the Party.

The first accusation is the most severe, and many instances are cited to support it. 'The Yugoslav security organs controlled and supervised the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia.' (Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, 27th March, 1948). Milovan Djilas, one of the four leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia mentioned in the Resolution, is alleged to have stated at a session of the Central Committee of the Party in 1945 'that the Soviet officers were, from a moral standpoint, inferior to the officers of the British army'; 'this anti-Soviet statement by Djilas met with no opposition from the other members of the C.C. of the C.P.Y.' (Ibid.) The Yugoslavs 'began to abuse our (Soviet) military advisers, to call them loafers, and to discredit the Soviet army', and the government decided to ask for the withdrawal of a number of Soviet military advisers. (C.C. of C.P.S.U. to C.C. of C.P.Y., 4th May, 1948). The Yugoslav government passed a decree forbidding the state organs to give economic information to any Soviet representative without government permission. (C.C. of C.P.S.U. to C.C. of C.P.Y., op. cit, 27th March, 1948).

It will be shown elsewhere what connection the second and third accusations have with the basic one of unfriendliness, or more correctly, refusal to submit to Russia.

The Cominform Resolution was only the first shot in a barrage of sharp attacks on the Yugoslav government.

The Short Memory of the Cominformites

Amnesia is the greatest blessing granted the Cominform leaders. Hardly had the ink on the Cominform communique excommunicating Yugoslavia dried, before the unlimited

* This correspondence together with the Cominform Resolution has been printed in English in *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1948).

praise previously showered on Tito's head evaporated. The Church of Stalin knows only of saints and devils, and St. Tito was now Lucifer.

Every member of the Communist Party conscientiously forgets what his leaders wrote just prior to the rupture. For instance, the editor of the *Daily Worker* had written on 13th September, 1947: 'Yugoslavia is the most advanced of the new democracies in Europe . . . It is a real democracy where the people rule and build a new life'. Two days later he wrote: 'Yugoslavia is showing the whole world the miracle that a free people can accomplish when power is in their hands'. Rákosi stated on 10th September, 1946: 'During this great world war we saw with tremendous enthusiasm that there were two peoples who justified the hopes of mankind—the Soviet people and the Yugoslav people'. *Soviet News* said on 20th August, 1947: 'A complete democratic transformation has taken place in Yugoslavia'. All these statements and thousands of similar ones have been blissfully forgotten by the Communist Parties.

One of the first to give the new version of Tito's past was Vittorio Vidalli, leader of the pro-Cominform Communist Party in the Free Territory of Trieste. Already on 15th September, 1948, he was ready with stories of the sins committed by Tito's agents in Trieste over a number of years: 'For a number of years any disagreements with the directives of the Babié-Jursić group (Tito's agents in Trieste—Y.G.) were qualified as "slander", as intrigues by the agents of "Anglo-Saxon imperialism", as expressions of "Factionalism", and so on. On the orders of the Slovenian Ranković, Boris Kreiger, nationalist Minister of Police in Lubljana, honest Communists who differed from Tito's policy, were brutally persecuted'.

'In "A" zone and in Trieste at that time there were attempted assassinations of Italian and Slovene Party functionaires.

'Here Tito's puppets tried to use as "propagandists" Slovenes—civil servants in the Yugoslav State institutions. Students of the so-called "school for cadres" were used for subversive work. This school had been secretly established by Babić and Jursić under the leadership of Sedmak and Srechko who had been expelled from the Party as Trotskyites and who were linked up with the British Intelligence Service.'

This had been going on 'for a number of years'! Why had no member, in the democratic Party of Trieste, proclaimed these terrible facts before June 28th, 1948?

The Albanian Communist Party leaders were also quick to find out the dark past of the Yugoslav leaders. In *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* of 15th August, 1949, Bedri Spahi, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Albania, tells of the policy that the 'third-rate Belgrade tsar' Tito carried out during the war in Albania: ' . . . as far back as the spring of 1943 the aims of the traitor Tito, with regard to the Albanian people, fully coincided with the plans of Mussolini'. On the eve of the liberation of Albania from the Italian occupation Tito insisted on 'placing rabid fascists . . . in the country's leading organs'. Afterwards the Tito agent 'Kochi Xoxe, then organisational secretary of the Central Committee and Minister of Home Affairs,' by a 'systematic campaign of slander and threats' 'drove Nako Spiru to commit suicide. A leading member of the Party, Nako Spiru had boldly exposed the colonising, imperialist policy pursued by Tito in relation to Albania'. 'Many Communists and functionaires of local Party committees were thrown into prison or shot on the basis of false information fabricated on his (Xoxe's—Y.G.) instructions'. These are terrible accusations, but all the years that these crimes were being committed not one in democratic Albania uttered a word that might expose the sinners!

Jacques Duclos finds another proof that Tito in the past was a reactionary agent of Western imperialism—the fact that Tito's partisans got arms during the war from the Western Powers. He writes:

'We know, for example, how Churchill refused to send arms to the French Francs-Tireurs and Partisans.

'But on the other hand we know that Churchill's attitude to Tito was quite different. And since the old British reactionary never lost sight of the interests of reaction for one moment, the question arises: what guarantee was Tito able to give him at that time? We have the right to assume that during the war the Intelligence Service had its agents among those who were closest to Tito'. (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* 1st July, 1949).

The crudeness of this argument is astonishing! Russia during the war received many times more arms from the West than Yugoslavia. (Actually the West started giving serious help to Tito's partisans only in the spring of 1944). Does this not prove that 'the Intelligence Service had its agents among those who were closest to' Stalin?

N. Zachariades, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Greece, blames Tito's agents for the defeat of the Greek Partisans. Their machinations against them go back as far as 1943:

'Since 1943, the Greek Communist Party and revolutionary movement have been between two fires: on the one side the foreign imperialists and monarcho-fascists, on the other—the Tito clique . . . ' Tito worked hand in hand with General Zervas, the Axis quisling in Greece, and together, among other deeds they organized the murder of a member of the Political Bureau of the Greek Communist Party (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* 1st August, 1949).

The Rajk trial brought 'proof' after 'proof' of Tito's past crimes. It 'proved' that he was an agent of British imperialism during the war, that he tried to come to terms with Hitler but was prevented from doing so by the Yugoslav people, that even in the Spanish Civil War his followers, members of the International Brigade, were agents of Franco, Mussolini and Hitler. Immediately after the trial, the Cominform agent, Pero Popivoda, 'remembered' a few other significant facts. During the war, on Djilas' and Pijade's orders, many partisan units in Montenegro were split into small groups, the intended and inevitable result of which was that many were caught by the Germans; Tito's escape from the German encirclement in Sutesca—previously acclaimed by the Communists as an act of heroism and claimed by the Russian press at the time to have been achieved by a Russian aircraft's saving him—was the result of Tito's agreement with the Germans; proof: 'Over 10,000 partisans died there, but Tito escaped'. Tito all the time had relations with the Gestapo and the Italian Ovra; proof: three General Staffs of the partisan army, one after the other, were wiped out. (*Rumanian News*, 9th October, 1949).

It appears that Tito commanded the National Liberation

Army, keeping more German and Italian divisions engaged than the Allies in North Africa (according to Radio Moscow at the time), killing 477,000 German and Italian soldiers and taking 559,434 prisoners—all in the interests of . . . Hitler and Mussolini!

Measures Taken Against Tito

Moscow did not stop at verbal attacks on Yugoslavia.

She also carried out an economic boycott. Prior to the rift, Yugoslavia was to a large extent dependent on the Russian bloc of countries for its supply of goods and as a market for its products. In 1947 Russia and the 'People's Democracies' supplied 51.8 per cent of Yugoslavia's imports and took 49.1 per cent of her exports. In 1948 the corresponding figures were 43.3 and 49.6. A disruption of these economic relations would be bound to cause great harm to Yugoslavia. Russia was well aware of this, and after long and tedious negotiations concluded a trade agreement with Yugoslavia for 1949 which reduced the amount of goods to be exchanged to an eighth of the 1948 trade. The satellites followed suit, going even further. The Polish government denounced its trade agreement with Yugoslavia on 7th June, 1949, and declared its intention of stopping all deliveries to her; Czechoslovakia actually stopped all deliveries from 12th June, 1949, and Hungary denounced the trade agreement with her on 18th June, 1949. Trade between Yugoslavia and the Russian bloc declined steeply in the first three quarters of 1949. In the first quarter of 1949 Yugoslavia got 26.1 per cent of her imports from the Russian bloc; in the second quarter 14.8 per cent, and in the third quarter only 3.2 per cent. The Russian bloc accounted for 23.8 per cent of her exports in the first quarter, 22.2 per cent in the second quarter and 7.7 per cent in the third. Since then trade relations have almost entirely ceased. (Figures quoted by Tito in a speech to the Federal Assembly, 27th April, 1950).

This policy exactly fits the definition of 'economic blockade' given by the *Soviet Political Encyclopaedia*: ' . . . blockade in peace time is the dearly-loved means of pressure used by imperialist countries towards weaker countries.'

Yugoslavia was forced to expand her trade with the West.* Nevertheless the boycott caused her some harm. Her exports in 1948 amounted to 14.3 billion dinars, while in 1949, at the same prices, they amounted to only 11 billion (Tito's speech of 27th April, 1950, *op. cit.*), and in 1950 to even less. (It is difficult to know, of course, how much of the decline in 1950 the severe drought accounted for).

Yugoslavia is also threatened with military action. Russian, Hungarian, Rumanian, Bulgarian and Albanian troops are concentrated on her borders, they stage large-scale manoeuvres and even more frequently cause 'border incidents'. From July, 1948, to December, 1949, there were 1,397 incidents on Yugoslavia's borders with Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania. (Tito's speech to Federal Assembly, 28th December, 1950).

In addition special broadcasts in the languages of the nationalities of Yugoslavia are transmitted from the capitals of all the countries in the Russian bloc. Day and night they call upon the people of Yugoslavia to 'turn Yugoslavia into a Second Korea', to sabotage the Yugoslav economy and take up arms against the 'fascist beasts who have run amuck.'†

*FOREIGN TRADE OF YUGOSLAVIA (VALUE IN MILLION U.S. DOLLARS)

	EXPORTS			IMPORTS		
	1948	1949	1950 (Jan.-June)	1948	1949	1950 (Jan.-June)
U.S.A.	..	50	148	79	80	209
United Kingdom	183	448	173	120	159	74
Germany	..	1	88	102	11	153
Italy	..	175	158	73	218	252
Austria	..	122	167	55	96	203
Netherlands	197	137	27	101	108	22
Switzerland	..	78	60	15	88	95
France	..	37	26	27	51	63
Total	843	1,232	551	765	1,242	776

(U.N. Statistical Office, *Direction of International Trade*, 1950 issues).

†According to *Tanjug* of 26th January, 1951, broadcasts to Yugoslavia from these countries were taking up 162 hours and 40 minutes weekly, as against 37 hours and 35 minutes weekly in 1948, before the publication of the Cominform Resolution. During the first six months of 1950 these countries gave 6,731 broadcasts lasting 3,055 hours in Yugoslav languages, which amounts to 4 months 8 days and 3 hours of anti-Yugoslav propaganda.

Foreign radio broadcasts from the Russian bloc of countries in Europe were being given in 26 languages, and amounted to 644 hours and 51 minutes weekly. Of these, nearly a quarter were given in three Yugoslav languages alone (Serbo-Croat, Slovene and Macedonian).

Russian radio broadcasts in English, French and Spanish—that is, in languages spoken by 460 million people—were in length almost equal to broadcasts in Yugoslav languages spoken by 16 million people. In Bulgaria broadcasts in 13 foreign languages lasted only half an hour per week less than broadcasts in Yugoslav languages.

CHAPTER II

ON THE MOTIVES OF THE TITO-STALIN CONFLICT



Tito Against the National Oppression of Yugoslavia

DIFFERENT explanations of the conflict between Russia and Yugoslavia have been given by political commentators. Some see in it only, or mainly, a personal conflict between two dictators, but this explanation is much too simple and far from convincing. In view of the bitterness of the conflict, the outcome of which may well mean life or death not only for Tito and his immediate circle, but for tens or hundreds of thousands of Titoists in Yugoslavia, it is clear that the stakes are much higher than the antipathy of two dictators suggests. On the other hand, the Russian Government would not have taken such big risks as this wrangle involves, such as the explosion of many of the Stalinist legends and the 'bad example' to other would-be Titos, had there not been some issue of paramount importance to both sides and not just a question of the personal whims of the Generalissimo and the Marshal to disrupt relations between the two countries. The explanation of the rift to which the majority of commentators now incline is that it is a national struggle of the rulers of Yugoslavia against the subjugation of the country by Russia. As far as it goes this explanation is satisfactory and is borne out by the facts, as well as by the declarations of the Yugoslav leaders.

Unlike the other leaders of the 'People's Democracies', Tito and his friends came to power without the support of the Russian Army. Moše Pijade, the *eminent grise* of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, stated: '... certain heads of other parties ... arrived in their free countries in planes with pipes in their mouths, and ... for four years, four times daily, vainly called on the masses to struggle, via radio, while we won our freedom with arms in our hands'. (*Borba*, 10th July,

1948). The Yugoslav leaders therefore felt superior to the Rákosis, Paukers and other governors of the Russian gubernias, and on an almost equal footing with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This feeling was given expression from the beginning of the open conflict with Moscow. ' . . . our party succeeded in . . . achieving in practice the greatest results after the All-Union Communist Party'. (Tito's Report to the Fifth Congress of the C.P.Y., July, 1948). '(Our) Communist Party has made the greatest advance toward socialism, after the All-Union Party'. (M. Pijade, op. cit.). 'Every other party, with the exception, of course, of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, would have collapsed in a struggle such as the one that has been imposed upon us'. (Milovan Djilas in *Borba*, 5th July, 1948). 'No other Communist Party, except the All-Union Communist Party, could withstand such blows without falling to pieces like a house of cards'. (Ibid.). All the speeches in the Fifth Congress, convened three weeks after the Cominform Resolution, conveyed the same thought.

The bitter and courageous war of national liberation against the German and Italian Occupation forces and their quislings gave the Yugoslav leaders much more self-confidence and independence than could be achieved by Bierut, Pauker or Rákosi, who came to power on the bayonets of the Russian Army and never succeeded in gaining strong mass support. Other than in Yugoslavia, the Communist Party leaders had mass support only in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, and even in these countries, where the support had not been forged through years of heroic struggle in a war of national liberation, it was much weaker than in Yugoslavia.

The Communist-controlled administration of Yugoslavia was built in the war years, with no direct intervention of the Russian Army, and it had no Rokossovsky or Radkiewicz in command. Ranković had organised his Secret Political Police, the U.D.Ba. (formerly called O.Z.N.A.) on the pattern of the N.K.V.D., but independently of it. The regime in Yugoslavia appears not as an extension of the Russian regime, but as a relatively independent replica of it.

Under such conditions it is natural that the Yugoslav leaders should demand the full equality of their country with Russia, and its independence.

'Russia Wants to Keep Yugoslavia a Backward Colonial Country, a Source of Cheap Raw Materials'

With the relative independence of the Yugoslav Government from the Kremlin it was natural that its industrial ambitions should be greater than those of the other 'People's Democracies'* and it could not but revolt against any impediments to the industrial development of the country.

Simply to say that Yugoslavia is fighting for national independence, does not explain the social content of the struggle. An old national form in a new social setting is not quite the same national form. National struggles have different characters as, for instance, when Abyssinia fights against Italy, when France fights against Germany, or Yugoslavia against Russia. The character of the struggle and the *real* motives behind it are dependent in every case on the stage of development of the nation concerned. A national struggle between the big landlords of two nations is necessarily concentrated primarily on the question of who is to own the big estates of a certain territory. The national struggle between the Croat peasants and the Hungarian landlords was fought on the question of land reform. The struggle between the rising class of Indian industrialists and British imperialism was fought over hegemony in the Indian market. Of course there is no Chinese wall separating the various classes of the different nations, and as long as a certain class rules it has a social, political and cultural influence over the lower classes of its nation, and carries them with it into the national struggle, even, in many cases, when this struggle bears no relation to their particular needs. Further, to avoid over-simplification, it must be remembered that there is no Chinese wall separating the different aspects of human life, economic, social, and cultural. For instance, when the Croat peasants fought against Hungarian landownership, they fought at the same time for democratic rights, and in the cultural field against the Magyarisation of the schools, the press, etc.

In Yugoslavia the national struggle against Russia is led by the ruling class—the bureaucracy. Therefore the character, the motivation, the driving force in the national struggle derive from the character of this class and from its place in the economic system.

*See Part I, Chapter V.

The material basis of a bureaucracy ruling in a state capitalist economy is the state enterprise, primarily in industry, and the only historical explanation, if not justification, for its existence is the pursuit of industrialisation and of the accumulation of capital. Any serious national fight between two groups of bureaucrats ruling in state capitalist countries is inevitably concentrated on this key problem, their be all and end all. The facts given above about the economic relations between Russia and her satellites (the reparations, the mixed Sovrom and Soviet-Hungarian companies, the sharp trade practices) lend weight to the contention that the main reason for the Tito-Stalin conflict is the question of industrialisation and the accumulation of capital. Tito and other Yugoslav leaders themselves stated this to be the case when, after the first period of self-justification and self-defence, they went over to the attack and accused their accusers.

Less than a month after the Cominform Resolution, Vlajko Begović, one of the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, in attacking Hebrang and Žujović, formerly leaders of the Party and supporters of the Cominform who served for some months as whipping-boys for the Cominform, said: 'Until recently there was (referring to Hebrang and Žujović—Y.G.) and there still can be found, the opinion that Yugoslavia is an agrarian country and would remain such; and that it should deliver to industrially developed countries raw materials and food, and they to Yugoslavia finished industrial consumer goods. This for us would mean renouncing industrialisation of the country'. (*Borba*, 20th July, 1948).

At the Party Congress convened as a counter-demonstration to the Cominform Resolution, all the speakers attacked Hebrang and Žujović chiefly for their opposition to the quick industrialisation of the country. In the main report on the country's economic problems given by Boris Kidrić, Chairman of the Planning Commission, a whole section was devoted to Hebrang and Žujović. His formulation of their crime makes the issue plain: 'Their struggle against the increase of the productive forces of our country, against the abolition of contradictions between our inherited wealth and the backwardness of our techniques inherited from pre-war semi-colonial Yugoslavia—this struggle of theirs could be reduced to

a policy of dependence of our country on abroad—that is, on imperialism'. (*On the Construction of Socialist Economy in the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia*, op. cit. p.53).

There is no doubt, of course, that Kidrić was not accusing those ardent supporters of the Kremlin of striving for Yugoslavia's dependence on *Western* imperialism.

In a speech to the Federal Assembly in the debate on the Budget (27th December, 1948), Tito spoke of the 'difficulties from outside placed in our path from many sources designed to prevent us from fulfilling our Five Year Plan and from building socialism in our country. It would be wrong to think that these obstacles had arisen only during the last months of 1948. No, these obstacles began earlier, and grew more acute during the last six months when they assumed such proportions that they acquired a hostile character.' Why this opposition to the development of Yugoslavia? Tito answers: ' . . . so far we did not want to speak about the real reasons lying behind all this (the hostile attitude of the Cominform countries to Yugoslavia—Y.G.). But today matters have come to such a point that we must say a little more, although for comprehensible reasons, we cannot say all.

'One only needs to read various papers and to listen to various broadcasts, not only from Western Europe but also from Budapest, Bucharest, Prague, Warsaw, Sofia, etc. to be able to grasp immediately without much perspicacity what it is all about . . . Our country . . . cannot continue to remain only a source of raw materials for those countries which already possess a strong industry. It cannot keep on buying industrial products from them at high prices as this is being done today and as was the case in the past, while our peoples continue to remain poor and backward . . . No, so long as a capitalist form of trade, namely exchange of goods, continues to exist among socialist countries (by 'socialist countries' he means the U.S.S.R. and the 'People's Democracies'—Y.G.) where everybody tries to sell at as high a price as possible and to buy as cheaply as possible, no one has the right to ask the other not to use their own possibilities to the maximum to improve the living standards in backward countries such as our country was, despite the great mineral and other wealth which it possessed.'

The same theme is repeated more sharply in the Yugoslav press. The following quotation from *Borba* about the Cominform propaganda against Yugoslavia is one of many possible examples: 'It is quite clear to everybody in this country that the robes of revolutionary phraseology conceal counter-revolutionary attempts to prevent industrialisation of our country . . .'

'Capitalist Exploitation Among Socialist States'

Joze Vilfan, Yugoslav delegate to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, said in a speech before the Council: 'The application of the principle of the world market and world prices in relations between industrial countries and insufficiently developed countries constitutes exploitation of the latter. There exists above all an enormous difference in the productivity of labour between developed and insufficiently developed countries; furthermore, the big economically developed countries act like monopolies in trade with the insufficiently developed countries; finally, through their domination over the world market they give a one-sided structure to the export of undeveloped countries. In this way, through this entire mechanism, the world market becomes an instrument for exploiting insufficiently developed countries . . . *Experience shows us that the exploiting character of trade on the basis of the principle of the world market does not change, even when it is used in economic relations between socialist countries?*' (*Tanjug*, 11th October, 1949).

Milentje Popović, Deputy Finance Minister of Yugoslavia, in his booklet *On Economic Relations Among Socialist States* writes: ' . . . socialist states (i.e., U.S.S.R. and the 'People's Democracies'—Y.G.) under the now prevalent circumstances are divided in their mutual exchange into those which are exploiting and those which are being exploited.'

In this very important work, Popović explains, with the help of Marx's Theory of Value, how industries with a high 'organic composition of capital'—i.e., with a great deal of capital compared to labour—get part of the 'surplus value' which industries with a low 'organic composition of capital' produce. This applies also to international trade between more developed and less developed countries, i.e., countries which have

relatively more capital and those which have less. He quotes Marx to support this argument: the 'favoured country obtains in such an exchange more labour in return for less labour.' Thus, under conditions of free competition, poor countries are exploited by rich. Popović argues that this exploitation increases when the latter, for one reason or another, are in a monopoly position in relation to the former. The backward countries are then charged even higher prices than other buyers.

In conclusion Popović argues that 'capitalist relations do not unite—they divide. Countries under these relations are split apart into two contradictory categories, into those that are exploited and those that are exploiting. Among them there is neither equality nor unity, but only contradiction'. The rich, he says, try to become richer at the expense of the poor, whom they try to preserve in poverty and backwardness, while the poor are justified in waging a fight against exploitation and oppression. The U.S.S.R. belongs to the former category, Yugoslavia to the latter.

The Conflict Between Tito and Stalin over Yugoslavia's Agricultural Policy

Nearly all the commentators on the Tito-Stalin conflict name as the main, if not only, economic issue in dispute not the rate of Yugoslavia's industrialisation, but her agricultural policy. This is because, as regards the economic issues, the only important accusation the Cominform Resolution makes against the Yugoslav Government is that it is not carrying out a sufficiently vigorous policy of collectivisation. At first glance it seems that an insoluble contradiction exists between the over-ambitious plans for state industry and indifference to the existence of private property in agriculture. Before seeing whether the contradiction really is insoluble, the true facts of Tito's agricultural policy should be investigated. Is he really tardy in the 'sharpening of the class struggle in the countryside', in the substitution of collective farms for peasant farms?

The 'Law on the Five Year Plan of Yugoslavia' (1947-51) devotes fourteen pages to agriculture but only five lines of it deal with 'peasant working co-operatives' and no definite targets are set. The only sector of so-called 'Socialist agriculture' for which a target is set is the state farms: to increase

from 202,000 hectares in 1946 to 300,000 in 1951, constituting less than 4 per cent of the agricultural area—and this is indeed a very modest target. The Five Year Plan consequently set a very low target for the mechanisation of agriculture which is the technical basis of collectivisation: it was aimed to raise the number of tractors from 3,790 in 1946, to 4,500 in 1951, a rise of only 13 per cent. It is true that prior to the rift the Communist leaders in the other 'People's Democracies' had also not mentioned a rapid 'collectivisation', but the plans of all of them aimed at a very quick mechanisation, which clearly reveals their intention of carrying out 'collectivisation' as quickly as possible. Bulgaria's current plan aims to raise the number of tractors from 4,600 to 10,000; Hungary's from 11,900 to 21,000; Czechoslovakia's from 11,800 to 45,000; Poland's from 5,500 to 76,500. (U.N., *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, op. cit. p. 208).

The disinclination of the Yugoslav leaders to undertake mass 'collectivisation' was expressed clearly in the long treatise written by Vice-Premier Edvard Kardelj, 'Peasant Co-operatives in a Planned Economy' (*Komunist*, organ of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, September, 1947). He says that in the next few years their energies must be directed towards the building *not* of working co-operatives, but of co-operatives for selling the products of the agriculturists and for supplying them with industrial goods, for the processing of agricultural products, for credit, etc. (i.e., co-operatives like those in Holland and Denmark).

Tito's cautious attitude towards the 'collectivisation' of agriculture in the present and immediate future is determined by economic-political considerations. He knows that in Russia 'collectivisation' so isolated and weakened the state that its very existence was in the balance. He cannot conduct a war on two fronts, externally against Russia and internally against the peasantry, and any attempt at large-scale and compulsory 'collectivisation' would have put him at the mercy of Stalin.

But life is more complex than any scheme, and Tito's will is not powerful enough to overcome this complexity. The Stalin-Tito rift itself, by a wayward turn of events, forced the Yugoslav government to depart from its original plan of going slow

and to accelerate the collectivisation of agriculture a little, as can be seen from the following table:

Date	Number of co-operative farms	Households	Index	Area	Index
		Number		Hectares	
Dec. 31st, 1947	779	40,590	100	210,986	100
Dec. 31st, 1948	1,318	60,157	148	323,984	153
July 1st, 1949	4,535	226,087	558	1,241,065	588
Nov. 10th, 1949	6,003	290,000	714	1,580,000	744

Nevertheless the Yugoslav Government's agricultural policy remains very different from that of the Soviet Government at the time of its 'collectivisation.' The big majority of the working co-operatives differ from the kolkhozes in that more private property is allowed in them, and they are therefore based less on coercion and more on the voluntary adhesion of the peasants than the kolkhozes. Working co-operatives cover about 14 per cent of the area of Yugoslavia and the kolkhoz type of co-operative not more than 4 per cent, or, including the state farms, 9 per cent.

The rift with Moscow not only compels Tito, in the interests of getting food and raw materials for industrialisation, to proceed with collectivization of agriculture faster than he intended, but makes the step less fraught with dangers for him. Faced with the threat from Moscow, and as long as it can choose only between Stalin and Tito, the peasantry will be impelled by its national consciousness to give critical support to Tito, and grumble less bitterly at any harshness he shows them.

In passing, it is worth noting that the Tito-Stalin conflict is slowing down 'collectivisation' in the other 'People's Democracies', because of the fear that a strong peasant opposition would strengthen Titoist tendencies. By a dialectical process, 'collectivisation', even in its highest forms, may be completed earlier in Yugoslavia than in the other 'People's Democracies.'

'The Yugoslav Communist Party is Dissolved in the People's Front'

One of the accusations made against the Yugoslav leadership in the Cominform Resolution is that 'The Yugoslav leaders belittle the role of the Communist Party and actually dissolve the Party in the non-party People's Front . . . it is only the People's Front which figures in the political arena, while the

Party and its organizations do not appear openly before the people in its own name . . . ' The accusation was repeated by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This seemingly inexplicable criticism becomes clearer when it is considered in connection with the policy of the Yugoslav leadership for national independence and their indulgence towards the peasantry.

The accusation itself is not without foundation. Independent observers had already remarked upon the fact that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had not proclaimed its predominant position. Two years before the Cominform Resolution, Hal Lehrman could write: 'While Grol's opposition Democrats, who boycotted the elections and are now practically invisible, are a legally recognized party, Yugoslavia is the only country in Eastern Europe, or for all I know in the world, where the Communist Party is still illegal . . . Yugoslav parties were required to file their by-laws with the minister of the interior. The Democrats complied, and the Communists refused. Indeed, the only public admission of the Communists' existence is their official newspaper, *Borba* (Struggle), which confesses it in the masthead. Not even the number or identity of Communist deputies is formally known; they all registered themselves in the parliamentary lists after election as People's Front or Independent. Notwithstanding this mummery, the Communists are in full control of the country, and other parties which once had meaning in the Front have become ciphers' (*The Nation*, 22nd June, 1946). Lehrman explains this as due to 'the renowned Communist weakness for secrecy.'

The concealment of the Communist Party in Yugoslavia did not mean that it was 'dissolved in the non-party People's Front', or that its influence was not decisive. A glance at the figures given in Aleksandar Ranković's Report to the 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia leaves one in no doubt about this: 'Of the total number of officers in the Yugoslav Army 89.9% are members of the C.P., 1.3% are candidates, 1.2% are members of the Union of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia, and 7.7% are not organised'. Other important branches of the administration have a similar proportion of Communist Party members. Dr. Dragoljub Jovanović, the leader of the Serbian Peasant Party (now in

prison for opposing Tito's regime) made this clear when he said in May, 1946: 'The C.P. has monopolized the People's Front, the factories and public offices. In every ministry, in every public enterprise and institution, there is a confidential man from the C.P. who takes care of every individual, follows everything and decides his destiny.'

Just as in every other country of Eastern Europe, the Communist Party in Yugoslavia holds the reins of power. But while the Party is the machine which runs the state, it is the People's Front which appears before the public. When the Communist Party was conducting the national war of liberation it made good use of this front organisation. In view of the threat from Moscow to the national independence of the Yugoslav people, with 80 per cent of the adult population (the majority of whom are peasants) organised in the People's Front, it is even more natural for Tito to push this front organisation, and not the Communist Party, to the fore.

After the Resolution the Communist Party took a more prominent place in public life: the national Congress was convened and this was followed by Republican conferences, etc. In this way Tito tried to cut across any appeal the Cominform criticism might have made to members of the Communist Party. He could do this, sure in the knowledge that his appeal to national unity around the government would receive a favourable response even if the Communist Party were to reveal its true power, without the masquerade of the People's Front.

The Problem of Balkan Federation

Another bone of contention between Stalin and Tito, which is not unconnected with the economic factors already mentioned, is the vexed question of a Balkan Federation.

The slogan of a Balkan Federation has for decades been of primary importance in the programme of the Communist, as well as the Socialist, Parties in the Balkan countries. So long as it was directed against the national bourgeoisie and monarchies of these countries, Stalin looked favourably upon it. But when it was Russia which became the 'mother' country, she feared that a Balkan Federation might be used as a weapon against her. Hence her opposition to this slogan after World

War II, at first covert and then open. Tito, on the other hand, conscious that single-handed Yugoslavia could never stand up to the Russian giant, adopted the slogan eagerly.

Already during the war he dreamt of it, and he even took steps to lay its foundations by opening negotiations with Bulgaria. In December, 1944, he met a special envoy of the Bulgarian Cabinet, Petar Todorov. The Bulgarian proposed that a Joint Regency Council be formed, with Tito as Prime Minister of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav Federation. But two hours before the special Bulgarian delegation was scheduled to leave for Belgrade, the Russians requested it to remain in Sofia. They later explained that they vetoed the Federation project because of British and American objections. (*The World Today*, September, 1948). But this explanation must be taken with a pinch of salt, as Russia could be adamant against her Allies' demands when it suited her.

After the war fresh approaches were made. On 27th July, 1947, Dimitrov and the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Georgiev, met Tito in Belgrade, a meeting which was widely publicised in both countries. On 2nd August, at a meeting in Bled, a treaty was signed, and contrary to former practice, its text was published immediately with a loud fanfare of publicity. Article 2 of the treaty provided for the economic co-operation of both countries, including a fixed rate of exchange, the preparation of a customs union, and the co-ordination of economic measures covering electric power, mining, agriculture, transport, and foreign trade. Article 3 provided for the abolition of visas. Under Article 7 Yugoslavia renounced the 25 million dollars still outstanding on her reparations account.

On the same occasion a *secret* agreement was made between the two countries. It ceased to be secret with the Cominform-Tito rift, when Tito hastened to publish it and the Bulgarians were compelled to do the same. This agreement was for the establishment of a common Yugoslav-Bulgarian State under the name of 'Union of South Slav People's Republics.'

Dimitrov went even further. On January 17th, 1948, he said: 'If and when this problem becomes ripe for discussion, the democratic countries—Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and perhaps

Greece—will decide how and when such a federation should come about. What the people are doing now is, in fact, to prepare for such a federation in the future'. As an immediate step he proposed a customs union: ' . . . we are convinced that only a Customs union can really contribute to the development of our peoples, and therefore we conscientiously and courageously go ahead, preparing this Customs union with all countries who wish to join it.' Thus a federation not only of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was envisaged but a federation of the Balkan and Danubian countries.

This went too far for Moscow's liking, and *Pravda* on 28th January, 1948, published an *open* attack on Dimitrov, claiming that 'these countries do not need a problematic and artificial federation, or confederation or a Customs union'. It seems that the only 'federation' which is not 'problematic and artificial' is that of the Eastern European countries in the Russian empire.

Immediately after the *Pravda* attack on Dimitrov the leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party, including Dimitrov, instituted a campaign against any idea of Balkan Federation.* Thus, in an interview in Budapest on 18th March, 1949, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Kolarov, denied 'Western press reports' that Bulgaria wished to create a Balkan Federation. He said: 'We have many times declared and declare again that for us the slogan "Balkan Federation" does not exist . . .' He added that it had existed twenty years ago among 'the Social Democratic Parties of the separate Balkan States', 'but we have outgrown this'. Elizabeth Barker who quotes these words of Kolarov, says in parentheses: 'This was, of course, a curious reference to Kolarov's own role as leading member of the Balkan Communist Federation in the nineteen-twenties, when it had most ardently sponsored Balkan Federation.' (*Macedonia. Its Place in Balkan Power Politics*, London, 1950 p. 124).

The fact that Dimitrov, Kolarov and the rest, of the Bulgarian leaders were ready on the warning of Moscow to withdraw from the plan of building a Balkan Federation was for the Yugoslav leaders another wrong to be added to their list of grievances against Moscow. Pijade since reminded

*See Dimitrov's speech to the Second Congress of the Fatherland Front, 2-3 February, six days after *Pravda's* attack on Dimitrov (*Second Fatherland Front Congress, Sofia, 1948*, op. cit. p. 36).

himself that the Soviet Union was responsible for the shelving not only of the project of South Slav Federation but also of every treaty of alliance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and disputed all efforts made towards these objectives between November, 1944, and February, 1945. As regards the *Pravda* attack on Dimitrov, Pijade said: 'The meaning of this outlawing of the idea of federation, by proclaiming all federation, confederation, and even customs union as "doubtful and artificial" lies simply in preventing the grouping of small socialist states, stopping them from safeguarding their independence and sovereignty, so that they might be kept apart, isolated from one another, without mutual support, and so that each of them separately might place its sovereignty and independence in the hands of the Soviet Government and under its protectorate' (*Tanjug*, 5th January, 1950, report of Pijade's speech in the National Assembly).

Previously Pijade had said: 'The old eastern question is again reviving. No wonder, therefore, that the imperialist policy of Russian terrorism in the Balkans is today presented in Soviet textbooks as unselfish protection of Balkan nations.' (Quoted by *The Times*, 27th September, 1949).*

The Macedonian Question

Another bone of contention between Moscow and Belgrade is the policy regarding Macedonia.

This conflict arose only after it became clear to Moscow that 'the healthy elements' in the Yugoslav Communist Party were not strong enough to remove the Tito leadership.

Macedonia is divided among Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece. The three divisions are known as Vardar Macedonia—the Yugoslav portion, much the largest; Pirin Macedonia—the Bulgarian portion; and Aegean Macedonia—the Greek

*The opposition of Moscow to Balkan federation stands in apparent contradiction to the following fact mentioned by Tito (Federal Assembly, April 26, 1950): In February and March 1948, when Kardelj and Djilas were in Moscow and the relations were already strained between them and Stalin, 'Stalin himself imperatively demanded the immediate conclusion of an act of federation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, while on the other hand the Soviet was against a federation with Albania.' But in face of the impending break with Moscow, such a step, with the changes connected with it, would have impaired the homogeneity of the 'Tito administration, and could have played into the hands of Moscow (especially as Russian troops were stationed in Bulgaria). As Tito said: 'We came to the conclusion that the demand was put forward to facilitate the overthrow and subjugation of Yugoslavia.'

portion including the sea coast. A glance at the map shows what a strategic advantage Russia would have gained by the unity of the whole of Macedonia under a government vassal to it: she would have had access to the Aegean Sea; Albania, a Russian satellite with no land connections with any of the other satellites, would have become the direct opening to the Adriatic; Yugoslavia would not only have lost part of her territory and population, but would have found herself hemmed in on north-east, east and south by Russia's satellites. He who rules Macedonia rules the whole Balkan peninsula.

Seeing that in the Pirin district there are only about 200,000 Macedonians as against a million in Vardar Macedonia, it seems very improbable that the former should draw the latter under its aegis; the opposite seems much more possible. Aegean Macedonia, with a population of $1\frac{1}{2}$ million is thus a necessary factor in uniting Macedonia under the hegemony of Russia. Hence there is the collaboration of the Bulgarian and Greek Communist Parties in the struggle for the 'unity of Macedonia.'

What zigzags, what hypocrisy, what acrobatics, this policy demands of the Kremlin agents!

In 1924 the Fifth Congress of the Comintern put forward the slogan of 'united and independent Macedonia' as well as 'united and independent Thrace'. The latter slogan is quite baseless, as Thrace is a geographical term, not a national one, a Thracian nation not existing. The former is not much better. After the Greek-Turkish war (1921-3) the Turks expelled the whole Greek population from Asia Minor and some 700,000 of them settled in Aegean Macedonia, so that nine-tenths of the population of this area today is not Macedonian but Greek. The slogan of the unity of Aegean Macedonia with the other parts of Macedonia is therefore quite inappropriate. This was made clear by Maximos, the Greek delegate to the Congress, who said: 'After the Treaty of Lausanne, all the Turkish inhabitants of Macedonia were obliged to leave, and the Greek bourgeoisie installed 700,000 refugees in their place. The Greek Communist Party opposed and will continue to oppose this violation of the Treaty of Lausanne. We would be glad if the Turkish comrades did so also. But the fact remains that there are 700,000 Greek refugees in Macedonia. The

workers and peasants of Greece were therefore not prepared to accept the slogan of the autonomy of Macedonia'. The Congress did not heed these words but stuck to the slogan of 'united and independent Macedonia.' It imposed it on the 7th Conference of the Balkan Communist Parties and the Extraordinary Congress of the Greek Communist Party notwithstanding the opposition of the Greek leadership headed by the General Secretary Professor Pouliopoulos.

The main reason for the obstinacy of the Comintern on this point was that the defeats of the Communist movement in Germany and in Bulgaria in 1923 made it necessary to find some new 'explosive' adventure to bolster up the prestige of the Moscow leadership: unity with the Macedonian Nationalist Committee of Alexandrov and Protegerov (who were ready to collaborate at that time with the Communist leaders, then with the Bulgarian militarists, then with Mussolini's and Horthy's agents) seemed to provide a good means of doing so.

After a year or two, when the policy of alliance with Alexandrov and Protegerov proved to be bankrupt, the Greek Communist Party abandoned the slogan of 'united and independent Macedonia' as a central plank in its policy. If it turned up on occasion in one form or another (the resolution of the 3rd and 4th Congresses of the Greek Communist Party and the Plenum of the Central Committee of December, 1931) this was as a defence of its prestige in the face of the Left Opposition (Trotskyists) led by Pouliopoulos.

When Hitler came to power, the Comintern dropped the slogan. 'National unity', 'defence of the existing state boundaries' were incompatible with it. Accordingly the policy was officially reversed in the programme of the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party in January, 1935. The resolutions of the 6th Congress (December, 1936) proclaimed that the Macedonian national question *did not exist* because of the changes brought about in the ethnic composition of the population of Aegean Macedonia. With this proclamation, the Communist Members of Parliament ceased to defend the smallest Macedonian demands in Parliament. The same policy continued for more than a decade. During his trial in Athens in 1945, Zachariades declared: 'Since 1931, when I became its leader, the Greek Communist Party has rejected

that watchword (the watchword of an autonomous Macedonia —Y.G.) and hereby declares that Macedonia is Greek . . . Macedonia is and shall be Greek'. The Resolution of the Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party which was held in 1946 stated: 'The Communist Party of Greece, pioneer fighters in the struggle for national independence and integrity, once again proclaims the present frontiers of Greece holy and sacred. The Communist Party of Greece declares that it will not agree to fighting for recognition of any rights or equality of the Slavs domiciled in Greek Macedonia except in the framework of the Greek State'. (Quoted by Svetozar Vukmanović, *How and Why the People's Liberation Struggle of Greece met with Defeat*, London, 1950, p. 51). In an interview with a British correspondent in May, 1946, Zachariades said that the population of Greek Macedonia was 90 per cent Greek and only 10 per cent Slav, and that E.A.M. stood for the territorial integrity of Greece.

With Tito's revolt against Stalin, all this changed. Who should bother now about the ethnic composition of the population? Who should bother if the people of Aegean Macedonia do not wish to be in a united Macedonia? The 5th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party held in January, 1949, raised the slogan of 'united and independent Macedonia' from anew: 'There should be no doubt that one consequence of a victory of the Democratic Army of Greece and the People's Revolution would be that the Macedonian people would acquire the full possibility of national self-determination, as it in fact wishes'. A month later the leadership of the Greek Party declared that the desire for 'one single independent Macedonia' was the 'centuries-old aim' of the people of Aegean Macedonia.

We need have little doubt that this turn will not meet with success: the people of Aegean Macedonia do not consider it their highest ambition to fulfil Stalin's ukazes, changing with his foreign policy.

Tito need not fear that Salonica will take Skopije from him.

It is much more likely that Pirin Macedonia will gravitate towards Vardar Macedonia than vice versa. Hence, at the same time that Moscow demagogically put forward the slogan of 'united and independent Macedonia' the Bulgarian

Communist leaders took measures to limit the national rights of the Macedonians of the Pirin district: immediately after the excommunication of Tito by the Cominform, the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party met (Plenum of July 12th and 13th, 1948), passed a resolution that in the Pirin District the 'study of the Macedonian literary language in the schools' be 'optional', and decided 'to abolish the practice of compulsory study of the official Macedonian language by government employees and of compulsory subscription to Macedonian papers by the population in the Pirin District'. Bulgarian was to be taught instead. (It was only in 1945 that Macedonian became a literary language with an alphabet and grammar).*

Russia's policy on the Macedonian question reveals her big imperialist appetite, but also the limitations of her potency. Tito does not come worst out of it.

*It is interesting to note that while there are statistics on schooling among the Turkish, Armenian, Gipsy and Jewish minorities, 'There is no data available concerning Macedonians in the Pirin region'. (*Bulgarian Bulletin* issued by the London Office of the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, 15th December, 1950).

CHAPTER III

THE TITOISTS EXPOSE STALINISM



THE TITOISTS' evaluation of the internal and foreign policies of the U.S.S.R., of Stalin's role as leader of the working class, of the moral attributes of Stalinism, etc., have undergone a complete metamorphosis since the fatal day of 28th June, 1948. Although nothing is more recalcitrant to logical systematisation than empirically evolved conceptions, there is no doubt about the *direction* of the thoughts of the Yugoslav leaders. Every sharpening of their differences with Moscow compels them to tear down another stone of the edifice of Stalinism. They began with acceptance of all the basic tenets of Stalinism, and ended with undermining them all. They did so not after a systematic, theoretical study, but because of the unity of all the facets of Stalinism. This is proved empirically by the development of the Titoist criticism of Stalinism. There is such a discrepancy between Stalinism and real communism or socialism, that to criticise any facet of Stalinism from the standpoint of socialism leads to its total exposure.

Praise for Russia and Stalin

At the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, convened after the rift, the pictures of Tito and Stalin dominated the assembly. The delegates repeated such phrases as 'Our great teachers Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin', 'the leader and teacher of the international proletariat—the great Stalin'. Stalin was frequently quoted as a guide by the main speakers. 'Stalin—Tito—Party!' was shouted over and over again. The U.S.S.R. was repeatedly declared 'The country of Socialism', the only country whose socialist achievements were greater than Yugoslavia's. Russia's foreign policy was also extolled; Russian imperialism, national exploitation, etc., were condemnations unheard of at that time. Criticism of the Cominform—if indeed criticism it may be termed—was

limited to a denunciation of 'certain leaders' of the Cominform for deviating from internationalism in their attack on Yugoslavia. Stalin is not once accused of being the instigator of all the trouble.

The solidarity of the Yugoslav leaders with Stalinism in the first year or so after the rupture is illustrated by their completely uncritical attitude to Russia's foreign policy, even though the Belgrade-Moscow rift was an outcome of this very policy. The 'Programme of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia' adopted at its Fifth Congress states: ' . . . two camps were formed after the Second World War, on the one hand the imperialist, anti-democratic and warmongering camp led by American imperialism and on the other hand, the anti-imperialist, democratic and peace-loving camp headed by the Soviet Union'. The same theme is repeated time and time again in the speeches of Foreign Minister Kardelj. For instance, in his address on Yugoslavia's foreign policy to the Federal Assembly on 29th December, 1948, he said: 'The foreign policy of our Government will continue to serve the struggle for peace and peaceable international co-operation, and for the closest unity of the anti-imperialist forces led by the Soviet Union.' In a speech he delivered at the General Assembly of U.N.O. (29th September, 1948) he stated that the United States was the arch-imperialist power and was alone responsible for the war danger. It is of particular interest to note that Kardelj made a point of praising the policy of U.S.S.R. in Korea, which he described as a policy of peace and national independence. And he unconditionally supported the Russian-inspired Peace Campaign, saying: 'Millions of working people, who, days on end, are being intimidated by the noise raised by the war-mongers, should be given vivid proof that they need not fear the morrow. The only realistic road which in the present conditions in the world is leading towards that aim is the prohibition of atomic weapons, destruction of atomic bombs, control of atomic energy and in general reduction of armaments. It is precisely for this reason that the proposal brought forward by Mr. Vishinsky on behalf of the Soviet government and concerning the question of reduction of armed forces by one third, represents a serious and important contribution to the strengthening of peace and peaceful international

collaboration and thus the United Nations Organization itself. To accept this proposal would mean to contribute essentially towards freeing the masses from the fear of war, towards abolishing the threat of war as a method of international politics and towards creating such an atmosphere in which the burning international questions can really be solved by mutual agreement.'

At the same time as Russia came in for praise, a note of criticism was heard, directed mainly against the Cominform. In view of the Russian blockade, Yugoslavia's consequent turn to trade with the West—a big and sharp change which was bound to cause her difficulties—and the burdens imposed by the over-ambitious Five-Year Plan, Tito found it absolutely necessary to refute the legend that Russia had given Yugoslavia unselfish, altruistic economic help, and from the beginning of the rift he insisted that their economic relations had been based on capitalist principles. The necessity to solidify his mass support compelled Tito from the beginning not to limit himself to generalities about the threat to Yugoslavia's national independence, but to attack the Cominform countries on more immediate, day to day issues, namely, that their policy was to keep Yugoslavia a backward country, a source of cheap raw materials, with a low standard of living, etc. Russia or Stalin were never held responsible for the Cominform policy; and the Cominform countries were accused of conducting a reactionary policy only towards Yugoslavia, this being an aberration without any general causes and for which no attempt at explanation was made.

'U.S.S.R.'s Foreign Policy is Hegemonic'

The second stage in the evolution of Yugoslavia's attitude to Stalinism after the rift was characterized by a general criticism of Russia's foreign policy as expansionist, but her internal regime was still called socialist and Stalin was still praised as one of the greatest Marxist teachers.

When the Rajk 'Trial' took place, which attempted to prove that Yugoslavia had imperialist designs on her neighbours, and that she was 'the agency of Anglo-American Imperialism', the Yugoslav leaders, in self-defence, had to refute Russia's claim of leading the peace-loving, anti-imperialist forces. Consequently,

since September, 1949, the Yugoslav press has been full of news of what it calls the 'hegemonic policy of Russia'. They had to expose her imperialist character and the 'internationalist' phraseology she used to cover it, her exploitation and subjugation of other countries, and her desire to transform Yugoslavia into a dependent colony. As a defence against the Stalinist stock-in-trade that anyone not unconditionally supporting Russia must become an agent of the United States, they also had to expose the 'Peace' campaign.

They were very vehement in their exposures of Stalinism, as the following random selection of quotations from their declarations shows.

On 7th July, 1949, Pijade stated: 'During this one year, the peoples of Yugoslavia have learned much. We have learned that the great principles of Socialism and international solidarity can become commercial phrases in the mouths of socialist statesmen and diplomats. We have learned that phrases about socialist internationalism can conceal simply the interests of big states against small. We have learned that rightness of subjugating the interests of certain peoples to the general interests of Socialism conceals a selfish policy which considers its own State interests, and them alone, as general interests to which all those individual interests should be sacrificed.'

'The howling dervishes in the Informburo predicted that, by resisting their resolution, we would in two months lose our independence and become a colony of the imperialists. The result of our resistance is exactly the opposite! We have saved our freedom and independence, and our country will become neither a colony nor a "gubernia". Their prediction, from a theoretical point of view also, was not at all farseeing, and historically it was unjustified.'

'Incidentally, this is the height of hypocrisy, because this prophecy only means that small peoples should leap into the mouth of one shark lest they be swallowed by another. However, there is no justification for small peoples jumping into the mouth of one shark or another.' (*Tanjug*).

Of the 'Peace' campaign, the Belgrade fortnightly *Review of International Affairs* (30th August, 1950) said that it was 'planned war-inciting propaganda which the Cominform propagandists so cleverly camouflage, imputing to others the

practice and intentions of their employers'. An editorial in a former issue (16th August, 1950) carries the apt heading 'War Psychosis Spreads Under the Slogan of Struggle for Peace'. It says among other things: 'Such a struggle (in the Russian satellites—Y.G.) "for peace" or rather the dissemination of fear of war under the cloak of that struggle has a special purpose. In this way the U.S.S.R. manages to hold its satellites tightly on its leash, making it possible to exploit them in greater measure and more brutally. On the other hand, such propaganda directed at provoking a feeling of insecurity and fear of war, attracts the attention of the peoples in the east European countries from their internal economic and political situation and from the difficulties into which the U.S.S.R. has plunged them with its policy of "elder brother" who in exchange for economic and political independence of which he has deprived them, gives his "younger brother" empty promises and extends his "brotherly aid" in the form of struggle for peace which camouflages war-incitement propaganda'.

When Yugoslavia is accused of chauvinistic intentions on her neighbours, what is more natural than that the Yugoslav leaders should expose Great Russian chauvinism? In an article in *Komunist*, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (September, 1949) Djilas accuses the Russian leaders of 'nationalism in its most vulgar form': 'Their propagandists speak about the exceptional ability of the Russian people (e.g. in the message from the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. to Molotov), about the superiority of Russian culture (great as it indeed is) over the cultures of other nations. The leaders of the U.S.S.R. do practically nothing to acquaint their peoples with the revolutionary, socialist, and cultural achievements of other peoples, not even of those who have already embarked upon the road of socialist progress. They have invented the anti-Marxist theory of the exceptional importance of discovery "firsts" in the field of science (viz. that Russian scientists have been the first to discover one thing or another)*, and on the basis of this

*The Russian press informs the world that the inventor of the steam engine was not, as was universally thought, the famous Englishman Watt, but was the Russian Polzunov. The steam turbine, electric telegraphy, the electric motor, electric lighting, radio, the aeroplane, jet propulsion, rocket propulsion, the helicopter and penicillin—all these were Russian inventions. (*Soviet Monitor*, 24th September, 1947, 10th April, 1948, 6th May, 1948; *Izvestia*, 16th March, 1948; *Pravda*, 17th March, 1948).

“idea” they have appropriated innumerable inventions made by nationals of many other nations.

“There is hardly any need to stress that all that is new about this “theory” (also the “theory” of an exceptional ability of a given nation) is that it has now appeared in the U.S.S.R., but otherwise it was advanced long ago, in a somewhat different form, by all sorts of racists and nationalists.”

This Russian chauvinism has become a laughing-stock in Yugoslavia. In a window display in Belgrade devoted to satirising the Cominform countries a rusty piece of iron was exhibited with the explanation: ‘According to the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., this rusty bit of iron formed part of the first locomotive in the world—a Russian locomotive—which ran between the Siberian cities of Irkutsk and Verkhoyansk in the sixth century A.D.’ (Alexander Werth in *The Manchester Guardian*, 16th June, 1950).

Mijalko Todorović, Minister of Agriculture, stated on 6th November, 1950: ‘As an expression of this policy of domination, has appeared a “theory” about a leading nation, about an “elder brother”, which in essence is indistinguishable from the racial theory, familiar to everyone in the near past, concerning a *Herrenvolk*, the only difference being that the counter-revolutionary essence of this is hidden behind the October Revolution. (*Tanjug*).

Naturally, if the Russian leaders are chauvinists and imperialists, they cannot be opponents of the Tsarist tradition, but upholders of it. Djilas made this point when he said: ‘It is . . . not at all coincidental that in Soviet propaganda today there is almost a complete disappearance of any criticism of Tsarism and Tsarist imperialistic policies in general, and vis-a-vis the down-trodden and weak nations in particular*. (*Komunist*, September, 1949, op. cit.).

*An example of this is the tribute paid to Suvorov, whose name graces the highest medal in Russia today, and also schools and other institutions. At the time of the French Revolution Suvorov wrote to the Tsarina: ‘Oh, Little Mother! Order me to go against the French!’ he later led his army into Switzerland to fight against the French Revolutionary Army; he appealed to the leader of the Royalist counter-revolution of Vendée in the following terms: ‘Great hero of the Vendée! Defender of thy fathers and of the throne of thy kings . . . may the evil one (the French Revolutionaries—Y.G.) perish and their race disappear’; he bloodily suppressed the national uprising of the Poles in 1793 and was invested with the title of Field-Marshal for this by Catherine, who assured him: ‘You yourself have promoted yourself Field-Marshal, for you have subdued Poland.’ If not for this he would have merited the order of Field-Marshal for his ‘pregressive’ deeds in Russia itself, among other the suppression of the peasant revolt led by Pugachev.

Exposure of the 'Trials'

The criticism could not stop here. When the Rajk 'trial' was used against the Yugoslav leaders, they were compelled to expose the whole system of the Vishinsky 'trials', not only the 'exported' articles, but also the originals, the Moscow 'trials' of the thirties. In dealing with the Rajk 'trial', Pijade stated: 'The Budapest trial is reminiscent of the trials in the Soviet Union in 1936, the organizers of which could have helped in staging the Budapest trial with their abundant experience. Still, the trials in Moscow, although they were of significance for all Communist parties, were the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, the indictment was charged and the trial conducted against Soviet citizens accused of various crimes, among which was also of having linked up with German and Japanese fascism. But Hitler was not charged nor mentioned. A non-aggression pact was concluded with him a few years later, on which occasion even toasts to his health were exchanged. And now when the Public Prosecutor is Minister of Foreign Affairs, this type of trial is transferred to the international scene, it is becoming an article of export'. He concludes in strong terms: 'It has proved that the counter-revolutionary attitude of these Bolshevik leaders towards Yugoslavia cannot be an exceptional or partial deviation from the general line, that it cannot progress parallel with a general correct revolutionary attitude; but that it is a component part of a new policy, a new ideological line which is a deviation from the basis of Marxism-Leninism itself, a work of revision which has encompassed all fields of theory and practice.' (*Borba*, 22nd September, 1949).

In order to defend themselves against the lies spread by the Kremlin about them, the Titoists found it necessary also to tackle the moral assumption implicit in Stalin's policy, that the end justifies the means. In a New Year's message Tito declared: 'Those who keep on saying, in order to appease their consciences, that the ends justify the means should know that this particular slogan was well known by the Jesuits in the days of the Inquisition. Great things can never be built by foul means and in a dishonest way'. (*The New York Times*, 2nd January, 1949).

The Messianic Role of Russia

In destroying the legend of Moscow's internationalism, the Titoists are driven to destroy some other ideas that have become semi-axioms in the world Communist movement. There was the conception that Moscow was the infallible authority in deciding who is a socialist and who is a fascist, who is a democrat and who is not.* Now that they themselves are the target of Moscow's denunciation, they are mindful of the fact 'that no-one today has a right to distribute diplomas concerning Socialist regimes as old Rome's Popes used to hand out imperial titles'. (Pijade in *Borba*, 22nd August, 1949).

Another legend destroyed is that Russia plays a messianic role in liberating the whole world. In a speech to a group of miners on 12th September, 1949, Tito said: 'They (the Cominform countries—Y.G.) make a mistake in putting forth the idea of the exclusive revolutionary role of the Red Army, which, in fact, means the demobilization of the revolutionary forces latent in every people, and in every working class'. 'Every working class is capable of fighting and winning the new social order. Bayonets have never correctly spread a progressive idea and brought social transformation but only enslavement.'

On another occasion Tito said: 'Were the path they (the Cominform countries—Y.G.) have taken to be followed, that is, bringing liberation on the bayonets of the Red Army, which would really be but enslavement of peoples in another form, the science of Marxism-Leninism would perish, while the so-called new social relationships which would be created would not differ greatly from those which preceded them.' (*Yugoslav Fortnightly*, 2nd November, 1949).

Vukmanović tried to explain the reasons for the Stalinist theory that only when the Soviet Army was present could a revolutionary movement be victorious: '... the Soviet Government is not at all interested in the victory of Socialism in any

*For instance, when Zilliacus, who had for many years been highly praised by the Communist leaders, did not accept their line (in Yugoslavia after the rift, the Cominform paper *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* called him an 'attorney of fascism,' a 'shady gentleman,' and declared: 'Democratic public opinion was indignant at the behaviour of Zilliacus . . .' (30th December, 1949). The term 'democratic public opinion', apparently denotes for the Cominform only its supporters, even if these constitute less than a half per cent of the population of Britain. 'When I use a word', Humpty Dumpty said, 'it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.'

other country, unless it at the same time has guarantees of that country becoming dependent and subordinate, just as it is not in the least interested in any revolutionary movement which it cannot control and subordinate to its own hegemonic plans, but even considers it an obstacle. In practice these guarantees of any revolutionary movement submitting to the hegemonic plans of the Soviet Government have in the last resort boiled down to the brute force of the Soviet Army. For that matter, it could not be otherwise! 'To realise its hegemonic policy, the leadership of the Soviet Union has shown itself completely hostile to the revolutionary movements and the revolutionary struggle of any country in which its control was not assured (whether through geographical distance, the "unreliability" of the leadership, or any other cause), or which may have been fated to be the subject of bargaining with the imperialists (on the principle of spheres of interest). For these reasons, the leadership of the Soviet Union maintained that the French and Italian Communists should disarm the people, once the Second World War hostilities were over, that they should disband any people's committees which might have sprung up during the war as preliminary or even in part real organs of a revolutionary regime, that they should participate in bourgeois coalitions (which in actuality meant liquidation of all results of the revolutionary struggle, and renunciation of further revolutionary struggle). And so on and so forth. Now what are we to conclude from these facts? Clearly, that the leadership of the Soviet Union was interested in developing the movement only in those countries which were in the "sphere of interest" of the Soviet Union, and where there was some possibility of submitting them to the control of the Soviet Government. As for the revolutionary movements of other countries, in practice the Soviet Government strove to prevent them winning and to compel them to collaborate with the reactionary bourgeoisie, with all its consequences.' (Vukmanović, *op. cit.* pp. 2, 3).

Exposure of Russia's Internal Regime

So far only Russia's foreign policy has been criticised. Up to 1950 there was no suggestion by the Yugoslav leaders that this

foreign policy implied the existence of a certain economic, social and political regime in Russia herself. But this could not be avoided for too long. To anyone claiming to be a Marxist—and Tito claims to be—the foreign policy of a country is a continuation of its internal policy. For instance, the foreign policy of feudal estates or groups of estates is quite different to the foreign policy of a country in the stage of commercial capitalism; the latter, again, is different from the foreign policy of a highly industrialised capitalist country, and so forth. No state, a socialist state included, can isolate itself from this law of history. The Marxist teachers assumed that a socialist state would have a foreign policy of peace, national freedom and equality: if within the country, they said, there is no place for the exploitation of man by man, there is no place in its foreign policy either for national oppression and exploitation. It is axiomatic for Socialists that just as a merchant-capitalist foreign policy—let us say the encouragement of commercial expansion, the establishment of trade colonies, and so forth—cannot be combined with a feudal internal policy, so is it impossible for a capitalist foreign policy to be grafted on to a socialist internal policy.

Therefore if Tito is correct in saying that the foreign policy of Russia is imperialist, its internal policy can not be socialist, but must be exploitative, oppressive. As a concrete instance of this we may take the thesis of Tito—never referred to by the Cominform, even for denial—that in trade between the U.S.S.R. and the 'People's Democracies' the capitalist principle is predominant. If it prevails in trade among these countries, it raises the question: will not each of them try to sell its products as dearly as possible, not only to other countries, but also to its own people, and try to buy their goods—mainly labour-power—as cheaply as possible? Furthermore, since the sellers can sell their labour-power to nobody but the state-employer, and the buyers buy their goods from nobody but the state-seller, it is clear that if the workers have no control over the state-employer, they suffer much more than even a backward country trading with this state. If a country which has more capital exploits one with less capital, especially if the former is in a monopolistic position (strengthened by political devices), the bureaucracy which owns the state and the means

of production is certain to exploit very harshly the toilers who own no wealth and lack all political rights.

In 1950 the Yugoslav leaders began to expose and attack the social set-up of Stalin's regime. The ice was broken by Djilas, who in his important pre-election speech to Belgrade students (18th March, 1950) catalogued Russia's chief sins: '... introduction of unequal relations and exploitation of other socialist countries; un-Marxist treatment of the role of the leader which often takes the shape of even vulgar, historical falsifications and idolatries similar to those in absolute monarchies; differences in pay which are greater than in bourgeois bureaucracies themselves, ranging from 400 to 15,000 rubles; ideological promotion of Great Russian nationalism and under-estimation and subordination of the role, culture and history of other peoples; a policy of division of spheres of influence with the capitalist states; monopolization of the interpretation of Marxist ideology and the tactics of the international working class movement; introduction of lying and slandering methods into the working class movement; underestimation of the role of consciousness—especially the consciousness of the masses—in the struggle for a new society; tendencies toward actual liquidation of socialist democracy and transforming it into a mere form; rendering impossible a struggle of opinions and putting brakes on the initiative of the masses, that is, the basic productive forces, and by that very fact productive forces in general . . . ' (*On New Roads of Socialism*, Belgrade, 1950, pp. 11-12). These sins are the result of the existence of a bureaucracy separated from the people and ruling them; the bureaucracy has become an impediment to the development of the productive forces of Russian society. Djilas says: 'The development of production forces in the Soviet Union has reached a point where social relations no longer correspond to it. Neither does the method of management of the process of production itself or the method of distribution of the goods produced'. (*Ibid.* p. 10). Djilas then poses the question: 'Is what is taking place in the Soviet some new kind of class society, is it state capitalism, or "deviations" within socialism itself?' He says that Russia is 'deviated' socialism. The bureaucracy which distorts Russian socialism is also responsible for the the imperialist foreign policy. 'The

Cominform Resolution . . . shows . . . that bureaucratic elements in the U.S.S.R. who have frozen their privileged position, are attempting to find the solution to the internal crisis in the outside world, that is, to hush it temporarily by foreign successes, by exploitation and subordination of other socialist countries.' 'Thus have the internal contradictions between bureaucratic centralism and the direct producers, that is, the people, inevitably developed . . . into external contradictions—into a conflict between bureaucratic imperialism and the aspirations of the people for a free and equal life.' (Ibid. pp. 17, 18).

Three months after Djilas's speech, Tito himself sharply criticized Stalin's regime. It is possible that the sharpness of his attack was dictated by the fact that it was made a day after the outbreak of the Korean war, after Yugoslavia had supported the Western Powers in U.N.O., when her collaboration with them in foreign affairs, trade, etc. was becoming closer. He said: 'The October Revolution made it possible for the state to take the means of production into its hands. But these means are still, after 31 years, in the hands of the state. Has the slogan "the factories for the workers" been put into practice? Of course not. The workers still do not have any say in the management of the factories. They are managed by directors who are appointed by the state, that is, by civil service employees. The workers only have the possibility and the right to work but this is not very different from the role of the workers in capitalist countries. The only difference for workers is that there is no unemployment in the Soviet Union, and that is all.' (Tito, *Workers Manage Factories in Yugoslavia*, Belgrade, 1950, p. 24). Tito points out that while Marx, Engels and Lenin taught that the state would wither away under socialism, in the Soviet Union the state was raising itself further and further above society, and becoming more and more bureaucratized. 'Are there any tendencies in that country (the Soviet Union—Y.G.) to turn over the state functions, either economic or political, to the lower organs? Are there any signs of decentralization? So far there have been none. On the contrary, there is increasingly inflexible centralism which is a feature of the most outspoken bourgeois, bureaucratic, centralistic state. The most obvious signs of such centralization are: (a) concentration of all

economic, political, cultural and other functions in one centre; (b) a tremendous bureaucratic apparatus; (c) increase instead of decrease of the militia, Ministry of Internal Affairs, N.K.V.D., etc.' (Ibid. p. 26). He then quotes what Stalin said in 1939: 'The function of military suppression inside the country ceased, died away; for exploitation had been abolished, there were no more exploiters left, and so there was no one to suppress . . . As for our army, punitive organs, and intelligence service, their edge is no longer turned to the inside of the country but to the outside, against external enemies'. Tito refutes these statements with the following argument: 'To say that the functions of the state as an armed force, not only of the army but also the so-called punitive organs, are directed only outwards means talking with no connection with reality, just as it has no connection with the present situation in the Soviet Union. What is the tremendous bureaucratic, centralistic apparatus doing? Are its functions directed outwards? What are the N.K.V.D. and the militia doing? Are their functions directed outwards? Who deports millions of citizens of various nationalities to Siberia and the Far North? Can anyone claim that these are measures against the class enemy, can anyone say that whole nations are a class to be destroyed? Who is obstructing the struggle of opinions in the Soviet Union? Is not all this being done by one of the most centralized, most bureaucratic state apparatuses which bears no resemblance whatsoever to a state machine that is withering away? Stalin is right in one thing here if it is applied to the present period, and that is that this state machine really has functions regarding the outside world. But this must be added, too—that these functions are aimed where they are necessary and where they are not. They are directed at interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, and against the will of the people of those countries. Therefore, these are least of all the functions of a socialist state that is withering away but rather resemble the functions of an imperialist state machine which is fighting for spheres of influence and the subjugation of other peoples'. (Ibid. pp. 29-30).

In all these arguments the socialist character of U.S.S.R., however much it had 'deviated', was never denied. In due course this too was done. If Russia's foreign policy was

characterised by capitalist-imperialist exploitation, her internal policy by slave camps, and the position of the workers in Russia, as Tito stated, 'is not very different from the role of the workers in capitalist countries', what is it that differentiates her from capitalism?

A step was taken towards the conclusion that Russia is a state capitalist country by Todorović in his speech quoted above: ' . . . though . . . the factories are State property, yet, if the workers play no part in the management of those factories, if nobody ever asks the workers what is to be done with the surplus of their labour, if the surplus labour is decided on and a good part of it seized by the bureaucratic caste for themselves, and for the maintenance of various services which ensure the privileged, ruling position of that caste, if this is all the case, and it certainly is today in the U.S.S.R., in what then substantially does the position of the Soviet worker differ from the position of the capitalist worker? The tribute paid by the working class for the maintenance of a highly paid and privileged bureaucracy, the policy of this, its "poets" and other hangers-on and protectors, that tribute is nothing more—precisely since it is expressed in terms of commodity production—than a masked capitalist surplus value. The fact that private property does not exist in what we might term the classical form does not essentially affect the character of the exploitation. Such private ownership has long ceased to exist even under monopolistic capitalism. For example, as early as 1891, Engels wrote:

“If from share-capital companies we pass to trusts, which subordinate to themselves and monopolise whole branches of industry, not merely does private production there cease, but also absence of plan.” (Tanjug, 7th November, 1950).

Finally it was openly stated that Russia is a state capitalist society.

In an article entitled "The Soviet Union, Appearance and Reality" (*Borba*, 20 November, 1950), Djilas wrote that 'not only to any marxist, but even to any bourgeois politician, or even to an ordinary man who is no politician' is it clear what the Soviet Union stands for. 'In place of internationalism, or the fraternity and equality of peoples, in place of efforts to settle disputes between them peaceably, we have nationalistic

obscurantism, the holding of six civilised European countries under a masked occupation force, an export of capital and the extraction from these—by the methods of primitive accumulation—of super-profit, preparations for a war of conquest, allegedly against capitalism, though in fact—unless a temporary deal with them is feasible—for the insurance of booty and the acquisition of new territory. . . . In place of the joyous and free forms of spiritual and social life of working men and women who have shaken off the “concern” on their account of capitalist masters or feudal lords, we have thought which is grey and standardised, the frenzied, dehumanised gushing of drunkards of a patented form of happiness, the savage, total oppression of an iron heel—a spy system of which has permeated the smallest unit of society, crept into the relations between husband and wife, parents and children, artists and their inspiration and work—such as human history has never before known . . . Uniforms, dusty and forgotten, have come forth from the museums of Tsardom, and not even those of the “glorious” days of Catherine, but those of Nicholas I, and with the glitter of “new” epaulettes, and have draped the backs of “socialist” marshals, generals and policemen. Shallow, trivial falsehood and demagogery and cooked-up trials, after the fashion of those of heretics and witches, intended to deceive plain, simple working folk—which in itself is revelation of inhuman scorn of ordinary folk and of their intelligence and strength—in place of passionate, unquenchable seeking of truth, lies and slander everywhere and in everything, even in their description of capitalism and of certain capitalist countries. . . .

He said further that ‘it is the U.S.S.R. which strives to protect itself and shut itself away from the capitalist world’ and, asks, ‘What do these men hide, and what do they fear? They hide their own social order and their own shape, which are monstrous even in comparison with bourgeois democracy’. ‘State capitalist monopoly in the U.S.S.R. has acquired monstrous, despotic forms in all spheres of life.’ ‘And when they accuse us of anything, we know that in actuality it refers to them. So even when they speak of fascism, or such like, experience with other accusations teaches us that we can confidently say: *De te fabula narratur.*’

CHAPTER IV

TITOISM IS NOT A BASIC NEGATION OF STALINISM



Efforts to Overcome Some Traits of Stalinism in Yugoslavia

THE LOGIC of the struggle against the domination of Moscow, which compels the Yugoslav leaders more and more openly to expose the real character of Stalin's regime, forces them themselves to renounce, or at least to pretend to renounce, its more obnoxious features. The struggle, by making it a question of life and death for the Yugoslav Government to enlarge its mass support, forces it to 'liberalise' the dictatorship. The economic difficulties connected with the isolation of Yugoslavia from the Russian bloc of countries, and even more, the very severe drought of 1950, push the government in the same direction. Whether it is possible for a regime like Tito's (or Stalin's) to be really liberalised, or whether on the contrary, it must become more and more dictatorial, is another question.

As a counter to Stalin's 'bureaucratic centralism' Tito has attempted to implement 'Socialist Democracy'. The administration was decentralised, beginning with the economy. The Federal Ministries of Electricity and Mines were abolished by a decree of 7th February, 1950, and responsibility for the management of these branches of the economy handed over to the governments of the component Republics of Yugoslavia. On 11th April, another six ministries of the Central Government were abolished—agriculture, forestry, light industries, commerce and supply, and state supplies. At the federal level the departments are headed by Councils, and the decrees grant wide autonomy to the governments of the republics.

On 26th June, 1950, the Yugoslav Federal Assembly passed the 'Basic Law on Management of State Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations by the Workers'

Collectives'. Tito declared this to be the fulfilment of the slogan 'the factories to the workers', and another big step towards the complete establishment of socialism. The law stipulates that a Workers' Council of enterprises, as well as of the higher economic Associations, amalgamating several economic units, is to be elected by the workers of the enterprise or association (Article 2). This Council is to be elected for one year (Article 3). It is to elect the management board (Article 4). The management board is to run the business and be responsible to the Workers' Council and to the competent state organ (Article 5). The management board is to be elected for a term of one year. Only one third of the members of the management board holding office during the previous year may be elected to the new management board. No one can be a member of a management board for more than two successive years. The members of the management board receive no payment for their work (Article 6). 'The production and business of an enterprise is under the charge of the director of that enterprise, or the working and business of a higher industrial association in the charge of the director of that association'. 'The director of the enterprise will be appointed by the management board of the higher economic association, or competent state organ, if the enterprise is not amalgamated, while the director of a higher economic association will be appointed by the competent state organ'. (Article 8). 'The director of an enterprise is responsible to the management board and director of the higher economic association, as well as to the competent state body, while the director of a higher economic association is responsible to the management board and the competent state organ' (Article 9). 'The Workers' Council of an enterprise is chosen by general, equal and direct suffrage, and by secret vote' (Article 11). 'Workers' councils of the enterprises: approve the basic plans and final accounts of the enterprise; make decisions on the management of the enterprise and fulfilment of the economic plan; elect, recall and change the management boards of the enterprise or its individual members; make the rules of the enterprise, with the approval of the management board of the higher economic association, or of the competent state organ; discuss reports on the work of the management board and make decisions on,

and approve of, its work; discuss the various measures of the management board and make decisions on them; distribute that part of the accumulation remaining at the disposal of the enterprise, that is, of the working collective.' (Article 23). 'The director and other members of the management board are bound to be present at sittings of the workers' council. Any member of the workers' council has the right to put questions to the management board or to the director concerning their work. The management board and director are bound to give an answer at the session of the workers' council' (Article 24). 'The director of an enterprise allocates the workers and employees of the enterprise to their particular work and determines their duties. Workers and employees of an enterprise are responsible for their work in the enterprise to the director. The director of an enterprise ensures discipline in the work and other activity of the enterprise.' (Article 39).

Another measure towards 'liberalising' the regime was the decision of the People's Front (September, 1950) that citizens would no longer be compelled to give 'voluntary' labour, the police measures hitherto adopted to get this labour having been due to the influence of the Russian example.

With the famine of the latter months of 1950, even more drastic 'measures against bureaucratism' were taken. On 14th October, Tito signed a decree abolishing the special shops and lower prices for senior Government and Communist Party officials and industrial managers. Vil'as and rest homes reserved for these privileged people were handed over to the tourist industry. 'Persons who fulfil specially responsible State and social functions' are, however, exempted from these provisions, and the government will decide who belongs to this special category.

In the cultural and educational spheres, the leitmotif has become freedom for the creative powers of the individual. To quote the directive of the Central Committee of the Party on the reorganisation of the educational system (2nd January, 1950), the function of education is to be: 'To educate a new, free and bold Socialist man whose conception should be broad in many respects and to whom bureaucratic and standardized ideas will be foreign.'

'To develop a fight for thought, the all-round development of initiative through the exchange of practical experience and

comprehension of the struggle to build socialism in our country'. (*The New York Times*, 3rd January, 1950).

No concrete measures, however, have been taken to ensure this development.

Squaring the Circle

The decentralisation of the administration, the establishment of so-called 'workers' management' in the economy, the measures in favour of equality, the ideological liberty and the free development of the individual, all appear to contradict the practice of the Stalinist regime. But can the aim set be achieved? Unfortunately, however much one may wish it could be, the testimony of Yugoslav practice, and, as relevant, an analysis of the historical circumstances in which Tito's experiment takes place, make the reply negative: a bureaucratic state capitalist government threatened from outside, may make concessions to the people, but it will never give up its independence of them, nor cease to rise above them.

The Yugoslav leaders do not try to explain how decentralisation of the administration can be compatible with the existence of a monolithic, highly centralised, one-party system, managed by the Political Bureau; nor how workers' management of an enterprise can be compatible with a central economic plan determined by the same nine people in the centre of political power. What autonomy can a workers' council have that is elected from a list of candidates put forward by the trade union, which is centralistic and controlled by the Party? Again, what autonomy can it have when the economy is planned and the vital decisions on production, such as real wages (the amount of consumers' goods to be produced and distributed nationally) are made by a central government independent of the people? How can there be genuine local self-government in a situation where everything, from factories to papers, from people to machines is in the hands of the centralised, bureaucratic state?

Above all, the Yugoslav leaders do not explain the historical causes for the rise of what they call 'bureaucratic centralism' in Russia, nor whether these causes can be counteracted in Yugoslavia. Bureaucratic state capitalism in Russia is not an accident, but is the result of rapid industrialisation in a country

with very low productive forces; this caused the subordination of the consumption of the people to the needs of accumulation, and so the separation of the toilers from the means of production, which led to poverty increasing side by side with wealth. The bureaucracy appears as the embodiment of this process, as the incarnation of the accumulation of capital at the expense of the people and as the beneficiary from the accumulation. If this was the case in Russia, in small, backward and isolated Yugoslavia the similar objective circumstances must give fundamentally the same unhappy results.

The experience of the last two years or so has supplied evidence to support the contention that Tito and his friends cannot break away from the basic features of Stalin's regime. To illustrate the limited rights the Yugoslav worker has in 'his' factory, it need but be mentioned that not a single strike took place either before or after the law on workers' management of 26th June, 1950; that the labour-book (the *karakteristika**) continues to exist, and that the most severe punishments are meted out to workers who break discipline or pilfer, even if they do so only to ease their hunger. This last point shows clearly the contradiction between the outward form—that 'the workers own the factories'—and the real social content, and it will therefore be relevant to give an instance. *The Manchester Guardian* of 19th August, 1950, gives the following report under the heading 'Death Sentence in Workshop for Stealing': 'The novel procedure of trying offenders in their place of work instead of a courtroom was introduced in Belgrade a few days ago. Seventeen workers were tried in a big workshop of an engineering works for having committed numerous thefts. One man was sentenced to death and 16 to penal servitude ranging from two months to twenty years. The whole staff of the works had to attend the trial that was designed to serve as a warning.'

'It is small wonder that Yugoslav workers resort to stealing and have to be warned off by spectacular methods. Rations are small and the Government finds it hard to honour them. Prices on the free market are extremely high . . .'

On the political arena the one-party system continues to exist. 'Elections' are still the pseudo-democratic masquerades

*See p. 93

they always were. That only one list of candidates be allowed in the general elections, and that only the official candidates will be elected seems so evident to the Yugoslav leaders, that one of them—Djilas—could say at a pre-election meeting (18th March, 1950): '... it is obvious that the question of the candidates being elected is a secondary one, since in such conditions and in such a system (as prevails in Yugoslavia—Y.G.) they will in any case be elected'. Inside the party itself no factions are allowed, and up to now there has not been any open discussion between different leaders on any question. The press too, is always unanimous in its praise and condemnation.

The term 'free ideological development' does not, of course, mean freedom for any Cominform supporters. They are arrested. It does not mean freedom for Socialists and Peasant Parties to publish papers or hold public meetings. It also does not do for anyone to take advantage of the 'cultural freedom' the leaders encourage. When Branko Copić, one of the best-known Communist writers, wrote three articles criticising the extravagant style of living and snobbishness of the high officials (October, 1950), no less a person than Tito himself immediately took up the issue and sharply censured him.

When it comes to the moral aspects of democracy, to the choice of weapons in the struggle against his opponents, Tito is no more reluctant to slander and lie than his Cominform opponents. This aspect in itself and as a general barometer of the real essence of the regime, is very important and merits illustration. In a speech on 1st September, 1948, Djilas described all the supporters of the Cominform in Yugoslavia 'who have fled to the other People's Democracies and to the U.S.S.R.' as 'traitors to socialism, opportunists, Trotskyites, malcontents with unlimited ambitions'. What an amalgam: Trotskyist agents of Stalin find refuge in Russia and her satellite countries!

Soon after the publication of the Cominform Resolution, 233 students were expelled from the University of Belgrade and technical institutes on charges ranging from criticism of the authorities to spy work, collaboration with the enemy during the war, stealing public property, speculation, and so on.

The Yugoslav leaders declared that Hebrang, the main

pro-Stalin agent in Yugoslavia, was an agent of the Ustashe, the quisling Croat fascists, as early as 1942. The fact that after that time he occupied one of the highest positions in the Partisan Army and the government and that his whole political life was devoted to fighting against the Ustashe and their ilk (for which he spent 12½ years in prison) is apparently forgotten.

In his report to the Third Congress of the People's Front (9th April, 1949), Tito described the Yugoslav supporters of the Cominform Resolution. One, he says, 'was Nedić's district police officer during the occupation and . . . tortured patriots. He succeeded in covering up his past and smuggling himself into our Party'. Another was 'Pavelić's district chief of police', another a 'Gestapo agent', and so forth. To sum up: 'In the case of at least 95% of them you will find that either they have a marked record (i.e., have been police spies—Y.G.) or that they are people of ambition, cowards and weaklings, class enemies, kulaks' sons or Chetniks and Ustashe elements, White Guards, etc.' in short, 'human rubbish'. To complete the amalgam Tito says in the same speech that in Prague a 'well-known Trotskyist' was attacking Yugoslavia on behalf of the Cominform.

On another occasion he accused the Cominform supporters in Trieste of collaborating with the Italian fascists, and of having 'the whole-hearted support of the Anglo-American occupation authorites'. This was in protest against a 'calumnious article' published in the Polish daily *Trybuna Ludu* (13th February, 1949) entitled 'The Anglo-American Forces of Occupation Support Tito's Clique in Trieste!'

Borba stated: 'The Bulgarian Communist regime is rife with civilians and officers who committed war crimes in Yugoslavia during the Bulgarian occupation of parts of Serbia and Macedonia. Some of the officers received promotions, others got pensions and some of the civilians hold important posts in the Bulgarian Communist Party . . .

'The Budapest Communist regime is employing Hungarian war criminals and former spies of the pro-German Hungarian Army . . . ' 'Former Gestapo members are active in the Rumanian Communist police', etc. (Quoted by *New York Herald Tribune*, 22nd January, 1949).

If all this is true, why was no mention made of it in the years between the establishment of the 'People's Democracies' and the Stalin-Tito rift?

Tito, it seems, does not repudiate in practice the immoral Jesuitic principles he condemns so roundly in words.

CHAPTER V

THE EPIDEMIC OF TITOISM IN EASTERN EUROPE



SINCE TITO's excommunication his ghost has haunted Eastern Europe, and a large number of leaders of the Communist Parties have been accused of being bewitched by it, and have been 'purged.'

Poland

In September, 1948, Warsaw announced the 'unanimous resolution of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party' and the 'unanimous approval' of this resolution by the All-Polish Conference of the active members of the Party to remove from office Wladislaw Gomulka, the General Secretary of the Party. Gomulka was vice-Premier and the real head of the administration (the Premier, a member of the P.P.S., being merely a figurehead). He was also Minister of the Regained Territories, the industrial heart of the country. Within the space of a few months Gomulka was removed from all these positions, as well as from membership of the Political Bureau, and even of the Central Committee. Some light was thrown on the technique of the 'purge' in the speech of Boleslaw Bierut, who replaced Gomulka as General Secretary of the Party. The main—if not the only—proof of Gomulka's 'deviation' which was cited, was an article which appeared in the *Trybuna Wolności*, the central organ of the P.P.R. on . . . 1st July, 1944. It might be thought that this criticism appeared four years too late, or that the article was criticized previously. No. But at least one would assume that the article was written by Gomulka. No. It was written by another leader of the Party, Benkowski. But it is a warning to Gomulka and the other leaders of the Party that if they do not toe the line, their deviations will be ante-dated

to 1944, or even earlier, and the 'mistakes' of one leader will be used to implicate others.

Gomulka was perhaps singled out for attack because he was not one of the P.P.R. leaders who came to Poland from Moscow at the end of the war—in Pijade's phrase—'in planes with pipes in their mouths.'

A few days after the disgrace of Gomulka, Warsaw announced that nearly all the leaders of the P.P.S. (which was on the verge of merging with the P.P.R.) were also removed: Kazimierz Rusinek 'resigned' the chairmanship of the Central Executive Committee—the highest body—of the P.P.S.; Edward Osubka-Morawski, Prime Minister for the years 1945-6, Stanislaw Piaskowski, Drobner and another eight members, were removed from the Central Executive Committee. The Chairman, Stanislaw Szwalbe and eleven members 'resigned' from the National Council of the P.P.S. The new leadership, in true Machiavellian style, allotted the task of denouncing Gomulka, who did not recant abjectly enough for his 'nationalism' to his closest collaborator, Zenon Kliszko, a member of the Political Bureau, Secretary of the Party, and the man in charge of the Party cadres from 1944 until September, 1948. His attack was loudly applauded by the Congress. Later Kliszko himself was disgraced for 'nationalist deviations.'

On 7th September, 1949, after a silence of more than a year, the Warsaw daily, *Trybuna Ludu* published an article by Gomulka attacking Tito. One might have thought this the end of the 'Gomulka affair'; but far from it. With the political degradation of being attacked by his former collaborator and being made to denounce the 'nationalist' Tito, the stage was set for physical liquidation as a warning to anyone else who might dare to deviate. The attack of Kliszko on Gomulka, and of Gomulka on Tito follow the same pattern as the letters of Radek and other future victims of the Moscow Trials to *Pravda* at the time of the Zinoviev-Kamenev Trial, in which they called their former friends in the leadership of the Party 'mad dogs', a 'counter-revolutionary Fascist Band', and appealed to 'our beloved leader, Stalin' to have 'no mercy' on 'the contemptible murderers and traitors.'

A few weeks after his attack on Tito, the *coup de grace* was administered to Gomulka. This happened four days after the

announcement of the appointment of the Soviet Marshal Rokossovsky as Poland's Minister of Defence. At a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, held on 11-13th November, 1949, Bierut accused many members of the Dombrowski Brigade—the Polish unit of the International Brigade in Spain—of being fascist police spies who had taken leading positions in the new administration of Poland. Those responsible for this situation were Gomulka, Kliszko and General Marian Spychalski. The last-named had been commander of the Dombrowski Brigade, head of the Information Department (i.e., the Political Department) of the P.P.R. military organization under the Nazis, and then of the Armia Ludowa, the P.P.R.-controlled Polish army, and was, until recently, Deputy Minister of Defence and a member of the Political Bureau. In the report of the Unity Congress at which Gomulka was the only object of attack and Kliszko his main denouncer, Spychalski's speech and a photograph of him take a prominent place, second only to those of Bierut and Berman. Now the three, Gomulka, Kliszko and Spychalski, are in prison for 'aiding and shielding fascists'. At the same time Lechowitz, former Minister of Food Supply, Dr. Stanislaw Kowalewski, former Vice-Minister of Agriculture, Ryszard Borowy, Vice-Minister of Forestry, and Tadeusz Kachanowitz, Vice-Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, were arrested.

This is by no means the end of the 'purge' of 'Titoists' in Poland, and Bierut, in an article published just after the Plenum, indicated that the net would be spread more widely still. He said: 'It is sufficient to analyse a little more deeply our specific conditions in Poland to conclude that the dangers of subversive work in the form of espionage, sabotage, conspiracy and terror, has, in our country, both objectively and subjectively, a wider basis than anywhere else'. (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* 9th December, 1949).

Bulgaria

In Bulgaria the 'Titoists' were led by Traicho Kostov, who was not a friend of Tito, having come into conflict with him on the question of Balkan Federation, but was also not a completely obedient lackey of Stalin.

Before his dismissal (and later arrest, trial and execution), Kostov was the Political Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, Acting Prime Minister and President of the Government Committee of Economic and Financial Affairs. The Bulgarian Communist press, on Kostov's fiftieth birthday, described his long struggle for the Party and the high posts he held in it, having been a foundation member in 1919, a member of the Central Committee in 1924, leader of the Communist Parliamentary Group (officially called 'Workers' Party' at the time), and editor of its paper in 1931-2, a member of the Balkan Secretariat of the Comintern in 1932-4, a member of the Political bureau of the Party since 1935, its secretary since 1940, and General Secretary since 1944. He spent more than ten years in prison, and was one of the most prominent martyrs of the Bulgarian working class between the world wars; in 1924, he was tortured so badly that, fearing he might betray his comrades, he tried to commit suicide by throwing himself from the fourth floor of the Police Headquarters in Sofia; he remained alive but with both legs broken and a hunchback. The Central Committee of the Party addressed him with these words: 'Great are your achievements, Comrade Kostov, as the builder of the party, as the teacher and instructor of the party members. Under your leadership and inspired by your heroic life, thousands of Communists were educated into unquestionable loyalty to the party. Your deep Marxist-Leninist theoretical knowledge, your great culture, your famous industry and steadfastness, your modesty, your iron will, your unquestionable loyalty towards the party and the working class are those Bolshevik characteristics which beautify your whole fighting life, for ever united with the struggle of the party. A loyal colleague of Comrade Dimitrov and his first assistant, you are today one of the most loved and respected leaders of the party, a great statesman and builder of new Bulgaria.' (Quoted by *The World Today*, April, 1950).

It was generally expected that when Dimitrov died, his mantle would naturally fall on Kostov's shoulders.

When, on 5th April, 1949, he was removed from his post as Acting Prime Minister and member of the Political Bureau, the official explanation was: 'Traicho Kostov has pursued an insincere and unfriendly policy toward the U.S.S.R. during

the trade negotiations and on the question of furnishing economic information to Soviet representatives. He has tolerated nationalistic tendencies within the state apparatus and, in fact, has encouraged them . . . A few months later he was indicted and executed for having been a spy of the Bulgarian police since 1942 and of the British, American and Yugoslav Intelligence services since 1944.

Many other high officials were 'purged' together with Kostov. Actually the 'purge' was so extensive as to suggest that the whole state and Party administration was in a critical position. The large majority of the senior officials 'purged' were declared to be 'fascist spies'. Some idea of the extent of the 'purge' may be gained by a scrutiny of the list of their names. To avoid the possible error of including anyone removed simply as part of administrative routine, those officially declared fascist spies will be marked with *.

*Prof. Ivan Stefanov, Minister of Finance.

*Nikola Pavlov, Deputy Minister of Construction, Cadre Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Central Commission of the Party.

*Prof. Petko Kunin, Member of the Political Bureau up to 8th January, 1948, and since an alternate member; Minister of Industry (also Minister of Finance for two months after the arrest of Stefanov).

*M. Sakelarov, Minister of Public Works.

*S. Tonchev, Minister of Transport and former Secretary of the Fatherland Front.

General Dobri Terpeshev, Vice-Premier and President of the State Planning Commission. (He was in prison for fourteen years, and was twice condemned to death; during the war he was Commander in Chief of the Bulgarian Partisans), expelled from all his posts 'for failure to cope with work and blunted vigilance.'

*Yordan Bozhilov, formerly Minister of Foreign Trade.

*Ljubomir Kairakov, formerly Minister of Electrification.

M. Gochev, formerly Minister of Industry, member of the Central Committee of the Party, expelled from the Central Committee.

*Nikola Nachev, Assistant President of the Government Committee for Economic and Financial Affairs.

- *Lulcho Chervenkov, Deputy Minister of Transport.
- *Vasil Markov, Deputy Minister of Transport.
- *Georgi Petrov, Deputy Minister of Finance.
- *Boris Simov, Deputy Minister of Industry.
- *Nikola Govedarsky, Deputy Minister of Internal Trade.
- *Dimiter Kochemidov, Deputy Minister of Internal Trade.
- *Bonyu Petrovsky, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade.
- *Ivan Tutev, Director of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
- *Georgi Andreichin, Foreign Under-Secretary.

Popencharov, Deputy Foreign Minister and Director of Communist Propaganda Services.

General Ivan Kinov, Chief of the General Staff, 'relieved of his post' and expelled from the Central Committee of the Party. He was a commander in the International Brigade during the Spanish Civil War.

General Boyan Balgaranov, Chief of the Army Political Department, 'relieved of his post' and expelled from the Central Committee of the Party.

*Peter Vranchev, Head of Army Intelligence.

*Lev Glavinchev, Deputy Commander of the Frontier Guards.

*Stefan Bogdanov, Director of the State Security Police.

*Georgi Ganev, Director of the State Security Police and Member of the Political Bureau.

*Nikolai Zadgorsky, Director of the State Security Police.

*Tsanyu Tsonchev, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, head of the Government Office of Statistics.

Grosev, former General Secretary of the Fatherland Front, expelled from the Central Committee of the Party.

B. Kopchev, K. Dobrev, I. Bacharov, K. Stoychev, expelled from the Central Committee of the Party.

It is yet difficult to judge what is the significance of the removal of Anton Yugov from his key position as Minister of the Interior after he had held it for five years. He was also removed from his position as vice-Premier. His removal may be the prelude to his complete disappearance.

Of the sixteen Ministers who were members of the Communist Party before the 'purge', only six (including Anton Yugov) have retained their positions. Of the nine members of the Political Bureau, the highest body of the Party, only

Vulko Chervenkov and Vladimir Poptomov (and possibly Georgi Chankov) are left.

But the axe did not stop here, for in the Kostov trial alone, another 55 Bulgarian 'Kostov agents' besides the defendants, were mentioned, the majority of them high officials of the Party and state; these too were 'purged'. After the trial another few dozen high officials were removed, and thousands of smaller officials followed suit. On 16th June, 1950, a government spokesman announced that in the previous twelve months 92,500 members and candidates had been expelled from the Communist Party (in June, 1950, there were 428,876 members and 13,307 candidates). And even after this mass purge, G. Grozev, the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Dimitrov Union of People's Youth declared that the Party was still suffering from 'nationalism, cosmopolitanism, Kostovism and Titoism'. (*East Europe*, 29th June, 1950).*

Hungary

The 'purge' in Hungary was extensive, but incomparably smaller than in Bulgaria. The first and most important person to be 'purged' was László Rajk.

Rajk, like so many of the others who were liquidated, had a fine record. He joined the Hungarian Communist Party in 1931 at the age of twenty-two, and was arrested a year later. After a year's imprisonment he continued his work under the very difficult illegal conditions then prevailing. In 1936 he went to Spain and became the secretary of the Hungarian unit of the International Brigade (the Rákosi Battalion), a position which he kept until the disbandment of the Brigade. He was badly wounded in Spain and retreated with the other members of the Brigade to France, where he was interned for more than two years. In February, 1941, he was released from the internment camp, and went back to Hungary. In October of the same year he was arrested again, and this time spent three years in prison, whence he continued to direct the activities of the Communist Party. With the retreat of the German army from

*It is interesting to compare these facts with the attack of the *Daily Worker* of 7th May, 1949, on the Western press, for reporting such 'lies' as the removal from the Central Committee and arrest of Kostov. Unable at that time to stomach such a 'calumny', now it cannot understand why such a fuss is made about the liquidation of the majority of the leaders of the Government and Party.

Hungary in October, 1944, he, with other political prisoners, was taken to Germany, where he was interned in a concentration camp. Hitler's fall gained him his release. Back in Hungary he soon became prominent, being acclaimed by the Party as 'the organiser of the Hungarian Resistance'. He became the Secretary of the Budapest organisation which included the great majority of the members of the Hungarian Communist Party (after fusion with the Social Democrats called the Hungarian Working People's Party), a member of its Central Committee and Political Bureau, the Secretary of the Party and the General Secretary of the Independent Front (the mass front organisation of the Communist Party). During the two years 1946-8, when the Communist Party was striving to take full control of the state apparatus, Rajk held the key position in the Government, that of the Minister of the Interior. He later became Minister of Foreign Affairs. According to *Szabad Nép*, the Communist daily, he drew rousing cheers on May Day, 1949, from the Budapest crowd who acclaimed only Rákosi more vociferously. An official edition of Rákosi's speeches which appeared a few days later referred to Rajk as one of the most popular of Hungary's leaders and an uncompromising fighter for People's Democratic Hungary. In the General Elections of 15th May, he stood at the head of the list of candidates in his constituency and was elected to Parliament.

Barely a month later, with no previous warning, Rajk was once more imprisoned, and the whole press, recently so lavish in its praise, was clamouring against this 'fascist spy,' nor could one person be found who protested against this treatment in the press, or even proposed that judgment be withheld till the trial!

There were other important defendants at the trial. Dr. Tibor Szönyi was, until his arrest, secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party (and of its successor the Hungarian Working People's Party), a member of the Central Committee of the Party and of its Central Control Commission, and an M.P. Szönyi's deputy, András Szalai, was a member of the Central Committee of the Party. Dr. Pál Justus was a member of the Executive of the Social Democratic Party and then a member of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Working People's

Party, an M.P. and Vice-President of the Hungarian Radio Corporation. General György Pálffy was Chief of Staff of the Army, Deputy Minister of Defence, the head of the Party Organisation in the Army, a member of the Central Committee, and an M.P.*

Czechoslovakia

The last country to consolidate the 'People's Democracy', Czechoslovakia, was also the last in which the epidemic of Titoism rose to the surface.

At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on 24–26th February, 1950, Vilém Novy, the Editor-in-Chief of the Communist Party's most important paper, the daily *Rude Pravo* was 'exposed as an agent of imperialism', then removed from the Central Committee, expelled from the Party, and arrested. At the same meeting, Milan Reiman, the Department Chief in the Prime Minister's Office, was also accused of being an 'imperialist spy' and it was announced that he committed suicide while his case was under investigation. On 14th March, it was announced that Dr. Vládo Clementis had resigned his post as Foreign Minister. On 24th May, at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia, Vilém Široký, who replaced Clementis as the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia said: 'Comrade Clementis emigrated after the occupation of the republic in 1939. After the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact, which had such great importance for progressive humanity because it crossed the low and treacherous plans of the Anglo-American Imperialists, he stood up against the Soviet Union and adopted the attitude of a class enemy.'

'He maintained this attitude of a class enemy during the Soviet-Finnish conflict and during the liberation of the

*Since this book has been at the printers, new 'purges' have taken place in Hungary. Kádár, who replaced Rajk as Minister of the Interior, was arrested a few months after the trial of his predecessor. On 21st April, 1951, Radio Budapest announced that Dr. Sandor Zold, who replaced Kádár, was removed, no reason for this being given. Kádár and Zold had both been leaders of the Communist Party. On 18th July, 1950, Dr. Istvan Riesz, Minister of Justice, resigned. On 5th August, Marosan, Minister of Light Industry, resigned. Both of them had been members of the Social Democratic party that fused with the Communist Party. On 29th August they were both arrested. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General László Solyom, was arrested. On 27th May, 1951, it was reported from Budapest that the Kremlin had sent General Cvetayev, the war-time commander of Moscow, to take over the command of the Hungarian Army.

Western Ukraine and Western White Russia by the Soviet Armies.

'In London, Comrade Clementis was associated with the bourgeois emigrants surrounding President Beneš, and his activities and his broadcasts were all on the bourgeois line. He also maintained this attitude as Under-Secretary and as Minister of Foreign Affairs. This deviationist did not consider future developments after the war in terms of class warfare'. The accusation repeatedly hurled against him at the Congress was that of the 'Titoist' evil of nationalism.

At the same Congress Široký attacked a number of other very high Communist leaders. First of all there was Dr. Gustav Husak. He had remained in Czechoslovakia throughout the German occupation, and was the chief Communist leader of the Slovak uprising against Germany in 1944. He was the chairman of the Slovak Board of Commissioners—that is, head of the Slovak local Government—up to 5th May, 1950. Now he is attacked as a 'nationalist' and a 'follower of Clementis'. With him another member of the Slovak Board of Commissioners, Dr. Ladislav Novoméšky, and Dr. Karol Smidke, President of the Slovak National Assembly and of the Slovak Association of Partisans, were attacked.

In addition, the following people were arrested: Dr. Evžen Loebl, Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade, and a group of high officials of the Ministry who 'oriented Czechoslovak foreign trade towards the West to the detriment of extended trade with the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies'; Dr. Klinger, head of the Information Department of the Foreign Ministry; Bohdan Benda, former military secretary of the Prague regional committee of the Communist Party, an 'agent of the fascist Tito clique'; Josef Stavinoha, secretary of the Olomouc regional committee of the Communist Party, 'a Gestapo agent'; and three M.P.'s, Andrew Roba, Jan Lorko and Dr. Josef Bruha.

There is a hint of the possible removal of the Minister of the Interior, Vaclav Nosek, a close friend of Clementis and Novy, with whom he was in London during the war, and the only survivor of the emigrant Communist group in London who still holds an important position. On 23rd May, the establishment of a special Ministry of Public Security was announced;

up to then the Security Department was part of the Ministry of the Interior under Nosek. The head of the new Ministry is Ladislav Kopriva, one of the three or four most important people in Czechoslovakia and a reliable Kremlin agent, who is more vocal than anybody else in denunciation of the 'Titoists'.

It is not clear what is the significance of the removal of General Ludvik Svoboda from his position as Minister of Defence (25th April, 1950), and General Drgac from his position as Chief of Staff (5th May, 1950).

That the end of 'Titoism' in Czechoslovakia is not yet in sight, is clear from a recent criticism of *Rude Pravo* published in the Cominform paper: '*Rude Pravo*, in particular, shows a falling-off on the questions of the struggle against the fascist Tito clique'. (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* 8th December, 1950).*

Rumania

In Rumania the attack against 'bourgeois nationalism' in the leadership of the Party began four months before the Cominform-Tito rift. There the victim was Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, who for more than three years was Minister of Justice, and for many years Chairman of the Central Committee of the Party. He, too, has an impressive past, to which *International Press Correspondence*, the official organ of the Comintern, on

*Since the book has been at the printers, a new anti-Titoist "purge" has taken place in Czechoslovakia. On 22 February, 1951, Gottwald, in a speech to the Central Committee of the Party, named Otto Sling and Mrs. Marie Svermova as the leaders of a conspiracy of "traitors and plotters" which had planned to seize power and follow in the footsteps of Tito. Otto Sling had been the secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party unit of the International Brigade in Spain, an M.P. and the Secretary of the regional Party Committee of Brno, the second biggest city in the country. Mrs. Svermova, the widow of Jan Sverma, a war-time Resistance martyr, was a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, head of the Organisational Department of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and Deputy General Secretary of the Party. On 27th February it was announced that Clementis, Novomesky, Husak and Mrs. Svermova were arrested. On 9 March, Dr. Čepička, the Minister of Defence, declared that Dr. Clementis had many accomplices in the army ranging from 'generals to privates' and included General Rejčin, deputy Minister of Defence and General Kopold of the General Staff.

The wide compass of the "purges" is shown by the fact that up to 9 February, when the third wave of "purges" in the Party since it has been in power was taking place, of 1,846,957 members and candidate members examined, 143,590 had been struck off the membership lists and 25,954 had been expelled, which is tantamount to being handed over to the police. Of the 19 regional committees of the Party, the Chairmen or senior officials of six had been arrested for complicity in the Clementis "plot". One cannot but agrees with what "Borba" said of the "purges" on 1 March, 1951: 'Hundreds of thousands of expelled members cannot all be labelled "spies, traitors, bourgeois nationalists".'

14th November, 1936, paid tribute, speaking of his 'eighteen years of active struggle in the Rumanian working-class movement', and paying homage to him as the 'leader of the first Communist group in the Rumanian parliament'. He was the editor of the Party paper *Scanteia* and the recognised theoretician of the Party, was one of the leaders of the Party as early as 1921, and continued so for the following twenty-eight years. But he had one great fault in the eyes of Moscow—he did not live there for a long time. Anna Pauker, the Foreign Minister, was there during the 'purges' of the thirties, and showed her mettle by not flinching when her husband was executed as a 'Trotskyist', so she is a more trustworthy leader in the eyes of the Kremlin.

After the Tito-Stalin rift, the only prominent Rumanian leader to be 'purged' was the Vice-Mayor of Bucharest, Constantin Doncea. Doncea had been a comrade-in-arms of the General Secretary of the Party, Gheorghiu-Dej, in the great railway strike of 1933, and had been his principal defender in court. Now he is accused of 'bourgeois deviations.'

Albania

Here five members of the Central Committee were removed from their positions for pro-Tito tendencies. Koçi Xoxe, who was Vice-Premier, Minister of the Interior and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party was executed. Pandi Kristo, President of the State Control Commission, member of the Politbureau and Minister without Portfolio; Nosti Kerentyi, President of the State Planning Commission and member of the Political Bureau; Vaske Koletzki, Deputy Minister of the Interior; Vargo Mitrojorji, one of the Chiefs of the State Security Police, and Huri Nota, a member of the propaganda section of the Central Committee, were all tried and condemned to long terms of imprisonment (May, 1949). A year later another group of leaders of the Party was 'purged', led by another secretary of the Party and member of the Political Bureau, Abedin Shehu.

'Free Greece'

An early victim was Markos Vafiades, the head of the Government of 'Free Greece', and the Commander-in-Chief of

its army. A tiny news item, hidden away in a corner of the Communist Party press in different countries, announced 'the serious illness of General Markos', and his resignation from 'political and military responsibilities.' In view of the disappearance with him of his entire staff of military and political leaders—Petros Roussos (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Chryssa Hadjivassiliou and Militades Porphyrogenis (Minister of Justice)—this explanation is not very convincing. Additional light is thrown on the circumstances of Markos's 'resignation' by the fact that the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party which met on 30-31st January, 1949, on Mont Grammos, at which Markos's resignation was announced, also discussed, according to the radio of 'Free Greece', the following four points:

1. Greece in the path of victory (report by Zachariades).
2. The opportunist right deviation in the Greek Party.
3. Changes in the composition of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau.
4. Election of a new Political Bureau.

Only the report of Zachariades was broadcast by the radio of 'Free Greece'. The Political Bureau decided that the resolution adopted on 15th November, 1948, against the opportunist deviation in the Party, be approved but 'for the moment' not published.

Then, out of the blue, just a year after the Resolution against Tito, the Russian press (19th June, 1949) published a letter attributed to Markos attacking Tito. Whether it took a year of 'preparation' to get such a letter out of him, or whether it is only attributed to him while he is either in prison or the grave, it is impossible to know.

CHAPTER VI

ANTI-TITOIST SHOW TRIALS



EAST EUROPE has had two important show trials with the aim of vilifying Titoism: the Rajk trial in Budapest and the Kostov trial in Sofia. The technique of all such trials is basically the same, so that a description of the main lines of one illustrates the general character of them all. The course of the Rajk trial will be described, and the Kostov trial touched on briefly.*

During the whole interrogation of the eight defendants and the nineteen witnesses in the Rajk trial, the Counsels for the Defence did not ask a single question, and spoke altogether only three times: once the Counsel for the Defence of Pálffy requested that the accused be given 'permission to use his notes when making his statement'; once the Counsel for the Defence of Brankov requested the same for his client; and once Korondy's lawyer remarked, after the interrogation of his client, that he did not wish to ask a question, but reserved the right to do so when the witnesses were interrogated. (He forgot this afterwards, and asked the witnesses no questions.) The explanation that the defendants were so exposed as to make any effort at defending them hopeless hardly holds water; it may be remembered that at the Nuremberg trials of the Nazi leaders, where the guilt of the defendants was never for a moment in doubt, the Counsel for the Defence behaved quite differently.

Of the nineteen witnesses, twelve are mentioned in the Indictment or in the trial as 'fascist-Titoist' collaborators of Rajk and Co., and five as ex-officials of the Horthy police, that is, people who are dependent for life or death on the authorities. What value can the testimonies of such witnesses have? Vishinsky, himself a jurist, gave his answer in a similar case.

*Full verbatim reports of the Trials exist in English: *Laszlo Rajk and his Accomplices before the People's Court*, Budapest, 1949; and *The Trial of Traicho Kostov and his Group*, Sofia, 1949.

When the Balkan Commission of U.N.O. reported that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania were helping the partisans against the Royalist Greek Government, Vishinsky denied the validity of the report, as it was based on the testimony of 'men condemned to capital punishment, or were under the threat of capital punishment during their interrogation'. This criterion, it seems, holds good when others sit in judgment, but not when Vishinsky himself or any of his disciples does.

This in itself is enough to expose the real character of the trial. But an examination of some of the confessions of the defendants and the testimony of the witnesses, which contained absurd contradictions and pure fabrications, condemns it utterly.

Rajk confessed that he had been a spy of the Horthy police since 1931. In the International Brigade, he said, it became known that he was a 'Trotskyist spy', and so he was expelled from the Communist Party in June, 1938. This date was cleverly chosen: at the beginning of July, 1938, the International Brigade was officially dissolved, so that it is difficult to check exactly what happened in the Rákosi Battalion at the time.* The French 'Deuxieme Bureau' knew that he was a fascist spy at least since 1939, the Gestapo since 1941. It became known to the American and Yugoslav Intelligence Services in 1945. Rajk collaborated with all these. Thus while he was known to the intelligence services of five countries as well as to the International Brigade as a spy, the Communists responsible for the International Brigade, who expelled Rajk as a 'Trotskyist spy' omitted, it seems, to mention the fact to Moscow, so that the N.K.V.D. knew nothing of it. This is supposed to explain how he was permitted to gain so important a position in Hungary. In his own words: 'When I came home to Budapest the Hungarian Communist Party was then, of course, working legally in the liberated country. My activities were not

*The same care as regards dates was shown by the organisers of the trial in another case. A number of witnesses described an alleged secret meeting in Hungary between Rajk and the Yugoslav Minister of the Interior, Ranković. Many particulars of this meeting were given, but no exact date—the danger of a *faux pas* was too great. If a date were given it might have been proved that Ranković could not possibly just then have been at the place mentioned. There had been just such an instance at the Trial of Mensheviks (1931) in Moscow, where it had been alleged that R. Abramovich, the Menshevik leader, had been on a secret visit to Russia on a certain date. It was, however, proved that he took part on the very same day in a conference in Brussels, and his picture was shown in the Belgian press.

known to the leadership of the Communist Party. They knew me as the best member of the Communist Party. That is why immediately upon my return home I was given an important position in the Party . . .'*

Further, the Hungarian, French and German intelligence services knew, so he said, that he was a spy. Why did his defence counsel not ask how this is compatible with the fact that between 1932 and 1945 he spent nearly four years in Hungarian prisons, two years in a French concentration camp and nearly a year in a German concentration camp? Surely an odd way of paying a spy or using his services.

Another absurd fabrication concerned a certain Ljubitsa Hribar who testified that the Yugoslav and the British intelligence services co-operate in Hungary. Her story was that the Yugoslav Legation in Budapest tried to recruit her as a spy for Yugoslavia. When she refused, some of the Legation officials kidnapped her and smuggled her over the border into Yugoslav territory. She 'was kept there from about 15th December, 1947, until 5th January, 1948'. Then these Government agents 'instructed me that I must do intelligence work in Hungary against the Hungarian government and at the same time they wanted me to act as liaison between the Yugoslav and British intelligence agents. When I did not want to give my consent, they threatened that I, too, would be liquidated. After this they made me sign a statement in which I bound myself to work for the Yugoslav U.D.B.'. A person who does not want to be a spy for Yugoslavia and is only newly recruited, becomes the liaison between the 'Yugoslav and British intelligence agents'! What was hidden for years from the N.K.V.D.—that Tito was linked with the British Intelligence Service—is told to Ljubitsa Hribar. So simple!

The connection between Tito's Intelligence Service and that of the United States is testified to by Szönyi and a number of witnesses, who tell a story as ingenuous as Hribar's. In order to get from Switzerland to the part of Hungary which was occupied by the Russian Army in November, 1944, Szönyi and

* It is interesting to note that this blatant absurdity is very difficult to 'sell', and the British Communist, Derek Kartun, in *Tito's Plot Against Europe* (London, 1949), a 'thriller' of the Rajk Trial, which claims to be based on the official Report of the Trial, omits altogether the fact that Rajk was expelled from the Rákosi Battalion or the Communist Party in Spain, or that anybody in the Communist movement suspected him of being a 'Trotskyist' prior to 1948.

five other leading Hungarian Communist Party members were introduced to a large number of Yugoslav and American intelligence officers—all in order to get one aeroplane to fly them! The Russian authorities alone could not help them. An aeroplane could be acquired only by implicating Tito and the F.B.I.

Stories about the people chiefly accused—Tito and his friends—are of the same type. The present intentions of the Tito clique were told to Rajk by Ranković, the Yugoslav Minister of the Interior: 'We have to strive to overthrow the peoples' democratic regimes of the peoples' democratic countries which came into being after the Liberation, to prevent their socialist development, partly to win over the democratic revolutionary forces, to separate them from the side of the Soviet Union and partly, where there is no other way, to annihilate them. Instead of the peoples' democratic regimes in all these countries, that is, in the peoples' democracies, bourgeois democratic regimes must be set up; that is, instead of development towards socialism, capitalism must be restored. These bourgeois democratic governments would turn towards the United States instead of towards the Soviet Union . . . '

Long ago sinister plots were already being hatched in Yugoslavia. Most, if not all, of the volunteers to the International Brigade were Gestapo agents; in the internment camp of the International Brigade in France where Rajk was there were alone 150 Yugoslav Gestapo agents.

Here the *regisseur* of the Trial made a grave mistake. Five days before it began, Radio Budapest read the indictment (also printed in *Szabad Nép* and in the official report of the Trial) which mentioned that the following Yugoslavs were in the International Brigade, were in reality fascists, and were together with Rajk in a French detention camp: Bebler, Kosta-Nadj, Gošnjak, Maslarić, Mrazović. When, immediately after the publication of the indictment, a meeting of Yugoslav volunteers to the International Brigade made it clear that neither Bebler, Maslarić nor Mrazović had been in a detention camp in France, the *regisseur* of the Trial arranged it so that during the hearing Rajk should not mention the above three names. Instead Rajk spoke about Vukmanović (called Tempo)

as one of the volunteers to Spain he met in a French camp. Bad luck again! Vukmanović was not a volunteer in Spain and therefore could also not be in a French camp!*

As regards Tito himself Rajk says during the Trial: '... probably the Americans were in possession of some compromising evidence against Tito dating from the fascist era in Yugoslavia by which they hold in their power both him and the other Yugoslav statesmen now in leading positions'—a gentle hint that Tito and Co. were police spies even before the war. Why, then, did Tito lead the Partisan movement and expel the Nazi enemy and King Peter, the bankers and the industrialists? Actually he was devoted to them, but the pressure of the masses compelled him to eliminate them. (By the same logic Hitler might have loved the Jews, and been compelled only by anti-semitic mass pressure to murder six million of their number). Even so, Tito tried to wriggle out of this compulsion to his own advantage. Brankov searches his memory: '... there was much talk during the war that in 1941, '42 and at the beginning of '43, Tito had carried on negotiations with the Germans to discontinue the fight, provided the Germans would consent that he set up a government in Yugoslavia'. According to Brankov, this was known at the time to many in Yugoslavia, but apparently neither Hebrang nor Žujović, the Moscow agents then in the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, nor the Soviet Ambassador, consuls, military advisers and so forth had any inkling of this treachery, till 28th June, 1948, the date of the Tito-Stalin rift.

Rajk also said that Tito was an ally of the Vatican and 'counted most' on Cardinal Mindszenty—Tito, who condemned Archbishop Stepinac to 16 years' imprisonment and expropriated nearly all the land of the Catholic Church (which the Polish, Hungarian, Czech and Rumanian governments did not do).

Two confessions, those of Pálffy, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and Korondy, the Colonel of Police, throw light on the

*An interesting event in the aftermath of the Rajk Trial showed clearly what little conviction it carried for all except the religious believers in the Kremlin. About two months after the trial a large number of Yugoslav members of the International Brigade, who were mentioned in the trial as Nazi spies, received high decorations from the Spanish Republican Government for services in the cause of the Spanish Civil War. What a moral defeat for those who organised the frame-up!

character of the army and police in the 'People's Democracies'. These statements doubtless contain more truth than most of the other confessions, as they are based not on hearsay, but on the actual developments in Hungary, which can be checked by many Hungarians and by students. They show the continuity of the army and police institutions from the time of Horthy, and so give the lie to the Communist propaganda that since the 'revolution of 1944' they have an altogether new, democratic character. Pálffy stated: 'I sabotaged the drawing of working class cadres into the army, and I not only did not support the few workers who were nevertheless already there, or managed to get in, but pushed them back, relegating them to a secondary position. I was the chief of the military political department for three years and during these years not a single worker managed to get into a leading position even of a lower grade. On the contrary, in the interests of the aim previously mentioned, I brought back former officers of the Horthy army who were partly of pro-western convictions, partly of fascist, chauvinist sympathies, in great numbers; I promoted and supported them to high posts . . . My further destructive activities I carried out within the military political department where, in my capacity as president of the Party organisation, I consciously introduced such a dictatorial system'.

And Korondy said: 'To build up this anti-democratic spirit we even published text-books for the police, copying the text-books of the old gendarmerie and police and at the beginning of 1948 compiling the material of the basic examination which was compulsory for all police officers from the old text-books, so that the new police officers could not pass the examination and could be removed from the police force. Through our activities we succeeded in making the training units of the police into an important armed force and because of their convictions they could at any time be utilised against the democracy and the democratic regime'.

It is obvious that Rákosi, Gerö and the other leaders must have known that for nearly five years workers were prevented from gaining high positions in the army and police and that the new text-books for police officers were copies of those used in the old gendarmerie. Pálffy and Korondy, and of course Rajk, merely took upon themselves to be the scapegoats, but in so

doing they revealed the real situation in the army and police.

The Rajk trial shows once again that no man or movement can stray from blind obedience to Moscow without being branded as a 'fascist spy'. Two particularly glaring instances were brought out in the trial. One concerned Earl Browder, who for sixteen years was General Secretary of the American Communist Party and was 'unanimously' supported and applauded by all the Communist Parties in the world. Suddenly, without ceremony, when Moscow's line changed, he was removed from the leadership (July, 1945), then expelled from the Party (February, 1946). Szönyi blamed his influence for his own degeneration into an American and Yugoslav spy. He said: 'In this influence the theory of Browder, then leader of the Communist Party of the U.S.A., played a great part. Printed copies of Browder's books in French and German were distributed in great number by Lompar and Field both in Switzerland and in France, on behalf of the American secret service'. And later: 'In 1944 I openly professed views serving the interests of American imperialism. The treacherous theory of Browder played a great part in this.'

The second instance concerns the Zionist movement. This too comes very badly out of the trial, as an agent of American imperialism. The People's Prosecutor, with no relevance to the course of the trial, asks Szönyi: 'You were a member of the Zionist movement?' Szönyi replies: 'As far as I know, Ferenc Vági and György Demeter were members of the Zionist movement. In this connection it is known to me, and I also experienced it in Switzerland, that in general the Zionist movement maintained very close co-operation with the American secret service'.

The defendant Szalai makes an odd amalgam that implicates the Zionist movement. He says: 'I was connected with the Horthy police. Detective Inspector Réti, the head of the political section of the Pécs police, enrolled me in 1933. Since 1930 I had participated in a Trotskyist Zionist movement, in which I received the sort of anti-working-class education that helped Réti's attempt to enroll me'.

The President asks the accused Pál Justus if he was a Zionist; and in case someone should forget that Szalai had been a Zionist, the question is repeated to him.

Szabad Nép, the Hungarian Workers' Party daily, wrote: 'The familiar surroundings and ideological morass out of which grew Rajk and his accomplices consisted of Trotskyism, Fascism, Zionism and anti-Semitism'. (19th June, 1949). The crowning amalgam was made by a writer in *Pravda* (20th September, 1949) who spoke of the collective from which Tito and American imperialism drew their agents as 'professional traitors, mean spies, murderers, gendarmes, Trotskyists and Zionists'.

The Kostov trial was conducted in the same way as the Rajk trial. But the unexpected happened. At the beginning of the trial Kostov withdrew his written confession. After a 'rest' of half an hour to 'refresh his memory', he repeated the same plea of 'not guilty'. He did so again at the end of the trial even though his very 'counsel of defence' argued his guilt in an angry attack, saying that 'in a Socialist country it is the duty of the defence counsel to aid the Public Prosecutor'. Not once did any of the defendants, witnesses or counsel refer to the fact that Kostov had withdrawn his 'confession', and they made extensive use of the statements made in the 'confession'. Seeing that he remained obdurate, he was interrogated for only a few minutes, while far less important defendants were interrogated for ten or more times as long. When he spoke his 'last words' he was booed and hissed by the spectators, who acted spontaneously, of course.

The official commentators in Bulgaria as well as the Communist commentators elsewhere did not know what to make of Kostov's denial of his 'written confession'. (There had been one precedent to this, when, in the Moscow trials of the thirties, the defendant, Krestinsky, denied his 'confession'. Next day, however, he repented his stubbornness and affirmed everything Vishinsky desired). For two days no paper or radio station in Russia or the 'People's Democracies' dared to comment upon it. On the third day *Pravda* gave the 'line', describing Kostov as 'a shrewd, experienced and determined enemy' with a 'soft and oily voice' and 'the cunning eyes of a thief'. The paper poked fun at his 'bent back', which he had received in 1924, when, as an organiser of the Party, he had jumped from the top floor of the Sofia police headquarters, where he had been tortured.

A few hours after he was hanged, the Communist press published a 'confession' written by him, in which he praised his death sentence, saying that it was 'absolutely correct and corresponding to the interests and peaceful development of Bulgaria in its struggle against Anglo-American imperialists and their agent, Tito'. The machine is working more quickly in the 'People's Democracies' now, for after the Petkov trial it took three weeks before a similar 'posthumous confession' was published.*

*By the way, it is interesting to note that one of the gravest accusations brought against Kostov was that he was a friend of Béla Kun, the head of the Communist Government of Hungary in 1919; since it was 'proved' that Béla Kun was a 'Trotskyist-fascist'.

CHAPTER VII

‘TITOISTS’ BEFORE TITO



TITOISM expresses the struggle of a small nation led by its bureaucracy against oppression by the Great Russian bureaucracy. The Tito-Stalin conflict throws light not only on the Rajk-Stalin, Gomulka-Stalin or Kostov-Stalin conflicts, where the issue is the national oppression of the peoples of Stalin's new vassal states, but also on the national question in the U.S.S.R. herself. It is instructive to survey this little-known aspect of Russian policy.

The most numerous non-Russian people in the U.S.S.R. are the Ukrainians. Their national aspirations have constantly been suppressed by a series of purges. In 1930 the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was dissolved and members of it arrested for ‘national deviations’. In 1933, Skrypnik, the most prominent leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party and a member of its Central Committee and Political Bureau, committed suicide in order to avoid arrest. At the same time Kostubinsky, the Vice-President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine (the Ukrainian Government), Kovnar, the Commissar of Agriculture, and a few score of high officials were shot as nationalists. To prevent further deviations, Postyshev was sent to Ukraine from Moscow in 1933 to reorganise the party and the state administration. He was given dictatorial powers. At the 12th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1933, he said: ‘In Ukraine our leading Party members and Comrade Stalin himself are specially hated. The class enemy has been to a good school in this country and has learned how to struggle against Soviet rule. In Ukraine have settled the remnants of many counter-revolutionary parties and organizations. Kharkov has gradually become the centre of attraction for all sorts of nationalistic and other counter-revolutionary organizations. They have all been drawn to this centre and they have spread their webs all over the Ukraine, making use of our Party system for their own ends. You remember, Comrades,

when twenty Secretaries of Party Regional Committees dared to declare that it was impossible to fulfil the Harvest Plan' (Nos. 15-21 of *Proletarian*, Kharkov, 1934, quoted by W. E. D. Allen, *The Ukraine*, Cambridge, 1940, p. 326). Postyshev expelled more than a quarter of the members of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Three years later he himself suffered a similar fate, being expelled and arrested. In his place came Kosior, from Moscow. He, in due course, was also arrested. In 1937, Lyubchenko, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine, committed suicide in order to avoid arrest. The Commissars Petrovski and Eiche were liquidated.

Other republics have a similar history. In the Republic of White Russia, Goloded, who for ten years was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, was in 1937 arrested as a Trotskyist. Some months later his successor as chairman, Cherviakov, committed suicide to avoid arrest. He had been Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of White Russia (i.e., President of the Republic) for seventeen years.

In Tadjikistan, the Chairman of the Executive Committee was purged as a nationalist in 1934. His successor held the position for three years and then suffered a similar fate. Walter Padley, in his article 'Empire or Free Union?' in *Politics*, New York, Spring, 1948, gives the following list of some of the foremost people in the national republics who were purged in 1937:

<i>Presidents</i>	<i>Republic</i>
Cherviakov	White Russia
Rahkimbayev	Tadjikistan
Arkupov	Karelian
Shotemur	Tadjikistan
Lordkipanide	Adjar
Dolbat	Daghestan
Kunz	Volga-German
<i>Prime-Ministers</i>	<i>Republic</i>
Goloded	White Russia
Mgalobishvili	Georgia
Khodjaev	Uzbekistan
Rakhinov	Tadjikistan
Bondarenko	Ukraine
Ovakabelashvili	Transcaucasia.

These are just a few of the victims. Altogether in the big purge of 1937 the whole or the majority of thirty national governments were liquidated. The main accusation against them was their desire for secession from the U.S.S.R.

The fact that the N.K.V.D. directed from Moscow can arrest heads of governments, Commissars (now called Ministers), first secretaries of the Party in the national republics and a host of lesser figures, shows that the much-vaunted independence of the national republics is purely formal. Nothing remains of the right of secession, even though this is recognised in the Stalin Constitution (Article 17). As early as the twelfth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (1923) Ukrainian communists who demanded that control over the G.P.U. in the different republics be vested in the national governments, were severely rebuked.

The most important element of the administration of the state besides the police is the army, but the national republics have no separate armies of their own. They are not even allowed to keep their own soldiers within their own borders, but armies composed mostly of other nationals camp on their territories. The story of the Ukrainian army is typical. This army won its laurels during the Civil War in 1918-21, when, almost single-handed, it liberated Ukraine from the Whites. It continued to camp in Ukraine until 1929. But the Great Russian bureaucracy, becoming afraid of the strength of this peasant army, decided to cripple it permanently. The army was broken up, its separate units moved from the Ukraine and dispersed all over the U.S.S.R. It was replaced in Ukraine by a Great Russian army commanded from Moscow, to ensure the complete dependence of Ukraine on Moscow. The same fate befell the other national republics.

The Communist Parties in the republics are not only directed from Moscow, but even the majority of those they appoint to the State or Party apparatus are Great Russians. Nearly all the First Secretaries of the Ukrainian Communist Party came from Moscow: Kaganovich, Postyshev, Kosior, Khrushchev, and Kaganovich once more. Of the five First Secretaries of the Communist Parties of the Central Asiatic Republics today, four are Russians, and the position in the other republics is similar. Even where the secretaries are drawn from the local

population, they are so dependent on the centralised Party machine and the N.K.V.D. that they are nothing but local quislings.

A study of the national composition of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. gives a clear picture of the subordination of the non-Russian peoples. Vs. Felix and Ju. Snov made an interesting analysis in the Ukrainian Socialist review, *Vpered* (Munich, 1950, No. 3), using as their basis the list of M.P.'s published in *Pravda* on 15th March, 1950. Of the 25 deputies every republic sent to the Soviet of Nationalities, 5 from Ukraine S.S.R. were Russians, 4 from Uzbek S.S.R., 6 from Kazakh S.S.R., 5 from Lithuanian S.S.R., 6 from Latvian S.S.R., 5 from Tadjik S.S.R. and 6 from Kirghiz S.S.R. Actually, these Russians hold the key positions in the administration of the republics. For instance, of the 5 Russian deputies from the Tadjik S.S.R., two were D. K. Vishnevski, who is the Minister of State Security (M.G.B.) for Tadjikistan, and A. V. Kharchenko, who is the Minister of the Interior (M.V.D.) for Tadjikistan.

The overriding control of Moscow over the administration of the national republics explains the complete defeat of all the national resistance movements hitherto. It also explains the defeat of the 'Titoists' in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Tito has been successful so far because Moscow never controlled the state apparatus of Yugoslavia. She was 'liberated' not by the Soviet Army but by her own National Liberation Army, organised and led by Yugoslavs.

The cultural life of the various nations is also subjected to Russification. When the Bolsheviks came to power, they introduced the Latin alphabet for the many nations in Russia which had no written language at all, and 71 written languages in this form were introduced. This was considered the simplest and most progressive means of promoting the cultural development of these people, and it underlined the fact that there was no intention of Russification. Stalin reversed this progressive policy. In 1936, the Latin alphabet was replaced by the Cyrillic, which is much more complicated, and in 1938 Russian was made a compulsory language in all Secondary schools of the U.S.S.R.

Even more important than the language people speak or write is what they speak or write.

The direction of people's minds along the groove required by Moscow begins at school. Pupils in Ukraine are made to pay tribute to Kutuzov, known as the hangman of the Ukrainians. Chmelnitzki, who massacred the Jews and betrayed the Ukrainian peasants into Russian serfdom must be acclaimed a national hero. Pupils in Azerbaijan must be taught that the Russian occupation of their country in 1806 was not symbolic of the superiority of Russian arms alone, but shows the long attachment of Azerbaijan to Russian culture. It is often very difficult for the non-Russian scholars to explain their history in the way required, and they are frequently accused of nationalism. In the summer of 1944, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. severely criticized the cultural work of the Tartar Republic, its main defalcation being nationalist falsifications in the teaching of its national history. The Tartars were instructed to emphasize the elements in their history which united them with Russia (*Propagandist*, 15th June, 1944). The journal *Kultura i Zhizn* of 30th November, 1945, is devoted mainly to criticisms of 'nationalist deviations' in the teaching of history. The institutes of history in the Ukrainian, Tartar, Bashkir, Armenian, Georgian, Latvian and White Russian Republics all come in for their measure of stern criticism.

The war proved a great test for Stalin's national policy. The fact that the soldiers of the U.S.S.R. fought with great courage proves nothing by itself. Russia's greatest military victories in the eighteenth century were won by Suvorov in Catherine the Great's reign, the worst period of serfdom. The serfs who were so cruelly exploited showed immense heroism and self-sacrifice in the army. In the Second World War the German and Japanese soldiers doggedly persisted in their struggle even when all hope of military victory was lost, but this fact does not prove that there were harmonious social relations within these countries.

It is extremely difficult to discover the whole truth about the number of quislings in Russia. The case of General Vlassov is well known. He received the highest orders of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, but on being taken prisoner by the Germans, organised an army of between 100,000 and 1,000,000 prisoners of war from the U.S.S.R. to fight by the side of the Germans. This by itself, however, indicated very little. Hitler,

for instance, was more successful in finding quislings in France than in Russia, but much less successful in Poland, where he could not get one general or military unit to fight on his side. Nevertheless, Vlassov's defaulting was disquieting to the Russian authorities, and they took care never to mention it in the press or over the radio.

At the end of the war, repeated attacks in the press on fascist influence in the areas of occupation—Ukraine, White Russia, Crimea and the Caucasus—serve as clear testimony to the apathy or even enmity of the populations to the Russian authorities. For instance, *Bolshevik* of 17th August, 1944, stated: '... the population of White Russia was for three years deprived of real Soviet information, and was under the influence of lying fascist propaganda. This applied also to other now freed areas. The Soviet people remained true to their Fatherland. (Examples follow—Y.G.) ... This does not give us the right to quiescence. The treacherous enemy, with his lying propaganda, with his bloody terror, hitherto unparalleled in history, demoralised more than a few people, brought more than a little confusion in their consciousness. He strengthens his agency which conducts skilled undermining work ...' In another issue of *Bolshevik* there occurs this statement: 'The existence and the vitality of vestiges of capitalism in the mind of people in our country is explained not only by the fact that people's minds are lagging behind economic conditions, but also by the influence of an alien ideology ... The German fascist occupants endeavoured to implant the ideology of private property and of nationalism ... (The enemy) did his utmost to demoralise them, to poison their consciousness and to sap their belief in the rightness of our great cause.' (Quoted by *The Economist*, 16th March, 1946).

The explanation is not convincing. The Nazi reign of terror would not sow doubts and breed hatred against the Russian regime, but on the contrary, would put it in a much better light in the eyes of the oppressed. This quotation reveals that, in spite of the German terror and oppression, anti-Russian 'nationalist deviations' occurred. To one who knows how to read the Communist Party press, such an admission, repeated in numerous articles, is a sure sign that an important fact is being touched on.

The strongest proof that Russia's national policy does not create harmonious and fraternal relations between the different peoples is the dissolution of a number of national republics. A year before the war, when there was tension between Russia and Japan on the Manchurian border, the *entire* Korean population on the Russian side of the border was transferred to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

On 28th August, 1941, the entire population of the Volga German Republic was transferred East of the Urals. The German Republic was one of the oldest national republics of Russia. As early as 19th October, 1918, the Workers' Commune of Volga Germans was constituted, and on 19th December, 1923, it was reconstituted as the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Volga Germans. It was one of the first republics to achieve almost complete collectivisation. *International Press Correspondence* of 18th April, 1936, said: 'The German Soviet Republic on the Volga is a living proof of the cultural and national progress which follows on the victory of socialism and a living disproof of the lies and slanders spread by the fascist enemies of the proletariat'. Just two years before their expulsion, an article appeared in *Moscow News* called: 'Volga German Republic, a Vivid Illustration of Soviet National Policy in Practice'. Then, after the Volga Germans had for so many years been commended for the unanimous support of the regime, came the decree of the dissolution of their republic, with the following explanation: 'According to reliable information received by military authorities, there are thousands and tens of thousands of diversionists and spies among the German population of the Volga region who are prepared to cause explosions in these regions at a signal from Germany. No Germans (living in the Volga districts—Y.G.) ever reported to Soviet authorities the presence of such great numbers of diversionists and spies. Therefore, the German population of the Volga regions are covering up enemies of the Soviet people and the Soviet power.'

In the areas of the U.S.S.R. formerly occupied by the Germans a number of republics were dissolved. These dissolutions were not even mentioned in the press, and it was only when *Pravda* on 17th October, 1945, gave a list of the constituencies for the coming general elections, that it was

discovered that a number of republics had disappeared, since when one cannot know: the autonomous Crimean Tartar, Kalmyk and Checheno-Ingush Soviet Republics and the autonomous Karachev region were abolished and the non-Russian populations deported.

In Ukraine, Khrushchev, head of the government, declared in August, 1946, that half the leading personalities of the Ukrainian Party had been expelled in the previous eighteen months. It would be too much even for the Great Russian bureaucracy to expel 30 million Ukrainians and dissolve their 'republic'.

CHAPTER VIII

STALIN'S EMPIRE HAS NO FUTURE



An Empire with a Backward 'Mother' Country

HARDLY HAD STALIN's empire extended into central Europe than cracks began to appear in its structure. The Titoist rebellion, whatever its future development, had the effect of transferring the problem of the internal contradictions of Stalinism to the plane of popular discussion, revealing all their ramifications. It raised the question of whether an empire with a materially and culturally backward 'mother' country can exist. The further the Stalinist empire advances westwards, the larger will be its population whose standards of living and culture are higher than those of the Russian peoples, who have a national history, culture and consciousness of their own, and who do not expect to be moulded by foreign forces. In the present epoch, when the peoples of Asia and Africa are awakened to the fight for their national liberation, it cannot be expected that the peoples of Europe, which was the cradle of the national movement and the national state, would succumb for any length of time to an imperialist power.

In all fairly stable empires hitherto, the ruling nation has had a higher material and cultural level than the ruled nations. No artificial means used in an attempt to enhance the importance of the culture of the Russians, such as the attribution of all inventions, scientific discoveries, etc. to them, can raise them above the Czechs, Poles and other peoples, especially when culture is diffused internationally and no nation can lay claim to superiority in all spheres. No 'iron curtain', even if it is as thick as the one between Russia and the 'People's Democracies' which is even thicker than the curtain between the 'People's Democracies' and the West, can successfully hide the fact that the Russian people as a whole is much poorer than the Czech, Polish or Hungarian. Even the backward peasants, who are now taught to look upon Moscow as the Mecca of

agricultural achievement, and upon Lysenko as the prophet, will be convinced through their own experience that the level of productivity in Russian agriculture is actually not higher than in Rumania or Bulgaria, and much lower than in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, and that the conditions of the kolkhozniki are much worse than their own. When Britain was the 'workshop of the world', she could easily subjugate the large Indian subcontinent, which had no industrial centres of any size, no railway network uniting the country, and no national literature and press. Russia could rule Uzbeks or Tadjiks, or even the more developed Ukrainians and Poles, as long as they were at a low level of development. To transform the countries of Europe into colonies for any length of time is out of the question.

The epoch of stable empires has gone for good.

The Inquisition is a Symptom of Decline

The extent of terror used by a ruling class is a criterion of its stability. The deeper the contradictions in which a ruling class finds itself, when it is conscious that it is a brake on progress, and is isolated from and antagonistic to the majority of the people, the more does it have to resort to the weapon of mass terror. This was revealed previously in the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church to heretics. For a long period the Medieval Church played a necessary and progressive role, being the organisation possessing the greatest wealth and concentration of free and learned people in society, and for many centuries was the citadel of culture; the monasteries were relatively developed centres of agriculture and artisanship; the Church stimulated commerce and kept the permanent warfare between the feudal lords within bounds; she was the great and only institution of charity; she alone maintained schools and acted as a 'publishing house', and she alone was able to organise the Christian peoples against the threat of Arab expansion. From the fourth century onwards, the Catholic Church accorded perfectly with the material and cultural level of the period. Therefore even when social conflicts produced rebels who claimed to speak in the name of primitive Christianity, they remained small sects and were easily defeated by the mighty Church. As long as the Church fulfilled a necessary role in

society which could be fulfilled by no alternative institution, she was so self-confident that she could afford to be (in comparison with other feudal lords) a generous and kind overlord. The Jews did not fare too badly under the Church at this time; even the few heretics were treated reasonably well. In the words of the article in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* on the Inquisition: 'During the first three centuries of the Church there is no trace of any official persecution and the earlier Fathers . . . rejected the idea of it.' In the next few centuries assemblies of heretics were prohibited, but there were hardly any cases of execution. From the tenth to the twelfth centuries a growing number of heretics in France, Italy, the Holy Roman Empire and England were burned or strangled. In the thirteenth century, for the first time, the Inquisition became a regular institution. This was the result of the reactionary character of feudalism, and therefore of the Medieval Church which was part and parcel of it. The rise of new social forces so undermined the moral fibre of the old, that the latter, for self-preservation, had to resort to fanatical persecution.

A rising class also uses terror, but with a difference. The strength and nature of the methods used by the opponents of revolution determined those used by the revolutionaries. If we look back at the struggle of the towns of Europe in 11th-13th centuries for civil and political rights, we see that they achieved a democarcy which was the mother of all modern democracies only after a long series of bloody insurrections waged by the town dwellers against the feudal lords both secular and clerical. A German proverb says, 'Town air makes a man free', but this freedom was achieved by civil wars. The peaceful, industrious Dutch, Swiss and Tyrolean peasantries, which have a high material and cultural level, achieved the prerequisites for their development by sanguinary struggles which put an end to serfdom some centuries prior to struggles elsewhere. The Puritan Revolution in England which overthrew absolute monarchical autocracy and established the unchallenged rule of Parliament and the new middle class, paving the way for modern democratic parliamentarism, also used terror. So did the Great French Revolution, which swept aside all remnants of feudalism, and so did Lincoln in his struggle for the abolition of slavery.

A consideration of the terror used in the French Revolution clearly shows that violence, when used by revolutionaries, is a measure of self-defence (see, for instance, Gérard Walter's *Histoire de la Terreur, 1793-1794*, Paris, 1937).

Until the great military victories of the Republic in the summer of 1794 which made all revolutionary terrorism superfluous, violence was used as a defence against the counter-revolutionary terror. Thus, the first wave of terror on 1-3rd September, 1792, was a spontaneous reaction to the news that General Longway, the Commander of the Army, had turned traitor and gone over to the Austrians, that the Girondist Ministry had decided to evacuate Paris and withdraw to the south and that the Royalists were openly attacking the people in Paris itself. With their backs to the wall, the sansculottes resorted to anti-Royalist terror. The second wave, in September, 1793, came immediately after the fall of Toulon to the English, after Lyons, Marseilles, Toulouse, Nîmes and Grenoble rose against the Convention and after the Vendées in the North won great military victories and behaved with a cruelty far surpassing anything France had hitherto seen. Only for a few weeks was the Jacobin terror superfluous, a blind force serving no useful purpose. This was between 11th June and 27th July, 1794, after the big military victories of the Republic, when the liberatory, progressive role of the revolutionaries had come to its end; 1,285 people were condemned to death in this time.

The Russian Revolution followed a similar course. In its anti-feudal, anti-capitalist liberatory stage, the Red Terror was a measure of self-defence, and was on a much smaller scale than the White Terror. This is illustrated by the following statements. The Lord Emmett Committee, appointed by Lloyd George on 17th May, 1920, to 'collect information on Russia', reported to Parliament on six months of Bolshevik rule, 'that liberty was restricted only after two members of the Government had been assassinated, civil war and Allied intervention had started, and the air was thick with plots and rumours of plots'. Sir Bruce Lockhart stated in his memoirs that at the outset the Bolshevik regime was comparatively tolerant. 'The cruelties which followed later were the result of the intensification of the civil war. For the intensification of that bloody struggle Allied intervention with the false hopes

it raised was largely responsible. I do not say that a policy of abstention from interference in the internal affairs of Russia would have altered the course of the Bolshevik revolution. I do suggest that our intervention intensified the terror and increased the bloodshed'. General William S. Graves, Commander of the U.S. troops in Siberia during the intervention, wrote: 'There were horrible murders committed, but they were not committed by the Bolsheviks as the world believes. I am well on the side of safety when I say that the anti-Bolsheviks killed one hundred people in Eastern Siberia to every one killed by the Bolsheviks'. (The last three quotations are from K. Zilliacus, *I Choose Peace*, London, 1949, pp. 39-40).

Stalin's terror—the slave camps with millions of inmates, the execution of hundreds of thousands of people, the spy net covering all aspects of life—cannot be compared with the terror in the Puritan or French Revolutions, the American Civil War or the Russian February and October Revolutions. In its extent, in its bureaucratic, police method of execution, in its unscrupulousness in breaking the morale of its opponents, it can not but be compared with the Inquisition of the declining Middle Ages, the Brown Terror of declining German capitalism, or, to go back, the bloody orgies of the Amphitheatre in declining Roman society. It is not the sign of a rising, healthy class, but of a reactionary, doomed society.

The Titoists for the first time show in practice the limitations of Stalin's terror and thus undermine the one necessary element of its success—the belief of its victims in its omnipotence.

The Communist Parties and the Kremlin— Latent Antagonisms

The successful revolt of Tito against the Kremlin, as well as the liquidation by the Kremlin of Communist leaders like Gomulka, Kostov, Rajk, Pătrăşcanu and Clementis, raises another important problem of world Stalinism—the relation between the Communist leaders and Moscow.

It is usual to speak of the Communist Parties as blind followers of the Kremlin, and to a large extent this is true. When there is any zigzag in Russian foreign policy the Communist Parties follow suit: they called the war a 'war of

Democracy against Fascism' up to 1st September, 1939, and then condemned it and called for peace until 21st June, 1941, on which date it once more became a 'war of Democracy against Fascism'. But in following the lead of Moscow, the Communist Parties are liable to enter certain deep contradictions. As long as economic and political power is in the hands of the bourgeoisie, the Communist Parties stand for the right to strike, for freedom of the press, assembly, etc. This policy attracts many honest, really democratic militants. If the Party comes to power, its bureaucracy will try to limit the fruits of victory to itself and the new henchmen it will attract—the police and army officers who will join the Party in power, the technicians, etc. Entirely different people are needed to run a state capitalist regime than to organise a union or a strike. For administering the former, self-sacrificing, honest, self-confident people are not needed, but careerists, 'yes'-men, cowards. The principle governing the selection of the Party cadres after it has come to power is the opposite of that governing the Party in opposition. The transition from one stage to the other necessarily passes through a crisis, which is bound to be much deeper than the crisis in the Nazi Party after Hitler took power. Hitler came into conflict with the plebeian, petty bourgeois wing of the Nazi Party (led by Röhm and Strasser) which had taken his promise to establish socialism, nationalise the banks, the trusts and the big department stores seriously. Relying on the old Reichswehr and police he succeeded, without great difficulty, in overcoming this crisis, in June, 1934. The factors which would cause a crisis in the Communist Parties if they came to power are much deeper. The rank and file of the Nazi Party were petty bourgeois people, dispersed in small shops, offices, etc. with weak ties among them and little experience of organisation; the rank and file of the Communist Parties, however, are mainly workers, who are much more capable of putting up organised opposition to the leaders who promise much before coming to power, and promptly forget on achieving it. A number of misguided rank and file Nazis desired socialism, but their conception of it was not only polluted with reactionary ideas of race, etc., but in practice was not ingrained with the basic elements of socialism—social, collective activity in the process of production, as the

foundation of democratic activities. The Communist Party rank and file participates in collective production, and, however factory or trade union elections may be deformed by bureaucratic machinations, they have the last word, especially in times of crisis, such as during strikes. The workers' struggle is basically, essentially democratic. If Thorez or Pollitt want to get through the 'transformation' unscathed, they will need even greater support from the police and army to take action against the workers if need be, than Hitler needed. A big abyss has to be crossed before the Communist Parties will be transformed from working class parties, however subservient they may be to the state capitalist rulers of Moscow, into totalitarian ruling parties which are the open weapon of the state capitalist bureaucracy. The more the Communist Party is merged with the people and the more developed the country and the working class, the wider is the abyss, and the greater the need for the Communist leaders to bridge it with the help of a strong army and police force. If the Russian army were not present in a France ruled by Thorez, it is very doubtful if Thorez would succeed in bridging the abyss; he might be compelled by the French workers to resign were he to fail to carry out his avowed programme.

In addition to the social factor there is the national factor which deepens the crisis of transition of the Communist Parties from opposition to power. The French Communist Party is an agency of Moscow, and to this extent, is not a national French party at all. But this dependence appears to the majority of the Party members not as an externally imposed relation, but as the result of free conviction: the Soviet Union is the citadel of world socialism; the interests of the French workers are the victory of socialism, hence, the French workers must consider their first duty the victory of the Soviet Union. This argument would fall to pieces if Thorez were to come to power, and France were still subordinated to poverty-stricken, grasping, chauvinistic Russia. To fulfil the role assigned to it by Stalin, the Party, after coming to power, would be transformed into an openly quisling organisation. The deeper the roots of the Party, the more difficult this is to achieve. What assurance has Stalin that Mao Tse Tung will not be another Tito tomorrow? He has even less guarantee

that Thorez or Togliatti, in advanced France or Italy, will not be new Titos. From this flows the emphasis of the Cominform on the messianic role of the Soviet Army, and the auxiliary role of the Communist Parties to the 'Soviet Army of Liberation' in a third World War.

No amount of indoctrination can be an absolutely safe guarantee against Titoism. The fact that Thorez swears morning, noon and night by Stalin is not sufficient. Tito did the same for two decades. The ease with which he discarded a number of the incontrovertible 'truths' of Stalinism, for instance, the Moscow Trials, shows that in the heart of many a Communist Party member there must be doubts about the absolute dogmas taught them: indeed the fanaticism may simply be Dutch courage, an effort to still the gnawing doubts.

Titoism reveals that when the institutions of the bourgeoisie—private property, fascist or semi-fascist political regimes, etc.—are abolished, Stalinism loses its power of appeal. While the Mindszenty or Maniu opposition to the Stalinist regime is a reflection of the past, the Titoist opposition is a phenomenon connected intimately with the Stalinist regime itself. Titoism reveals the dual character of the Communist Parties from the social and national standpoints, and shows how dark is the future of a regime whose expansion demands Parties that call for self-sacrifice, a fight against social and national oppression, but which at the same time carries out the most extreme and obnoxious social and national oppression.

The Leader Cult is a Symptom of Decline

The leader cult in the Russian empire takes the most extreme, Byzantine forms. Cities and towns are called after Stalin: in 1937 there were one Stalingrad, 10 Stalinos, 4 Stalinskis, 2 Stalinskoes, 2 Stalinsk, 1 Stalinogorsk, 1 Stalin, 1 Stalinstadt, 1 Stalinabad, 1 Stalinissi, 1 Stalinir, and others. Since 1937 many more have been added in Russia itself and in the 'People's Democracies'. His name figures everywhere, even in the national anthem; he is not mentioned unless the most extravagant praise accompanies his name; he is called 'our father', 'our infallible one', 'our sun', 'our soul'.

At the Congress of the Soviets in 1935, a writer, A. Avdeyenko, delivered a speech entitled, 'Why I Applauded Stalin'.

It was one of the highlights of the Congress. So profound an impression did it make that Molotov himself paused in his summary to take note of it. He said: 'I do not intend to dwell upon the speeches of individual comrades . . . I shall refer only to the speech of writer Avdeyenko who . . . brilliantly under-scored the great significance of our struggle for socialism, as well as the devotion to Soviet power and the love for our party and for Comrade Stalin which permeates the toilers in their millioned masses'. The issue of *Pravda*, 1st February, 1935, that carried Molotov's summary also carried Avdeyenko's photograph and his speech. These are a few of his remarks: 'Centuries shall elapse and the communist generations of the future will deem us the happiest of all mortals that have inhabited this planet throughout the ages, because it is we who have seen Stalin, the leader genius, Stalin the sage, the smiling, the kindly, the supremely simple . . .

'When I met Stalin, even at a distance, I throbbed with his forcefulness, his magnetism and his greatness. I wanted to sing, to shriek, to howl from happiness and exaltation'.

And so Avdeyenko sang, shrieked and howled. He said in conclusion: 'Our love, our devotion, our strength, our heart—our heroism, our life—all these are thine, great Stalin! Here, take them, all this is thine, chief of the great fatherland. Dispose of thy sons, capable of heroic feats in the air, under the earth, on the waters, and in the stratosphere . . .

'Men of all time and of all nations shall call by thy name all that is beautiful, strong, wise, and pretty. Thy name is and shall remain on every factory, every machine, every bit of land, and in the hearts of every man . . .

'When my beloved will bear me my child, the first word I shall teach him will be—STALIN!' (Frenzied applause).

'I am not infected with any disease, I am strong, I cherish in my bosom the very finest human feelings: love, devotion, honesty, self-sacrifice, heroism, disinterestedness—all thanks to thee, great educator Stalin! I write books, I am a writer, I dream of creating a work which will never be forgotten, I love a girl in a new way, I procreate my kind, and it shall be a happy one—all thanks to thee, great educator Stalin . . .

'I am happy, full of joy of living, I am unshakably bold, I go to sleep with greatest sorrow, I wake up happy, I will live to

be 100 years old, my hair will turn white, but I will remain eternally happy and radiant—all thanks to thee, great educator Stalin . . .

'I can fly to the moon, travel to the Arctic, invent a new machine, for my creative energy is not trampled by anybody—all thanks to thee, great educator Stalin . . .'

Songs like the following are written about him:

'O great Stalin, O leader of the peoples,
Thou who broughtest man to birth,
Thou who fructifiest the earth,
Thou who restorest the centuries,
Thou who makest bloom the spring,
Thou who makest vibrate the musical cords.'

* * * *

Thou, splendour of my spring, O Thou,
Sun reflected by millions of hearts . . .'

(*Pravda*, 28th August, 1936).

'I would have compared him to a white mountain—but the mountain has a summit.

I would have compared him to the depths of the sea—but the sea has a bottom.

I would have compared him to the shining moon—but the moon shines at midnight, not at noon.

I would have compared him to the brilliant sun—but the sun radiates at noon, not at midnight'.

(*Znamya*, Soviet Authors' Union monthly, October, 1946).

This bears a strong resemblance to the deification of the Roman Emperors during the decline of Rome. The omnipotence of the emperor was limitless: Nero got first prize for everything in the Olympic games; the legend that he burnt Rome as a background to his music may not have a basis in fact, but is symptomatic of his megalomania; Caius Caligula could appoint his horse Consul of Rome. What then, could the emperor not do?*

*It is a point of interest that the adulation of the Führer was similar to that of the Vozhd. For instance, "Das Schwarze Korps", the official organ of the S.S., said on Hitler's birthday: 'On this day I draw near to your image. It is hard, magnificent and sublime. It is simple, benevolent and warm. It is, in one person, our father, our mother and our brother; it is more still. Thus you stand in the basilica of the love of millions of human beings, a basilica whose luminous cupola rises towards Heaven'. (Quoted by W. Deuel, *People under Hitler*, London, 1942, p. 46).

It must be borne in mind, however, that the relations that existed between the Roman emperor and the so-called proletariat were quite different from those existing in an industrial society. The population of Rome, producing nothing and therefore entirely dependent on the Emperor who supplied them with 'bread and circuses', felt impotent. In modern industrial society every machine produced inspires in the worker a feeling of importance, of significance, of independence. Economic power in our epoch has too collective a character to allow for the existence of one figure among ciphers.

In Lilliput, Gulliver finds that the Emperor 'is taller by almost the breadth of my nail than any of his court, which alone is enough to strike an awe into the beholders'. If another grew as tall as the Emperor, the awe would quickly disappear. This is exactly the effect of Tito. Two authorities have risen in the world Communist movement, undermining the concept of the High Authority, the leader, as such. The appearance side by side between 1378 and 1417 of numbers of Catholic Popes, each attached to a national manarchy, did great damage to Catholicism. When Henry VIII quarrelled with Rome and decided to cut the connection between the Church in England and the Pope without greatly modifying the religious rites and dogmas, he opened the door to non-conformism. If every secular power imposes its truth as the absolute and only one, conformism as such is exposed.

To undermine the leader cult is to undermine the foundation of the bureaucratic state capitalist regime. This regime, which is based on the maximum concentration of capital, on the complete divorcement of the workers from the means of production, on extreme poverty in the midst of increasing wealth, could not exist without the denial of all democratic rights—starting with the right of the people to think and decide for themselves—and without making the people ciphers before the only omnipotent Man-God. To ridicule the pretensions of the semi-ignorant Vozhd in science, literature, music, etc., is to make a laughing-stock of the regime. Titoism encourages this.

INDEX

Abramovich, R., 295n
 Abyssinia, 242
 Adjar Republic, 304
 Adler, Viktor, 186
 Agrarian Party (Czechoslovakia), 164
 Agrarian Union (Bulgaria), 14, 132,
 134, 165 and n., 166 and n., 170-2
 Agriculture, 44-9, 246-8 ; collective
 farms, *see* Collectivization ; ferti-
 lizers, use of, 47 ; livestock, density
 of, 46 ; marketing, 47, 48-9 ;
 mechanization, 46-7, 49, 77, 110-1,
 116 ; output, 72, 73 ; overpopula-
 tion, 49-51, 111 ; prices, 47-8 ;
 productivity, 44-6, 111-2
 Albania, ix, 45, 46, 50, 112, 236, 251,
 292
 Allen, G. C., 68
 Allen, W. E. D., 304
 Aleš, 190
 Alexander, King of Yugoslavia, 170
 Alexander II, Tsar, 219
 Alexandrov, 255
 Andreichin, Georgi, 286
 Antireligioznik, 208, 209, 210
 Antisemitism, *see* Jews
 Antonescu, Marshal Ion, 136, 163
 Arab feudalism, 78-81
Arbeiter Zeitung, 101
 Ardealul, 167
 Arkupov, 304
 Armenian Republic, 307
 Armia Krajowa (A.K.), 149, 176
 Armia Ludowa, 148
 Armia Ludowa, 283
 Aš, 191
 Associated Press, 100
 Atholl, Duchess of, 144
 Austria, ix, 43, 55, 59, 159
 Avdeyenko, A., 318-20
 Averescu, General, 137
 A.V.N.O.J. (Anti-Fascist Council of
 National Liberation of Yugoslavia),
 153-4
 Azerbaijan, Republic, 307
 Babić, 235
 Bacharov, I., 286
 Bačka, 151
 Baginski, Kazimierz, 168
 Balgaranov, Boyan, 286
 Balkan federation, 250-3
 Banat, 125, 151
 Banczyk, Stanislaw, 167, 168
 Banker, *The*, 56-7
 Baranowski, Wincenty, 167
 Baranya, 151
 Barker, Elizabeth, 252
 Bartlett, Vernon, 102-3
 Bashkir Republic, 307
 Bauer, Otto, 186
 Baykov, A., 82
 Bavaria, 195
 Bebler, Ales, 297
 Becker, C.H., 81n
 Beddie, J. S., 174-5
 Begović, Vlajko, 243
 Behrisch, Arno, 195-9
 Behrisch, Hildegard, 195-9
 Belair, Felix, 67
 Belea, 170
 Belene, 97
 Belgium, 45, 46, 48, 74
 Belgrade, 47, 102, 103, 251, 268
 Benda, Bohdan, 290
 Beneš, Edvard, 38, 219
 Benkowski, 281
 Beran, Archbishop Rudolf, 219
 Berlin, 200
 Bessarabia, 16, 17, 163
 Betts, R. R., 60
 Beuer, Gustav, 193
 Bezbozhnik, 208, 209, 210
 Bialystok, 62, 145
 Bien, Adam, 168
 Bierut, Boleslaw, 37, 281, 283
 Bihac, 153, 154
 Biuletyn Informacyjny, 149
 "Black Distribution," 44
 Bled, 251
 Bogdanov, Stefan, 286
 Bohemia, 19, 26, 27, 28, 81, 193n., 195
 Bojkoff, L., 14
 Bolshevik, 308
 Bondarenko, 304
 Bor-Komorowski, Tadeusz, 143-4, 150
 Borba, 67, 107, 240, 241, 243, 249, 264,
 265, 271-2, 291n.
 Borowy, Ryszard, 283
 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 107, 151, 152,
 153, 154
 Bozhilov, Yordan, 285
 Brady, A., 207
 Brankov, Lazar, 294
 Brasov, 213
 Bratislava, 27

Britain, 45, 46, 49, 53, 54, 67n., 74
and n., 203

Brno, 27, 291n

Browder, Earl, 300

Bruha, Josef, 290

Bucovina, 17

Budapest, 158, 294, 295, 296

Bukharin, Nikolai I., 174, 233

Bulgaria, agriculture, 45-7, 49, 50, 72, 73, 77; collectivization, 117, 118-23; direction of labour, 92-3; economic planning and trade, 67, 71-4; elections, 223, 224; land reform, 14-5; national income, 52-3; nationalization, 42-3; parties, *see* Agrarian Party; Communist Party; Social Democratic Party; Zveno Party; peasant resistance, 118-23; piece-work, 89n; pre-war foreign capital, 26; private enterprise, 42-3; privileged bureaucracy, 99, 104; religion, 211, 212, 214, 215; Soviet enterprises, 32

Bulgarian Bulletin, 257n

Burdacea, Father, 137

Byrnes, James F., 58

Canada, 48

Cambrea, General Nicolae, 140

Carol, King of Rumania, 132, 137, 141, 162

Casey, R. P., 210, 215

Catherine the Great, 219, 263n, 307

Central European Observer, 165, 204

Čepička, Alexej, 86, 291n.

Ceyrat, Maurice, 193n.

Chankov, Georgi, 287

Charles, Edward, 56-7

Checheno-Ingush Republic, 310

Chervenkov, Lulcho, 286

Chervenkov, Vulko, 120n., 123, 287

Cherviakov, 304

Chetnik, 152, 279

Chmelnitzki, Bogdan, 307

Christian Science Monitor, 86, 140

Churches, *see* Greek Orthodox Churches; Protestant Churches; Roman Catholic Church; Uniate Church; *see also* religion *under* individual countries

Churchill, Winston S., 236

Cif, 102

Ciliga, Anton, 93

Ciolkosz, Adam, x, 175, 176

Clark, Colin, 52 and nn., 53

Clarion, N., 28, 29, 36-7, 87

Clementis, Vlado, 289-90, 291n., 315

Codreanu, 162

Cohn, 178

Collection of Laws (Moscow), 90n., 91n.

Collectivization, 109-27; causes of, 109-11, 125-7; influence on productivity, 111-2; obligatory deliveries under, 112-3, 122, 125; resistance to, 118-26; types of collectives, 116-8; *see also* under individual countries

"Colonels" regime (in Poland), 168, 176, 217n.

Communist Party (Albania), smear campaign against Yugoslavia, 236; "Titoist" deviation, 292

Communist Party (Bulgaria), Agrarian League, attitude to, 165-6, 170-2; coalition with extreme Right, 132-5; private property, support for, 132-5; "purges," 109, 283-7; "Titoist" deviation, 283-7, 301-2; religion, attitude to, 212, 214, 215; *see also* Bulgaria; Dimitrov

Communist Party (Czechoslovakia), German minority, attitude to, 187, 189-94; Hungarian minority, attitude to, 189, 190, 201-2; in police force, 158, 190; "purges," 109, 289-91; religion, attitude to, 219; "Titoist" deviation, 289-91; *see also* Czechoslovakia; Gottwald

Communist Party (Greece), Macedonian question, 253-7; "Titoist" deviation, 292-3

Communist Party (Hungary), and police, 158, 299; private property, support for, 142; "purges," 109, 287-9; "Titoist" deviation, 287-9, 294-301; *see also* Hungary; Rákosi

Communist Party (Poland), liquidation of leaders in 1930's, 174; Peasant Party, attitude to, 167-9; pre-war dissolution of, 174; pre-war "Trotskyist" deviation, 173-4; Roman Catholic Church, attitude to, 217-9; Socialist Party, attitude to, 176-81; "Titoist" deviation, 281-3

Communist Party (Rumania), coalition with extreme Right, 136-9; National Peasant Party, attitude to, 166-7; private property, support for, 138-40; "purge," 109, 291-2; religion, attitude to, 212-3, 215, 219-20; royalism of, 141-2; "Titoist" deviation, 291-2

Communist Party (Yugoslavia), agricultural policy conflicting with Cominform, 246-8; Balkan Federation, attitude to, 250-3; capitalist exploitation via foreign trade, views on, 245-6; expulsion from Cominform, 233-4; in army and administration, 249-50; internal regime of Russia, views on, 266-72; "liberat-

ing" role of Soviet Army, views on, 265 ; liberation from Hitler with own forces, 240-1 ; Moscow Trials, views on, 264 ; national question, attitude to, 152-3 ; People's Front, attitude to, 248-50 ; private property, attitude to, 153-4 ; ranks in army, introduction of, 155 ; relation between U.S.S.R. and Communist Parties abroad, views on, 265-6 ; religion, attitude to, 154, 213 ; Russian chauvinism, criticism of, 262-3 ; Russian state capitalism, views on, 271-2 ; Russia's attitude to Yugoslavia's industrialization, views on, 242-5 ; Serbian Peasant Party, attitude to, 170 ; smear campaign against Cominform, 278-80 ; smear campaign by Cominform, 234-9 ; "spontaneous" demonstrations, 262 ; Stalin, adulation of, 258 ; U.S.S.R. foreign policy, criticism of, 260-1, 263 ; U.S.S.R. Peace Campaign, criticism of, 261-2 ; U.S.S.R. Peace Programme, praise of, 259-60 ; U.S.S.R. policy in Korea, praise of, 259

Constitution, 78, 222 and n., 305
Continental News Service, 42

Copenhagen, 47

Copić, Branko, 278

Council of National Unity (Poland), 149-50

Council for Mutual Economic Aid (U.S.S.R. and Eastern European states), 65

Cracow, 168, 175, 179, 218

Crimean Tartar Republic, 310

Criminal Code (RSFSR), 91 and n.

Croatia, 16, 18, 28, 107, 151, 152, 153, 154, 163, 242

Croat Peasant Party (Yugoslavia), 163

Cwik, Tadeusz, 180

Cyrankiewicz, Jozef, 179, 180, 181

Cyril, Slav apostle, 212

Czapinski, 176

Czechoslovakia, agriculture, 45-7, 50, 72, 73, 77 ; collectivization, 123-4 ; economic planning and trade, 40, 64, 67, 71-4, 75 ; elections, 222-4 ; elections to works councils, 84-5 ; expulsion of Germans, 18-9, 58, 185-200 ; expulsion of Hungarians, 19, 201-3 ; industrial one-man management, 83-5 ; labour camps, 96, 98 ; land reform, 18-9 ; Marshall Aid, rejection of, 35, 54 ; national income, 52-3 ; nationalization, 38-9 ; parties, *see* Agrarian Party ; Communist Party ; Social Democratic

Party ; Poland relations to, 204-5 ; pre-war state property, 24-5 ; private enterprise, 38-9 ; privileged bureaucracy, 100-2 ; property Germanized, 26-7 ; religion, 211, 213, 217, 219 ; reparations, 58, 61 ; Stakhanovism, 86-7 ; strikes, 92 ; workers' resistance, 105-6

Czechoslovakia. *Six Studies in Reconstruction*, 84

Czechoslovak News Letter, 85

Daghestan Republic, 304

Daily Herald, 147

Daily Worker, 146, 223, 235, 287n.

Dallin, David, J., 93, 95

Dalmatia, 16, 48, 151

Debrecen, 108, 125

Deuel, W., 320n.

Demeter, György, 300

Denmark, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 67, 74 and n., 185, 247

Dimitrov, Georgi (Bulgarian Communist leader and Premier), 253 ; on Balkan Federation, 251-2 ; on food delivery and collectivization, 119-20 ; on land reform, 15 ; on parliamentary system, 134 ; on religion, 212

Dimitrov, G. M. (Bulgarian Agrarian leader), 165

Dimiter, Dimov, 120n.

Dinnyes, László, 125

Direction of International Trade, 239n.

Djilas, Milovan, 237, 241, 253n., 262-3, 268-9, 271-2, 278

Dóbi, István, 170

Dobrev, K., 286

Dobrudja, 15

Documentation Francaise, La, 139

Dolgat, 304

Dombrowa Basin, 27

Domski, 174

Doncea, Constantin, 292

Drobner, Boleslaw, 177, 180, 282

Drtina, Prokop, 92

Drzewiecki, Bronislaw, 167

Duca, 137

Ducháček, Ivo, 190

Duclos, Jacques, 236

Duriš, Julius, 123

Dziegielewski, Jozef, 178

East Europe, 92, 141, 201, 202, 203, 205, 212, 287

Eckhardt, Tibor, 163, 164

Economic Development in S.E. Europe, 46-7, 50-1

Economic planning, *see under* individual countries

Economic Survey of Europe in 1948, 73, 74, 247
Economic Survey of Europe in 1949, 74n.
Economics of Socialist Industry (Moscow), 83
Economist, The, 40, 83, 132-3, 214, 220, 308
 Ehrenburg, Ilya, 192
 Eiche, 304
Einheit, 192
 Eire, 49
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 313
 Engels, Friedrich, 127, 228-9, 258, 269
 England, *see* Britian
Era Noua, 141
Études et Conjoncture, 87
 Evangelical Church, 206-7
 Feiler, A., 83
 Felix, Vs., 306
 Fierlinger, Zdeněk, 181 and n. 187, 205
Finanze si Industrie, 139
 Finland, 43, 135, 185
For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy! 43, 108-9, 124, 236, 237, 265n., 283, 291
Foreign Affairs, 179
Fortnightly Review, 61
 France, 45, 46, 47, 54, 74 and n., 242
 Frankel, Henryk, 114
Free Bulgaria, 15, 99, 120-1, 135n., 165n.
 Free Yugoslavia Radio, 154
 French Revolution, 216, 229, 313, 314
 Galaj, Boleslaw, 178
 Ganev, Georgi, 286
Geographical Review, 68
 Georgian Republic, 304, 307
 Georgiev, General Kimon, 134-5, 166, 251
 Germain, E., 67
 Germany, ix, 26-30, 31, 45, 46, 47, 54, 55, 56, 57-8, 63, 71, 135, 159, 174, 175, 184, 185, 189, 191, 242, 309
 Gerö, Ernő, 61, 85, 88, 299
 Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe, 141, 292
 Gitchev, Dimiter, 135n., 165
Glas, 104
 Glavinchev, Lev, 286
Glos Ludu, 37-8, 40, 124, 179, 218-9
 Gochev, M., 285
 Goerner, 158
 Goethe, 229
 Gollancz, V., 183, 200n.
 Goloded, 304
 Gomulka, Wladislaw, 178, 180, 191, 281-3, 315
 Gordon, M. S., 68
 Gošnjak, 297
 Gottwald, Klement, 92 ; and religion, 219 ; expulsion of Germans, views on, 189 ; expulsion of Hungarians, views on, 189, 201 ; Marshall Aid, rejection of, 35, 54 ; nationalization, views on, 39 ; "Titoists" in Party, views on, 291n.
 Govedarsky, Nikola, 286
 Grajdanzev, A. J., 68
 Graves, General William S., 315
 Greece, 52n., 237, 253-6
 Greek Orthodox Churches, 16, 210-1, 211-5
 Gregory, Archbishop, 212
 Grenoble, 314
 Grol, 249
 Grosev, 286
 Groza, Petru, 136, 137, 138, 141, 170, 203, 212, 213
 Grozev, G., 287
 Gyorgy, A., 222n.
 Hadjivassiliou, Chryssa, 293
Hameshek Hashitufi, 81n.
 Hebrang, Andrija, 243-4, 298
 Henlein, 187-8
 Henry VIII, 321
 Hertz, E., 48
 Herzegovina, *see* Bosnia-Herzegovina
 Hitler, 206-7, 320n.
 Hlond, Cardinal, 217n.
 Hlubčice, 204
 Hof, 195
 Holland, 45, 46, 48, 49, 74 and n. 247
 Horthy, Admiral, 163, 164, 217, 294, 295, 299, 300
 Hora, 158
 Hribar, Ljubitsa, 296
 Huberman, 174
 Hungary, agriculture, 45-8, 50, 72, 73, 77 ; collectivization, 116, 125 ; Czechoslovakia, relations to, 201-3 ; economic planning and trade, 64, 71-6 ; elections, 41, 223, 225, industrial one-man management, 85 ; labour camps, 97 ; land reform, 20-2 ; national income, 52-3 ; nationalization, 40-2 ; parties, *see* Communist Party ; National Peasant Party ; Smallholders' Party ; Social Democratic Party ; piece-work, 88, 89n. ; private enterprise, 40-2 ; property Germanized, 28-9 ; religion, 21, 215-7 ; reparations, 60-2 ; Rumania, relations to, 203-4 ; Soviet-owned enterprises, 31-2 ; workers' resistance, 106, 107, 108, 109
 Husak, Gustav, 290, 291n.

Imprecor, *see International Press Correspondence*

India, 67n., 242

Industry, problems of development, 49-52, 67-70; *see* Investment; also economic planning and trade under individual countries

Inquisition, The, 313

International Brigade (in Spanish Civil War), 237, 286, 287, 295, 296n., 297-8

International News, 138

International Press Correspondence, 40n., 56, 135n., 136-7, 165 and n., 166-7, 187, 193n., 291-2, 309

Investment, 51-2, 73-6

Iron Guard (Rumania), 162

Italy, 74, 242

Izvestia, 91, 262n.

Jablonec, 191

Jaksch, W., 185

Japan, 68-9, 309

Jasienski, 174

Jewish Chronicle, 97

Jews, 28, 29, 55, 97, 132, 137, 185n., 193, 197, 211, 217, 233

Joachimov, 96

Jovanović, Dragoljub, 170, 249-50

Jurić, 235

Justus, Pál, 182n., 288-9, 300-1

Juvenal, 97

Kachanowitz, Tadeusz, 283

Kadaň, 191

Kaganovich, Lazar M., 305

Kairakov, Ljubomir, 285

Kalmyk Republic, 310

Kalugin, Captain Constantin, 145-6, 148

Kamenev, Lev B., 282

Karachev Region, 304

Karakteristika, 93, 277

Kardelj, Edvard, 108, 154, 247, 253n., 259-60

Karelian Republic, 304

Karpov, Georgii G., 210, 211

Kartun, Derek, 296n.

Katowice, 179

Kautsky, Karl, 81n., 186

Kazakhstan, 306

Kerentyi, Nosti, 292

Kharachenko, A. V., 306

Kharkov, 303

Khodjaev, 304

Khrushchev, Nikita S., 305, 310

Kidrić, Boris, 25-6, 40, 243-4

Kielce, 217n.

Kinov, General Ivan, 286

Kirghiz Republic, 306

Kisieliev-Gromov, 93

Kladno, 96, 202

Kliment, A., 85

Klinger, 290

Kliszko, Zenon, 282-3

Kochemidov, Dimiter, 286

Koev, Peter, 170-2

Köhler, Bruno, 188

Kolarov, Vassil, 214, 252

Koletzki, Vaske, 292

Kolský, Josef, 85

Komotau, 197

Komunist, 247, 262, 263

Kopchev, B., 286

Kopecky, Václav, 189

Kopold, General, 291n.

Kopriva, Ladislav, 291

Korczyc, General, 159

Korea, 239, 259, 269

Koreans in USSR, 309

Korondy, Colonel Béla, 294, 298-9

Korzycki, Antoni, 167

Kościuszko, 181

Kościuszko Radio, 144, 148

Kosior, S., 304, 305

Kossa, Istvan, 108

Kosta-Nadj, 297

Kostov Traicho, 283-5, 287, 294, 315

Kostov Trial, 32, 121-2, 294 and n., 301-2

Kostrzewska-Koszutska, 174

Kostubinsky, 303

Kovács, Imre, 170

Kovnar, 303

Kowalewski, Stanislaw, 283

Kowalski, Wladyslaw, 167, 168

Krasnaya Gazeta, 208

Krawczyk, Wiktor, 178

Kreiger, Boris, 235

Kremer, A., 81nn.

Krestinsky, Nikolai N., 301

Kristo, Pandi, 292

Krystof, Colonel, 158

Kulischer, E. M., 184-5

Kultura i Zhizn, 307

Kun, Béla, 20-1, 164, 302n.

Kunin, Petko, 285

Kunz, 304

Kursk, 209

Kurylowicz, Adam, 180

Kutuzov, General Mikhail, 307

Kuznian, 97

Labor Action, 169n.

Labour, *see under* individual countries

Labour Code (Moscow), 89-90

La Guardia, 59

Lamartine, P., 48

Land reform, *see under* individual countries

Lascar, General, 140
 Latvia, 306, 307
 Lazarov, Cyril, 43
 League of Militant Atheists, 207-10
 Lechowitz, 283
 Lehrman, Hal, 249
 Lenin, Vladimir I., 113, 211, 258, 269
 Leningrad, 208
 Lenski, 174
 Liberal Party (Rumania), 136-7, 141, 162, 166-7
 Liberec (Reichenberg), 189
Lidova Demokracie, 190
Lidové Noviny, 87, 106, 123
 Lincoln, Abraham, 313
 Lithuania, 306
 Lloyd George, David, 314
 Lockhart, Bruce, 314-5
 Lodz, 62, 88
 Loebl, Evžen, 290
 Longway, General, 314
 Lord Emmett Committee, 314
 Lordkipanide, 304
 Lorko, Jan, 290
 Louis XVI, 227
 Lozovsky, A., 91n.
 Lublin, 177
 Lubljana, 235
 Lulchev, Kosta, 181
 Lupescu, Magda, 132
 Luxemburg, Rosa, 173, 174, 229
 Lyons, 314
 Lyubchenko, 304

 Macedonia, 133, 151, 253-7, 279
 Maček, Vladko, 163
 Macovescu, Gheorghe, 137
Magyar Kommunista, 159
 Mamelukes, 78-81
Manchester Guardian, 38, 54, 144-5, 167, 263, 277
 Manchuria, 62n., 68-9, 309
 Mandelbaum, K., 51, 52n.
 Mánes, 190
 Maniu, Iuliu, 140, 141, 162, 166-7
 Mao Tse Tung, 317
 Markham, R. H., 86
 Markos (Vafiades), 292-3
 Markov, Vasil, 286
 Marosan, György, 182n.
 Marschak, J., 83
 Marseilles, 314
 Marshall Plan, 35, 54
 Marx, Karl, 80, 86, 126, 127, 206, 221, 228, 245-6, 258, 269
 Masaryk, Jan, 35, 54
 Masaryk, Thomas G., 219
 Maslarić, 297
 Matuszewski, Stefan, 177
 Maximos, 254

 Medjumurje, 151
 Mende, Tibor, 61
 Mensheviks, 233, 295n.
 Mensikov, General, 159
 Methodius, Slav apostle, 212
 Mgalobishvili, 304
 Michael, King of Rumania, 17, 136, 141, 142, 149
 Mihailović, General Draža, 152
 Mihalache, Ion, 162
 Mierzwa, Stanisław, 168
 Miklos, General Béla, 149
 Mikolajczyk, Stanisław, 66, 168, 169, 179
 Milecin, 97
 Milosna, 143
 Minc, Hilary, 27n., 62
 Mindszenty, Cardinal József, 216, 225, 298
 Mitchell, K. L., 68
 Mitrogorji, Vargo, 292
 Modzelewski, 63n.
 Moga, 170
 Molotov, Vyacheslav, M., 133, 136, 174, 175, 201, 319
 Montenegro, 16, 154
 Moore, W. E., 14, 44-6, 49-51, 112
 Moravia, 19, 26-7, 193n.
 Morawska-Ostrawa, 205
 Morgan, O.S., 15, 16, 17
 Moscow, 103, 209, 213, 253, 295n., 303, 304
Moscow News, 309
 Moscow Radio, 188, 192, 238
 Mrazović, 297
 Muchanov, Nikola, 135n.

 Nachev, Nikola, 285
 Nagy, Ferenc, 163
 Nagy, Imre, 142
 Napoleon, ix, 131, 155, 221, 227
Narodnaya Pravda, 174
Narodno Žemedelsko Žname, 166
 Narodowe Sily Zbrojne, 149
 Nastić, Bishop, 213
Nation, The, 135, 147, 249
National Income Statistics of Various Countries, 1938-48, 102n.
 National Peasant Party (Hungary), 165, 170
 National Peasant Party (Rumania), 162-3, 166-7
 Nationalization, *see under* individual countries
 Nedić, General Milan, 151, 152, 213, 279
 Neikov, Dimitri, 181 and n.
 Nejedly, Zdeněk, 189-90
 Nero, Emperor, 320
 Netherlands, *see* Holland

Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 39, 103-4, 106, 125, 139
 Neumann, Franz, 88-9
New Leader, 148-9, 168n.
New Republic, 155
News Chronicle, 102-3
News From Czechoslovakia, 87, 106
New York Herald Tribune, 67, 88, 140, 279
New York Times, 85, 107, 133, 134, 138-9, 141, 212-3, 264, 275-6
 Nicodim, Patriarch, 212-3
 Nicolaevsky, B.I., 93, 95
 Niedziałkowski, 176
 Nîmes, 314
Nineteenth Century, 184
 N.K.V.D. (M.V.D., M.G.B.), 295, 296, 305, 306
 Norway, 74 and n., 185
 Nosek, Václav, 190, 191, 223, 290-1
 Nota, Huri, 292
 Novoměšky, Ladislav, 290, 291n.
 Novy, Vilém, 289

Oak, L. M., 148-9, 168n.
 Obarski, Adam, 178
 Obbov, Alexander, 165, 166
 Ober-Georgenthal, 187
Observer, The, 135
 Olomouc, 290
 Olchovski, P., 174
 One-man management, *see under* individual countries
 Orwell, G., 100
 Osubka-Morawski, Edward, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181n., 282
Otechestven Front, 119, 122, 123, 134
 Otwock, 143
 Ovakabelashvili, 304
 O.W.P.P.S. (Socialist Insurgent Military Detachments, Poland), 176
 O.Z.N.A. (Yugoslav security police), 241, 296

Pacific Affairs, 68
 Padev, Michael, 171-2
 Padley, Walter, 304
 Pajdak, Antoni, 178, 179
 Palacký, 190
 Pálffy, György, 289, 294, 298-9
 Paris Peace Conference, 59-60, 60-1, 201-2, 203
 Partisans, *see under* Poland, Yugoslavia
 Patchova, 96
 Pătrășcanu, Lucrețiu, 138-9, 140, 203, 291-2, 315
 Pauker, Anna, 241, 292
 Pavelić, Ante, 151, 163, 213, 279
 Pavlov, Nikola, 122, 285
 Pawley, Edwin, 62n.

Peasant Party (Poland), 149, 164-5, 167-9, 178, 179
 Penrose, E. F., 68
 Peri, Gabriel, 56
 Perlman, S., 26
 Pernik, 97
 Peter the Great, 215
 Peter, King of Yugoslavia, 298
 Petkov, Nikola, 165 and n., 166 and n., 171, 302
 Petkov, Petko, 116n.
 Petrescu, C. Titel, 181
 Petrov, Georgi, 286
 Petrovsky, Bonyu, 286
 Peyer, Karoly, 181
 Philip, André, 72
 Piaskowski, Stanislaw, 180, 282
 Pieck, Wilhelm, 205
 Pijade, Moše, 153, 237, 240, 241, 253, 261, 264, 265, 282
 Piłsudski, Marshal Józef, 164
 "Pladne" group, 165 and n.
 Ploughman's Front (Rumania), 165, 170
 Poland, agriculture, 45-7, 50, 72, 73, 77; anti-Nazi resistance, 143-50, 176; collectivisation, 124-5; Czechoslovakia, relations to, 204-5; economic planning and trade, 40, 64, 66-7, 71-6; elections, 168; expulsion of Germans, 20, 35-7, 58, 184, 200n.; labour camps, 97; land reform, 19-20; national income, 52-3; nationalization, 35-8; parties, *see* Communist Party; Peasant Party; Socialist Party; piece-work, 87-8; pre-war foreign capital, 25; pre-war state property, 23-4; private property, 35-8; privileged bureaucracy, 99-100; property Germanized, 27-8; religion, 20, 211, 217-9; reparations, 58, 62, 66-7; Union of Polish Patriots, 144-5, 148-9; Western Territories, 20, 35-6, 72, 191; workers' resistance, 106-7
 Poliak, A. N., 81nnn.
Polish Facts and Figures, 217-8
 Polish Peasant Party, *see* Peasant Party (Poland)
Politics, 304
 Pollitt, Harry, 317
 Popencharov, 286
 Popescu-Argetoia, Major, 140
 Popivoda, Pero, 237
 Poplawski, General, 159
 Popović, Milentije, 245-6
 Poptomov, Vladimir, 287
 Porphyrogenis, Militades, 293
 Postelberg, 195

Postyshev, Pavel, P., 303, 304, 305
 Pouliopoulos, 255
 Poulos, Constantine, 135
 Poznanski, C., 175
 Práce, 101
 Praga, 143, 144, 145, 147
 Prague, 189
 Prague Radio, 189, 194, 204-5
Pravda, 82, 83, 90, 93-5, 192, 208, 223n., 252 and n., 253, 262n., 282, 301, 306, 309-10, 318-20
Pravo Lidu, 84
 Pretorian, General, 140
 Preysing, Konrad Graf von, 207
 Private enterprise, *see under* individual countries
 Privileged bureaucracy, *see under* individual countries
 Prochniak, 174
 Prokopovicz, S.N., 111, 112, 113
Proletarian, 304
Proleter, 154
Propagandist, 307
 Protegorov, 255
 Protestant Churches, 206-7, 211, 215
 Pugachev, Emelian, 263n.
 Puritan Revolution, 313
 Purkyně, 190
 Putek, Jozef, 167
 Puzak, Kazimierz, 177, 179
 Quatrième Internationale, 67
Rabotnichesko Delo, 43, 119
Rad, 107
 Radaceanu, Lotar, 137
 Radek, Karl, 173, 282
 Raditsa, Bogdan, 155
 Radkiewicz, Stanislaw, 168, 241
 Rajk, László, 225, 287-8, 294-301, 315
 Rajk Trial, 181-2, 237, 264, 294-301
 Rakhimbayev, 304
 Rakhinov, 304
 Rákosi, Mátyás, 225, 241, 295, 296n., 299 ; Czechoslovak chauvinism, views on, 202 ; frontiers, views on, 203 ; nationalization, views on, 41 ; Rajk, praise of, 288 ; Tito, praise of, 235 ; waste in factories, views on, 107-8 ; workers' absenteeism, views on, 106 ; workers' opposition to managers, views on, 88
 Ralea, Mihail, 137
 Ranković, Aleksandar, 154, 235, 249, 295n., 297
 Rascanu, General Vasiliu, 140
 Ratibor, 204
Réforme Agraire en Roumanie, *La*, 17
 Reiman, Milan, 289
 Reimann, P., 192
 Rejcin, General, 291n.
 Renner, Karl, 186
 Reparations, *see under* individual countries
 Révai, József, 108-9, 202
Revue des Études Islamiques, 81n.
Review of International Affairs, 261-2
 Riazan, 209
 Riesz, Istvan, 182n.
 Ripka, Hubert, 157-8
 Roba, Andrew, 290
 Robespierre, 227
 Robinson, H. W., 100
Robotnik, 179, 180
Robotnik Polski, 178
 Rodenbach, 191
 Rodgers, Allan, 68, 69
 Röhm, Ernst, 316
 Rokossovsky, Marshal Constantin, 143, 158-9, 241, 283
 Rola-Zymierski, General Michal, 146, 158 and n., 204
 Roman Catholic Church, 16, 17, 20, 21, 81, 206, 207, 211, 215-9, 312-3, 321
 Rome, 265, 320, 321
 Rose, W. J., 66
 Rosenberg, Alfred, 210
 Roussos, Petros, 293
Rude Pravo, 87, 233, 289, 291
Rudy Prapor—Rote Fahne, 191
 Rudzienski, A., 169n.
 Rumania, agriculture, 45-7, 50, 77 ; collectivization, 125 ; economic planning and trade, 71, 74 ; elections, 222 ; Hungary, relations to, 203-4 ; labour camps, 96-7, 98 ; land reform, 16-8 ; national income, 52-3 ; nationalization, 40-2 ; parties, *see* Communist Party ; Iron Guard ; Liberal Party ; National Peasant Party ; Ploughman's Front ; Social Democratic Party ; piece-work, 86, 89n. ; pre-war foreign capital, 26 ; private property, 40-2 ; privileged bureaucracy, 99 ; property Germanized, 29 ; religion, 17, 211, 212-3, 215, 219-20 ; reparations, 58-60 ; Soviet-owned enterprises, 30-1, 33-4
Rumanian News, 99
 Rusinek, Kazimierz, 179, 180, 282
 Ruthenia, 18, 204
 Rval, 174
 Saaz, 194-9
 Sakelarov, M. 285
 Salonica, 256
 Salus, V., 102
 Sănătescu, General, 136
 Saxony, 200

Scanteia, 86, 141, 292
 Schiffer, Paul, 182n.
 Schumpeter, E. B., 68
 Schlüsselburg, 177
 S.D.K.P.i.L. (Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania), 173
 Serbia, 16, 28, 49, 107, 151, 152, 279
 Serbian Peasant Party (Yugoslavia), 163, 170
 Serge, Victor, 90, 115
 Seton-Watson, Hugh, 163 and n.
 Sharp, Samuel L., 23-4, 26-8, 29, 222n.
 Shehu, Abedin, 292
 Shotemur, 304
 Silesia, 27, 199
 Simov, Boris, 286
 Siroký, Vilém, 289-90
Six Years of the Agrarian Crisis (Moscow), 21
 Skopije, 256
 Skrypnik, Nikolai A., 303
 Slansky, Rudolf, 86-7, 124
 Sling, Otto, 291n.
 Slovakia, 18, 27, 84, 186, 193n., 202, 203
 Slovenia, 16, 107, 151, 153, 154
 Smallholders' Party (Hungary), 41, 163-4, 169-70
Small Soviet Encyclopaedia, 90, 167, 175
 Smidke, Karol, 290
 Snov, Ju., 306
 Sobolewski, Stanislaw, 178
 Sochacki, 174
 Social Democratic Party (Bulgaria), 123, 173, 181, 182 and n.
 Social Democratic Party (Czechoslovakia), 84-5, 173, 181 and n., 182
 Social Democratic Party (Hungary), 173, 181, 181-2n.
 Social Democratic Party (Rumania), 173, 181, 182
 Social Democratic Party (Sudeten), 186, 188, 194-9
 Socialist Party (Poland), 149, 150, 173, 175-82
 Sofia, 172, 215, 294, 301
 Sontag, R. J., 174-5
South-Eastern Europe, 26
Soviet Monitor, 262n.
Soviet News, 235
Soviet Political Encyclopaedia, 238
Sozialdemokrat, *Der*, 188, 190, 192
 Spahi, Bedri, 236
 Special Security Police (Hungary), 158, 299
 Spirkov, Petko, 15
 Spiru, Nako, 236
 Spiš, 204
 Spychalski, Marian, 283
 Stalin, Iosif V., 55, 57-8, 138, 174, 175, 181, 190, 201, 205, 210, 223n., 226, 253n., 258, 282, 318-21
 Stalin (town), 318
 Stalinabad, 318
 Stalingrad, 318
 Stalinir, 318
 Stalinissi, 318
 Stalino, 318
 Stalinogorsk, 318
 Stalinisk, 318
 Staliniski, 318
 Stalinisko, 318
 Stalinstadt, 318
 Stambolijsky, Alexander, 14, 132, 165, 166 and n.
 Stanchev, General, 171
 State Security Police, Bulgaria, 170-2
Statistical Bulletin of Czechoslovakia, 101
 Stavinoha, Josef, 290
 Stefanov, Ivan, 32, 285
 Stepinac, Archbishop Aloysius, 213, 298
 Sternberg, Fritz, 68, 69
 Stoica, Chivu, 108
 Stoychev, K., 286
 Strasser, Gregor, 316
 Strong, Anna Louise, 147
 Sturdza, 136
 Sudeten, 18, 27, 61, 123, 185-200
 Suliman, Khalif, 80
 Sutesca, 237
 Suvorov, Marshal Alexander, 181, 263n., 307
 Sverma, Jan, 291n.
 Svermova, Marie, 291n.
 Svoboda, Ludvík, 291
Svobodné Slovo, 100, 102n.
 Sweden, 67, 74 and n., 199
 Swierczewski, Karol, 218-9
 Switzerland, 45, 46, 48, 185
Szabad Nép, 108, 202, 288, 297, 301
 Szakasits, Árpád, 181, 181-2n.
 Szalai, András, 288, 300
 Szönyi, Tibor, 288, 296-7, 300
 Szturm de Sztrém, Tadeusz, 178
 Szwalbe, Stanislaw, 180, 282
 Tadzhikistan, Republic, 304, 306
 Tambov, 209
Tanjug, 32-3, 239n., 253, 261, 263, 271
 Tappe, E. D., 60
 Tarnow, 175
 Tartar Republic, 307
 Tătărescu, Gheorghe, 59, 136-7, 139, 141, 162, 166, 167
 Terpeshev, Dobri, 26, 134, 285
 Terror, 312-5
 Teschen, 204-5

Texter, L. E., 18
 Theft, punishment for in USSR, 93-5 ; in Yugoslavia, 277
 Thorez, Maurice, 317, 318
 Thorp, Willard L., 59
 Thrace, 133, 254
 Tiflis, 209
 Timashev, N. S., 208-9
Times, The, 97, 106, 107, 124, 125, 146, 219, 223, 253
Timul, 138
 Tiso, Mgr. Joseph, 193
 Tito, Josip Brož, 226 ; amalgam technique, use of, 279 ; Balkan Federation, views on, 251, 253n. ; blockade by Russian bloc, views on, 238 ; border incidents, views on, 239 ; foreign trade, views on, 238-9 ; freedom of parties, support for, 223 ; Jesuitic immorality of Cominform, views on, 264 ; "liberating" role of Soviet Army, views on, 265, Russian slave camps, views on, 270 ; Russian state capitalism, views on, 269-71 ; Russia's attitude to industrialization of Yugoslavia, views on, 244 ; "voluntary labour," views on, 98 ; Yugoslav Communist Party second only to Bolsheviks, 241
 "Titoist" deviations, *see under Communist Party and USSR*
 Todorov, Peter, 251
 Todorović, Mijalko, 263, 271
 Togliatti, Palmiro, 318
 Tolbukhin, Marshal, 133
 Tolstoy, Count Dimitri, 219
 Tomsky, Mikhail P., 91n.
 Tonchev, S., 285
 Topinek, 176
 Toulouse, 314
 Trade, *see* economic planning and trade under individual countries
 Transcaucasian S.F.S.R., 304
 Transylvania, 16, 17, 162, 170, 203
 Trepcha, 107
 Trieste, 235
 Troppau, 199
 Trotsky, Leon and Trotskyism, 173, 174, 233, 255, 279, 295, 300-1, 302n., 304
Trybuna Ludu, 279, 282
 Tsankov, 134
 Tsonev, Tsanyu, 286
 Turnov, 191
 Tutev, Ivan, 289
Učetničstvo a Kontrola, 101
 U.D.Ba, *see* O.Z.N.A.
 Ukraine, 204, 303, 304, 305, 307, 310
 Uniate Church, 219-20
 Union of Polish Patriots, 144, 148-9
 U.N.R.R.A., 60
 United Kingdom *see* Britain
 United States of America, 48, 53, 54, 63, 64n., 72, 203
 Unschlicht, Sofia, 174
 Urzad Bezpieczeństwa (Polish security police), 168
 U.S.S.R., capital goods, ability to supply, 54 ; capital goods versus consumption goods, 76-7n ; collective farmers' standard of living, 113-5 ; collectivization, 111-6 ; elections, 223n. ; internal passports, 90 ; labour-book, 90 ; labour camps, 93-6, 98, 270 ; national income compared with other countries, 53 ; national oppression in, 303-10 ; one-man management, 82-3 ; privileged bureaucracy, 99, 100n., 103, 104 ; religion, 207-11 ; scarcity of capital, 53, Stalin cult, 318-21 ; strikes, 91 and n. ; for foreign relations *see under* countries concerned ; *see also* Communist Parties ; Stalin ; Tito
 Ustashe, 151, 152, 193, 279
 Uzbekistan, Republic, 304, 306
 Vági, Ferenc, 300
 Varga, E., 57, 58
 Velchev, General, 133, 171
 Vendée, 263n.
 Veres, Péter, 170
 Vesilinov, Jovan, 107
 Vidalli, Vittorio, 235
 Vilfan, Joze, 32-3, 245
 "Village explorers," 170
 Vishinsky, Andrei Ia., 203, 259-60, 294-5, 301
 Vishnevski, D. K., 306
 Vlassov, General, 307-8
 Volga Germans, 304, 309
 Voronezh, 209
 Vpered, 306
 Vranchev, Peter, 286
 Vukmanović, Svetozar, 152, 153, 256, 265-6, 297-8
 Walter, Gérard, 314
 Wandurski, 174
War and the Working Class, 57
 Warriner, Doreen, 48, 114, 115
 Warsaw, 47, 143-50, 174, 176, 178, 180, 205
 Warski-Warszawski, 174
 Wellisz, L., 25
 Werth, Alexander, 263
 Western Territories, 20, 35-6, 72, 185n., 191
 White Russia, 304, 306, 307
 Wilczynski, Wladislaw, 178

Winiarski, 174
 Wiskemann, E., 18
 Witos, Andrzej, 167, 168
 Witos, Wincenty, 168
World Agriculture, 47
World News and Views, 137
World Today, The, 30, 35, 36, 62n., 124, 226, 251, 284
 Worsley, R. H. M., 184
 W.R.N., 176, 180; *see also* Socialist Party of Poland

Xoxe, Kochi, 236, 292

Yalta, 57, 58
 Yaroslavski, Emelian, 208
Yugoslav Fortnightly, 265
 Yugoslavia, agriculture, 45-48, 50, 72, 77, 246-8; blockade by Cominform, 67, 238-9; collectivization, 117, 246-8; demonstrations, 226; economic planning and trade, 40, 64-5, 67, 71-2, 74, 76, 242-6; elections, 223, 224, 278; factory management, 273-5; labour-book, 93; labour camps, 97; land reform, 15-6; national income, 52-3; nationalization, 39-40; opposition to Moscow, *see* Communist Party; parties, *see* Communists; Croat Peasant Party; Serbian Peasant Party; partisans, 152-6; pre-war foreign capital, 25-6; private enter-prise, 39-40; privileged bureaucracy, 102-4, 275; property Germanized, 28; punishment for theft, 277; religion, 16, 211, 213; Soviet-owned enterprises, 32-3; Stakhanovism, 108; strikes, 91-2; "voluntary labour," 98; workers' absenteeism, 107

Yugov, Anton, 134, 135, 265, 286

Zachariades, N., 237, 255-6, 293
 Zadgorsky, Nikolai, 286
 Zagreb, 152
 Zambrowski, Roman, 37-8, 40, 124
 Zapotocky, Antonin, 39, 84, 106
 Zaremba, Z., 145-6, 149-50
 Zároni, Romulus, 170
 Zarski, 174
 Žatec, *see* Saaz
 Zdanowski, Antoni, 177-8
Zemedelsko Noviny, 201
Zemedelsko Zname, 165n., 166
 Zervas, General, 237
 Ziliacus, K., 265n., 314-5
 Zinoviev, Grigorii E., 282
 Zionists, 97, 300-1
Znamya, 320
 Zürich, 47
 Žujović, Šreten, 243-4, 298
 Zulawski, Zygmunt, 178
 Zveno Party (Bulgaria), 134-5, 135n., 166
 Zweig, F., 19, 24nnn. 25



GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD
LONDON: 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C.1
CAPE TOWN: 58-60 LONG STREET
SYDNEY, N.S.W.: 55 YORK STREET
TORONTO: 91 WELLINGTON STREET WEST
CALCUTTA: 17 CENTRAL AVE., P.O. DHARAMTALA
BOMBAY: 15 GRAHAM ROAD, BALLARD ESTATE
WELLINGTON, N.Z.: 8 KINGS CRESCENT, LOWER HUTT

OUTER MONGOLIA :
AND ITS INTERNATIONAL POSITION
by *Gerard M. Friters*

DEMY 8vo.

25s. NET.

The Chinese Communist victory and the events in Korea have put a new emphasis on our need for an understanding of that vast stretch of land called Outer Mongolia—the Mongolian People's Republic—which lies between Russia and China. Very little has been published on Outer Mongolia in English in recent years. This is the first work to knit together not only the story of the economic, social and political changes which have occurred in Mongolia but also the history of the relations between that country and the other nations of the world in modern times.

“Dr. Friters’ work fills a crying need in the contemporary English documentation on the Far East.”

International Affairs

A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF CHINESE
COMMUNISM 1921-1950

*Prepared by Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, Chao-chun
and others under the guidance of Professor J. K. Fairbank*

DEMY 8vo.

30s. NET.

This is the first scholarly study to provide a concrete and documented account of the development of Marxism in China. It consists of a series of 40 documents, each one of which is a key statement bearing on the growth of Chinese Communist ideology and policy. These key documents are combined with a series of analytic summary statements which describe their significance and bring out in brief form the major points in the ideological growth of Chinese Communism.

POLICY FOR THE WEST
by *Barbara Ward*

DEMY 8vo.

12s. 6d. NET.

“Clearly and convincingly Miss Ward advocates the military, economic and political steps a unified Western world must take if the danger is to be overcome.”

Birmingham Post.

“The literature dealing with the problem of keeping the Free World free is assuming very big proportions, but this is a contribution to it which no student, no politician or man of affairs can afford not to read. It is a cool appraisement of the existing situation as between East and West.”

w. j. BROWN in Time and Tide.

CIVITAS DEI

by *Lionel Curtis*

DEMY 8VO.

30s. NET.

Civitas Dei deals with the questions whence human society has come, where it is now going, and, lastly, where it ought to go. In the first and second books the history of man is told from the stone ages to the end of 1949, in such a way as to show how the present has come out of the past. They give the reader a view of history as a whole which is unique and which cannot be found in any other book. In Book III the conclusion is reached that all public questions can be tested by one criterion, how far the measures proposed would tend to increase a sense of duty in men to each other

UNITED NATIONS AND POWER POLITICS

by *John McLaurin*

DEMY 8VO.

25s. NET.

One of the main objects of this book is to point out that people are too ready to praise or abuse UNO as an entity, whereas UNO is no more than the sum of the nations which make it up. To show how the organization really works, the author takes a number of actual problems (such as the quarrels over Russian troops in Iran and the Palestine question) and traces the way they were handled from start to finish. Thereby he gives the reader not only a clear impression of the aims, rules and machinery of UNO but a vivid picture also of the delegates working and arguing and revealing their concealed and unconcealed motives.

THE BRITISH APPROACH TO POLITICS

by *Michael Stewart, M.A., M.P.*

DEMY 8VO. SECOND EDITION, THIRD IMPRESSION.

16s. NET.

Now, in its third large printing, the book is entirely revised and re-written. In the intervening years there has been something of a social revolution. The revised edition makes the book one of the few which can claim to be completely up-to-date and to take account of the changes brought about since the second World War.

In preparing the revised edition Mr. Stewart has added to his previous advantages those of being both a Member of Parliament and a member of H.M. Government. To his wide and detailed constitutional knowledge and to his teaching skill he adds the M.P.'s "pungent sense of reality" in describing how the British political system works.

"We consider this the ideal book on citizenship."

A.M.A.

GEORGE ALLEN AND UNWIN LTD

